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A book on courts in federal countries is a welcome addition to the 
literature on federalism. The judicial dimension of federations is one of 
the least studied aspects of comparative federal governance. This volume 
demonstrates that whatever the reason for this neglect, it cannot be the 
unimportance of the subject. In its role as adjudicator of constitutional 
disputes, the judicial branch of government in a federation – above all 
its highest court – can play a crucial role in shaping the balance of power 
between the orders of government in a federation. It is this aspect of 
judicial federalism that receives most attention in this volume.
Another aspect of the subject is the organization and structure of 
courts in federations – the extent to which the division of judicial power 
parallels the division of legislative and executive power. This aspect of 
judicial federalism also receives attention in this volume. The only com-
parative book on court structures in federal countries is W.J. Wagner’s 
Federal States and Their Judiciaries, published in 1959. Most of the world’s 
federations did not exist when Wagner wrote his book. We need more 
systematic comparative study of federal court systems to gain a better 
understanding of how the organization of courts in federations affects 
the federal balance of power and the quality of justice.
There is clearly more than one way of properly organizing courts in a 
federation. Some federal states, such as the United States and some of the 
Latin American federations, have highly dualistic court systems, while 
judicial structures are more unitary in Commonwealth federations such 
as Canada and India, and in civil law federations such as Germany. The 
way courts are provided for in a constitution and develop over time is 
shaped by historic circumstances and legal culture. Whereas no particu-
lar court structure is essential for a country to qualify as a federation, 
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the same cannot be said about the first dimension of judicial federalism. 
The judicial umpiring of constitutional disputes about the powers of the 
constitutional orders of government in a federation would seem to be an 
essential feature of government in a federation.
In the classical model of a federal state, the powers of its two or three 
orders of government are constitutionally guaranteed. This volume goes 
beyond the classical model and includes chapters on the role of the judici-
ary in devolutionary multinational models of federalism. Disputes about 
the boundaries of each order of government’s competence or jurisdiction 
are bound to arise, and when they do, an independent judicial tribunal 
would seem the logical institution for settling the disputes. Switzerland 
is the one federation in which the highest court, the Federal Tribunal, can 
declare cantonal laws invalid if they exceed the limits on cantons set by 
the federal constitution, but it must accept laws of the general legislature 
as valid. however, any law passed by the federation’s legislature can 
be challenged by referendum at the request of fifty thousand citizens or 
eight cantons.
This volume shows that there is a great deal of variation among federal 
countries in the importance of judicial review in settling constitutional 
disputes about federalism. In some of the older federations, such as Aus-
tralia, Canada, and the United States, at different times in each country’s 
history, high-court decisions have played a major role in interpreting the 
federal division of powers. Political leaders in newer federations may be 
less inclined to allow the judiciary to play a vital role in constitutional 
development. The question arises of whether excluding the judiciary 
from the role of arbiter of the constitutional division of power will under-
mine the integrity of the state’s federal character.
There is a natural tendency for the highest courts in federal countries 
to have a centralist bias. If the judges who serve on these courts live in 
the national capital (as they usually do) and socialize with federal polit-
ical leaders who have had an important role in their appointment, they 
are likely to share the central government’s perspective on the pow-
ers it needs in order to govern effectively. Most federal constitutions 
try to offset this tendency by establishing some checks and balances on 
the central government’s appointing power. These range from giving 
the upper chamber in the federal legislature a major role in selecting 
judges for the highest court (as with Germany’s bundesrat selecting half 
the members of the Constitutional Court and the U.S. Senate’s advice 
and consent role in appointing Supreme Court justices), through the 
inclusion of four members of the Council of States on South Africa’s 
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twenty-three-member Judicial Services Commission, and to the legisla-
tive requirement in Australia that the federal attorney general consult her 
state counterparts before filling a vacancy on the country’s high court.
It is ironic that in Canada, a relatively decentralized federation, the fed-
eral government’s power to appoint Supreme Court justices is unencum-
bered by any obligation to obtain provincial input. but Canada’s highest 
constitutional court until 1949 was the high court of the british Empire, 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), which fashioned a 
jurisprudence highly supportive of provincial rights. While  Canada’s 
Supreme Court, since becoming truly supreme, has not felt bound by the 
JCPC’s legacy, its centralism has been constrained by its justices’ concern 
to retain their legitimacy as a federal arbiter in a country with a very 
federal political culture.
The Canadian case and accounts of other federations included in 
this volume suggest that it is the evolving politics of a federal coun-
try rather than the intricacies of appointing procedures that have the 
greatest influence on the role judges perform as arbiters of the federal 
division of powers. It is easy, for example, to understand why, since the 
Civil War in the United States, American Supreme Court justices have 
not shown the respect for states’ rights that Canadian Supreme Court 
justices continue to show for provincial rights. The Spanish Constitu-
tional Court’s engagement with the aggressive claims of autonomous 
communities shows that it is not only in limiting the growth of central 
government power that the capacity of high courts to resist the tides of 
federal politics may be tested.
For high courts in countries that adopted federalism at least in part 
to accommodate regionally based ethnic and/or linguistic minorities, 
there is a strong rationale for respecting the rights of ethnically distinct 
sections of the federation. In some of these federations, respect for ethnic 
and linguistic diversity is built into the structure of their highest court, 
as with the linguistic requirements of Switzerland’s Federal Tribunal 
and belgium’s Constitutional Court. Similarly, in Canada, a requirement 
that at least three of its Supreme Court’s nine justices must come from 
Quebec ensures at least minimal representation of jurists nurtured in the 
distinctive civil-law culture of that province.
high-court justices in federations may find that respecting the cul-
tural distinctiveness of ethnic or linguistic minorities collides with their 
responsibility for enforcing universal civil rights. In most federations, it 
is the judiciary’s function not only to adjudicate disputes about federal 
limits on the powers of governments but also limits on legislative and 
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executive powers arising from constitutional guarantees of the funda-
mental rights of citizens. Indeed, a crucial turning point in American 
constitutional history was its Supreme Court’s rulings that the bill of 
Rights in the U.S. Constitution applies to state governments as well as to 
the federal government. Those decisions and the practice in other feder-
ations of applying constitutionally protected citizens’ rights against all 
orders of government should be seen not so much as a centralizing but 
as a unifying influence on the federal polity, ensuring that its citizens 
share a common set of civil rights, regardless of the unit of the federal 
state in which they live.
Ultimately, the most important function of the judicial branch of a 
federal government is to ensure that the federal state is a constitutional 
state. Without a judiciary strong enough to protect the powers of gov-
ernments and the rights of citizens, federalism cannot have much 
reality. I hope this volume will stimulate scholars and practitioners of 
federalism to give more attention to how this essential judicial function 
is performed in federations.
Peter h. Russell
Preface
Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists or Unitarists? is an important 
addition to the books of comparative scholarship produced by the 
Forum of Federations that detail many sectoral issues, themes, and 
practical problems that arise in federal systems around the world. 
The Forum of Federations is an international organization and 
network created by the Government of Canada. It consists of federal 
partner countries from both mature and developing nations. The forum 
seeks to strengthen democratic governance by promoting dialogue on, 
and understanding of, the values, practices, principles, and possibilities 
of federalism.
Today the work of the Forum of Federations takes the organization 
to many established and democratizing nations around the globe. It 
works in these countries sharing the experiences of other federal and 
decentralized nations that have an interest in shared rule, promoting 
best practices, and adopting better governance options in the interests 
of advancing democracy.
The forum’s activities in building intellectual capital through pro-
jects such as the Courts and Judicial Systems project are a pillar of the 
organization. These core activities enable it to utilize these experiences 
around the world with its partners, and in its development assistance 
programs in countries aspiring to democratic multi-level governance.
A comparison of courts in federal countries has seen little scholarly 
attention; its vital importance in federations was a compelling rea-
son to investigate this area as part of the Forum of Federations core 
programming.
In March 2012, the Forum of Federations, in collaboration with 
the Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes, 
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Government of Quebec, held an international conference titled “Courts 
and Judicial Systems in Federal Countries.” The conference was part of 
a larger project, generously supported by the Quebec Government, the 
culmination of which is this volume.
The international conference was organized by volume editors Nich-
olas Aroney (TC beirne School of Law, University of Queensland), John 
Kincaid (Robert b. and helen S. Meyner Center for the Study of State 
and Local Government, Lafayette College), Felix Knuepling (Forum of 
Federations), and Phillip Gonzalez (Forum of Federations). Gonzalez 
and Knuepling also provided program leadership.
The conference took place in Montreal and was structured to incor-
porate both an international and a Canadian round table. The meeting 
brought together country authors and over forty experts, practitioners, 
and academics. The objective for both meetings was to share experi-
ences, debate issues, and examine practices of federal courts and their 
judicial systems.
The opening of the conference was complemented by a keynote 
address by eminent scholar Peter Russell, professor emeritus of politi-
cal science at the University of Toronto. he offered a brief comparative 
analysis of the countries under investigation and highlighted some of 
the challenges and experiences of their courts and judicial systems. his 
address underlined the importance of the project and this publication.
The international conference presented for discussion the preliminary 
findings of the experiences of the thirteen federal countries covered by 
this project: Australia, belgium, brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, 
India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United 
States. This sample of country experiences was selected because it offers 
a mix of new and old, as well as common-law and civil-law, federations 
at various levels of development. The round table assembled some of 
Canada’s leading experts, practitioners, and scholars on the subject to 
debate Canada’s courts and judicial system.
During the two days of the conference, country authors presented 
their case findings based on the template developed by the book edi-
tors Nicholas Aroney and John Kincaid. The conference outlined and 









After each country case presentation, subject-matter experts made 
their own comparative comments. This drove further discussion and 
provided an additional layer of context and insight for country-chapter 
authors. A key objective was to analyse underlying trends, and two 
questions were especially discussed:
•	Have	courts	generally	been	regarded	as	institutions	that	have	sup-
ported (or alternatively undermined) the values and principles of 
the federal system? 
•	What	“reforms”	or	changes	are	being	proposed,	or	should	be	 
considered, for strengthening the role of the courts in supporting  
or improving the proper operation of the federal system?
A Canadian round table was held on the final day of the conference 
with about twenty Canadian experts and government representatives. 
The round table followed a similar approach. Presentations were given 
by experts reflecting practice, experience, and opinion from across 
the country. The group discussed a number of issues dealing with 
jurisprudence specific to Canada and other factors and influences 
within the Canadian judicial system. The valuable contribution of all 
participants fed into the research and content being prepared by each 
country-chapter author.
The editors and the Forum of Federations wish to thank all contribu-
tors from the international conference and Canadian round table.
This book, therefore, is the product of many people, most impor-
tantly, the editors and contributing authors. The editors and the forum 
heartily thank the authors for their cooperative participation in seeing 
this book through several stages and some unexpected turns in devel-
opment. We enjoyed working with all of them and appreciated their 
eagerness to produce as comprehensive and up-to-date chapters as 
possible.
We wish to thank the following people who volunteered their time 
to review and comment on the first drafts of the book’s chapters: Joash 
Amupitan, University of Jos, Nigeria; A.J. brown, Griffith University, 
brisbane, Australia; Rajeev Dhavan, senior lawyer, Supreme Court of 
India; Julio Antonio Rios Figueroa, Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
xiv Preface
Económicas, A.C., Mexico; Alem habtu, Queens College, City Uni-
versity of New york, United States; bradley W. Miller, University of 
Western Ontario and Court of Appeal for Ontario, Canada; Chris-
tina Murray, University of Cape Town, South Africa; Johanne Poirier, 
McGill University, Montreal, Canada; Carles viver i Pi-Sunyer, Institut 
d'Estudis Autonòmics, barcelona, Spain; Cheryl Saunders, University 
of Melbourne, Australia; Christoph Schönberger, University of Kon-
stanz, Germany; Nicolas Schmitt, Institut du Fédéralisme, Université 
de Fribourg, Switzerland; Ajay Kumar Singh, hamdard University, 
New Delhi, India; Jaap de visser, University of the Western Cape, Cape 
Town, South Africa; and Conrad Weiler, Temple University, Phila-
delphia, United States. Three anonymous reviewers engaged by the 
University of Toronto Press also provided helpful comments. These 
individuals, of course, are not responsible for any author’s errors of 
commission or omission, but their observations did help greatly to 
improve the book.
We thank, as well, Dr John Trone in brisbane, Australia, who provided 
professional research assistance, and Terry A. Cooper at the Robert b. 
and helen S. Meyner Center for the Study of State and Local Govern-
ment, who managed many aspects of the book’s progress. We would 
like to acknowledge the support offered by several staff members at the 
Forum of Federations: Fauziah Pruner and Olu Ayeni. Thanks to Forum 
CEO and President Rupak Chattopadhyay and Forum vice-President 
Charles Cloutier for their input and guidance.
A special note of thanks must be given for the generous financial, 
intellectual, and logistic support provided by the Secrétariat aux affaires 
intergouvernementales canadiennes, Government of Quebec. Josée 
bergeron has been a wonderful and strong supporter of this project.
The goal of this book is to add greater insight into the role of judi-
cial power in relation to federalism. Given the fundamental role that 
courts and judicial systems play in most federal systems, the compara-
tive research presented in this volume will add immense value and 
promote greater research and discussion in this vital area of federal 
governance. Our aim is to encourage practitioners and scholars to uti-
lize this resource to devise new solutions and to engage with the many 
active participants around the world in the growing international net-
work on federalism.
Ottawa, May 2016
COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES
Federalists or Unitarists?

1 Introduction: Courts in Federal Countries
nicholas aroney and john kincaid
This book examines courts in thirteen federal and quasi-federal countries: 
Australia, belgium, brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. The 
book’s principal theme is whether the courts, particularly a federation’s 
highest court, lean in a “unitary” direction by fostering or reinforcing 
centralization, or in a “federalist” direction by fostering or reinforcing 
powers of the federation’s constituent polities (e.g., cantons, Länder, 
provinces, regions, or states). This theme is important because courts 
are key players in the dynamics of most federations, and they can affect 
centralization and decentralization directly by ruling on the constitu-
tional distribution or powers and indirectly by ruling on social issues, 
individual rights, economic affairs, and other matters. Courts may 
choose to some extent to be federalist or unitarist, but they also are 
pushed in one direction or another by the design of the constitution and 
by uses and abuses of the constitution by political forces.
The book consists of thirteen country chapters written by coun-
try experts. Each chapter follows a template which asked authors to 
(1) outline the main constitutional, structural, and historical features of 
their federal system; (2) explain the constitutional and institutional sta-
tus of their country’s court system or systems, including organization, 
judicial selection, degree of independence, curial procedures, judicial 
culture, and degree of attention to federalism matters; and (3) discuss 
their high court’s federalism jurisprudence in the light of these features. 
Employing various theoretical perspectives, the book offers possible 
explanations for the judicial behaviour observed in these countries. 
Although, because of the diverse conditions in these federations and 
the exploratory nature of this project, we do not test a specific theory, 
we hope this work will pave the way for more theory-based research.
4 Courts in Federal Countries
basic characteristics of the thirteen federations are listed in table 1. 
We classified a federation as “devolutionary” when its origins lie in the 
devolution of powers from a centralized unitary state or colonial sys-
tem (e.g., Spain and Nigeria) and as “integrative” when its origins lie in 
the unification of otherwise actually or potentially independent politi-
cal communities (e.g., the United States). We classified Canada as devo-
lutionary and integrative, because its foundation involved an imperial 
division of the unitary Province of Canada into Ontario and Quebec, 
along with the integration of two maritime provinces, followed by six 
more provinces from 1870 to 1949. We classified the Federal Republic 
of Germany similarly, because it was formed from the previously cen-
tralized Nazi state, and the boundaries of the Länder were drawn by 
the Allied military occupiers. however, Länder existed previously and 
were integrated into a federal arrangement before the Nazi era; then, in 
1990, the East German Länder were reconstituted in nearly their historical 
forms and integrated into a united Germany.
I. Courts and Federalism
because federalism is a constitutional arrangement in which powers 
(or competences) are divided and shared between two or three orders 
of government, courts – as arbiters of constitutional disputes – have a 
potentially very important role in policing the distribution and sharing 
of powers. To the extent the courts are independent and vested with a 
duty to maintain the constitution, they might be expected to uphold 
the constitutional distribution of powers against political forces bent on 
altering that distribution in a more centralist or decentralist direction.
Albert venn Dicey famously claimed that “federalism” necessarily 
implies “legalism” and the “predominance of the judiciary.”1 he defined 
federalism as a system in which “the ordinary powers of sovereignty 
are elaborately divided between the common or national government 
and the separate states.”2 he believed that proper maintenance of this 
division of power required a “supreme constitution” with courts having 
authority to interpret it.3 Was he right? Partly.
1 Albert venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1915), 170.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 Courts in Federal Countries
Dicey’s conception of federalism has been criticized as being overly 
legalistic and excessively influenced by the idea of “sovereignty,” 
which Dicey thought was the prime characteristic of britain’s Parlia-
ment. Michael burgess is scathing: “Dicey’s impact and influence 
upon the british tradition of federalism proved especially damaging,” 
because “it established a narrow legalistic conception of federation that 
was handed down from one generation to the next in supine fashion.”4 
however, Dicey’s influence was limited outside of the british tradition, 
and even Kenneth C. Wheare – an Australian who spent most of his life 
at Oxford University, and who shared Dicey’s view that federalism nec-
essarily involves a division of powers – treated the judicial role as less 
essential. All that is strictly necessary, he said, is that “some impartial 
body, independent of the general and regional governments, should 
decide on the meaning of the division of powers.”5 Wheare, like James 
bryce before him,6 observed that while in the United States, Canada, 
and Australia this function is performed by the courts, Switzerland is 
different because the Tribunal fédéral lacks authority to determine the 
constitutionality of federal laws.7 In 1994, Ethiopia established a high 
court with no judicial-review authority. however, Wheare still saw that 
the role of courts in Switzerland, as well as in the other federal systems 
he examined, is highly significant, and he dedicated several sections of 
his book to their analysis.8
Certainly federalism seems to have had a significant influence on 
the development of constitutional judicial review. As Andreas Auer 
observed, federalism “was first in bringing the constitution to the 
courts, long before civil rights and liberties did the same,” and it “has 
contributed much to the evolution of the constitution from a political 
recipe to a legal norm.”9 After all, a federal system ordinarily requires 
4 Michael burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (New york: Routledge, 
2006), 21.
5 Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, 1st American ed. (New york: Oxford 
University Press, 1947), 66.
6 James bryce, The American Commonwealth, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1889), 
1:253–4.
7 Wheare, Federal Government, 64–8.
8 E.g., ibid. 72–8 and chap. 4.
9 Andreas Auer, “The Constitutional Scheme of Federalism,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 12, no. 3 (2005): 419–31. See also Martin Shapiro, “The Success of Judicial Review,” 
in Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective, ed. Sally J. Kenney, William W. 
Riesinger, and John C. Reitz, 193–219 (New york: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
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a written constitution, and a written constitution requires interpreta-
tion, usually, though not always exclusively, by judges. The impor-
tance of the judiciary was established by most of the pre-federation 
U.S. state constitutions, such as the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, 
the world’s oldest written constitution still in effect. The Declaration of 
Rights of that constitution guarantees all citizens “an impartial inter-
pretation of the laws … by judges as free, impartial, and independent 
as the lot of humanity will admit.”10 Given the states’ experiences with 
judicial review before 1788,11 Alexander hamilton expressed a widely 
held view when he wrote in Federalist 78 that “whenever a particular 
statute contravenes the constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial 
tribunals to adhere to the latter, and disregard the former.”12
Consequently, judicial review, if it exists in a federal system, is not 
limited to executive action; it applies also to legislative action that 
impinges upon federalism, although there may be a judicial presump-
tion of the constitutionality of federal legislation. This power may 
allow a court to remove a law from the statute books, as can some Euro-
pean courts. Other courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, cannot go 
this far, even though the Court’s rulings have the same effect.13 how-
ever, it should be noted that the constitutions of the United States and 
 Australia do not explicitly confer the power of judicial review on the 
federal supreme court, while some other constitutions (e.g., Germany 
and India) explicitly authorize it.
The importance of courts also loomed large in the origin of modern 
federalism because of the fundamental change wrought in the tradi-
tional notion of federalism (i.e., confederalism) by the U.S. Constitution. 
The great innovation of this constitution, said Alexander hamilton, 
was the authority of the new “general” government to legislate for indi-
viduals, that is, to levy taxes, regulate businesses, conscript men into 
the military, and prosecute citizens for crimes defined by federal law. 
10 Massachusetts Constitution, 1780, Art. XXIX.
11 Julius Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the United States. vol. 1, Antecedents 
and Beginnings to 1801 (New york: Macmillan, 1971); Edward S. Corwin, “The 
Establishment of Judicial Review I,” Michigan Law Review 9 (December 1910): 102–5; 
Corwin, “The Establishment of Judicial Review II,” Michigan Law Review 9 (February 
1911): 283–316.
12 Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 
1961), 526.
13 Mauro Cappelletti and John Clarke Adams, “Judicial Review of Legislation: European 
Antecedents and Adaptations,” Harvard Law Review 79, no. 6 (1966): 1207–24.
8 Courts in Federal Countries
The “general” government under the Articles of Confederation had no 
such authority. The new government’s authority to legislate for indi-
viduals necessitated establishment of a federal court system, which did 
not exist under the confederation. Lacking the political ability to dis-
place the states’ courts, and recognizing the liabilities of relying only on 
the states’ courts to adjudicate federal matters, the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution established a separate U.S. Supreme Court and authorized 
Congress to create lower federal courts.
The power of judicial review, which Alexis de Tocqueville termed 
“the only power peculiar to an American judge,”14 is now found in 
about 83 per cent of the world’s constitutions.15 Multiple explanations 
have been offered for this diffusion, including the need for coordina-
tion in federal systems, elite desires to attract investment for economic 
growth, a growing worldwide rights consciousness urging courts to 
restrain intemperate majority rule, diffusion of the principle of judicial 
review, and desires for political insurance by elites and parties fearing 
a loss of power after a constitution’s founding.16 Independent judicial 
review is said to serve “a valuable insurance function for competitors 
in a stable democracy.”17
In the U.S. system and others like it (e.g., Canada, Australia, and the 
Latin American federations), judicial review is non-centralized; ordi-
nary courts at every level of the judiciary can declare a statute uncon-
stitutional, although courts are limited to actual disputes brought to 
them. In these countries, the highest court is merely the final arbiter in 
constitutional matters for the whole federation. by contrast, other sys-
tems, especially in Europe, employ a centralized system in which a spe-
cial constitutional court exercises judicial review. This system emerged 
from the 1920 Federal Constitutional Law of Austria’s first republic, 
which was influenced by hans Kelsen, who served on Austria’s court 
from 1920 to 1930.18 The court was established mainly to adjudicate 
14 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence 
(Garden City, Ny: Anchor books, 1969), 102.
15 Tom Ginsburg and Mila versteeg, “Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional 
Review?” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 30, no. 3 (2014): 587.
16 Ibid.; and Ran hirschl, Toward Juristocracy (Cambridge, MA: harvard University 
Press, 2004).
17 Matthew C. Stephenson, “‘When the Devil Turns …’: The Political Foundations of 
Independent Judicial Review,” Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 1 (January 2003): 85.
18 See, e.g., hans Kelsen, “Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the 
Austrian and American Constitution,” Journal of Politics 4 (May 1942): 183–200.
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constitutional disputes over federalism. Review by a centralized con-
stitutional court is often called “abstract,” because the court does not 
resolve disputes between litigants but resolves constitutional matters 
referred to it by elected government officers after or before a law’s 
enactment. The Austrian court, for example, addressed challenges to 
Land laws by the federal executive and challenges to federal laws by 
Land governments. Later, Germany authorized citizens to contest the 
constitutionality of a law or government action with no need to present 
a specific controversy. A similar process is the writ of amparo used in 
Latin America.
The U.S. non-centralized system of judicial review (with variants), 
which was the most prevalent system until the end of the twentieth 
century, was adopted in Argentina, brazil, and Mexico, among other 
Latin American countries, as well as in Australia, Canada, India, Nige-
ria, and Switzerland. Centralized constitutional courts were established 
in belgium, Germany, South Africa, and Spain, among many other 
countries.19 One cannot, however, make too much of the difference 
between non-centralized and centralized judicial systems because, as 
a practical matter, there has been convergence in the operations and 
effects of both kinds.20
Another distinction is between strong and weak judicial review. 
Under strong judicial review, which exists in Germany and the United 
States, for example, a court’s declaration of unconstitutionality is final 
until the constitution is amended or the court overrules itself. Indeed, 
India’s Supreme Court has gone so far as to assert authority to invalidate 
any constitutional amendment that, in the Court’s opinion, conflicts 
with the constitution’s “basic structure.”21 Under weak constitutional 
19 A third system not relevant to this volume is often called the French system, wherein 
judicial review is exercised by an independent body, the Conseil Constitutionnel, 
located outside of the regular judicial hierarchy.
20 See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Indianapolis: 
bobbs-Merrill, 1971); and Louis Favoreu, “Constitutional Review in Europe,” in 
Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution, ed. Louis 
henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal, 38–62 (New york: Columbia University Press, 1990).
21 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225. See also Sudhir 
Krishnaswamy, Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure 
Doctrine (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009). In Germany, the basic Law 
explicitly provides that certain of its most important elements, including the division 
of the federation into Länder and their participation in the legislative process, cannot 
be altered by constitutional amendment.
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review, a court’s declaration of unconstitutionality can be overridden 
or superseded by an act of the legislature. Weak review is more com-
mon in british Commonwealth countries that follow the tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty.22 In Canada, for instance, with respect to 
certain parts of its 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the “notwith-
standing” clause (la clause dérogatoire)23 allows the federal Parliament 
or a provincial legislature to validate for five years a statute deemed 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. however, such weak review, 
to the extent that it exists,24 usually applies only to the adjudication of 
rights; in Canada, as in most federal countries, the adjudication of most 
if not all federalism issues involves the strong form of judicial review.
The relationship between federalism and the courts is basically two-
fold. First, through the exercise of judicial review, the courts interpret 
constitutional norms associated with the federal system. These norms 
most prominently concern the distribution of powers between the fed-
eration and its constituent polities, but they also often concern inter-
pretation of the structural features of the federal system, such as the 
representation of the constituent polities within the federation’s political 
institutions. Courts can shape a federal system through their authorita-
tive interpretation of these and other aspects of the constitution. Second, 
federalism has certain implications for the judicial system. Given that 
courts are usually intended to be independent arbiters of constitutional 
disputes between the federation and the states, they need to be inde-
pendent of both orders of government. At the least, it is widely thought 
that judges in federations must have security of tenure, but beyond that, 
questions are often asked about how judges are appointed and whether 
they should be, in any sense, representative of the constituent polities, 
cultural or linguistic groups, or geographic regions. Moreover, because 
federalism is generally taken to involve a distribution of legislative pow-
ers between the federation and the constituent polities, the distribution 
of judicial power within the federation can itself be shaped by federal 
ideas, as in the establishment of separate state and federal courts and 
22 David Erdos, Delegating Rights Protection: The Rise of Bills of Rights in the Westminster 
World (New york: Oxford University Press, 2010).
23 Canada Constitution, section 33.
24 The Canadian notwithstanding clause is limited in its application and has been 
used only rarely. See Grant huscroft, “Rationalizing Judicial Power: The Mischief 
of Dialogue Theory,” in Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ed. James b. Kelly and Christopher P. Manfredi, 50–65 
(vancouver: UbC Press, 2009).
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the investing of distinct fields of jurisdiction in those courts. Wheare 
considered that if the federal principle is applied strictly, one would 
expect a dual judicial system to be established: state courts to apply 
and interpret state law, and federal courts to apply and interpret federal 
law. however, of the four countries he examined in the 1940s, only the 
United States came close to applying this dualist principle. Switzerland 
and Australia relied extensively on cantonal or state courts to adjudi-
cate disputes concerning both state and federal law, and Canada came 
close to having a single unified system of courts for the whole country 
appointed by the dominion government.25 Wheare concluded that there 
is “no uniformity among federations in organizing their courts.”26
II. Legal and Political Perspectives
Lawyers and political scientists tend to adopt different approaches to 
the analysis and evaluation of the role of courts in adjudicating consti-
tutional disputes. The caricature, which bears some semblance to real-
ity, suggests that lawyers focus on the reasoning used by the courts 
when they interpret the relevant sources of law (e.g., constitutional text, 
legislation, and judicial precedents), whereas political scientists focus 
more on the outcome of a judicial decision in the context of the wider 
political issues that are at stake and tend to consider the courts as one 
set of political actors among many. The reality is a complex combination 
of all these factors.
Gerard baier argues that there is a sensible middle way between a 
formal legalistic approach that overemphasizes the stability of legal 
meaning within constitutional texts and judicial doctrine, and an over-
reaching political realist approach that reduces legal reasoning to a mere 
instrument of partisan power and influence.27 Focusing on the United 
States, Canada, and Australia, he argues that judicial doctrine operates 
as an independent variable in judges’ decision-making. Drawing on 
barry Cushman’s account of the U.S. Supreme Court in the New Deal 
period of the 1930s28 and on various new institutionalist approaches to 
 25 Wheare, Federal Government, 68–72.
 26 Ibid., 71.
 27 Gerard baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia, and 
Canada (vancouver: UbC Press, 2006), 24–9.
 28 barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional 
Revolution (New york: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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the analysis of judicial decision-making,29 baier argues that doctrine is 
a formative influence on judicial decisions, which gain their legitimacy 
from the traditions and methods of formal legal reasoning. On this 
view, judicial doctrine is not merely a smokescreen for the real determi-
nants of a decision, nor is it the basis for a formal, almost mechanistic 
process of reasoning.
One must be alert to the possibility that the conclusions drawn by 
baier from three democratic, well-established, common-law federa-
tions might not apply to courts in civil-law federations and to courts 
in countries that do not respect judicial independence. Furthermore, 
“judicial doctrine” (narrowly conceived) is not the only source or mode 
of legal reasoning. Philip bobbitt has proposed six distinct modalities of 
judicial reasoning in constitutional cases, which he labels textual, struc-
tural, historical, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential.30 bobbitt contends 
that courts of final jurisdiction draw on any one or a combination of 
these modalities of reasoning as seems suitable to the circumstances 
of the case before them. It is not necessary to accept bobbitt’s pragma-
tism to recognize that judges frequently use each of these modalities, 
and constitutional decisions often turn on views about which modali-
ties ought to apply and how they should fit together. This applies just 
as much to federalism-related cases as it does to other areas of judicial 
decision-making. A full assessment of the role of courts in interpret-
ing federal constitutions should take account of the role of all of these 
modalities of reasoning, as well as of how judges select a particular 
modality to apply to a specific case’s circumstances.
It is well known that courts are not fully independent of their politi-
cal environment.31 The ways in which politics potentially intersects with 
judicial reasoning are as diverse as politics itself. To put the matter sche-
matically, politics can be “personal,” “partisan,” and “ideological.” It can 
be about individuals vying for political power, as was partly the case in 
 29 howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton, eds., Supreme Court Decision-Making: New 
Institutionalist Approaches (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1999); Rogers 
Smith, “Political Jurisprudence, the ‘New Institutionalism,’ and the Future of Public 
Law,” American Political Science Review 82 (1998): 89–108; Mark Richards and herbert 
Kritzer, “Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making,” American 
Political Science Review 96 (2002): 305–20.
 30 Philip bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New york: Oxford 
University Press, 1982).
 31 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New haven, CT: yale University 
Press, 1991).
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Marbury v. Madison,32 the celebrated 1803 decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court to which modern judicial review is routinely traced. Judicial deci-
sions can also have obvious partisan implications, even to the extent 
of determining the result of a presidential election, as in Bush v. Gore 
(2000).33 The political background to a constitutional dispute may also 
be largely ideological, or at least cast in ideological terms;34 indeed, the 
very institutions of “judicial review” and “constitutional law” as such 
can be presented as ideologies and as acts of judicial power,35 even when 
they result, paradoxically, in abnegations of judicial jurisdiction or com-
petence, as in Marbury or McCawley v. The King.36 The judicial determi-
nation of federalism disputes is no exception, although adjudication of 
demarcations of government power (as in many federalism disputes) 
and adjudication of human rights occur in very different registers.
What is the underlying federal theory, one might ask, of the courts’ 
determination of federal constitutional issues? Federalism-related 
political disputes concern a great diversity of issues. Adjudication of 
the distribution of powers between the federation and its constituent 
polities is the most prominent example. These cases usually involve 
questions about the constitutionality of federal or constituent legisla-
tion, or of administrative action purportedly authorized by such leg-
islation. The question here can be whether the legislation falls within 
 32 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See, e.g., William W. van Alstyne, “A Critical Guide 
to Marbury v. Madison,” Duke Law Journal 1 (1969): 1–47; Susan Low bloch, “The 
Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the Supreme Court?,” 
Constitutional Commentary 18 (2001) 607–28.
 33 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, “Of Law and Politics,” in The Vote: 
Bush, Gore & the Supreme Court, ed. Cass R. Sunstein and Richard A. Epstein 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1.
 34 See, e.g., bruce Ackerman, “Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,” Yale Law 
Journal 99, no. 3 (1989): 453–547.
 35 Alec Stone Sweet, “The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 1 (2007): 69–92.
 36 [1920] AC 691; (1920) 28 CLR 106. See Nicholas Aroney, “Politics, Law and the 
Constitution in McCawley’s Case,” Melbourne University Law Review 30, no. 3 (2006): 
605–56. McCawley’s Case was a constitutional challenge to the appointment of 
Thomas McCawley as a judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland by the state’s 
first-ever Labor government. his appointment was opposed with personal, partisan, 
and ideological motives, and the issues in the case involved the independence 
of the judiciary, the nature of parliamentary sovereignty, and the bindingness of 
the Queensland Constitution. his appointment was initially invalidated by the 
Queensland Supreme Court and the high Court of Australia, but ultimately upheld 
on appeal by the Privy Council.
14 Courts in Federal Countries
a prescribed area of competence, or whether the legislation interferes 
with the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of another order of gov-
ernment. Federalism-related issues can be of other kinds as well. There 
can be disputes between constituent polities over territorial boundaries 
and other matters, disputes about the representation of the constituent 
polities in the federation’s decision-making institutions, and disputes 
about the proper way to amend the federal constitution. Moreover, the 
judicial system or systems within the country are both a reflection and 
a part of the federal system, and disputes about the jurisdiction of the 
courts can come before the courts for resolution. Federalism is both 
shaped by and shapes the judicial system.
As such, the courts, especially a country’s highest court, are often 
objects of political attention and pressure from the federal executive 
and legislative branches, the constituent polities, and sometimes local 
governments. Likewise, given the importance of political parties in 
shaping federal systems,37 courts are affected by the nature and char-
acter of the federal system’s political parties. Parties, especially a domi-
nant nationwide party, may even keep certain federalism disputes off 
the high court’s docket by settling them politically.
III. Basic Conceptions of the Federal Polity
One of this book’s fundamental questions concerns the underlying con-
ception of the federal polity. Is it conceived – by the courts, by political 
actors, and by the population generally – in ultimately unitary or fed-
eralist terms? In other words, what is the nature of the federal political 
community? Does it consist of a single demos or plural demoi? Who 
or what, therefore, is the constituting power – le pouvoir constituant – to 
which courts ultimately owe their own authority? Is it “the people,” 
“the peoples,” “the nations”?
Traditional state theory presupposes the unity of the political commu-
nity, and some writers have sought to interpret federal systems within 
the parameters of conventional state theory’s unitarist assumptions and 
centralist implications.38 When Tocqueville studied American federal 
democracy in the 1830s, he termed the common government created by 
 37 Klaus Detterbeck, Wolfgang Renzsch, and John Kincaid, eds., Political Parties and 
Civil Society in Federal Systems (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada, 2015).
 38 E.g., John W. burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (boston: Ginn, 
1890).
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the U.S. Constitution “an incomplete national  government.”39 by con-
trast, the authors of The Federalist most often referred to the government 
eventually headquartered in Washington, DC, in non-statist terms as 
the “general” government, a term used also by the U.S. Supreme Court 
until the twentieth century, when “federal” and “national” government 
became common.
Alternative theories stress that federalism needs to be understood 
as grounded in a covenant, compact, or contract among political com-
munities by which they agree to form a larger political community of 
which they will become constituent parts, while retaining their discrete 
and constitutionally protected independent existence.40 This was the view, 
for example, that James bryce took of the American federal system, 
which he called “a Commonwealth of Commonwealths.”41 Not all fed-
erations are integrative in origin or character; some come into being 
through devolution within a formerly unitary state, although staying 
together involves some underlying covenantal agreement.
Accounts of the formation, operation, and evolution of federal sys-
tems often divide today between those that offer primarily social and 
cultural explanations and those that emphasize the role of political and 
legal institutions.42 by focusing on the way in which the federal polity 
is conceived, we propose a way of analysing the role of courts in federal 
countries that mediates between these two approaches. Focusing on the 
underlying conception of political community can have this synthesiz-
ing effect because it simultaneously reflects a certain view of the under-
lying social and political reality and operates as an effective political 
principle and legal premise in the formation, design, and interpretation 
of a federal constitution. This does not mean that only one conception 
of the federal polity operates in all federations, or in one federation 
for all time, or that the conception operating in any particular federa-
tion is uncontroversial. Rather, there is reason to expect that the under-
lying conception of the federal polity will be contested, and that this 
 39 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 157.
 40 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987); 
Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theology 
to Modern Federalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington books, 2000); and Olivier beaud, 
Théorie de la Fédération (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009).
 41 bryce, American Commonwealth, 1:12–15, 332.
 42 Compare baier, Courts and Federalism; and Jan Erk, Explaining Federalism: State, Society 
and Congruence in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany and Switzerland (London: Routledge, 
2010).
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contestation will often lie at the heart of legal controversies about how 
the federal aspects of the constitution are to be interpreted and applied, 
whether acknowledged43 or not.44
The terminological history of American federalism illustrates the 
tension between underlying conceptions of the federal system. Martin 
Diamond highlighted the different and evolving senses of the term fed-
eral and its cognates used during the debate over the ratification of the 
U.S. Constitution.45 The English word federal (and its equivalent in other 
languages such as French, German, Italian, and Polish) is derived from 
the Latin, foedus, meaning “covenant, compact, or treaty.”46 The term 
thus carries an original sense of a solemn agreement between parties, 
whether individuals, groups, or entire nations. The term also has sev-
eral technical meanings in law, political philosophy, and theology, all of 
which contributed to debates over the nature of the federal union to be 
created by the proposed U.S. Constitution in 1787–8.47 The word federal 
in the 1780s referred to a political system that has, since the 1780s, been 
termed “confederal.” The U.S. Constitution was seen as a novel devel-
opment because, on James Madison’s analysis, it combined both “fed-
eral” (i.e., confederal) and “national” features. by national, Madison 
meant “unitary,” in the sense of a single location of sovereignty from 
which the constitution’s authority is ultimately derived, in contrast to a 
“federal” conception, in which the constitution is seen as an agreement 
between sovereign and independent states.
The common assumption for many (but not all) at the time was that 
sovereignty had to be located somewhere: either singularly in the unitary 
 43 As in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435–6; Lane County v. Oregon, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 77 (1868); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 
304, 316–19 (1936); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 416 (1938); U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801–3, 838–45, 845–9 (1995).
 44 See the allusions to the underlying conception of the polity in National League of 
Cities v. Usery 426 U.S. 833, 868–9 (note 9) (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 582 (1985); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 
(1997). For Canadian and Australian cases, see also Nicholas Aroney, “Formation, 
Representation and Amendment in Federal Constitutions,” American Journal of 
Comparative Law 54, no. 1 (2006): 277, 284–305.
 45 Martin Diamond, “The Federalist’s view of Federalism,” in Essays in Federalism, ed. 
George C. S. benson, 21–64 (Claremont, CA: Institute for Studies in Federalism, 1961).
 46 The corresponding Germanic terms Bund, Bundesstaat, and Staatenbund likewise come 
from roots that convey the sense of binding or being bound by law or covenant.
 47 See Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., The Covenant Connection: From Federal 
Theology to Modern Federalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington books, 2000).
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whole, or severally in the federating states. The U.S. Constitution, as a 
mixture of both national and federal elements, represented a challenge to 
any extreme view about the necessity to locate sovereignty in either the 
whole or the parts. All commentators had to recognize the mixed nature 
of the system, famously expressed by Madison as a “compound repub-
lic.”48 Nonetheless, there remained room for debate about its ultimate 
foundations. The unitarist interpretation tended to locate sovereignty in 
a singular American people who had decided to form a federal repub-
lic under which their “ordinary powers of sovereignty”49 were distrib-
uted among federal and state institutions of government. The federalist 
interpretation insisted that the federation rested upon the consent of (the 
peoples of) the federating states, which had agreed to delegate limited 
powers to the federal institutions of government while retaining for 
themselves all of the original powers of government they had not trans-
ferred. These contending accounts of the federation’s foundations led to 
differing approaches to interpreting the federal constitution.
Although many federal systems, such as those of Switzerland, Ger-
many, and Australia, are largely like the United States in this respect, 
not all modern federations are. The United States and Switzerland 
clearly have federative foundations when their origins are compared to 
the more unitary fundamentals of the constitutions of belgium, South 
Africa, and Spain, for instance. The contrast between unitarist and fed-
eralist orientations also applies to these countries, but the cultural and 
historical contexts in which this conceptual scheme operates is signifi-
cantly different. In Spain, for example, the tension is expressed in the 
dispute over whether the statutes of autonomy should be interpreted 
as expressions of self-constitutive authority by the autonomous com-
munities or as ordinary organic laws of the Spanish state.
The various terms used to designate the political communities and gov-
erning institutions of a federation are suggestive of this distinction between 
unitary and federalist orientations. Several federations refer to their con-
stituent polities as states (Australia, India, Nigeria, and the United States 
of America). Other terms include Länder (Austria and Germany), cantons 
(Switzerland), provinces (Canada), autonomous communities (Spain), and 
communities and regions (belgium). Terms used to designate the federation 
 48 Cooke, Federalist, 351 and 416. hamilton also used the term compound, ibid., 149, 553, 
and 591.
 49 As Dicey later put it in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1915), 139.
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also differ: for example, Union (India and the United States), Common-
wealth (Australia), Dominion (Canada), Federation (Nigeria), and State  
(belgium and Spain). In some countries, the federation and its institutions 
are commonly referred to as “federal” or “national” (Australia and the 
United States). Where there are significant sub-state nations or national 
movements (Canada, Ethiopia, and Spain), the term nation is usually 
reserved for those entities. The inversion is especially apparent in Spain, 
where the word state is used to designate the general or federal govern-
ment in Madrid. Each of these terms reflects, to a degree, a view about the 
status and nature of the federal and constituent polities that make up the 
federation. The chapters in this book reflect this diversity of terminology 
and the diversity in federal systems to which the terminology attests.
IV. Potential Explanatory Factors
While this tension between unitary and federalist orientations is of fun-
damental importance, explaining the behaviour of courts across diverse 
federal systems must necessarily be multidimensional. We believe that 
the key explanatory factors concern the federation’s (1) federal and pre-
federal history, (2) formation by integration or devolution, (3) cultural 
and political homogeneity or heterogeneity, (4) constitutional and institu-
tional structure, (5) legal traditions and culture, (6) selection of judges and 
institutional role of courts, and (7) nature of the political party system.
1. Federal and Pre-Federal History
history admittedly covers a broad swathe of explanatory terrain, but 
salient facets of a federation’s history or prehistory can influence both 
the constitutional design of the federal system and the attitude of the 
courts towards that design, as well as the extent to which courts are 
independent and competent. The historical circumstances of each fed-
eration are unique, thus ensuring an inherent level of diversity across 
the country cases. There is, as a consequence, a kind of path dependency 
at play in many cases,50 but also a desire to escape path dependency 
in other cases. One thinks, for example, of the Nazi era that preceded 
 50 Daniel Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy, Germany, and the Puzzle of 
Federalism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006). See, generally, Paul Pierson, 
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review 94 (2000): 251–67.
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formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Decades of 
military rule in Nigeria, as well as endemic institutional corruption, 
warped that country’s judiciary. Elements of authoritarian legality per-
sist in brazil’s democratic era from the influence of security courts that 
operated during prior years of military rule.51 The United States experi-
enced a bloody civil war in 1861–5 that altered the federal constitution 
and the behaviour of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court 
of South Africa operates against a historical backdrop of white minority 
rule, including the 1948–94 apartheid era. Whether or not courts invoke 
history explicitly in making decisions, history informs and influences 
their decision-making, especially when citizens cry, “Never again!”
2. Homogeneity or Heterogeneity
Federations are more or less homogeneous or heterogeneous. Some fed-
erations are relatively homogeneous (e.g., Germany and Austria), but 
even among federations with ethno-culturally diverse populations, cer-
tain cultural groups within the federation may be concentrated in particu-
lar constituent polities (e.g., belgium, Canada, India, and Switzerland), 
or they may be dispersed among all of the constituent polities relatively 
evenly (e.g., Australia and the United States).52 Especially in multinational 
or pluri-national federations, the courts may be required or pressured to 
respond to the country’s plural constituencies, and rulings may need to 
negotiate cleavages produced by this heterogeneity. Depending on the 
nature of relations among the various cultural or national communities, 
the federation’s high court may lean in a unitarist or federalist direction.
Courts often decide cultural issues that are flashpoints for conflict. In 
2013, for example, Canada’s Supreme Court struck down three major 
federal anti-prostitution laws, India’s Supreme Court upheld an 1861 
colonial-era law that criminalizes gay and lesbian sex nationwide, Aus-
tralia’s high Court held that constituent territories and states cannot 
legalize same-sex marriage, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld same-
sex marriage in California and struck down a federal law that did not 
 51 Anthony W. Pereira, “Of Judges and Generals: Security Courts under Authoritarian 
Regimes in Argentina, brazil, and Chile,” in Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in 
Authoritarian Regimes, ed. Tom Ginsberg and Tamir Moustafa, 23–57 (New york: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
 52 Luis Moreno and César Colino, Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).
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recognize spousal rights under state-authorized same-sex marriages. In 
making such rulings, courts decide who can and cannot make decisions 
about cultural matters. In the United States, for example, voters in thirty-
one states had amended their state constitution to prohibit gay marriage, 
while only three states had legalized same-sex marriage by popular vote 
and eight states by the legislature; yet in 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down all state bans on gay marriage as contrary to the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 In 
these countries, a key debate has been over who should decide the status 
of same-sex marriage: voters of the states, voters of the federation as a 
whole or appointed federal judges? Thus, while rights cases are argued 
in a register different from that for federalism cases, they can have pro-
found implications for the balance of power within a federation.
In turn, the heterogeneous character of a federal polity will likely 
influence the composition of its judiciary. In Canada, for instance, the 
nine-member Supreme Court must include at least three members of 
the bar or superior judiciary of Quebec, in part because Quebec adheres 
to civil law while the rest of Canada follows the common law. by con-
vention, the Court also includes three justices from Ontario, two from 
the western provinces, and one from the Atlantic provinces. belgium’s 
Constitutional Court consists of six Dutch-speaking and six French-
speaking judges. Nigeria’s constitution establishes the “federal charac-
ter” principle by which personnel in all government institutions must 
adequately reflect all of the country’s regional, linguistic, ethnic, and 
religious groups. Such rules about the composition of courts admit that 
judicial decision-making is, and should be, influenced by the cultural 
histories and values that judges bring to the bench.54 An important 
question, thus, is the extent to which diversity in judicial appointments 
affects the way courts approach federalism questions.
3. Constitutional and Institutional Structure
The text and structure of the federal constitution are also impor-
tant. Court decision-making is likely to be influenced by such factors 
as (1) whether the federal constitution is centralist or decentralist in 
 53 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584; 192 L. Ed. 2d 609; 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
 54 Guy Grossman, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Samuel D. Pimentel, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, 
“Descriptive Representation and Judicial Outcomes in Multiethnic Societies,” 
American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 1 (2016): 44–69.
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content, nature, or spirit, (2) whether it specifies concurrent powers, 
(3) where it locates reserved powers (if any), (4) whether the arrange-
ment is dualist (as in the United States) or integrative (as in Germany), 
(5) whether the specific powers granted to the various orders of gov-
ernment are limited or extensive, (6) whether the constitution recog-
nizes local government as the third order of government, (7) whether 
the constitution provides for emergency rule or federal intervention 
into the governance of the constituent polities, and (8) whether certain 
provisions of the constitution are unamendable or amendable only by 
special procedures. The extent to which the federal constitution has the 
character of a general framework or detailed code may also affect judi-
cial decision-making. A highly codified constitution may constrain the 
interpretative function of a high court.55
4. Selection of Judges and Institutional Role of Courts
The institutional roles of the courts themselves and modes of judicial 
selection may also affect court decision-making. Particularly important 
is the extent to which the constitution and political practices ensure or 
undermine judicial independence. Can “judges exercise meaningful 
authority without fear of or manipulation by powerholders”?56 Each fed-
eration places unique expectations on judges and requires them to oper-
ate in unique constitutional and political contexts. The manner in which 
judges are selected, the degree to which appointments are controlled or 
influenced by the federal and constituent governments, and the extent 
to which judges are in some sense representative of the federation or the 
constituent polities all have potential to shape how judges adjudicate 
federalism-related disputes.
5. Formation by Integration or Devolution
A federation formed by the union of previously independent political 
communities (e.g., the United States and Switzerland) is likely to have 
structures and to give rise to constitutional issues and pressures that are 
 55 For a comparison of the high courts of India and South Africa in this respect, see 
Rosalind Dixon, “Partial Constitutional Codes,” University of New South Wales  
Law Research Paper no. 2014-37, 2014.
 56 Peter vonDoepp, Judicial Politics in New Democracies: Cases from Southern Africa 
(boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 18.
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different from those of a federation formed by a devolution of powers 
from a central state (e.g., Spain and belgium). Whether a federal system 
represents a voluntary coming together or an attempt at staying together57 
can have significant jurisprudential implications, because the two modes 
of formation represent different socio-political agendas. In some federa-
tions, there may be a dispute over the nature of formation, as in Canada 
where the Québécois view the confederation as a compact between two 
peoples, English and French, while English-speaking Canadians and 
Aboriginals have different formation beliefs. John C. Calhoun’s notion 
of the U.S. Constitution as a compact among sovereign states58 was simi-
larly opposed to Daniel Webster’s view of it as the “people’s Constitu-
tion … made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the 
people.”59 Even though all modern federal systems were founded during 
documented historical times, beliefs about the formation of some federal 
systems have the character of creation myths.
Formation may be overlaid with an ideology or tradition of central-
ism or decentralism, such as the Iberian tradition of centralism charac-
teristic of most Latin American federations. Although these federations 
drew heavily on the U.S. Constitution, Simón bolívar declared that the 
U.S. Constitution could work only in “a republic of saints” and “that it 
has never for a moment entered my mind to compare the position and 
character of two states as dissimilar as the English American and the 
Spanish American … I am convinced … [Spanish] America can only be 
ruled by an able despotism,”60 not federalism.61
6. Legal Traditions and Culture
Some federations operate within the common-law tradition; others 
operate within the civil-law tradition. These traditions can lead to 
 57 Alfred Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: beyond the U.S. Model,” Journal of 
Democracy 10 (October 1999): 19–34.
 58 John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, and Selections from the Discourse,  
ed. C. Gordon Post (New york: Liberal Arts Press, 1953).
 59 Daniel Webster, “Second Reply to hayne, 1830,” in A Source Book of American Political 
Theory, ed. benjamin Fletcher Wright (New york: Macmillan, 1929), 481.
 60 Quoted in Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power (London: 
Penguin, 2011), 123–4.
 61 On the failures of federalism in nineteenth-century Latin America, see also Joshua 
Simon, “The Americas’ More Perfect Unions: New Institutional Insights from 
Comparative Political Theory,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (December 2014): 808–28.
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different modes of judicial decision-making having jurisprudential 
consequences affecting a federation’s character and internal bal-
ance of power. Another important issue is whether a federation has 
a strong or weak rule-of-law tradition. The developed democratic 
federations (e.g., Australia) have a robust rule-of-law tradition, but 
some newer federations in less developed countries (e.g., Nigeria) 
have weaker traditions, while some federations have elements of 
authoritarian rule (e.g., brazil and Ethiopia). Thus, it is important 
to note that not all the federations examined in this volume are free, 
rights-respecting democracies. For comparison purposes, table 2 
shows rankings of the thirteen case federations on the World Justice 
Project’s rule-of-law index and Freedom house’s estimates of free-
dom and rights protections.
One can also speak of judicial culture, the positive values of 
which include independence, professionalism, scholarship, and 
Table 2 Rankings of Case Federations on Rule-of-Law Index and Freedom House 
Indices






Germany .81 Free 1.0 1 1
Australia .80 Free 1.0 1 1
Canada .78 Free 1.0 1 1
Belgium .77 Free 1.0 1 1
United States .73 Free 1.0 1 1
Spain .68 Free 1.0 1 1
South Africa .58 Free 2.0 2 2
Brazil .54 Free 2.0 2 2
India .51 Free 2.5 2 3
Mexico .47 Partly free 3.0 3 3
Ethiopia .42 Not free 6.0 6 6
Nigeria .41 Partly free 4.5 4 5
Switzerland NA Free 1.0 1 1
* These scores are average scores for the eight index factors provided for each country. 
The factors are (1) constraints on government powers, (2) absence of corruption, 
(3) open government, (4) fundamental rights, (5) order and security, (6) regulatory 
enforcement, (7) civil justice, and (8) criminal justice. The higher the country score, the 
better the rule of law.
Sources: Column 1: World Justice Project, The Rule of Law Index 2015, http://
worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf; columns 2–5: Freedom House, 
“Freedom in the World 2015,” https://freedomhouse.org.
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non- partisanship. While certain global notions of judicial culture have 
emerged in recent decades, every federation has a judicial culture of its 
own that is more or less aligned with global values.
Another facet of legal traditions and culture is the late twentieth-
century rise of the judicialization of politics, namely, the use of courts 
to decide important public policy matters, political disputes, and cul-
tural values. Many high courts have narrowed the “political ques-
tion” doctrine, which holds that courts should not decide political 
questions or settle issues constitutionally assigned to the legislature 
or executive. Courts have entered the political thickets of election 
processes, legislative and executive prerogatives, nation building, 
and the full range of issues on national policy agendas. In some cases, 
courts actively seek out political issues; in other cases, political actors 
prefer to have certain political issues determined by the courts. In 
emerging democracies, courts can play an important consolidating 
role by ensuring horizontal accountability, namely, “the controls that 
state agencies are supposed to exercise over other state agencies.”62 
however, if a court becomes too politically aggressive, political forces 
may corral it.63
7. Political Parties
The organization and operation of political parties are important 
determinants of centralization or decentralization in federal systems.64 
Parties likewise have a substantial influence on the autonomy and 
operation of courts. Matthew Stephenson argues, “Political competi-
tion, a long-term perspective, and a willingness to compromise are 
fundamental to independent judicial review, and the nature of the 
political competition and the competitors is largely determinant of the 
 62 Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7,  
no. 2 (April 1999): 44.
 63 vonDoepp, Judicial Politics in New Democracies.
 64 William h. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (boston: Little, brown, 
1964), 129; Donald v. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-hill 
Ryerson, 1987), 103–4; Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvestova, 
Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions (New york: 
Cambridge University Press. 2004), chap. 6.
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conditions, if any, under which judicial independence is viable … 
[E]fforts to build judicial independence in the absence of genuine and 
stable political competition will likely founder.”65
Changes in a country’s party system may also affect federalism juris-
prudence, as in India where in 1989 the emergence of state-based par-
ties and coalition governments at the centre displaced the monopolistic 
rule of the Congress Party, which had dominated the country since 
independence. The new multi-party environment enabled the Supreme 
Court to become more assertive and sympathetic to state interests. 
The federations examined in this volume display very different party 
systems.
V. Selection of Cases
All of these dimensions provide focus for the thirteen federal and 
quasi-federal countries analysed in this book. In some of these coun-
tries, the highest constitutional court plays a significant role in shap-
ing its federal system; in others, this court plays little or no role. We 
deliberately chose a variety of federal systems. We believed it impor-
tant to include the major democratic federations (Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United States) that have also histori-
cally been models for some other federations, as well as the world’s 
largest democratic federation (India), a sampling of other devel-
oped and less developed federal systems (belgium, brazil, Ethiopia, 
Mexico, and Nigeria), and two quasi-federal systems (South Africa 
and Spain). Some of these federations are very old (Australia, brazil, 
Canada, Mexico, Switzerland, and the United States), some younger 
(Germany, India, and Nigeria), and others comparatively new (bel-
gium, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Spain). Some of the countries fall 
within the common-law tradition (Australia, Canada, India, South 
Africa, and the United States) and some within the civil-law tradition 
(belgium, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland), while others have more 
complex, mixed inheritances (brazil, Ethiopia, Mexico, and Nigeria). 
Some of the countries have been stable democracies for a long time 
(Australia, belgium, Canada, India, Switzerland, and the United 
States); others have emerged from, or still struggle with, undemocratic 
 65 Stephenson, “‘When the Devil Turns …,’” 85.
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histories and circumstances (brazil, Ethiopia, Germany, Mexico, Nigeria, 
South Africa, and Spain).
The countries also vary in degrees of decentralization. Table 3 dis-
plays the decentralization rankings among 182 countries of the thirteen 
federations examined in this volume. The four measures of decen-
tralization were developed by World bank analysts. On the overall 
aggregate measure of decentralization, table 3 shows that Switzer-
land is the third most decentralized country (following Denmark and 
Sweden) while the United States is the ninth and Mexico is the eighty-
first most decentralized country. Consistent with federalism principles, 
all of the federations rank among the top 45 per cent of most decentral-
ized countries, but inconsistent with federalism principles, many non-
federal countries are more decentralized than the thirteen federations 
examined here. Although it is difficult to measure decentralization 
empirically, and the data have many limitations, including an inability 
to measure the centralizing impacts of rights decisions that constrain 
the federal or constituent governments, the World bank measures offer 
Table 3 Global Rankings of Case Federations on Decentralization Indices
Federation
Decentralization
Overall Political Administrative Fiscal
Switzerland 3 2 1 3
United States 9 3 10 4
Canada 12 5 11 6
Brazil 13 4 15 12
Germany 20 15 32 25
Belgium 23 36 25 21
Ethiopia 37 86 59 74
Spain 46 100 67 18
South Africa 47 117 62 30
Nigeria 48 52 98 86
Australia 55 35 40 10
India 76 45 71 47
Mexico 81 8 88 57
Source: Maksym Ivanyna and Anwar Shah, How Close Is Your Government to Its People? 
Worldwide Indicators on Localization and Decentralization. Policy Research Working  
Paper 6138. The World Bank, March 2012, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/
pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6138.
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rough comparative benchmarks for assessing the federalist and unita-
rist leanings of the high courts of our case federations.66
We present the countries alphabetically in this book because it is the 
most neutral order. The countries might have been ordered themati-
cally, such as heterogeneous versus homogeneous countries, integrative 
versus devolutionary federations, established versus emerging democ-
racies, or common-law versus civil-law systems, but any of these orders 
would be an arbitrary pre-judgment that would obscure the important 
roles of all these classifications in explaining judicial behaviour.
We could not include all of the federal countries or systems that we 
would have liked. Argentina, Austria, Malaysia, and Russia, for exam-
ple, are regrettable omissions, although the characteristics of these 
countries do not substantially differ from countries in our sample except 
that Russia under vladimir Putin is arguably no longer federal. The 
European Union’s treaty-based system of supranational governance 
and the United Kingdom’s system of devolution in favour of Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and Wales also provide interesting and illuminating 
points of contrast and comparison with the thirteen federal countries 
examined here. We draw attention to some of these points in our con-
clusion to this volume.
VI. Template for Case Analyses
We asked the country experts who contributed to this volume to address 
structured questions calculated to draw out the various respects in 
which courts may be asked or required to adjudicate federalism-related 
issues, as well as the way in which federalism may shape the country’s 
court system. These questions began with the general characteristics of 
the federation, including how the federal system came into being, how 
it has evolved over time, and how it is generally regarded within the 
country. Also of general importance were questions about the degree 
of ethno-cultural or linguistic diversity in the country and the extent to 
which this diversity is expressed territorially. Next, we asked the con-
tributors to identify the main structural features of the federal system: 
 66 Another measure is the regional authority index, but it is not used here because 
rankings are available for only seven of the thirteen federations. See Liesbet hooghe, 
Gary Marks, and Arian h. Schakel, “Operationalizing Regional Authority: A Coding 
Scheme for 42 Countries, 1950–2006,” Regional and Federal Studies 18, nos 2–3 (April–
June 2008): 123–42, and “Appendix b: Country and Regional Scores,” 259–74.
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the constituent polities and orders of government; the mode, manner, 
and extent of the constitutional delineation of legislative, executive, fis-
cal, and judicial powers or competences; constitutional relationships 
between federal, constituent, and local orders of government; forms 
of political representation for constituent polities in the federation’s 
government institutions; and means and mechanisms of constitutional 
evolution and amendment. Fourth, we asked the authors to describe 
their country’s court system or systems; its broad legal tradition or tra-
ditions; the relationships between the courts; the composition of the 
courts; the manner in which judges are trained, appointed, and dis-
missed; protections of judicial independence; the extent and nature of 
court jurisdiction and judicial procedure; and, generally, the influence 
and importance of the courts within the federation. Finally, authors 
were asked to explain their court’s approaches to interpreting the vari-
ous federal aspects and dimensions of the federation’s constitution, 
particularly how the court’s conceptions of the foundations, nature, 
and purposes of the federal system are applied to the interpretation 
of specific constitutional provisions and the resolution of federalism-
related disputes. Where, for example, do the courts conceive “sover-
eignty” to be located within the federation, if anywhere?
The chapters that follow contain the country authors’ responses to 
these questions. Each country is unique; thus, not all of the questions 
are as apposite to a particular country as others. Each chapter tells its 
own story about the role of the courts within the country’s federal sys-
tem, and it has not been feasible (or desirable) for each contribution to 
follow the template slavishly. Nonetheless, the overall structure of each 
chapter is generically the same, and the questions addressed are as con-
sistent as possible in order to facilitate comparison across the thirteen 
federal countries.
2  The high Court of Australia: Textual 
Unitarism vs Structural Federalism
nicholas aroney
I. Introduction
The framers of Australia’s Constitution expected that the high Court 
would play a central role in the development of Australian federalism. 
They were correct, but whether they anticipated that the Court would 
interpret the Constitution in ways that would enable the powers of the 
federation ever to wax while allowing those of the states almost always 
to wane is not clear. The high Court has adopted an approach to consti-
tutional interpretation that is essentially unitarist. It interprets the legis-
lative powers of the federal Parliament in a manner that excludes from 
consideration a need to reserve any particular powers to the states. The 
basis for this approach is the view that the Constitution derived its legal 
force originally from its enactment by the british Parliament and that 
it obtains its continuing legitimacy from the support of the Austral-
ian people considered as an undifferentiated whole.1 On this view, the 
Court has held that federal powers are to be interpreted as broadly as 
the constitutional language can possibly sustain, without imposing any 
limit on their scope by reference to the merely “residual” capacities of 
the states, leaving them in an “inherently vulnerable” position.2
The Australian states nonetheless play an important role in federal 
politics and remain vigorous centres of regional and local political 
engagement. Why is this so? One reason is the sheer size of the coun-
try. Another is the continuing attachment to the states as locations of 
1 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 153.
 2 Michael Crommelin, “Federalism,” in Essays on Law and Government. vol. 1, Principles 
and Values, ed. Paul D. Finn (Sydney: Law book, 1995), 168, 172.
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political participation and activity. In support of this, although the high 
Court has denied that the Constitution guarantees to the states any of 
the particular powers they have exercised historically, it has insisted 
that they must continue to exist “as separate governments … exercising 
independent functions.”3 The status and position of the states within 
the federation is thus constitutionally entrenched and remains fun-
damental to Australia’s political system, even though their particular 




With a total territory of almost 7.7 million square kilometres, Australia is 
the sixth-largest country in the world and the only nation state occupy-
ing an entire continent.4 The continent is sparsely populated, with most 
of its population of approximately twenty-four million concentrated in 
major urban centres along the eastern, southeastern, and southwestern 
seaboard.5 Australia was inhabited by Indigenous peoples for many 
thousands of years before british settlement in the late eighteenth cen-
tury. Over the next two centuries, the country was populated by waves 
of migrants, initially from britain and Ireland, and later from continen-
tal Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.6 While the proportion of 
persons of british or Irish ancestry has declined,  English remains the 
dominant language. The most prominent reported ancestries are Anglo-
Celtic, and a significant majority of religious affiliations remain Christian. 
Australia’s different ethno-cultural groups are diffused throughout 
each of the major cities, regions, and states, so that by international 
standards, Australia has no strongly pronounced ethno- cultural  cleavages 
3 Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31, 83.
 4 Australian bureau of Statistics (AbS), 2006 Year Book Australia, cat. no. 1301.0 
(Canberra: AbS, 2006), chap. 1.
 5 AbS, Population Clock, 10 February 2016, http://www.abs.gov.au. See also Clive 
Forster, Australian Cities: Continuity and Change, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 2–13.
 6 AbS, 2006 Census of Population and Housing: Media Releases and Fact Sheets, cat. no. 
2914.0.55.002 (Canberra: AbS, 2000).
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that are territorially defined.7 In 2014, Australia’s gross domestic 
product was US$1,442 billion, the twelfth-largest economy in the world, 
with a GDP of US$61,066 per person.8
The Commonwealth of Australia is a federation of six states 
formed by an agreement among mutually independent, self-govern-
ing british colonies established separately between 1788 and 1859.9 
by the time of federation in 1901, each colony had a bicameral parlia-
ment and an operating system of responsible government modelled 
broadly upon the Westminster system then operating in the United 
Kingdom. Their reasons for federating included anxiety about Euro-
pean states exercising military power in the region, concerns about 
unnecessary inter-colonial rivalry and protectionism, and a desire to 
unite the people of the continent into one political community.10 A 
federal form of government was favoured, because there was a wide-
spread desire to preserve the powers of local self-government that 
five of the six colonies had enjoyed since the 1850s.11 Throughout the 
English-speaking world at the time, federalism was seen as the most 
appropriate structure for governing the vast territories of the New 
World, as suggested by the prominent examples of the United States 
and Canada.12
At a conference of colonial premiers held in 1890, it was agreed that 
the colonial parliaments would elect and send delegates to a convention 
to draft a federal constitution, which would be submitted to the colonies 
for their consideration. A convention was held in 1891, which drafted a 
constitution. For various reasons, the proposal lapsed and the federation 
movement was not reinvigorated until 1895, when it was proposed that 
 7 For more detail, see Nicholas Aroney, “Australia,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal 
Countries, ed. Luis Moreno and César Colino, 16–46 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). For important qualifications, see Nicholas 
Aroney, Scott Prasser and Alison Taylor, “Federal Diversity in Australia: A Counter 
Narrative,” in The Future of Australian Federalism: International and Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Gabrielle Appleby, Nicholas Aroney, and Thomas John (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 272.
 8 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015,  
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx.
 9 R.D. Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States, 5th ed. (brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1991), chaps 1–2, 4.
 10 Scott bennett, ed., The Making of the Commonwealth (Melbourne: Cassell, 1971), 38–42.
 11 Western Australia secured responsible government in the early 1890s.
 12 Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of 
the Australian Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chaps 3–4.
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a second convention be elected directly by the voters of each colony. The 
plan was that the convention would debate and draft a constitution to 
be submitted to the colonial parliaments for input and then submitted 
to the voters in each colony for approval by referendum, prior to being 
submitted to the british Parliament for enactment. The Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act was accordingly enacted into law by the 
british Parliament in 1900.13
The Constitution attempts to combine the principles of parliamen-
tary responsible government with federalism. In accordance with the 
conventions of responsible government, Commonwealth executive 
power, which is formally vested in the Queen and exercised by the 
governor-general as her appointed representative, is in the ordinary 
course of events exercised strictly on the advice of a prime minister and 
other ministers of state who have the confidence and support of the 
Parliament. In accordance with the federal principles of self-rule and 
shared rule,14 not only are the Commonwealth and each of the states 
constitutionally preserved as self-governing political communities (ss. 
106 and 107), but the people of each state are equally represented in one 
of the houses of Parliament (the Senate), while the people of the Com-
monwealth as a whole are represented in the lower house (the house of 
Representatives) (ss. 7 and 24). The combination of these two principles 
gives rise to tensions concerning the responsibility of the executive to 
Parliament in the context of the relative powers of the two houses of 
Parliament over supply bills, as explained below.
The federation has remained constitutionally stable since its incep-
tion. No new states have been added to the original six, each of which 
continues to have the same constitutionally guaranteed status as a 
self-governing political community. There are now two self-governing 
territories and several smaller territories, all of which are in principle 
subject to the authority of the Commonwealth Parliament (s. 122). Only 
eight of forty-four constitutional amendment proposals have secured 
the necessary support of a majority of voters in the nation as a whole 
and a majority in a majority of states (s. 128). This has led some to refer 
to Australia as the “constitutionally frozen continent.”15 however, the 
 13 Ibid., chap. 6.
 14 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 
1987), chap. 1.
 15 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1967), 208.
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proposals’ failure is not due simply to a supposedly onerous amend-
ment procedure, because most have failed to garner the support of 
a simple majority of Australian voters. Rather, the proposals have 
usually involved an increase in federal powers and have not secured 
bipartisan political support, partly for that reason.16 The most signifi-
cant causes of constitutional change have been the tendency of federal 
governments to press the scope of their powers up to (and arguably 
beyond) their constitutional limits and high Court decisions which 
have mostly affirmed those exercises of power, the opposition of the 
states notwithstanding.
The attitudes of political actors to the federal system have varied. 
From the time of federation, politicians from states such as Queensland 
and especially Western Australia have been highly critical of centrali-
zation, so much so that in 1933 the government of Western  Australia 
(unsuccessfully) petitioned the british government to allow it to 
secede.17 At the federal level, political leaders of the centre-left Labor 
Party have usually pressed Commonwealth powers as far as politically 
possible and have been opposed in this endeavour by parties of the 
centre-right.18 This general political alignment was partially reversed, 
however, under the Liberal-National government of Prime Minister 
John howard (1996–2007), which initiated numerous programs further 
expanding federal power, evoking defensive responses from state pre-
miers on both sides of the political spectrum.19
According to recent surveys,20 a very substantial majority of respond-
ents indicated that they considered attributes such as divided power, 
policy diversity, regional innovation, and intergovernmental collabora-
tion to be desirable features of Australia’s political system. At the same 
 16 George Williams and David hume, People Power: The History and Future of the 
Referendum in Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010), chap. 4.
 17 Gregory Craven, Secession: The Ultimate States Right (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1986).
 18 brian Galligan, A Federal Republic: Australia’s Constitutional System of Government 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 4.
 19 Andrew Parkin and Geoff Anderson, “The howard Government, Regulatory 
Federalism and the Transformation of Commonwealth-State Relations,” Australian 
Journal of Political Science 42, no. 2 (2007): 295.
 20 A.J. brown, “Escaping Purgatory: Public Opinion and the Future of Australia’s 
Federal System,” in Appleby, Aroney and John, Future of Australian Federalism, 365; 
brown, “Measuring the Mysteries of Federal Political Culture in Australia,” in 
Tomorrow’s Federation: Reforming Australian Government, ed. Paul Kildea, Andrew 
Lynch, and George Williams (Sydney: Federation, 2012), 310.
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time, Australians regard the present system as not being particularly 
good at securing these benefits. Almost three-quarters of respondents 
have said that the federal system needs to be restructured, but are split 
between preferring the abolition of either the Commonwealth, state, or 
local orders of government, the creation of more states, or the establish-
ment of regional governments.
It is now frequently said that Australia’s federal system needs 
reform, and there have been several recent initiatives directed to this 
end, including establishment of the Council of Australian Governments 
Reform Council in 2006 and the Council for the Australian Federation 
in 2008. Numerous problems are said to exist, including confusion of 
responsibilities and severe vertical fiscal imbalance between the Com-
monwealth and the states. but first among the problems identified in 
the recommendations of the report of the Senate Select Committee on 
the Reform of the Australian Federation in 2011 was the “tendency 
towards greater centralisation within the Australian federation result-
ing from high Court decisions.”21
The framers of the Constitution intended the high Court to exercise 
the power of judicial review over both legislation and executive action.22 
This has necessitated the development by the Court of a significant and 
varied body of federal constitutional law.23 No other institution has such 
an important role in laying down the fundamental principles upon 
which the system must operate, although the Commonwealth, state, and 
territory governments have played equally important roles in initiat-
ing policy, enacting relevant legislation, engaging in intergovernmental 
negotiations, and constitutionally challenging each other’s laws.
2. Structural Features
a. distribution of legislative and executive power
The Constitution guarantees the continuing existence and powers of 
both the Commonwealth and the states.24 Although the existence of 
 21 Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation, Australia’s 
Federation: An Agenda for Reform (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2011), xiii.
 22 brian Galligan, Politics of the High Court (brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
1987), chap. 2.
 23 Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the 
Constitution, 4th ed. (Sydney: butterworths, 1997).
 24 Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31, 82; Re Australian 
Education Union; Ex parte Victoria (1995) 184 C.L.R. 188, 231.
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local government is also acknowledged in all of the state constitutions,25 
the state parliaments have the power to subject local government to 
supervision, control, and fundamental reorganization.26 A proposal for 
federal constitutional recognition of local government in the form of 
a federal power to make financial grants directly to local government 
was passed by the federal Parliament in 2013, but as the result of an 
early election called by the prime minister, the necessary referendum 
could not conveniently be held within the constitutionally required 
timeframe.27
The Constitution distributes legislative, executive, and judicial power 
between the Commonwealth and the states.28 The legislative powers of 
the states are general and plenary (ss. 106 and 107),29 subject only to 
the exclusive legislative powers conferred upon the Commonwealth 
(s. 52) and various general constitutional prohibitions (e.g., ss. 90, 92). 
by contrast, the legislative powers of the Commonwealth are limited 
to specific topics (ss. 51, 52).30 The exclusive Commonwealth legisla-
tive powers relate to the Australian Capital Territory, places acquired 
by the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth public service (s. 52). 
The Commonwealth has broad legislative power over its territories 
generally (s. 122). Concurrent federal legislative powers (s. 51) concern 
matters such as defence, external affairs, immigration, quarantine, fish-
eries, interstate trade and commerce, trading and financial corporations, 
banking, insurance, bills of exchange, bankruptcy, intellectual property, 
industrial arbitration, postal services and telecommunications, invalid 
 25 Cheryl Saunders, “Constitutional Recognition of Local Government in Australia,” 
in The Place and Role of Local Government in Federal Systems, ed. Nico Steytler 
(Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2005), 47, 53–6.
 26 Chris Aulich and Rebecca Pietsch, “Left on the Shelf: Local Government and the 
Australian Constitution,” Australian Journal of Public Administration 61, no. 4 (2002): 
14; Scott Prasser, “Democracy and Local Government: The Queensland Experience,” 
Sydney Papers 19, no. 4 (2007): 82.
 27 See Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Local Government, Final Report 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).
 28 John Williams and Clement Macintyre, “Commonwealth of Australia,” in 
Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar Majeed, 
Ronald Watts, and Douglas brown, 6–33 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2006).
 29 Gerard Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 106–7.
 30 Attorney-General (Cth) v. Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited (1913) 17 C.L.R. 644, 
651–4.
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and old-age pensions, various special allowances and endowments, 
currency, census statistics, marriage, and divorce. If the Commonwealth 
cannot show that its legislation is authorized by the Constitution, then it 
is liable to be held invalid by the courts.
The scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth and the 
states is less easy to define.31 As with legislative power, state execu-
tive power is not limited to particular topics,32 whereas the Common-
wealth’s executive power is constitutionally defined as extending to the 
“execution and maintenance of [the] Constitution, and of the laws of 
the Commonwealth” (s. 61). Noting that executive power is formally 
vested in the reigning british monarch, the executive power includes 
the common-law prerogatives of the Crown that apply to Australia, as 
well as specific powers conferred by statute and the Constitution itself. 
however, the high Court has very recently adopted a narrower view 
of the scope of executive power than had commonly been assumed, as 
is explained below.
The Constitution also confers a range of fiscal powers on the Common-
wealth, including the powers to borrow money, raise taxes, appropriate 
public funds for constitutional purposes, and make grants to the states 
on terms and conditions the Commonwealth thinks fit (ss. 51(ii), (iv), 81, 
96). Federal taxes must not be imposed on the property of any state and 
must not discriminate between states or parts of states (ss. 51(ii), 114). 
however, the Commonwealth has exclusive power to impose excise and 
customs duties (s. 90) and, as will be seen, effectively monopolizes the 
most significant sources of government revenue.
If validly enacted Commonwealth and state laws are inconsistent, 
the federal law will prevail to the extent of the inconsistency (s. 109). 
Such inconsistency can be established in at least one of four situations: 
the two laws impose inconsistent duties so that it is impossible to obey 
both;33 one law confers a liberty to act in a certain manner and the other 
law imposes a duty not to do so;34 a state law purports to “alter, impair 
or detract from” the operation of a Commonwealth law;35 or a Common-
wealth law evinces an intention to “cover” a particular “field” or topic 
 31 The leading account is George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-
General: A Constitutional Analysis (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1983).
 32 Carney, Constitutional Systems, chap. 8.
 33 Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow & Co. (1910) 10 C.L.R. 266;  
R. v. Licensing Court of Brisbane; Ex parte Daniell (1920) 28 C.L.R. 23.
 34 Clyde Engineering Co Ltd. v. Cowburn (1926) 37 C.L.R. 466.
 35 Dickson v. The Queen (2010) 241 C.L.R. 491.
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of regulation, thus displacing state law in that field.36 Such an intention 
to cover the field can exist explicitly or implicitly, as when a Common-
wealth law by virtue of the breadth and depth of its provisions implies 
an intention to establish a comprehensive and exhaustive regulatory 
scheme over the entire field in question.37 The Commonwealth can also 
explicitly state an intention not to cover the field when it wishes state 
law to continue to operate.38 however, it cannot do this by retrospective 
legislation. To do so would undo the effect that the Constitution had in 
the past, undermining the reliance that citizens place on clear consti-
tutional demarcations of the legislative powers and enactments of the 
Commonwealth and the states.39
Since a body of federal constitutional law has developed around 
these provisions, the states continue to legislate, regulate, and provide 
services in important areas such as education, hospitals, policing, and 
civic infrastructure, but the Commonwealth now exercises substan-
tial regulative control in these fields by placing conditions on finan-
cial grants to the states and by enacting overriding legislation. Further 
adjustments to the federal distribution of power can be achieved in var-
ious ways, including formal amendment of the Constitution (s. 128) and 
state referral of legislative powers to the Commonwealth (s. 51(xxxvii)). 
harmonization of law also occurs through the enactment of uniform 
legislation on the basis of “host” laws enacted in one state and adopted 
by others, through promulgation of “model” legislative schemes that 
states and territories “mirror” in their own legislation, and through 
Commonwealth “framework” laws that operate only in the absence of 
adequate state or territory laws.40 Many such “cooperative” arrange-
ments exist in areas of great significance, such as the regulation corpora-
tions and securities, employment conditions, consumer protection, and 
counter-terrorism.41
 36 Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472.
 37 O’Sullivan v. Noarlunga Meat Ltd. (1954) 92 C.L.R. 565; Ansett Transport Industries 
(Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. Wardley (1980) 142 C.L.R. 237; Viskauskas v. Niland (1983) 153 
C.L.R. 280.
 38 R. v. Credit Tribunal; Ex parte General Motors Acceptance Corporation (1977) 137 C.L.R. 545.
 39 University of Wollongong v. Metwally (1984) 158 C.L.R. 447.
 40 John Wanna, John Phillimore, Alan Fenna, and Jeffrey harword, Common Cause: 
Strengthening Australia’s Cooperative Federalism (Council for the Australian 
Federation, 2009), 20.
 41 Andrew Lynch, “The Reference Power: The Rise and Rise of a Placitum?,” in Kildea, 
Lynch, and Williams, Tomorrow’s Federation, 193.
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Despite these arrangements between the Commonwealth and the states, 
Australia’s Constitution, unlike Germany’s basic Law, for example,42 does 
not formally envisage a role for federal framework legislation, partly 
because the Constitution’s framers were influenced by A.v. Dicey’s 
interpretation of federalism as involving a “division” of powers 
between the federation and the states.43 This approach was followed by 
James bryce – another highly influential figure – who held that federal-
ism distributes powers into separate and “coordinate” federal and state 
“spheres,” each sphere being regulated primarily if not exclusively by 
the governing institutions of the appropriate order of government.44 For 
the Australians, this meant that it was essential that the states continue 
to exercise full legislative, executive, and judicial powers within their 
fields of operation and that the Commonwealth, likewise, be granted 
the constitutional capacity to establish a federal bureaucracy and fed-
eral courts to administer and adjudicate laws enacted by a federal legis-
lature. This did not mean, however, that the Constitution was designed 
to separate the Commonwealth and the states into “watertight” com-
partments. The decision to confer concurrent powers upon both was 
deliberate.45 Nonetheless, Australia’s federal system is quite different 
from that of many of its European counterparts, where the integration 
of the constituent polities (e.g., Länder and cantons) within the govern-
ing institutions of the federation is more far-reaching than in common-
law federations such as Australia, Canada, and the United States.46
 42 German basic Law, Art. 75. See Arthur Gunlicks, “Reforming German Federalism,” 
in Appleby, Aroney, and John, Future of Australian Federalism, 115.
 43 A.v. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1897), 130–55, 410–13.
 44 Galligan, Federal Republic, 193–4, discussing James bryce, The American Commonwealth, 
2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1889). See also John Wright, “Anglicizing the United 
States Constitution: James bryce’s Contribution to Australian Federalism,” Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism 31 (2001): 107–31; and Graham Maddox, “James bryce: 
Englishness and Federalism in America and Australia,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 34 (2004): 53–69.
 45 Aroney, Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth, chaps 9 and 10; Galligan, Federal 
Republic, chap. 8. The high Court interpreted the Constitution in unnecessarily co-
ordinate terms in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511. For a critique, 
see Nicholas Aroney, “The Constitutional Demise of the Cross-vesting Scheme,” 
Insolvency Law Journal 7 (1999): 116.
 46 Thomas hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry 
(Peterborough, ON: broadview, 2006), 145–78, 235–43.
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b. constitutional judicial review
It is generally accepted that the courts and, in particular, the high 
Court of Australia, have ultimate competence to determine the scope of 
power possessed by the various institutions of government in the fed-
eration.47 When the high Court decides such matters, although there 
may be criticism and disagreement, the specific finding and its legal 
implications are widely adhered to by the other institutions and orders 
of government. While some scholars have pointed out the difficulties of 
identifying a textual basis for judicial review in the Constitution48 and 
have questioned whether judicial review on federalism grounds can be 
justified,49 the Court’s decisions are generally accepted as binding and 
authoritative.
While it is widely acknowledged that the powers conferred upon 
the Commonwealth were intended to be specific and limited, the high 
Court has adopted a method of constitutional interpretation that has 
tended to place the widest possible construction on the scope of those 
powers, especially since its landmark decision in the Engineers case in 
1920.50 Political leaders in the states have frequently expressed grave 
concern about the centralization of power. These issues have therefore 
often generated heated disagreement between the two orders of gov-
ernment.51 Such disagreements often affect the tone and conduct of 
intergovernmental negotiations concerning the regulation of matters 
 47 See Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 262–3, citing 
Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137; The Queen v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society 
of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, 267–68; Plaintiff S157/2002 v. Commonwealth (2003) 
211 C.L.R. 476, 513–14.
 48 James A. Thomson, “Constitutional Authority for Judicial Review: A Contribution 
from the Framers of the Australian Constitution,” in The Convention Debates 1891–1898: 
Commentaries, Indices and Guide, ed. Gregory Craven (Sydney: Law books, 1986), 6:173.
 49 Stephen Gageler, “Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial 
Review,” Federal Law Review 17 (1987): 162; Adrienne Stone, “Judicial Review 
without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial 
Review,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008): 1; Nicholas Aroney, “Reasonable 
Disagreement, Democracy and the Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,” University of 
Queensland Law Journal 27 (2008): 129.
 50 George Winterton, “The high Court and Federalism: A Centenary Evaluation,” in 
Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia, ed. Peter Cain (Sydney: LexisNexis 
butterworths, 2004), 197; Gregory Craven, “The Crisis of Constitutional Literalism 
in Australia,” in Australian Constitutional Perspectives, ed. h. P. Lee and George 
Winterton (Sydney: Law book, 1992), 1.
 51 E.g., Ted baillieu, “Speech to the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce,” Melbourne, 
7 August 2012.
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ordinarily within state power. They also create incentives for state gov-
ernments to pool their political resources against the Commonwealth, 
most recently through the Council for the Australian Federation, a body 
formed to defend the states in the federal system.52
c. democratic representation and constitutional change
The Constitution establishes a system of federal representation of the 
people of the states in the Commonwealth Parliament, which consists of 
the Queen and two houses, the Senate and the house of Representatives 
(s. 1). Each of the six “Original States” is constitutionally entitled to be 
equally represented in the Senate (s. 7). The house of Representatives 
is composed of members “directly chosen by the people of the Com-
monwealth” under a formula that ensures that each state is represented 
in proportion to its population, but with each state being entitled to 
a minimum of five members (s. 24). It was envisaged that the house 
would represent the Australian people as a whole, organized into local 
electorates.53 This general principle of constituency electorates with pref-
erential voting is adopted in all but one of the states and territories for 
the lower house of Parliament.54 The state and Commonwealth upper 
houses, by contrast, are generally elected on the basis of a proportional 
system, based on multiple-member electorates and a single transfera-
ble vote. voting is compulsory in all Australian elections, except local- 
government elections in some states.55
Each state constitution is an ordinary statute of the state parliament, 
enacted under authority ultimately traceable to Orders in Council or 
british statutes, the effect of which is continued under the federal Con-
stitution (s. 106). Under these grants of power, the legislative power of 
each state parliament is “plenary” and extends to the enactment of any 
law for the state deemed necessary by the parliament.56 Consequently, 
 52 Jennifer Menzies, “The Council for the Australian Federation and the Ties That bind,” 
in Kildea, Lynch, and Williams, Tomorrow’s Federation, 53. On the general ineffectiveness 
of the Council, see Shipra Chordia and Andrew Lynch, “Constitutional Incongruence: 
Explaining the Failure of the Council of the Australian Federation,” Federal Law Review 
43 (2015): 339.
 53 Aroney, Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth, 224–7.
 54 With the exception of Tasmania, where the lower house is elected under a proportional 
system.
 55 Scott bennett and Rob Lundie, Australian Electoral Systems, Research Paper No. 5 
(Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2007–8).
 56 Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214, 249–50.
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the general principle is that the state constitutions can be altered 
by an ordinary statute of the state parliament, either explicitly or by 
implication.57 The first qualification is that the state constitutions are 
“subject to” the federal Constitution (s. 106) and cannot, therefore, con-
tain anything contrary to its relevant requirements, such as the main-
tenance of state courts meeting the description of “Supreme Courts” 
(as referred to in s. 73).58 A second, now far-reaching qualification to 
this principle is that pursuant to the Australia Acts (1986), whereby 
the authority of the british Parliament to legislate for Australia was 
brought to an end, the legislative powers of each state parliament is 
subject to any “manner and form” requirements that may have been 
imposed by a predecessor parliament.59 Pursuant to this, each state has 
enacted special legislative procedures for amending its constitution in 
certain important respects, such as the status and role of the Queen and 
the governor, the composition, procedures, and electoral basis of the 
parliament, and the independence of the judiciary. The manner and form 
requirements thus imposed are of varying kinds, such as approval by the 
voters in a referendum or by a special majority in the parliament.60 Under 
the Australia Acts, the subject matter of the law must concern the “consti-
tution, powers or procedure of the Parliament,” and so the effectiveness 
of some manner and form requirements is questionable. There has been 
some discussion of alternative grounds upon which state constitutional 
provisions might be entrenched, but the effectiveness of these grounds 
is subject to serious doubt.61
by contrast, the Commonwealth Constitution is fully entrenched and 
cannot be amended by the Commonwealth Parliament without voter 
approval in a referendum. In particular, a proposed amendment of the 
Constitution must be (1) passed by an absolute majority of both houses 
of the Commonwealth Parliament (or by only one house of the Parlia-
ment, if after a period of delay the other house fails or refuses to pass 
 57 McCawley v. The King (1920) 28 C.L.R. 106 (Privy Council), discussed in Nicholas 
Aroney, “Politics, Law and the Constitution in McCawley’s Case,” Melbourne 
University Law Review 30, no. 3 (2006): 605.
 58 Kirk v. Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 C.L.R. 531, 566, 580–1; Forge v. 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 C.L.R. 45, 76.
 59 Australia Acts, 1986 (Cth) and (UK), s. 6. This limitation was first imposed pursuant 
to the Colonial Laws validity Act, 1865 (UK), s. 5.
 60 Carney, Constitutional Systems, 195–204.
 61 McGinty v. Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, 296–7; Attorney-General (W.A.) v. 
Marquet (2003) 217 C.L.R. 545.
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the proposed law or passes it with amendments with which the first-
mentioned house does not agree) and (2) simultaneously approved by a 
majority of voters in the nation as a whole and by a majority of voters in 
a majority of states (s. 128). This procedure is competent to amend the 
Constitution in any respect, except that changes to the territorial limits 
of a state or its representation in the federal Parliament can be made only 
with the approval of a majority of voters in the state concerned (s. 128, 
para. 5). Notably, this procedure concerns only the Constitution itself, 
and not the preamble and “covering clauses” of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK), which contains the Constitution. 
At the time of federation, the british Parliament retained the power to 
amend the Constitution Act, but since the abdication of its power to leg-
islate for Australia, there is an unanswered question about the location 
of the residual power to amend the Constitution Act. various solutions 
have been proposed, ranging from granting the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment the power by ordinary constitutional amendment, to locating it 
in the peoples and legislatures of the states and Commonwealth acting 
unanimously.62 The operative effect of most of the covering clauses is 
now spent, but the preamble to the Constitution (which significantly 
recites the “agreement” of the people of the Australian colony-states to 
be united in a “federal commonwealth under the Crown”) is contained 
in the Constitution Act. When in 1999 an unsuccessful referendum was 
held on whether Australia would become a republic, there was a sec-
ond (again unsuccessful) proposal for a new preamble. however, given 
doubts about the precise mechanism necessary for amending the Con-
stitution Act, the plan was only to insert a second preamble into the 
Constitution proper, leaving the original preamble in the Constitution 
Act fully in place.63
The ultimate relationship between the Commonwealth and state con-
stitutions has not been entirely resolved. While provisions of the Com-
monwealth Constitution limit the states’ powers (e.g., ss. 90 and 92) 
and allow appeals to the high Court from state Supreme Courts (s. 73), 
thus operating in a manner that is paramount to the provisions of the 
state constitutions, there are isolated judicial dicta that there are limits 
on the extent to which Commonwealth legislation, although otherwise 
 62 These views are summarized in Nicholas Aroney, “A Public Choice? Federalism  
and the Prospects of a Republican Preamble,” University of Queensland Law Journal  
21 (1999): 205.
 63 Constitution Alteration (Preamble) 1999 (Cth).
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authorized by the Commonwealth Constitution, can alter certain fun-
damentals of the state constitutions, such as the existence and function-
ing of state courts.64
III. Court System
1. General Features
The Australian judicial system is profoundly shaped by federalism.65 
Prior to federation, each Australian colony had its own court system. 
Supreme courts of general jurisdiction were established initially in most 
cases by Imperial authority, together with various inferior courts created 
by the legislatures.66 At federation, provision was made in the Common-
wealth Constitution for the establishment of the high Court of Australia 
(s. 71), with general appellate jurisdiction (s. 73) and original jurisdiction 
in several kinds of matters (ss. 75–6), including the resolution of constitu-
tional disputes. The Constitution also empowers the Commonwealth to 
confer federal jurisdiction upon state courts (ss. 71, 77(iii)) and to establish 
other federal courts (ss. 71, 77(i)). The Commonwealth has established the 
Federal Court of Australia, Family Court of Australia, and Federal Mag-
istrates Court.67 At federation, the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council was also preserved (s. 74), but the high Court soon 
asserted that it was the final interpreter of the constitutional powers of the 
Commonwealth and the states (“inter se” matters),68 and between 1968 
and 1986 the Privy Council’s jurisdiction to hear appeals from Australian 
courts was abolished,69 rendering section 74 “obsolete.”70
 64 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 C.L.R. 518, 547, 574–5; Western Australia v. Wilsmore 
[1981] W.A.R. 179, 181–3.
 65 See James Stellios, The Federal Judicature – Chapter III of the Constitution: Commentary 
and Cases (Sydney: LexisNexis butterworths, 2010), 1–3, chaps 7–10.
 66 James Crawford and brian Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law, 4th ed. (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 22–3.
 67 Stephen Gageler, “Jurisdiction,” in The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, 
ed. Michael Coper, Tony blackshield, and George Williams, 383–5 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).
 68 Baxter v. Commissioners of Taxation (N.S.W.) (1907) 4 C.L.R. 1087.
 69 Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act, 1968 (Cth); Privy Council (Appeals from 
the high Court) Act, 1975 (Cth); Australia Act, 1986 (U.K.) and (Cth), s. 11.
 70 Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises Pty. Ltd. (No. 2) (1985) 159 C.L.R. 461.
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The states have their own hierarchies of courts, usually consisting of 
magistrates courts, district courts, and a supreme court (in some instances 
including a permanent court of appeal). The two self- governing main-
land territories, the Northern Territory and the  Australian Capital Terri-
tory, have their own supreme courts and systems of magistrates courts. 
because the high Court is the general court of appeal from the supreme 
courts, and those courts are invested with federal jurisdiction, the legal 
system as a whole has been described as an “integrated system of State 
and federal courts and organs for the exercise of federal judicial power 
as well as State judicial power.”71 because the high Court has general 
appellate jurisdiction, the theory that there might be different bodies of 
common law in each state, as in the United States, has been rejected.72
2. Constitutional Status of Courts and Judicial Officers
The independence of the high Court and other federal courts is guar-
anteed by the requirement in the Constitution that judges appointed 
to these courts enjoy tenure to age seventy.73 The high Court has vigi-
lantly protected its independence, drawing on the separation of pow-
ers implied by the distinct investment of legislative, executive, and 
judicial power in the legislature, executive, and judiciary (ss. 1, 61, 
and 71), following the U.S. Constitution in this respect.74 At federation, 
the independence and tenure of judges of some state courts was also 
protected,75 but not through any constitutionally entrenched provi-
sions.76 Since then, some state constitutions have guaranteed the status 
and independence of the state supreme courts,77 and it has been held 
by the high Court that the general principle of judicial independence 
 71 Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions for N.S.W. (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51, 114–15.
 72 Ibid. See also Lipohar v. The Queen (1999) 200 C.L.R. 485, 505.
 73 Australian Constitution, s. 72. Such judges can be removed from office only on an 
address from both houses of Parliament on the ground of proved misbehaviour or 
incapacity.
 74 R. v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254.
 75 The protections of judicial tenure contained in the Act of Settlement, 1700 (U.K.) did 
not apply to colonial judges in Australia until the grant of responsible government in 
the 1850s: Crawford and Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law, 66.
 76 McCawley v. R. (1918) 26 C.L.R. 9, 58–9.
 77 E.g., Constitution Act, 1975 (vic.), s. 18 and Pt. IIIA; Constitution Act, 1902 (N.S.W.), 
s. 7b and Pt. 9. Judicial tenure is protected but not entrenched in Queensland: 
Constitution of Queensland, 2001 (Qld), chap. 4.
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required by the Commonwealth Constitution also protects state courts 
and applies to state judges, because they exercise federal jurisdiction.78 
The tenure of lower court judges is also protected in some instances.79
Members of the high Court and Federal Court are appointed by the 
Governor-General in Council (s. 72(i)) based on a decision made within 
Cabinet on a recommendation by the attorney-general. The attorney-
general is required to consult with the state attorneys-general,80 but the 
nature and extent of this consultation is not transparent, and there have 
been calls for reform. Members of the state courts are correspondingly 
appointed by the state governors on the advice of the state govern-
ments. When conferring federal jurisdiction on state courts, the Com-
monwealth may regulate the jurisdiction and procedure of such courts, 
but cannot interfere with their composition and structure, which are 
matters for each state to determine within the limits prescribed by the 
federal and state constitutions.81
Most individuals appointed to the high Court have had substantial 
legal and usually judicial experience; relatively few have had political 
careers.82 Despite Australia’s federal structure and extensive territory, 
there is no convention that judicial appointments must reflect geo-
graphic diversity; indeed, despite a legislative requirement for consul-
tation with the states,83 the Commonwealth has appointed more than 
three-quarters of high Court judges from the two largest states, New 
South Wales and victoria, and has not yet appointed any high Court 
judge from the two smallest, South Australia and Tasmania. Persons 
appointed to the high Court have usually held prior judicial office in 
either the Federal Court or a state supreme court; occasionally indi-
viduals are appointed from the practising bar in one of the states, but 
this has become increasingly rare.84 The high Court presently consists 
of seven judges,85 and when considering major constitutional cases, the 
 78 Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions for N.S.W. (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51; South Australia v. 
Totani (2010) 242 C.L.R. 1; Wainohu v. New South Wales (2011) 243 C.L.R. 181.
 79 Crawford and Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law, 68–9.
 80 high Court of Australia Act, 1979 (Cth), s. 6.
 81 Crawford and Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law, 45–6. See Kirk v. Industrial Court of 
New South Wales (2010) 239 C.L.R. 531, 566.
 82 Crawford and Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law, 191.
 83 high Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), s. 6.
 84 On calls for reform of the appointment process generally, see George Williams, “high 
Court Appointments: The Need for Reform,” Sydney Law Review 30, no. 1 (2008): 161.
 85 high Court of Australia Act, 1979 (Cth), s. 5.
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Court usually sits as a full bench. Only five women have sat on the 
high Court since its establishment in 1903, three of whom were serving 
in 2016.
3. Jurisdiction, Procedure, and Remedies
Although the high Court’s jurisdiction clearly extends to constitutional 
matters, this arrangement was not entrenched by the Constitution; it 
had to be affirmed by legislation at the establishment of the Court in 
1903.86 Constitutional jurisdiction is not exclusive to the high Court, 
however. Any Australian court may consider such questions, on the 
basis that all courts are responsible to determine what the law is, and 
such a determination may on occasion involve application of the Con-
stitution.87 The constitutional jurisdiction of the high Court is enliv-
ened either when its original jurisdiction is directly engaged or when 
in the course of ordinary litigation, a party raises a constitutional issue 
and the matter is removed into the Court or comes before it upon 
appeal. The Federal Court is a superior court of record that likewise has 
jurisdiction in matters arising under federal laws generally, as well as 
matters arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.88 
The state supreme courts are courts of general jurisdiction in all mat-
ters that arise under common law, equity, or statute within the state, 
which can thus also include constitutional causes. They function as 
intermediate courts of appeal in state and federal matters and also have 
general supervisory responsibility for state law, state institutions, and 
the state’s legal profession.89 The high Court controls its workload by 
insisting that appeals from state supreme courts and the Federal Court 
be heard only by special leave,90 and by remitting matters commenced 
in its original jurisdiction to federal or state courts.91
The high Court’s jurisdiction is further limited to “matters” (ss. 75–7).
This means that it has no general advisory jurisdiction. As in the United 
 86 Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth), s. 30(a); Australian Constitution, s. 76(i).
 87 See Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth), ss. 38 and 39 (re jurisdiction of State courts).
 88 Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth), s. 39b(1A)(b).
 89 Crawford and Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law, 127.
 90 Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth), s. 35(2); Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 (Cth), s. 33. 
Such leave is granted only where it is in the interests of the administration of justice 
and raises matters of “public importance” or there is a difference of opinion between 
different courts: Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth), s. 35A.
 91 Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth), s. 44(1).
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States, and unlike Canada, the high Court’s jurisdiction is enlivened 
only when litigants bring a case involving the determination of the 
particular rights, duties, or liabilities of a person.92 Further, in order to 
commence such proceedings, a plaintiff must have standing. While it is 
clear that an individual will have standing to challenge a law that regu-
lates conduct in which that person has allegedly engaged, the extent to 
which a person will have standing beyond that is unclear. It is neces-
sary for a plaintiff to show a sufficient “material” or “special” interest in 
the matter, and thus an interest greater than that of an ordinary member 
of the public,93 but what exactly this amounts to has been confused, 
rather than clarified, by recent high Court cases, partly because the 
parties have often conceded the issue of standing.94 however, the Com-
monwealth and state attorneys-general have standing to challenge the 
constitutional validity of legislation or executive action of each other,95 
and individuals who lack standing are able to seek the fiat of an attorney-
general to bring the action in the attorney-general’s name.96
When a case involving constitutional issues comes before a court, 
the court must satisfy itself that notice of the case has been given to 
the Commonwealth, states, and territories attorneys-general to enable 
them to consider intervention in the proceedings or seek removal of the 
cause into the high Court.97 It is common for attorneys-general to inter-
vene in constitutional cases, especially those involving questions about 
the distribution of power between the Commonwealth and the states. 
The Court has only infrequently granted leave to persons and repre-
sentative groups to appear as amici curiae. At the least, they must dem-
onstrate that their legal interests are liable to be substantially affected by 
a decision in a case and that the Court would not receive submissions 
relevant to the matters in issue without their intervention.98
 92 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 C.L.R. 257.
 93 Australian Conservation Foundation Inc. v. Commonwealth (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493, 527.
 94 Cf. Croome v. Tasmania (1997) 191 C.L.R. 119; Pape v. Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 
238 C.L.R. 1; Williams v. Commonwealth (2012) 248 C.L.R. 156.
 95 Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel. Dale v. Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 237; Attorney-
General (Victoria); Ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559.
 96 E.g., Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel. Dale v. Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 237; 
Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel. McKinlay v. Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 1; Attorney-
General (Victoria); Ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559.
 97 Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth), s. 78b.
 98 Levy v. Victoria (1997) 189 C.L.R. 579.
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Parties alleging a breach of the Constitution may seek several rem-
edies. Three such remedies explicitly recognized by the Constitution 
are the writs of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against Com-
monwealth officers (s. 75(v)). These “constitutional writs” extend to 
compelling public officials to perform public duties (mandamus) and 
restraining public officials, especially lower courts or tribunals, from 
usurping or exceeding jurisdiction (prohibition). The courts can also 
issue orders quashing decisions of lower courts or tribunals (certiorari), 
preventing the usurpation of an office (quo warranto), and requiring 
the liberation of an unlawfully imprisoned person (habeas corpus).99 In 
addition, where the aforementioned remedies are not available or inad-
equate, the courts can issue authoritative declarations as to the legal 
rights of parties and the true state of the law, including the invalidity 
of legislation.100 Although a wide range of remedies is thus available, 
the high Court has discretion about whether to grant a remedy in any 
particular case. Nonetheless, in most constitutional cases, declaratory 
or other orders are readily issued once a finding of invalidity has been 
made, and it is rare for deserving cases to be without a remedy.101
A strict doctrine of precedent applies in Australia; the determinations 
of all superior courts bind courts lower in the judicial hierarchy.102 The 
high Court does not regard itself as being bound by its previous deci-
sions,103 but only rarely overturns well-established cases, except that it 
is somewhat more willing to overrule previous decisions in constitu-
tional matters as a result of the entrenched nature of the Constitution, 
the Court’s role as its final interpreter, and the importance of the issues 
raised in such cases.104 Under the doctrine of precedent, it is only the deci-
sion of the Court and the reasoning necessary for it to arrive at that deci-
sion that is binding (the ratio decidendi); all other opinions expressed in 
 99 high Court Rules, 2004, Pt. 25. See, generally, Leslie Zines, Cowen and Zines’s Federal 
Jurisdiction in Australia, 3rd ed. (Sydney: Federation, 2002), 15–16, 46–65.
 100 Robert French, “Declarations – homer Simpson’s Remedy – Is There Anything 
They Cannot Do?” (Paper presented at Faculty of Law, University of Western 
Australia, 30 November 2007).
 101 Garry Downes, “Judicial Review” (Paper presented at the Seminar for the College 
of Law, Government & Administrative Law, Sydney, 24 March 2011), 4.
 102 Garcia v. National Australia Bank Ltd. (1998) 194 C.L.R. 395, 403, 418.
 103 Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Perpetual Trustees Company Ltd. (1952) 85 
C.L.R. 237, 244.
 104 Zines, High Court and the Constitution, 433–4; Michael Kirby, “Precedent Law, 
Practice and Trends in Australia,” Australian Bar Review 28 (2007): 243.
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a judgment are deemed to be merely obiter dicta – authoritative but not 
binding. Decisions of Australian courts are usually presented seriatim 
as the decisions of individual judges. The court’s decision is determined 
by a majority of the judgments, whether agreeing in the reasoning and 
result or, if necessary, concurring only in the result.105 Joint judgments 
(whether forming a majority or a dissenting minority) are common, but 
in no sense mandatory, although unanimous judgments are often pre-
sented per curiam, as a decision of the court as a whole.106 The ratio 
decidendi of a case can be very difficult to identify where the majority 
agrees only about the specific orders to be made by the court, and not 
on the underlying reasoning.
4. Institutional Role of the Courts
because the Commonwealth and state constitutions do not contain a list 
of fundamental rights, but only a few scattered guarantees, the vast bulk 
of the high Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has historically con-
cerned federalism-related issues, principally the distribution of power 
between the Commonwealth and the states.107 Even the Court’s seminal 
decision on the separation of powers and the independence of the judi-
ciary was theorized in terms of the Court’s federal adjudicative role.108 
Since the 1980s, however, an increasing proportion of high Court consti-
tutional cases has concerned other matters, such as judicial independence, 
the nature and scope of executive power, and implied democratic rights.109
The political branches of government generally respect the courts, 
although in recent years when the high Court has struck down signifi-
cant legislation, politicians have sometimes criticized such decisions as 
not being properly grounded in the Constitution.110 There is a conven-
tion that the relevant attorney-general, and not the judges themselves, 
 105 Andrew Lynch, “Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial 
Disagreement in the high Court of Australia,” Sydney Law Review 24 (2002): 470, 476–8.
 106 Ibid., 479.
 107 See, generally, Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts.
 108 R. v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, 267–8; 
Forge v. Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 C.L.R. 45, 73. See, 
further, Stellios, Federal Judicature, 96–8.
 109 Compare Galligan, Politics of the High Court; haig Patapan, Judging Democracy: The New 
Politics of the High Court of Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
 110 Malcolm Fraser, “The Courts Must Rule, above and beyond the Political Fray,” 
Melbourne Age, 12 September 2011.
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should defend the courts against undue criticism, but this practice has 
sometimes been placed under pressure, especially when governments 
contend that the courts have engaged in “judicial activism.”111 This ten-
sion between the political and judicial branches has often concerned 
cases involving implied constitutional rights, but the high Court’s fed-
eralism jurisprudence has also given rise to political criticism, particu-
larly from the order of government adversely affected by a decision.112 
Another point of occasional tension between the branches of govern-
ment concerns the financial independence of the courts. The high Court 
has a significant level of administrative and fiscal autonomy guaran-
teed under a federal statute,113 but the independence of state courts is 
less well protected.114
Public confidence in the courts is also complex. While Australians 
place high value on the courts’ importance, they express low confidence 
in the criminal justice system in particular, both absolutely and relative 
to other public institutions.115 yet judges are frequently called upon in 
their personal capacity to investigate and report on controversial and 
sensitive issues, suggesting that they retain a reputation for impartial-
ity, integrity, and good judgment.116 Nonetheless, with the expansion of 
the courts’ adjudicative role to politically controversial matters, as well 
as the opportunities for scrutiny made possible by modern communica-
tions technology, popular criticism appears to have increased.117
 111 Enid Campbell and h.P. Lee, The Australian Judiciary (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 246–59.
 112 “Fed-State Powers Need Clarification,” The Age, 15 November 2006; Chris Merritt, 
“PM’s Attack on high Court Futile and Self-Defeating,” The Australian,  
2 September 2011.
 113 high Court of Australia Act, 1979 (Cth), Pts. III–v.
 114 Crawford and Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law, 129–31.
 115 Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, “The Work of the Australian Judiciary: 
Public and Judicial Attitudes,” Journal of Judicial Administration 20 (2010): 3, 7.
 116 Murray Gleeson, “Public Confidence in the Courts” (Paper presented at the 
Confidence in the Courts Conference, National Judicial College of Australia, 
Canberra, 9 February 2007), 10–11. Indeed, the high Court has been vigilant to 
ensure that such personal appointments do not undermine the independence of the 
judiciary: Grollo v. Palmer (1995) 184 C.L.R. 348.
 117 Gerard brennan, “Judicial Independence” (Paper presented at the Australian 
Judicial Conference, Australian National University, 2 November 1996); Greg 
Woods, “Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some historical Observations, and a 
Proposal” (Paper presented at the Confidence in the Courts Conference, National 
Judicial College of Australia, Canberra, 9 February 2007).
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Judges are conscious that confidence in their role and maintenance of 
their independence depend on the integrity with which they perform 
their office,118 and their responses to criticism are rare and usually very cir-
cumspect.119 One of the most influential judicial dictums on the issue was 
expressed by Sir Owen Dixon upon his appointment as chief justice of the 
high Court in 1952, when he said, “Close adherence to legal reasoning is 
the only way to maintain the confidence of all parties in federal conflicts. 
It may be that the Court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I should 
be sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide to 
judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and complete legalism.”120
Much of the debate over judicial technique and constitutional inter-
pretation has involved a critique, defence, or adaptation of Dixonian 
“legalism.”121
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
Australia’s legal system derives its origins from the English common 
law.122 Australian legal reasoning is, for this reason, most comparable 
to that of other common-law systems, principally the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Canada, but also India, South Africa, and other 
british Commonwealth countries. Following the cessation of appeals 
to the Privy Council and the termination of the british Parliament’s 
authority to legislate for Australia in 1986,123 the high Court has sought 
to reinterpret the conceptual and juridical foundations of the federal 
Constitution in autochthonous terms124 and has increasingly taken its 
 118 Anleu and Mack, “Work of the Australian Judiciary,” 14–15.
 119 Cf. Michael Kirby, “Attacks on Judges: A Universal Phenomenon,” Judicature  
81 (1997–8): 238.
 120 Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses (Melbourne: Law book, 
1965), 247. See Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (Melbourne: Miegunyah, 2003), 233–4.
 121 Zines, High Court and the Constitution, chap. 17; Michael Mchugh, “The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the high Court,” Sydney Law Review 30, no. 1 
(2008): 5; Michael Coper, “Court as a Political Institution,” in Coper, blackshield, 
and Williams, Oxford Companion to the High Court, 539–41; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 
“Australia: Devolution to Legalism,” in Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative 
Study, ed. Jeffrey Goldswothy, 106–60 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 122 Alex Castles, An Australian Legal History (Sydney: Law book, 1982), chap. 17.
 123 Australia Act, 1986 (Cth) and (U.K.), s. 1.
 124 On autochthony, see Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1980), 57–72.
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own path in developing the common law of Australia, including con-
stitutional law.125
The high Court has at times entertained three fundamental concep-
tions of the nature of the Constitution: as a british statute, as a federal 
compact among the Australian states, and as a social contract that derives 
its authority from the consent of the Australian people as a whole.126 In 
addition, the Court uses several modalities of constitutional reasoning, 
focused variously on text, structure, history, doctrine, political morality, 
and comparative law.127 Phases and trends in the high Court’s federal-
ism jurisprudence have been shaped by the varied application of these 
conceptions and modalities to constitutional questions.
1. The Constitution as a Federal Compact
During the first phase of the high Court’s federalism jurisprudence 
(1903–19), a majority of the Court emphasized the Constitution’s char-
acter as a compact between the Australian states. The Court was at this 
time composed of judges who had been leading participants at the fed-
eral conventions that drafted the Constitution, who interpreted it in 
the light of the pro-federalist assumptions they believed had animated 
the vast majority of the framers of the Constitution. As Sir Samuel Grif-
fith, who would be appointed the Court’s first chief justice, had put 
it in 1891, the “essential” condition of federation was that “the sepa-
rate states are to continue as autonomous bodies, surrendering only so 
much of their powers as is necessary to the establishment of a general 
government to do for them collectively what they cannot do individu-
ally for themselves, and which they cannot do as a collective body for 
 125 On Australian constitutional law as a component part of the common law, see 
Owen Dixon, “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation,” 
Australian Law Journal 31 (1957): 240.
 126 James Thomson, “The Australian Constitution: Statute, Fundamental Document 
or Compact?” Law Institute Journal 59 (1985): 1199; for more detail, see Nicholas 
Aroney, Peter Gerangelos, James Stellios, and Sarah Murray, The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia: History, Principle and Interpretation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), chaps 3–4.
 127 On modalities of constitutional interpretation, see Philip bobbitt, Constitutional 
Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New york: Oxford University Press, 1982). On their 
application in Australia, see Nicholas Aroney, “Towards the ‘best Explanation’ 
of the Constitution: Text, Structure, history and Principle in Roach v. Electoral 
Commissioner,” University of Queensland Law Journal 30 (2011): 145.
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themselves.”128 On this view, the legislative powers conferred on the 
Commonwealth Parliament were intended to be strictly derivative and 
limited, while the legislative powers retained by the states were to con-
tinue as original and plenary.
In accordance with this understanding of the federation, the early high 
Court read federal legislative powers together in a mutually limiting 
way, such that deliberate limits placed on the scope of one head of power 
were seen as relevant to the interpretation of the scope of other heads of 
power. In particular, the Commonwealth Parliament’s power to legislate 
on interstate trade and commerce (s. 51(i)) was understood to imply a 
limit on the scope of other powers, such that they could not be used to 
regulate intra-state trade and commerce because this fell within the states’ 
“reserved powers.”129 Pursuant to this doctrine, it was held, for example, 
that a legislative exemption from a federal tax that an employer would 
enjoy if it engaged employees on certain prescribed conditions could 
not be characterized as a “tax” (s. 51(ii)) but was rather a regulation of 
employment relations that fell outside the scope of the Commonwealth’s 
powers and was therefore invalid.130 Likewise, federal legislation regu-
lating the creation of worker’s trademarks was interpreted as not fall-
ing within the meaning of the federal trademarks power (s. 51(xviii)) 
but rather as interfering with matters falling within the states’ legisla-
tive jurisdiction.131 Similarly, federal legislation that prohibited trading 
and financial corporations from engaging in restrictive trade practices 
was struck down as extending beyond the limits of the Commonwealth’s 
power to legislate with respect to such corporations (s. 51(xx)), which the 
Court interpreted to extend only to the special kinds of regulatory issues 
that corporations characteristically pose for a legal system.132
 128 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney (Sydney: Acting 
Government Printer, 1891), 31–2; see, likewise, Samuel Griffith, Notes on Australian 
Federation: Its Nature and Probable Effects (brisbane: Government Printer, 1896), 6–7, 
10. On Griffith, see Roger Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith (brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1984).
 129 Nicholas Aroney, “Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices Case, or What 
Exactly Is Wrong with the Reserved Powers Doctrine?,” Melbourne University Law 
Review 32, no. 1 (2008): 1, 9–18.
 130 R. v. Barger; Commonwealth v. Mackay (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41.
 131 Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales 
(1908) 6 C.L.R. 469.
 132 Huddart, Parker & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330. For a discussion, see James 
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A second characteristic doctrine of the high Court’s early federal-
ism jurisprudence concerned a reciprocal immunity enjoyed by both 
the Commonwealth and the states from interference by the other. This 
immunity, which prevented any “fetter, control or interference” with 
an “instrumentality” of the Commonwealth or the states, was said to 
be an implication of the federal system created by the Constitution, 
under which each order of government would be “sovereign” within 
its sphere of operation and, therefore, immune from external interfer-
ence. As a consequence of this doctrine, state laws purporting to impose 
taxes on Commonwealth employees, and a Commonwealth law that 
purported to regulate industrial disputes between state railways and 
their employees, were deemed unconstitutional.133
2. The Constitution as an Imperial Statute
In the landmark Engineers case (1920), a differently composed high Court 
abandoned these doctrines in favour of the idea that the Constitution 
is ultimately to be understood as a statute of the british Parliament, 
approved by the Australian people as an undifferentiated whole.134 
The Court was now intellectually led by Sir Isaac Isaacs, a frequently 
dissenting member of the Court since 1906, just as he had been a fre-
quently dissenting member of the federal conventions of the 1890s.135 
Isaacs’s vision of the Australian federation had always been highly 
nationalist and unitarist, but these convictions about Australia’s place 
in the world now shaped the stance taken by the Court as a whole.136 
Isaacs believed that it was the Court’s role to look to what he under-
stood to be the interests of the entire nation, rather than the “partial” 
interests of the states,137 and he found a way of doing this by inter-
preting the Constitution in accordance with the ordinary common-law 
 133 D’Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91; Deakin v. Webb (1904) 1 C.L.R. 585; Federated 
Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v. New South Wales 
Railway Traffic Employees’ Association (1906) 4 C.L.R. 488, following McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Collector v. Day (1871) 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 113.
 134 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 153.
 135 Zelman Cowen, Isaac Isaacs (brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1993).
 136 Cf. R.T.E. Latham, “The Law and the Commonwealth,” in Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs. vol. 1, Problems of Nationality 1918–1936, ed. W.K. hancock, 
510–630 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937).
 137 Official Record of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Third Session: Melbourne 
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canons of statutory construction, looking to the actual words of the 
Constitution, understood in their ordinary and natural meaning.138 
These canons of construction, Isaacs maintained, required that federal 
grants of power be interpreted with as much liberality as possible.139 
In Engineers, it was accordingly held, contrary to previous decisions, 
that the Commonwealth could indeed regulate the employment con-
ditions of state employees pursuant to its industrial arbitration power 
(s. 51(xxxv)).140 Full effect must be given to this grant of power, the 
Court now said, without considering the “residue” of powers left to 
the states or any implied “immunities” that might protect the states 
from interference.141
Even though the Engineers case has been comprehensively criticized 
by scholars for its poor organization and suspect reasoning,142 its fun-
damental approach to the federal distribution of legislative power has 
been followed by the Court ever since. The Court has routinely rejected 
arguments that the interpretation of each federal power must be read 
in the light of the limited grants of power under other heads or the leg-
islative competence left to the states. For example, the “external affairs” 
power (s. 51(xxix)) has been interpreted to enable the Commonwealth 
to legislate to implement international treaties on topics otherwise fall-
ing outside the list of section 51 powers.143 More recently, the Court 
has interpreted the “corporations” power (s. 51(xx)) as enabling the 
Commonwealth to regulate any corporate activities, including con-
tracts with employees, notwithstanding the deliberately limited federal 
power to regulate employment relations through a system of industrial 
arbitration (s. 51 (xxxv)).144 In these and other cases, the proposition 
that the Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that maintains 
some kind of “federal balance” between the Commonwealth and the 
 138 Engineers (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 142, 148–9.
 139 Ibid., 153 citing Hodge v. The Queen (1883) 9 App. Cas. 117, 132.
 140 Ibid., 154.
 141 Cf. Huddart Parker (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330, 415, per higgins J: the powers left to the 
states cannot be determined “until the utmost limits of all the powers conferred on 
that Parliament by s. 51 have been ascertained.”
 142 Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, 197–201; Zines, High Court and the Constitution, 
10–14; Geoffrey de Q Walker, “The Seven Pillars of Centralism: Engineers’ Case and 
Federalism,” Australian Law Journal 76 (2002): 678.
 143 Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1.
 144 New South Wales v. Commonwealth (2006) 229 C.L.R. 1.
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states has been rejected as involving a return to the “heretical” reserved 
powers doctrine said to have been “exploded” in the Engineers case.145
This clause-bound approach to interpreting Commonwealth pow-
ers has had implications for the high Court’s approach to the char-
acterization of federal laws for the purpose of determining whether 
such laws fall within a head of legislative power.146 Prior to 1920, as 
a corollary to the reserved powers doctrine, the Court looked for the 
“true nature or character” of the federal law. This approach was influ-
enced by early Privy Council interpretations of the Canadian british 
North America Act 1867, where the distribution of legislative power 
between the dominion and the provinces is determined through two 
separate lists of powers for each.147 Although the legislative powers 
of the dominion are conferred in general terms, the addition of two 
specific lists suggests that it is necessary to determine the one true char-
acter (the “pith and substance”) of the law for the purpose of deciding 
whether it falls within the scope of a particular dominion or provin-
cial power.148 Reserved powers reasoning in Australia required a simi-
lar kind of determination; it was necessary to decide whether a law 
fell within the scope of a particular Commonwealth power or a topic 
reserved to the states. While it took some decades for the implications 
of the Engineers method to be worked out, the high Court eventually 
abandoned the quest for the “one true character” of the law in a deci-
sion upholding a Commonwealth law that deprived superannuation 
funds of an exemption from income tax unless a proportion of their 
funds was invested in prescribed public securities. Notwithstanding 
that the law was substantially concerned with the investment decisions 
of superannuation funds, it was characterized as a law with respect 
to “taxation” and therefore upheld.149 Several subsequent cases have 
underscored the principle, as one commentator has put it, that “it mat-
ters not that a law may properly be characterised as a law with respect 
to a subject that is not granted to the Commonwealth, provided that it 
may also be characterised as a law respecting a subject that is within 
 145 Aroney, “Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices Case,” 24–5, 27. See also 
Airlines of New South Wales Pty. Ltd. v. New South Wales [No. 2] (1965) 113 C.L.R. 54, 
79; Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31, 66.
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 148 See the chapter on Canada in this volume.
 149 Fairfax v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 C.L.R. 1
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Commonwealth power. The court is not compelled to choose.”150 Such 
an approach makes it much easier to characterize a federal law as fall-
ing within a federal head of legislative power, and therefore as validly 
enacted.
This expansive attitude towards Commonwealth power has been 
applied in several other ways. The Court has interpreted the Common-
wealth’s power to make grants to the states “on the terms and conditions 
that it thinks fit” (s. 96) to enable the imposition all sorts of conditions 
for the receipt of grants, even in areas of recognized state jurisdiction, 
such as roads, education, and health.151 Although the Commonwealth’s 
power to legislate on taxation is concurrent with the continuing power 
of the states to levy taxes, the high Court upheld a scheme introduced 
by the Commonwealth during the Second World War whereby it effec-
tively monopolized the imposition of income taxes.152 The only explicit 
prohibition on state taxing powers concerns customs and excise duties 
(s. 90), a prohibition that the Court has interpreted widely and substan-
tively, so that the states are not able to impose licence fees to conduct 
business if the fees are in any way referable to the quantity or value of 
goods or services provided by the business.153 This particular decision 
severely restricted a major source of state revenue and was the catalyst 
for an extensive restructuring of Australia’s tax system in 2000. The 
federal government had for some time wished to introduce a broad-
based consumption tax in substitution for a complex and inefficient 
array of Commonwealth and state taxes, but it faced significant politi-
cal opposition. The high Court’s decision on excise duties enabled the 
Commonwealth to convince the states to support the introduction of 
a goods and services tax, the revenue from which is distributed to the 
states by the Commonwealth on the basis of recommendations of the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission in order to achieve horizontal 
 150 Zines, High Court and the Constitution, 28–9. The cases include Murphyores Inc. 
Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1976) 136 C.L.R. 1; and Actors and Announcers Equity 
Association v. Fontana Films Pty. Ltd. (1982) 150 C.L.R. 169.
 151 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1926) 38 C.L.R. 399. The limitations on the terms and 
conditions that can be stipulated by the Commonwealth concern over-riding 
constitutional requirements, such as just terms for the acquisition of property (sec. 
51(xxxi)) and freedom of religion and the non-establishment of religion (sec. 116): 
ICM Agriculture Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (2009) 240 C.L.R. 140, 164–70.
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fiscal equalization.154 Notwithstanding this, Australia’s fiscal system 
involves a severe vertical fiscal imbalance between the Common-
wealth and the states, which undermines the political accountability 
of all orders of government and reduces incentives for competitive 
innovation.155
3. The Constitution as a Fundamental Law
Although the general tendency of the high Court’s federalism juris-
prudence has been centralizing, several important qualifications need 
to be noted. From the 1940s in particular, under the emerging intel-
lectual leadership of Sir Owen Dixon,156 the Court began again to take 
federal principles into consideration in its interpretation of the Consti-
tution. Recognizing that the Constitution was intended to create a fed-
eral system in which both the Commonwealth and the states operate as 
autonomous political communities, it was held that while they may still 
make laws that in some respects bind each other, they cannot do so in 
a manner that prevents the other from functioning as an independent 
government.157 Even here, however, an asymmetry remains between 
the immunities enjoyed by the Commonwealth and the states. On the 
Court’s reasoning in the Engineers case, the immunity of federal instru-
mentalities from state interference could be justified on the basis of the 
Commonwealth’s supposed “supremacy.”158 Somewhat in line with 
this view, the seminal case redefining the Commonwealth’s immunity 
in the 1960s did so on the basis that the states simply had no power 
to regulate the Commonwealth, either as colonies before federation or 
after federation pursuant to the Constitution.159 Consequently, it has 
been held that state laws can bind the Commonwealth only through 
generally applicable laws that regulate the exercise of capacities that 
the Commonwealth has in common with ordinary persons (such as 
entering into contracts or dealing with property); and even here the 
 154 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act, 1999 (Cth); Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations, 2009, cl. 26.
 155 Neil Warren, “Designing Intergovernmental Grants to Facilitate Policy Reform,” in 
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 156 Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (Melbourne: Miegunyah, 2003).
 157 Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31.
 158 Engineers (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 156–60.
 159 Commonwealth v. Cigamatic Pty. Ltd. (In Liquidation) (1962) 108 C.L.R. 372.
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Commonwealth can usually immunize itself by enacting legislation 
that will prevail over any inconsistent state law.160 by contrast, the 
states’ immunity is formulated more narrowly. Initially, it was thought 
to prohibit Commonwealth laws from either discriminating against the 
states or preventing them from performing their constitutional func-
tions.161 however, in its most recent decisions, the Court determined 
that there is only one ground of state immunity – the states’ capacity to 
function as independent governments – so that discrimination is only a 
factor to be considered, not a ground of invalidity in itself.162
One other line of challenge to Engineers orthodoxy has emerged from 
a more recent line of cases in which Court members have suggested 
that, following the cessation of the british Parliament’s power to legis-
late for Australia, the Constitution now derives its authority from the 
consent of the Australian people.163 This idea has laid the foundation for 
an implied rights jurisprudence inferred from the system of representa-
tive and responsible government established by the Constitution.164 
One line of argument here is that the requirement that members of 
the Commonwealth Parliament be “directly chosen by the people” (ss. 7 
and 24) implies that electoral divisions for the house of Representa-
tives ought to contain an equivalent number of voters so as to ensure 
an “equality of voting power” for all citizens. however, in determining 
whether this implication follows from the text, structure, and design of 
the Constitution, members of the Court have drawn attention to “the 
adaptation of representative democracy to federalism by the framers of 
the Constitution,”165 closely examining the way in which federal princi-
ples of representation and political participation shaped the formative 
compact among the people of the states, the representative institutions 
of the Commonwealth, and the popular procedure for amending the 
Constitution. While equal citizenship within a national democracy does 
 160 Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal of NSW; Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (1997) 
190 C.L.R. 410.
 161 Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31; Queensland Electricity 
Commission v. Commonwealth (1985) 159 C.L.R. 192.
 162 Austin v. Commonwealth (2003) 215 C.L.R. 185; Clarke v. Commissioner of Taxation 
(2009) 240 C.L.R. 272.
 163 See Geoffrey Lindell, “Why Is Australia’s Constitution binding? The Reasons in 
1900 and Now, and the Effect of Independence,” Federal Law Review 16 (1986): 29.
 164 Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106; Lange v. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520.
 165 McGinty v. Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, 274–5.
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seem to imply equal voting rights and equality of voting power, feder-
alism involves a plurality of political communities of which citizens are 
members, making equality of voting power across the entire federation 
quite beside the point. On this basis, the high Court has departed from 
the approach to electoral apportionment adopted in the United States 
and adopted one that is comparable to, although still different from, 
Canadian jurisprudence.166
The principle that the Senate represents the “people of the States” 
has potential to unsettle other aspects of the high Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence as well.167 The Constitution provides that the Senate is 
composed of senators “for each State directly chosen by the people of 
the State” and guarantees that the six Original States shall be equally 
represented in the Senate (s. 7). however, the Constitution also grants the 
Commonwealth Parliament a near plenary power to legislate for federal 
territories, including power to provide for their representation in the Par-
liament “to the extent and on the terms which it thinks fit” (s. 122). In 
exercise of this latter power, the Commonwealth has provided that the 
two mainland territories are represented in the Senate by two senators 
each. This provision was challenged in the high Court on the basis that 
the Senate is to be composed of senators for each state, and if the ter-
ritories are to be given representation, it must be subject to this funda-
mental principle. A narrow majority upheld the legislation, but exactly 
how far the Parliament can constitutionally dilute the character of the 
Senate as a “States’ house” remains an open question.168
The powers of the house of Representatives and the Senate are also 
carefully balanced by the Constitution. The general principle is that 
the Senate has equal power with the house, subject only to the rule 
that the Senate may not initiate or amend proposed laws appropriating 
money or imposing taxation (s. 53). The Constitution’s framers were 
conscious that the Senate’s power to refuse or fail to pass an appro-
priation bill could, under the conventions of parliamentary responsible 
government, lead to a loss of confidence in the government, with the 
 166 Nicholas Aroney, “Democracy, Community and Federalism in Electoral 
Apportionment Cases: The United States, Canada and Australia in Comparative 
Perspective,” University of Toronto Law Journal 58, no. 4 (2008): 421.
 167 For more detail, see Aroney et al., Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
46–61, 89–92.
 168 Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. 201; Queensland v. Commonwealth 
(1977) 139 C.L.R. 585.
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implication that the prime minister should resign.169 This remarkable 
course of events occurred in 1975, but Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
refused to resign. The governor-general controversially exercised his 
“reserve powers” to dismiss the prime minister and appoint the leader 
of the opposition as a caretaker prime minister, on condition that a fed-
eral election be held as soon as practicable.170
The Senate’s authority to refuse to pass proposed laws initiated in 
the house gives rise to the possibility of prolonged deadlocks between 
the houses. The Constitution provides a complex mechanism for resolv-
ing such deadlocks (s. 57). The mechanism comes into play in circum-
stances where the Senate twice refuses or fails to pass a bill passed by 
the house, or passes it with amendments to which the house will not 
agree. In order to allow both houses time to deliberate about the issue, 
three months must elapse between the Senate’s initial response to the 
proposed law and the second time that the house passes it. In such 
circumstances, the government is able to call for a dissolution of both 
houses and a general election. If, following the election, the two houses 
continue to disagree about the proposed law, the government can advise 
the governor-general to convene a joint sitting of both houses to deter-
mine, by absolute majority, whether to enact the bill. In 1974, several 
bills were subject to such disagreement between the houses, a general 
election was held, the houses continued to disagree, and the bills were 
passed at a joint sitting. In litigation concerning these bills, one question 
was whether the requisite three months had elapsed between the first 
failure of the Senate and the house to agree and the second passage of 
the bill through the house. because the Senate had in the first instance 
adjourned debate on the specific bill in question and did not consider 
it again until four months later, and because the house passed the bill 
for a second time only days after the Senate had decisively rejected it, 
the Court had to decide when the requisite three months would com-
mence. The Court held that the Senate had the constitutional right to 
consider the proposed law, provided it did not put off the debate for an 
unreasonable period of time, and that the time taken to deal with the 
bill was not in the circumstances unreasonable.171
 169 Aroney, Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth, 359–62.
 170 Geoffrey Sawer, Federation under Strain (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1977); L.J.M. Cooray, Conventions, the Australian Constitution and the Future (Sydney: 
Legal books, 1979).
 171 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. 81.
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This solicitude for at least some of the federal principles that under-
write the Constitution’s system of representative democracy has not 
generally translated into a more balanced interpretation of the dis-
tribution of legislative powers. however, even here there have been 
some important exceptions.172 First, where the text of a head of power 
is expressly limited in some respect, such as section 51(i), which refers 
to “trade and commerce … among the states,” and section 51(xx), which 
refers to “corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth” 
(emphasis added), the Court has insisted that these words of limitation 
do indeed limit the scope of that particular head of power.173 Second, in 
some heads of Commonwealth legislative power the definition of the 
subject matter is expressed in partly negative terms, such as the Com-
monwealth’s power to make laws with respect to “banking, other than 
State banking,” and “insurance, other than State insurance” (s. 51(xiii), 
(xiv); emphasis added). On a clause-bound approach, it remains pos-
sible to read the negative qualification in these clauses as limiting only 
the scope of power conferred by each clause, and thus as having no 
effect on the scope of other heads of power. however, the high Court 
has read the negative qualification as circumscribing the scope of Com-
monwealth powers generally, so that, for example, the Commonwealth 
is not able to legislate with respect to “State banking” by using its 
power to legislate with respect to “financial corporations” (s. 51(xx)).174 
The high Court has also consistently interpreted the power to legislate 
with respect to “the acquisition of property on just terms” (s. 51(xxxi)) 
as limiting the Commonwealth’s authority to legislate for the acquisi-
tion of property other than “on just terms” pursuant to other heads of 
power, unless the exercise of such other powers necessarily involves an 
acquisition of property of some kind, such as “taxation” (s. 51(ii)), the 
sequestration of the property of a bankrupt person (s. 51(xvii)), or the 
imposition of financial penalties for breaches of validly enacted federal 
law.175
 172 For more detail, see Aroney et al., Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
157–73.
 173 E.g., Airlines of New South Wales Pty. Ltd. v. New South Wales (No. 2) (1965) 113 C.L.R. 
54, 113–15; New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1990) 169 C.L.R. 482.
 174 Bourke v. State Bank of New South Wales (1990) 170 C.L.R. 276.
 175 Commissioner of Taxation v. Clyne (1958) 100 C.L.R. 246; Attorney-General (Cth) v. 
Schmidt (1961) 105 C.L.R. 361; Mutual Pools & Staff Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1994) 
179 C.L.R. 155.
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One final, potentially important development concerns the scope of 
the Commonwealth’s executive power (s. 61). In the 2009 decision of 
Pape v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation,176 the Court upended the widely 
held assumption that a parliamentary appropriation of money pro-
vided the necessary authority for the expenditure of those funds by the 
executive. The Constitution provides that no money can be withdrawn 
from the federal treasury without an appropriation made by law (s. 83) 
and that such monies are to be appropriated “for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth” (s. 81). In 1975, the high Court had upheld legislation 
that appropriated funds to be expended on numerous social welfare 
programs that otherwise lay beyond the Commonwealth’s legislative 
powers.177 Although the reasoning of a majority of the judges in that 
case did not support an unlimited view of the Commonwealth’s appro-
priation and spending powers, over the ensuing years, the Common-
wealth appropriated and spent very considerable amounts of money on 
a wide range of programs falling strictly outside its enumerated legisla-
tive powers. It also legislated for the administration of such programs, 
partly on the ground that such legislation was supported by what came 
to be called an “implied nationhood power.”178 The finding that such a 
power exists has been an important part of the centralizing tendencies 
of the high Court’s jurisprudence.179 however, the Commonwealth’s 
assumptions about the scope of its spending power were profoundly 
challenged by the high Court when it held in 2009 that a mere appro-
priation is not sufficient to authorize actual expenditure by the exec-
utive. The power to spend, it was said, must be found elsewhere in 
the Constitution or in statutes validly enacted under the Constitution. 
While, on the facts of the case, special Commonwealth fiscal stimulus 
payments made to taxpayers in response to the global financial crisis 
were upheld by a majority of the Court on the ground that they were 
authorized by either the implied nationhood or the taxation power, by 
 176 Pape v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 C.L.R. 1.
 177 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. 338. Cf. Attorney-General for a Victoria;  
Ex rel. Dale v. Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 237.
 178 Davis v. Commonwealth (1988) 166 C.L.R. 79. See Cheryl Saunders, “National 
Implied Power and Implied Restrictions on Commonwealth Power,” Federal Law 
Review 14 (1983–4): 267.
 179 For a critique, see Anne Twomey, “Pushing the boundaries of Executive Power: 
Pape, the Prerogative and Nationhood Powers,” Melbourne University Law Review  
34 (2010): 313.
64 Courts in Federal Countries
so circumscribing the power to spend, many other items of Common-
wealth expenditure were placed in serious doubt.180
These doubts were realized in a potentially more significant case, 
Williams v. Commonwealth, decided in 2012.181 The high Court held that 
the Commonwealth’s executive power does not authorize it to enter 
contracts and spend money for the provision of chaplaincy services 
in schools and, because no relevant authorizing legislation had been 
enacted, such contracts and spending were unconstitutional. Prior to 
this, most legal experts had assumed that the executive power of the 
Commonwealth included not only the common-law prerogatives of 
the Crown, but also the ordinary legal capacities of a natural person, and 
if there was any further limit to these capacities, it was that executive 
action must concern matters falling within the Commonwealth’s legisla-
tive powers pursuant to the Constitution.182 however, contrary to these 
assumptions, the high Court held that the Commonwealth does not 
have the executive capacities of a natural person, that its executive pow-
ers do not correspond simply to the scope of its legislative powers, but 
that they extend in this particular context only to the execution of laws 
validly enacted by the Parliament. In response, the Parliament passed an 
omnibus statute purporting to authorize Commonwealth expenditures 
across the many areas potentially affected by the case.183 however, there 
were reasons to doubt the constitutional validity of the law,184 and in a 
second case, challenging the application of the statute to the chaplaincy 
program, the high Court held that the law was relevantly unconstitu-
tional, principally because it was not authorized by the Commonwealth’s 
legislative power with respect to “student benefits.”185
What is perhaps most remarkable about these recent developments 
is not only the overturning of widely held assumptions about the scope 
of the Commonwealth’s spending and executive powers, but also the 
role of the principles of federalism and parliamentary government that 
informed the Court’s reasoning. Chief Justice Robert French began his 
 180 For more detail, see Aroney et al., Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
469–86.
 181 Williams v. Commonwealth (2012) 248 C.L.R. 156.
 182 Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General, 44–7.
 183 Financial Framework Legislation Amendment bill (No. 3), 2012 (Cth).
 184 Anne Twomey, “Parliament’s Abject Surrender to the Executive,” Constitutional 
Critique (Sydney: Constitution Reform Unit, 2012); Cheryl Saunders, “The Scope of 
Executive Power,” Senate Occasional Lecture (2012): 29.
 185 Williams v. Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 C.L.R. 416.
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judgment in the first Williams case by insisting that the Constitution must 
be understood as giving effect to “a truly federal government” in which 
the “preservation of the separate existence and corporate life of each 
of the component states” is as much an “essential” feature of the Constitu-
tion as the establishment of the Commonwealth as an effective govern-
ment.186 According to a majority of the Court, the federal principle not 
only requires that the executive power of the Commonwealth is neces-
sarily limited in scope so as to leave room for the states, but that execu-
tive expenditure must ordinarily be authorized by laws enacted by both 
houses of the Parliament, noting that the Senate represents the people of 
the states. A parliamentary appropriation is not sufficient, on this view, 
because the Senate’s powers in relation to appropriation bills are limited 
(see s. 53). To hold that the Commonwealth executive has a general power 
to deal with matters falling within Commonwealth legislative compe-
tence, but without specific legislation, “would undermine parliamentary 
control of the executive branch and weaken the role of the Senate.”187
Pape and the first Williams case thus suggest the possibility of a 
renewed interest in preservation of the federal characteristics of the 
Australian constitutional order. Moreover, the narrow reading of the 
“student benefits” power in the second Williams case suggests, remark-
ably, that this interest in federalism might even be applied to the scope 
of the Commonwealth’s legislative powers. Whether this does indeed 
represent a shift in orientation needs to be balanced, however, by a con-
sideration of other recent cases in which a relatively wide view of Com-
monwealth power has been upheld, such as the high Court’s decision 
in the Same Sex Marriage case. In that case, the Court held that a law of 
the Australian Capital Territory providing for same-sex marriage was 
inconsistent with the heterosexual definition of marriage in the federal 
Marriage Act. however, it also adopted a relatively very wide reading 
of the Commonwealth’s “marriage” power so that it would enable the 
Commonwealth to legislate not only for same-sex marriage but also 
polygamous marriage, provided the union is “consensual.”188
 186 Williams v. Commonwealth (2012) 248 C.L.R. 156, [1], [61], [83], citing Andrew Inglis 
Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (Melbourne: Charles F. Maxwell, 
1901), 12–13.
 187 Williams v. Commonwealth (2012) 248 C.L.R. 156, [60].
 188 Commonwealth v. Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 C.L.R. 441, discussed in 
Patrick Parkinson and Nicholas Aroney, “The Territory of Marriage: Constitutional 
Law, Marriage Law and Family Policy in the Act Same Sex Marriage Case,” 
Australian Journal of Family Law 28 (2014): 1.
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V. Conclusions
The wider political context in which Australia’s high Court has devel-
oped its federalism jurisprudence has changed dramatically over time. 
 Australia’s evolving political, legal, and constitutional independence 
from the United Kingdom, while significant for the country’s emergence 
as an independent nation state in international affairs, has tended to 
bolster the authority and prestige of the Commonwealth at the expense 
of the states. harold Laski’s view that challenges posed by “modern” 
economic and social problems made federal systems obsolescent has 
had influential echoes in Australia, with both political and academic 
voices calling for an increasing “concentration of political power in 
the hands of the central parliament.”189 While attempts to amend the 
Constitution to confer additional powers upon the Commonwealth 
have almost always failed at referendum,190 the high Court’s expansive 
interpretations have often been viewed by centralists as making up for 
the electorate’s conservatism.191 
Those on the other side sometimes suggest that in order to redress 
the balance, appointments to the high Court should better reflect the 
federal diversity of the country; but it needs to be recalled that there 
has been no simple correspondence between a judge’s state of origin 
and his or her federal predilections.192 More radical surgery is needed, 
some say, such as fundamental reallocation of legislative and finan-
cial powers between the Commonwealth and the states, a Senate that 
more effectively represents state interests, and measures to increase the 
accountability and transparency of intergovernmental arrangements.193 
In 2014, the Commonwealth government, following a meeting with the 
 189 Gordon Greenwood, The Future of Australian Federalism (brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1946), 340. See harold Laski, “The Obsolescence of Federalism,” 
New Republic 98 (1939): 367.
 190 brian Galligan, “Processes for Reforming Australian Federalism,” University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 31 (2008): 617.
 191 This was suggested, for example, in former prime minister Gough Whitlam’s “The 
Labor Government and the Constitution,” in Labor and the Constitution 1972–1975, 
ed. Gareth Evans (Melbourne: heinemann, 1977), 305.
 192 Allan and Aroney, “Uncommon Court,” 290n201.
 193 Anne Twomey, “Reforming Australia’s Federal System,” Federal Law Review 36, 
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states and territories under the auspices of the Council of Australian 
Governments, issued terms of reference for a White Paper on federal-
ism reform. The terms of reference declared that the federation is not 
a mere “relic from the past, broken beyond repair and ill-suited to the 
times,” and it was proposed that, “rather than seeking ever greater 
centralisation of power in the national government as a way of deal-
ing with increasing complexity, now is the time to strengthen the way 
our federal system works by being clear about who is responsible for 
what.” To these ends, the terms of reference called for a clarification of 
the “roles and responsibilities” of the states and territories to enable 
them to become, “as far as possible, sovereign in their own sphere.” The 
terms of reference accordingly call for an inquiry into the “practicality of 
limiting Commonwealth policies and funding to core national interest 
matters, as typified by the matters in section 51 of the Constitution.”194
These are perhaps promising signs, but given the twists and turns 
that have occurred in the history of the federation, it is difficult to pre-
dict where current trends are likely to lead.195 As far as the high Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution is concerned, a broad interpretation 
of the Commonwealth’s legislative and financial powers seems firmly 
entrenched, although there are other aspects of the constitutional system 
where its federal characteristics appear to be carrying more weight.196 
Indeed, while the high Court has done much to strengthen the Com-
monwealth, the states are still fundamental to the Constitution.197 Thus, 
when the power of the british Parliament to legislate for Australia was 
ended in 1986, it was of utmost significance that the Australia Act 1986 
(Cth) had to be enacted on the basis of a provision in the Constitution 
that confers upon the federal Parliament the authority to exercise the 
 194 Tony Abbott, “Terms of Reference: White Paper on the Reform of the Federation,” 
28 June 2014, https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/publications.
 195 The White Paper process was abandoned in early 2016 following a change in prime 
minister. See Nicholas Aroney, “Reforming Australian Federalism: The White Paper 
Process in Comparative Perspective,” in A People’s Federation, ed. Mark bruerton, Robyn 
hollander, Ron Levy, and Tracey Arklay (Sydney: Federation Press, forthcoming). 
 196 Cheryl Saunders, “Can Federalism have Jurisprudential Weight?,” in The Federal 
Idea: Essays in Honour of Ronald L. Watts, ed. Thomas J. Courchene, John R. Allan, 
Christian Leuprecht, and Nadia verrelli (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2011), 111, 127.
 197 See Nicholas Aroney and Campbell Sharman, “Territorial Politics and the Federal 
Frame in Australia,” in Handbook of Territorial Politics, ed. Eve hepburn and Klaus 
Detterbeck (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016). 
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powers of the british Parliament with respect to Australia, provided 
that this is done at the request or with the concurrence of the parliaments 
of all states directly concerned (s. 51(xxxviii)). This provision reflects the 
underlying principle of the federation, which is the agreement of the 
states to form themselves into a “federal commonwealth,” as recited in 
the preamble to the Constitution – as a “negotiated federal compact,” as 
Chief Justice French has put it.198 It is significant that, consistent with this 
principle, the amendment clause in the Australia Act also requires the 
unanimous approval of the Australian parliaments. Unanimity among 
the states is the fundamental decision-making principle of the entire 
federation.
At the time of federation, one of the leading architects of the Consti-
tution, Sir Samuel Griffith, expressed the hope that one day the consti-
tution of each state would be submitted to its people for their approval, 
so that the democratic foundations of the Commonwealth Constitution 
would be extended to those of the constituent states.199 While the pros-
pects of this happening in the foreseeable future remain rather slim, it is 
possible to speculate that such a step would contribute to the revitaliza-
tion of federalism, for it would not only consolidate the authority of the 
state constitutions over the state governments in a way that would be 
based on the active participation of their citizens, but it would also give 
the high Court reason to reconsider its understanding of the funda-
mental nature of the federal Constitution. It would provide a renewed 
basis, in other words, for the Court to adopt the view that the Constitu-
tion derives its authority, not from the british Parliament, nor from the 
Australian people as an undifferentiated whole, but from an agreement 
among the citizens of the several states.200 A reinvigorated federal sys-
tem could be the result.
 198 Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540 (French J., as he then was, of the Federal 
Court).
 199 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 2 March to 9 April, 
1891 (Sydney: Acting Government Printer, 1891), 490.
 200 Queensland Constitutional Review Commission, Report on the Possible Reform of 
and Changes to the Acts and Laws that Relate to the Queensland Constitution (brisbane: 
Queensland Constitutional Review Commission, 2000); Nicholas Aroney, “Popular 
Ratification of the State Constitutions,” in Kildea, Lynch, and Williams, Tomorrow’s 
Federation, 210.
3  The Constitutional Court of belgium: 
Safeguard of the Autonomy of the 
Communities and Regions
patrick peeters and jens mosselmans
I. Introduction
belgian federalism is based on a process of devolution. The country has 
been transformed from a unitary state into a federally structured state 
through several successive constitutional reforms. The belgian federal 
state is composed of three communities and three regions but is basically 
divided along linguistic lines: Dutch-speaking in the north, French-
speaking in the south, and an officially bilingual capital region in the 
centre. This results in a federal state with strong confederal characteristics.
The transformation into a federal state made it necessary to find an arbi-
trator to resolve disputes between the legislatures on the division of powers. 
A central constitutional body was established with judicial authority but 
separate from the judiciary: the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court has played an important role in enforcing the principles governing 
the relationships between the federal and the federated entities. Reflecting 
the progressive devolution of legislative powers through successive waves 
of constitutional reform, the Court has proved to be an important safe-
guard for the autonomy of the federated entities (the communities and the 
regions) and has, as such, played a mostly decentralizing role.
II. Federal System
1. Broad Characteristics
The population of belgium is 11,209,044,1 of which 6.4 million live in 
Flanders, 3.5 million in Wallonia, and approximately one million in the 
 1 Statbel, as per 1 January 2016: http://statbel.fgov.be/nl/binaries/NL_kerncijfers_2015_
WEb_COMPLET_tcm325-275721.pdf.
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brussels-Capital Region. belgium has three official languages: Dutch 
(approximately 60 per cent of the population), French (approximately 
40 per cent), and German (74,000 speakers, concentrated in the coun-
try’s east). In addition, belgium has about one million foreign residents, 
including as of 2015 over 159,362 French,156,977 Italians, 149,199 Dutch 
(from the Netherlands), 82,009 Moroccans, and 68,403 Poles.2 A major-
ity of belgium’s population is Roman Catholic (57 per cent). Six other 
recognized religions represent 6 per cent of the population, while 37 per 
cent profess no religion. The gross domestic product was €400.6 billion 
in 2014.3 In the same year, the gross domestic product per inhabitant 
was €29,200 in the Flemish Region, €21,300 in the Walloon Region, and 
€55,100 in the brussels-Capital Region.4
belgium is a federation of three communities (the Flemish Commu-
nity, the French Community, and the German-speaking Community) 
and three regions (the Flemish, Walloon, and brussels-Capital Regions). 
both the communities and the regions are territorially based, with 
an overlap of the Flemish and French Communities in the bilingual 
brussels-Capital Region. The autonomy of the federated entities (the 
communities and the regions) is guaranteed by the Constitution. Each 
federal and federated entity has its own parliament and government.5
The transformation from a unitary into a federally structured state 
took place in successive phases, mostly by revisions to the Constitution, 
followed by the dissolution of Parliament, parliamentary elections, and 
 2 Directorate General for Statistics and Economic Information, http://statbel.fgov.be/
nl/statistieken/cijfers/.
 3 Statbel, as per 1 January 2016.
 4 Study centre of the Flemish government, http://www4.vlaanderen.be/sites/svr/
cijfers/Exceltabellen/economie/1structuur/ECONECST_001.xls.
 5 For more information, see Kris Deschouwer, “Kingdom of belgium,” in Constitutional 
Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, 48–
75 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005); hughes Dumont, 
Nicolas Lagasse, Marc van Der hulst, and Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck, “Kingdom 
of belgium,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar 
Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and Douglas M. brown, 34–65 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); Frank Delmartino, hughes Dumont, and 
Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck, “Kingdom of belgium,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal 
Countries, ed. Luis Moreno and César Colino, 48–74 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2010); and Lieven De Winter and Caroline van Wynsberghe, 
“Kingdom of belgium: Partitocracy, Corporatist Society, and Dissociative Federalism,” 
in Political Parties and Civil Society in Federal Countries, ed. Klaus Detterbeck, Wolfgang 
Renzsch, and John Kincaid, 40–69 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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negotiations to form a new government. Indeed, the various political 
parties tend to make arrangements for state reform during negotiations 
to form a new government.
The state reforms of 1970–1, 1980, 1988–9, 1993, 2001, and 2011 resulted 
in the transfer of more powers to the communities and the regions. 
The division of powers is based on the principle of mutual exclusivity. 
The federal government, the communities, and the regions are all on an 
equal footing compared to one another. however, an increasing num-
ber of asymmetries can be noted in the institutional development of the 
communities and the regions. The sixth state reform (2011) reinforced 
this asymmetry by, for instance, transferring community powers to the 
brussels-Capital Region.
Fundamental weaknesses in the belgian federal model are becom-
ing more apparent. Despite the existence of three communities and 
three regions, the country is essentially bipolar (Dutch-speaking and 
French-speaking). In addition, a “centrifugal force” results in a federal 
state with confederal characteristics. At the federal level, powers must 
be exercised jointly by the Dutch- and French-speakers, which make it 
increasingly difficult to form a government. Thus, after the June 2010 
federal elections, negotiations to form a government stalled. It took 
until 11 October 2011 for the eight negotiating political parties to con-
clude a coalition agreement, including an institutional agreement for 
the sixth state reform.
The Constitutional Court has exclusive authority to review com-
pliance by the federal, community, and regional legislatures with the 
allocation of legislative powers provided for by the Constitution. The 
constitutional provisions on the basis of which the Constitutional Court 
performs its review are those dealing with the allocation of powers 
between the federal government, the regions, and the communities, the 
individual rights and freedoms set out in Part II of the Constitution 
(“belgians and Their Rights”), Articles 170, 172, and 191,6 and the prin-
ciple of federal loyalty (Art. 143, § 1 Const.). The Constitutional Court 
has played a significant role in enforcing the division of powers and in 
interpreting the powers of the regions and the communities.
 6 Article 170 relates to the principle of legality in tax matters, Article 172 confirms the 
principle of equal treatment in tax matters, while Article 191 guarantees the equal 
treatment of foreigners.
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2. Structural Features
belgium’s federal structure is mandated by the Constitution. According to 
Article 1, “belgium is a federal state composed of three communities and 
three regions.” Articles 2 and 3 refer respectively to the “Flemish, French, 
and German-Speaking Communities” and to the “Flemish, Walloon and 
brussels-Capital Regions.” The federal, provincial, and municipal institu-
tions are all recognized by the Constitution (Sections I, II, III, and vIII of 
Part III of the Constitution).
The division of powers between the federal government, the commu-
nities, and the regions is based either directly on the Constitution or on 
so-called special majority legislation (bijzondere meerderheidswetgeving; 
législation à majorité spéciale) enacted pursuant to the Constitution.7 The 
special majority requirement is based on the division of the members of 
both houses of the federal Parliament (the house of Representatives and 
the Senate) into a Dutch- and a French-speaking language group. The 
special majority requirement necessitates a majority of the votes cast in 
each language group in each house, on condition that a majority of the 
members of each group is present and provided that the total number 
of votes in favour that are cast in the two language groups is equal to 
at least two-thirds of the votes cast. The special majority requirement 
is intended to neutralize the numerical superiority of Dutch-speakers 
in Parliament and to prevent the unilateral adoption of legislation on 
matters pertaining to the autonomous status of the communities and 
the regions against the will of one linguistic group.
Unlike the federation, the communities and the regions, the prov-
inces and municipalities are merely territorially decentralized entities. 
Their powers are also enshrined in the Constitution, with reference to 
the provincial or municipal sphere of interest.8
Due to the devolutionary origin of the federation, the default princi-
ple has been that the federal government can exercise all residual pow-
ers, meaning all powers not expressly assigned by the Constitution to 
the communities or the regions, while the communities and regions 
can exercise only those powers expressly allocated to them. Article 35 
of the Constitution, which has not yet entered into force, reverses this 
principle. According to this provision, the federal government will be 
 7 Arts. 127–30 Const. (communities); Art. 134 Const. (regions).
 8 Art. 162 Const.
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competent only in relation to those matters expressly assigned to it, 
while the communities and the regions will become competent to exer-
cise all other powers. however, the coming into force of Article 35 of 
the Constitution is conditional upon the enactment of a special major-
ity act, which will also determine the date of its entry into force. This 
is because the exclusive powers of the federal government need to be 
determined prior to the entry into force of Article 35. Three delicate 
issues make the implementation of Article 35 particularly difficult. In 
the first place, Dutch- and French-speakers will have to agree on an 
exhaustive list of matters that will remain within the federal jurisdic-
tion. Until now, the two sides have been able to agree only upon those 
matters to be withdrawn from the federation. Second, they will have to 
determine whether the regions (the general preference of French-speak-
ers) or the communities (the general preference of Dutch-speakers) will 
take on the residual powers. Finally, the implementation of Article 35 
will necessitate a fundamental revision of the financing system of the 
communities and regions. These difficulties mean that, at this time, 
Article 35 remains merely symbolic.
The powers of the three communities can be divided into four cat-
egories: (1) cultural matters, such as libraries, media, fine arts, physical 
education, and sports; (2) personal matters, such as preventive health 
care (but not health care insurance) and social welfare; (3) education 
(but not the commencement and completion of compulsory educa-
tion, minimum requirements for the issuance of diplomas and pension 
arrangements for teachers) (these three matters are reserved to the fed-
eral authorities); and (4) the use of languages in administrative matters, 
education, and industrial relations. The three regions are competent for 
more territorially based matters, such as urban and country planning, 
environmental protection and water policy, land use and nature conser-
vation, housing policy, agricultural policy and fisheries, energy policy, 
employment policy, public works and transport, economic policy, and 
the rules and regulations governing municipalities and provinces. The 
federal government’s residual powers include monetary policy, justice, 
social security, safety, defence, civil law, criminal law, commercial and 
corporate law, and labour law. In addition, the federal government, 
the communities, and the regions can exercise those legislative and 
executive powers necessary to execute their constitutionally assigned 
powers.
The federal authorities as well as the communities and the regions 
all have the power to conduct international relations. Article 167 of the 
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Constitution lays down the principle of parallelism between internal 
and external powers: in foro interno, in foro externo. International treaties 
can thus be concluded by the federal, community, or regional authorities, 
within the limits of their respective powers.9
Legislative powers are divided pursuant to the principle of exclusivity. 
This means that a given power can be exercised only by one legislature 
(federal, community, or regional). The principle of exclusivity relates to 
both the subject matter (ratione materiae) and the territorial scope (ratione 
loci) of the legislation. If a given matter falls within the scope of author-
ity of more than one legislature, the Constitutional Court will determine 
which has jurisdiction, based on where the centre of gravity (“pith and 
substance”) lies. Further, the subject of legislation or regulation must be 
located within the territory of the legislature in question.
The idea is thus to achieve a closed system of exclusive powers. In 
principle, there should be no conflicts or antinomies (i.e., the mutual 
incompatibility of two laws enacted by different legislatures without 
breaching a rule on the division of powers). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the possibility of such conflicts is not completely ruled out. 
The Constitutional Court indeed has jurisdiction to review conflicts 
between federal and community or regional legislation, even if there is 
no violation of the division of powers.10
Sometimes other techniques of dividing legislative powers are used, 
such as framework legislation: the federal government lays down basic 
rules and the federated entities can either simply apply the rules,11 or 
supplement the rules and apply them.12 This technique has also been 
developed by case law, in order to reconcile federal policy with the 
autonomy of the regions and the communities, even in the absence of 
an explicit legal provision, as explained below.
belgium has only one constitution, operating at the federal level. This 
is closely linked to the devolutionary nature of belgian federalism. The 
communities and regions are recognized and legally established by 
 9 See also Peter bursens and Françoise Massart-Piérard, “Kingdom of belgium,” in 
Foreign Relations in Federal Countries, ed. hans Michelmann, 91–113 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
 10 Art. 26, para. 1, 2° of the Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court.
 11 See, for instance, Article 6(1)(IX)(4) of the Special Act on Institutional Reform, 
providing for the application by the regions of federal provisions on labour cards.
 12 See, for instance Article 6(1)(vI)(4)(1) of the Special Act on Institutional Reform, 
providing for the completion and application of the federal rules and ordinances on 
public tenders.
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the federal Constitution, that is, the constitution of the former unitary 
state. The federated entities therefore do not have constitutional power, 
although they have been granted a capacity to organize their own insti-
tutions, which is commonly called “constitutive autonomy.”
Article 195 of the Constitution sets forth the procedure to revise the 
Constitution, which proceeds in three phases. In the first phase, the three 
branches of the federal legislature, namely, the house of Representa-
tives, the Senate, and the King (in practice, the federal government), 
each issue a declaration calling for a revision of the Constitution. These 
three branches form the Pre-Constituent Assembly. Each branch indi-
cates the provisions it considers necessary to revise. Only those provi-
sions indicated in all three declarations can be revised. The declarations 
are adopted by a simple majority of votes cast in the two houses of the 
legislature.
The second phase consists of the publication of the declarations in 
the Belgian State Gazette. This results in the automatic dissolution of 
both houses of Parliament and the holding of elections within forty 
days. Within two months after the elections, the newly elected Parlia-
ment must be convened. The idea behind the automatic dissolution of 
Parliament is to give the electorate a say in the proposed constitutional 
revision. however, in practice, constitutional reform does not normally 
constitute a major electoral issue.
In the third and final stage, the newly elected Parliament may, 
together with the King, revise the constitutional provisions indicated 
in the declarations. The revision must be approved by a double two-
thirds majority of both houses. At least two-thirds of the members of 
each house must be present, and no revision can be adopted unless it 
is approved by at least two-thirds of the total votes cast in each house. 
After adoption, the revision must be promulgated by the King, after 
which it is published in the Belgian State Gazette.
The amendment of special majority legislation also requires a major-
ity in each language group and an overall two-thirds majority in each 
house.
Review of legislative compliance with the Constitution was intro-
duced only with the establishment of the Constitutional Court. Prior 
to that, state legislation was generally deemed inviolable, except for 
judicial review of the compliance of a statute, with international laws 
having direct effect within the country. It was not until the 1980 consti-
tutional reform that the Constitutional Court was entrusted with the 
power to assess the compliance of legislation with the constitutional 
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provisions on the division of powers and, subsequently, those dealing 
with fundamental rights and freedoms.
Except where a special majority is required expressly by the Con-
stitution (e.g., a revision to the Constitution [Arts. 195 and 198] and 
special majority acts [Art. 4(3)]), and certain matters with respect to the 
monarchy (Arts. 86 and 87), the following decision-making process is 
applied by Parliament: a majority of the members of the house in ques-
tion must be present, and the draft bill or proposal must be approved 
by a majority of the votes cast. Abstentions are taken into account to 
determine the quorum but not the majority. The same procedure (quo-
rum and majority) applies at the community and regional levels (Arts. 
31 to 56 of the Special Act on Institutional Reform).
The sixth state reform thoroughly revised the bicameral system. both 
the composition and the legislative powers of the Senate were revised. 
The representation of the federated entities was deemed too limited to 
make the Senate function as a chamber of the constituent entities at the 
federal level. The new Senate is much smaller and it does not sit perma-
nently anymore. There are no longer directly elected senators or sena-
tors by right. Only two categories of senators remain: fifty indirectly 
elected senators appointed by and from the members of the community 
and regional parliaments (twenty-nine form the Dutch linguistic group, 
twenty form the French linguistic group, and one is appointed by the 
German Community Parliament) and ten co-opted senators (six Dutch-
speaking and four French-speaking).
The unicameral procedure, in which the legislative power is vested in 
the house of Representatives and the King without involvement of the 
Senate, has become the standard legislative procedure. This unicameral 
procedure applies to all matters for which the optional or full bicameral 
procedure has not been explicitly prescribed by the Constitution. The 
remaining powers of the Senate relate mainly to institutional matters 
such as the revision of the Constitution, the special majority legislation, 
and other legislation with an institutional character.
It is doubtful whether the Senate will be able to play its role as a safe-
guard of the interests of the federated entities. It should be noted that, 
at present, there are other, more efficient guaranties at the federal level 
to protect the interests of the communities and regions. In this respect, 
reference can be made to the division of the federal house of Repre-
sentatives into Dutch and French language groups, the special majority 
requirements for institutional legislation, and equal representation of 
Dutch- and French-speakers on the federal Council of Ministers.
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III. Court System
1. Court System in General
belgium’s judicial system belongs to the civil law tradition, albeit one 
traditionally considered to combine elements of the French and Eng-
lish systems.13 In France, strict application of the principle of separa-
tion of powers means the judiciary has no authority when the executive 
branch is involved in a matter, in which case the matter is dealt with by 
a distinct administrative court. by contrast, in common law systems, 
which focus on the protection of individual rights, all disputes are sub-
mitted to the general courts, regardless of whether the executive branch 
is involved. belgium has opted for a position between these systems 
by establishing a dual judicial system.14 All disputes arising from civil 
rights necessarily fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts (Art. 144), whereas disputes regarding “political rights”15 fall 
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, unless provided other-
wise by law (Art. 145). Thus, ordinary belgian courts usually have juris-
diction, except where administrative courts with assigned powers have 
been set up by the legislature for cases involving political rights. The 
federal legislature has indeed set up a number of administrative courts 
with well-defined tasks. Conflicts of jurisdiction between ordinary and 
administrative courts are settled by the Court of Cassation.16
The judicial review of administrative acts is entrusted to the Council of 
State, the nation’s highest administrative court. The Council of State was 
established by the Act of 3 December 1946. Its most important power is 
the ability to suspend and/or set aside unilateral, binding administra-
tive regulations and orders, whether they emanate from a federal or a 
federated entity. In theory, one might think that this would have a uni-
fying effect across the various orders of government. however, this is 
not the case, because the Council of State can in principle only suspend 
or set aside an order or regulation. Since the Council of State reform 
 13 A. Alen, Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1992), 95.
 14 A. Alen, Rechter en bestuur in het Belgische publiekrecht. De grondslagen van een 
rechterlijke wettigheidscontrole (Antwerp: Kluwer, 1984), 812–15.
 15 Political rights are rights related to taking part in the state-power by the citizen: the 
jus sufragii (the right to vote or to present its candidature for elections), the jus tribute 
(tax rights) or the jus honorum (access to public functions).
 16 Art. 158 Const.
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of 2014, the Council of State can issue an injunction.17 however, this is 
limited to exceptional circumstances.
The ordinary judicial system is hierarchical. Cases are first heard by 
a lower court or tribunal, such as a justice of the peace, police court, 
court of first instance, labour court, or commercial court. If necessary, 
a case may be appealed to a higher or appellate court, namely (1) the 
five courts of appeal listed in Article 156 of the Constitution (situated 
in brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Liège, and Mons); (2) the labour courts 
of appeal; (3) the Court of Assizes (for major criminal matters); and 
(4) the Court of Cassation, belgium’s supreme court for civil, criminal, 
and commercial matters.
by contrast, constitutional and administrative judicial review is not 
subject to a hierarchical structure. The Council of State is the highest and, 
in most cases, the only court for disputes between citizens and public 
authorities or between two public authorities arising from administra-
tive acts. The Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the federal, community, and regional legislatures abide by 
the allocation of legislative powers laid down in the Constitution.
Courts and tribunals are organized on the basis of the principles of 
specialization and territorial jurisdiction. The law assigns to each type 
of court or tribunal a specific subject-matter jurisdiction, which allows 
the judges to acquire thorough knowledge of the cases entrusted to 
them.18
All the ordinary courts and tribunals, the Council of State, and the 
Constitutional Court are part of a one (federal) judicial system. The 
only exceptions to this general rule are a limited number of regional 
“ad hoc” administrative courts created by regional or community par-
liaments. Reference can, inter alia, be made to the Flemish Council for 
Permit Disputes, which is competent for all urban planning, building 
permits, and zoning disputes in the Flemish Region, while for the brus-
sels and Walloon regions, the Council of State remains competent.
Since the 2015 judicial reform, cases before the ordinary courts and tri-
bunals are in principle heard by single judge.19 however, the president of 
the court or tribunal may ex officio transfer cases to a chamber composed 
of three judges if he or she decides this is warranted by the complexity 
 17 Art. 36 of the Act of 3 December 1946 on the Council of State.
 18 D. D’hooghe, “The Judiciary,” in The Institutions of Federal Belgium: An Introduction to 
Belgian Public Law, ed. G. Craenen, 111–12 (Leuven: Acco, 2001).
 19 Art. 91 and 109 bis, § 3 Judicial Code.
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or importance of the case, or by special objective circumstances.20 This 
exception does not apply to the justice of the peace or the president 
of the police court, who always sits alone. On the commercial and 
labour courts, the presiding judge is assisted by two deputy lay judges. 
The Council of State and the Court of Cassation are composed of 
chambers of more than one judge (as a general rule, cases are heard by 
three judges).
The courts and tribunals are divided into two language roles (either 
the French-speaking or Dutch-speaking language role). A judge belongs 
to the Dutch-speaking or French-speaking language role, depending on 
the language of his or her diploma. The language of the proceedings is 
determined by the residence of the defendant. If the defendant’s resi-
dence is located in the Flemish Region, proceedings will be initiated in 
Dutch, while French is chosen if her residence lies in the Walloon Region. 
If the defendant lives in the bilingual brussels Capital Region, the lan-
guage of the proceedings will be determined by the language that the 
defendant actually speaks (French or Dutch). The Constitutional Court 
generally hears cases by a panel consisting of the two presidents, one 
Dutch-speaking and one French-speaking, and five judges. To make up 
those panels, a list is drawn up by the presidents at the beginning of 
each annual session. At the request of one of its presidents or any two 
judges, the Court will hear a case in plenum, that is, with all twelve 
judges present. In exceptional cases, the Council of State is also com-
posed of a bilingual general assembly of at least eight judges. This will 
be the case if there is a risk of the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking 
divisions of the Council of State rendering diverging judgments. All of 
these arrangements reflect and reinforce the bipolar nature of belgium’s 
judicial regime.
The judgments of courts and tribunals consisting of more than one 
judge are taken per curiam, with no possibility of dissenting opinions. 
Together with the secrecy of deliberations, this rule is considered a 
safeguard against the exertion of undue pressure on the individual 
members of a court.21 In the case of the Constitutional Court, which 
is equally composed of Dutch- and French-speakers, who are selected 
partly to reflect the spectrum of political trends in the federal Parlia-
ment, the fact that all decisions are issued by “the Court” limits the risk 
of a visible opposition between the two linguistic communities.
 20 Art. 92, § 1/1, and 109 bis, § 3 Judicial Code.
 21 Alen, Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law, 115.
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Decisions of the ordinary courts and tribunals are binding only inter 
partes (i.e., on the parties to the proceedings).22 In contrast to common 
law countries, the belgian judicial system does not recognize binding 
precedents or stare decisis. however, in practice, judgments rendered 
by higher courts do enjoy a considerable degree of moral authority, as 
most judges do not want their decisions to be set aside on appeal. The 
Court of Cassation, the nation’s highest ordinary court, therefore plays 
a very powerful role.23 After setting aside a decision that it considers 
legally incorrect, the Court of Cassation refers the case to another juris-
diction of the same level as the court from which the annulled decision 
emanated. This court is not legally obliged to comply with the ruling of 
the Court of Cassation. If it does, its judgment is final. In the rare case 
that it does not comply with that ruling, a second (this time binding) 
ruling is possible, by the Court of Cassation sitting with sections assem-
bled. In that case, the binding effect is limited to the parties involved 
and to the specific subject matter that has been submitted to the Court.
In contrast to the ordinary courts and tribunals, annulment judgments 
of the Council of State on acts of government have retroactive effect erga 
omnes. When appropriate, the Council of State can maintain, for a given 
period of time, the effects of administrative regulations that have been 
set aside.
The Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review cases 
involving the operation of the federal system and compliance with con-
stitutionally guaranteed individual rights and liberties. It supervises 
whether the federal, community, and regional legislatures abide by 
the allocation of legislative powers laid down in the Constitution. The 
provisions on the basis of which the Constitutional Court performs its 
review are the constitutional provisions on the division of legislative 
powers between the federal government, the communities, and the 
regions, and the provisions on individual rights and freedoms set out 
in Part II of the Constitution (“belgians and Their Rights”) and Articles 
170 (the principle of legality in tax matters), 172 (the principle of equal 
treatment in tax), and 191 (equal protection of foreigners). The sixth 
state reform added compliance with the principle of federal loyalty.24
 22 Art. 6 Judicial Code.
 23 P. De vroede and J. Gorus, Inleiding tot het recht (Antwerp: Kluwer, 1997), 250–1.
 24 Art. 142, 3° Const., and Art. 1, 3° of the Special Majority Act of 6 January 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court.
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The Constitutional Court can set aside and, when appropriate, suspend 
federal, regional, and community legislation pending annulment proceed-
ings. Annulment judgments rendered by the Constitutional Court are final 
and binding from the date of their publication in the Belgian State Gazette. 
They operate erga omnes and have in principle retroactive effect ex tunc 
or ab initio. The Court may, however, limit the effect of the annulment by 
allowing the consequences of the annulled norm to continue up to a certain 
time. All courts and tribunals may also ask the Constitutional Court for a 
preliminary ruling on the compliance of federal, regional, and community 
legislation with the Constitution. In case of such a preliminary ruling, the 
judgment of the Court is binding only for the referring court or tribunal 
and for all other courts or tribunals ruling in the same case. however, a 
judgment on a preliminary ruling frees the other courts and tribunals from 
the obligation to refer the same question to the Constitutional Court, pro-
vided they comply with the decision of the Court on the same subject mat-
ter. If a legislative norm is found unconstitutional further to a preliminary 
ruling, a new period of six months starts to run to file a request for annul-
ment of the legislative norm in question. Approximately one-third of the 
Constitutional Court’s 200 decisions in each year concern “federal” ques-
tions, mostly involving the division of competences and taxes.25
2. Constitutional Status of Courts and Judicial Officers
The ordinary courts and tribunals exist by force of the Constitution 
(Arts. 147, 150, 151, 156, and 157), and only the federal legislature has 
the power to establish courts or tribunals (Art. 146) and to determine 
and define their procedural rules (pursuant to its residual powers).26 The 
communities and regions can also, on the basis of their implied pow-
ers, determine the jurisdiction of administrative courts and tribunals, 
although they have done so only in a very limited fashion. The most 
recent example is the establishment by the Flemish Parliament of a Flem-
ish Council for Permit Disputes using its implied powers.27 In contrast 
 25 Constitutional Court, Year Report 2012 (bruges: Die Keure, 2013).
 26 Constitutional Court, no. 40/92, 13 May 1992; Constitutional Court, no. 49/93, 24 
June 1993.
 27 See Article 133(56) of the Flemish Decree of 27 March 2009 on the revision of the Flemish 
urban code. The Constitutional Court ruled, in judgment no. 8/2011 of 27 January 2011, 
that the Flemish legislature had complied with the three conditions to have recourse to 
its implied powers, as laid down in Article 10 of the Special Act on Institutional Reform.
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to the constitutional status of ordinary courts and tribunals, administra-
tive courts and tribunals (such as the Flemish Council for Permit Dis-
putes) have a statutory basis. Although the Council of State is mentioned 
in Article 160 of the Constitution, its rules of procedure and the rules of 
appointment and qualifications of judges are determined by federal law.28 
The Constitutional Court was established in 1980 pursuant to Article 142 
of the Constitution. Its statute of judges and rules of procedure are also 
determined by federal law (i.e., the Special Majority Act on the Consti-
tutional Court of 6 January 1989).
Pursuant to Article 151(2) of the Constitution, the selection, training, 
and external audit of judges of the ordinary courts and tribunals are 
entrusted to the so-called high Council of Justice. The high Council of 
Justice is an independent authority, not subject to government control. 
Its members are appointed by the King (i.e., the federal government), 
who nominates the candidates from a list submitted by the appoint-
ments committee of the high Council of Justice.29
The Constitutional Court is composed of twelve judges, who are 
appointed for life by the King from lists of two candidates submitted 
alternatively by the Senate and the house of Representatives. The lists 
must be adopted by a two-thirds majority in each house so as to ensure 
that the Court’s composition reflects the political diversity and bipo-
lar structure of the federal state. The Court is thus composed on the 
basis of language parity: six judges are Dutch-speaking, six are French-
speaking. One of the judges must have an adequate knowledge of 
 German (being the third official language besides French and Dutch). 
Each language group elects its president. The office of chief justice is 
alternately held for one year by the president of each language group. 
The language adherence of “judges-lawyers” (see below) is determined 
by the language of their university diploma, while the language adher-
ence of the “judges-politicians” (see below) is determined by the parlia-
mentary language group of which they were last a member.
In addition to the language parity within the Court, a second bal-
ance must be observed, namely, the balance between judges who are 
former magistrates on the Court of Cassation or Council of State or 
law professors of a belgian university (category of judges-lawyers) and 
judges who are former members of the federal, community, or regional 
 28 It should be noted that the Council of State was not included in the Constitution 
until 18 June 1993.
 29 See Art. 151(4) Const.
The Constitutional Court of belgium 83
parliaments with at least five years’ experience without having neces-
sarily had legal training (category of judges-politicians). Each language 
group within the Court always comprises three judges-lawyers and 
three judges-politicians.
The language group of each year’s chief justice constitutes a major-
ity (four judges) in each panel of seven judges. If a case is heard in 
plenum by the twelve judges, and in the event of a tied vote, the chief 
justice’s vote is decisive. This system is designed to avoid a structural 
majority of one language group within the Court, or a permanent dead-
lock between the language groups. Moreover, the system of alternat-
ing language majorities tends to prevent any abuse of the temporary 
majority situation. Since the office of the chief justice will be held the 
following year by the president of the other language group, the “rul-
ing” language majority knows that it will become a minority the next 
year. Finally, the Constitutional Court is composed of members of each 
gender.30
The forty-four judges on the Council of State are appointed by the 
King from lists of three candidates submitted by the Council of State 
itself. The Council of State compiles the lists on the basis of interviews 
with candidates. The Senate and house of Representatives also have a 
say in the process if the Council of State cannot reach a unanimous deci-
sion regarding the nomination of candidates. Thus, while independent, 
nominations also reflect political affiliations in a rather typical conso-
ciative approach.
The high Council of Justice has no authority over the Council of State 
or the Constitutional Court. however, the Act of 15 September 2006 on 
the reform of the Council of State provides for an internal evaluation 
system and the performance assessment of judges, comparable to the 
powers exercised by the high Council of Justice 31
Pursuant to Article 100 of the Judicial Code, a judge on a court of 
first instance, labour court, or commercial court can be appointed to sit 
on more than one such court. The reform of this article by the Statute 
of 1 December 2013 aims to improve this mobility. There are no official 
statistics on the (professional) mobility of judges. In any event, given 
the fact that the judicial apparatus is almost exclusively under federal 
 30 See Art. 34, § 5, and Art. 128 of the Special Majority Act of 6 January 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court.
 31 See Arts. 74(7) and 74(8) of the Act of 12 January 1973 on the Council of State.
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competence, mobility between courts does not tend to affect judges’ 
conception of federalism.
The impartiality and independence of the judiciary are expressly 
recognized by Article 151(1) of the Constitution. According to the lit-
erature, this provision is considered the cornerstone of the separation 
of powers between the judiciary and the executive branch.32 Several 
guarantees are included in the Constitution in order to safeguard the 
independence of the judiciary from the executive. Article 152 provides 
that judges are appointed for life. No judge may be deprived of or 
suspended from office, except by means of a judgment of the Court of 
Cassation, which acts as a disciplinary authority. Moreover, pursuant 
to Article 383 of the Judicial Code, the retirement age and pension of 
judges are determined by law. Pursuant to Article 152(3) of the Con-
stitution, the transfer of a judge is possible only pursuant to a new 
appointment and with the judge’s express consent.
The members of the judiciary are also financially independent from 
the executive. Article 154 entrusts the legislature with determining 
the salaries of judges. Further, Article 155 provides that no judge may 
accept an ordinarily salaried position from the government unless the 
judge agrees to exercise the position without remuneration and the 
position is compatible with the judge’s official duties. In this respect, 
Article 293 of the Judicial Code provides that a judge may not hold a 
remunerated political office or any administrative position, nor serve as 
a public notary, bailiff, attorney of law, in the military, or as a member 
of the clergy.
These constitutional guarantees are applicable only to members of 
the ordinary courts and tribunals. however, the Special Majority Act 
on the Constitutional Court and the Coordinated Acts on the Council 
of State provide similar guarantees,33 although it should be noted that 
appointments to the Council of State and the Constitutional Court are 
more openly dependant on political influence, given the procedure of 
appointing judges as noted above.
Pursuant to the 1998 judicial reform, the high Council of Justice was 
established to serve as the supervisor auditor of the judiciary and to train 
and select judges. In creating the high Council of Justice, the legislature 
wished to depoliticize the judiciary as much as possible. Although the 
 32 A. Alen, Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1992), 630.
 33 Ibid., 632.
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judges of the ordinary courts and tribunals are still formally appointed 
by the King, the executive no longer has discretionary power in this 
regard, because appointments are now made on the basis of candidate 
lists submitted by the appointments committee of the high Council of 
Justice. however, political influence on judicial appointments has not 
been eliminated altogether. According to recent literature, complete 
depoliticization can be achieved only once the appointments commit-
tee itself is completely free of political influence, which is at present not 
entirely the case.34
Unlike the ordinary courts and tribunals, the Constitutional Court 
consists of six judges coming from parliamentary circles35 and six 
judges from the legal profession, appointed by the King from a list sub-
mitted by the Senate and the house of Representatives. Although its 
judges are impartial and independent, the composition of the Court 
guarantees that the Court takes into account the political trends and 
institutional developments in belgium when rendering decisions on 
federal matters.
As noted, the organization of courts and tribunals is almost exclu-
sively a federal matter and is based on the principles of specialization 
and territorial jurisdiction. The federal Judicial Code assigns to each 
type of court or tribunal a specific subject-matter jurisdiction, which 
allows the judges to acquire thorough knowledge of the legal issues 
entrusted to them. It is also possible to increase the number of courts 
and especially tribunals, more or less based on projected case load. The 
courts and tribunals are spread across belgium on the basis of popula-
tion and the distance litigants have to travel to reach the nearest court 
or tribunal.36
The Court of Cassation is belgium’s highest “ordinary” court, and 
its principal task is to review the legality of decisions rendered by the 
judiciary. The Court of Cassation must ensure that decisions rendered 
by the lower courts do not violate the law or the procedures that must 
 34 M. Storme, De Hoge Raad voor de Justitie na vier jaar gewogen (bruges: Die Keure, 
2005), 48–56.
 35 The fact that the Court consists of six members of Parliament who do not necessarily 
have legal training reflects the legislature’s innate mistrust of a “government of 
judges.”
 36 D’hooghe, “Judiciary,” 111–12; the powers of the Constitutional Court and the Council 
of State are set out in the Special Acts of 12 January 1973 and 6 January 1989 on the 
Council of State and Constitutional Court, respectively.
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be observed in order not to render a decision null and void, within the 
meaning of the Judicial Code’s Article 608.
3. Curial Procedures
A distinction should be drawn between the commencement of proceed-
ings before the ordinary courts and tribunals, the Council of State, and 
the Constitutional Court. Most claims are initiated before the ordinary 
courts and tribunals by means of a summons (citation/dagvaarding), 
which is served on the defendant by a bailiff. Civil proceedings can be 
described as adversarial.
The public prosecutor’s office intervenes in some civil proceedings, 
that is, cases indicated by law37 or when its involvement is required 
by public policy.38 In contrast, the public prosecutor’s office does not 
intervene to help the court to determine whether a preliminary ruling 
should be requested from the Constitutional Court.
Any interested party can bring an action before the Council of State to 
set aside or, when appropriate, suspend an administrative act taken by 
any order of government.39 Proceedings before the Council of State are 
essentially written and inquisitorial. The Auditor’s Office intervenes 
in proceedings by drawing up a report on the case and presenting an 
opinion at the end of the hearing. In almost 90 per cent of cases, the 
auditor’s opinion is followed by the judges. The auditor thus qualifies 
as a sort of “first judge” of the case.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court are initiated by means of 
an application to set aside and, when appropriate, suspend a legislative 
act (within six months following its publication) or by a request for a 
preliminary ruling submitted by another court or by the Council of State 
(at any time).40 Such proceedings are also inquisitorial. Any natural or 
legal person having an interest in the eventual annulment of a legisla-
tive norm may initiate proceedings for annulment. The petitioner must 
demonstrate that he or she is directly and unfavourably affected by the 
 37 Art. 764 of the Judicial Code, e.g., when minors are involved in case of forgery of 
documents, bankruptcy, and other matters.
 38 Article 138 bis of the Judicial Code.
 39 Proceedings before the Council of State are governed by the Act of 12 January 1973 
on the Council of State.
 40 Proceedings before the Constitutional Court are regulated by the Special Majority 
Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court.
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challenged norm. The federal Council of Ministers, the regional and 
community governments, and the chairs of the legislative assemblies on 
request of at least two-thirds of their members are also allowed to file a 
request for annulment without having to demonstrate their interest.
Given that proceedings before the ordinary courts and tribunals are 
based on the adversarial principle, the judge can rule only within the lim-
its of the parties’ claims, except for grounds based on public policy. The 
orders and remedies available to the judge vary greatly, depending on 
the case, and can include an expert’s investigation and opinion, interim 
relief in urgent cases, non-application of unlawful administrative acts 
(Art. 159 of the Constitution), injunctions, and an award of damages.
In civil matters, there are no official statistics on the effective enforce-
ment of judgments. Enforcement will depend mainly on the nature of 
the case and the remedy sought by the plaintiff (for instance, an award 
of damages can be enforced more easily than a court order regarding 
a neighbour-caused nuisance). Since both law enforcement and justice 
are federal competencies, this does not really raise federal-type con-
cerns. Divergent cultural and political conceptions of “law and order” 
in the north and south of the country can nevertheless generate criti-
cism concerning actions by federal authorities (too repressive, too leni-
ent) in this regard.
The Council of State is in principle entitled only to suspend or set aside 
an unlawful government act. It can only in exceptional cases replace the 
illegal act and put in place its own decision.41 According to some scholars,42 
no effective judicial remedy is thus possible before the Council of State, as 
the government can take exactly the same decision as that set aside by the 
Council of State. According to recent literature, the legislatures generally 
comply with the Constitutional Court’s judgments.43
4. Judicial Culture
When belgium was occupied by French revolutionaries during the 
ancien régime, Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers 
 41 Art 36 of the Act of 3 December 1946 on the Council of State.
 42 For example, S. Lust, Rechtsherstel voor de Raad van State (bruges: Die Keure, 2000), 
345 a.s.
 43 W. verrijdt, “De plicht tot uitvoering van arresten van het Grondwettelijk hof door 
de wetgever,” in Leuvense staatsrechtelijke standpunten 2, ed. A. Alen, 305–69 (bruges: 
Die Keure, 2010).
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between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches led to the 
establishment of an administration-juge. This meant that judges were 
prohibited from reviewing any government act. Only the governments 
themselves were entitled to review the legality of their acts. When 
belgium afterwards became part of the United Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, King William I continued the administration-juge by means of an 
1822 decree.
In reaction to abuses under the ancien régime and Dutch occupancy, 
upon independence in 1831, the belgian legislature entrusted the pro-
tection of all subjective rights to the judiciary.44 however, as noted 
earlier, unlike in common law constitutional systems, which focus on 
effective protection of the rights of the individual and in which all dis-
putes are submitted to the judiciary, regardless of whether an adminis-
trative authority is involved, belgium has a dual judicial system.
Constitutional practice and custom also play an important role in the 
judicial system. On several occasions, the Council of State has referred 
to unwritten rules stemming from the principles and objectives under-
lying the Constitution. Examples are the rules concerning the powers of 
an outgoing government, which is authorized only to conduct current 
business, and the rule of constitutional secrecy governing the relations 
between the King and his ministers.45
Three methods and approaches to constitutional interpretation can 
be distinguished. First, the federal legislature can interpret the Con-
stitution. The Constitution itself often refers to the fact that the legis-
lature can take measures to execute its provisions. The executive and 
judicial branches are bound by the legislature’s interpretation of the 
Constitution, which is subject to review by the Constitutional Court. 
Second, when performing its review on the basis of the fundamental 
rights listed in Part II of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court takes 
into account the analogous rights and freedoms provided for in inter-
national treaties that are binding on belgium. In doing so, the Constitu-
tional Court undertakes an evolving interpretation of the Constitution.46 
Finally, the presumption of constitutionality, introduced by the Court of 
Cassation in its Waleffe judgment of 20 April 1950, is also noteworthy. 
 44 Alen, Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law, 641.
 45 Alen, o.c., 42.
 46 J. velaers, “Samenloop van grondrechten: het Arbitragehof, titel II van de Grondwet 
en de internationale mensenrechtenverdragen,” Tijdschrift voor bestuurswetenschappen 
en publiekrecht (2005): 301–4.
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When an act is unclear, the court must interpret it, insofar as possible, 
in conformity with the Constitution. This concept is known as verfassing-
skonforme Auslegung. It also applies to the Council of State and the Con-
stitutional Court.
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
1. Introduction: Extension of the Constitutional Court’s Jurisdiction
The creation of the Constitutional Court is closely linked to belgium’s 
transformation into a federal state in the 1970s and 1980s. The establish-
ment of the Constitutional Court represented a significant milestone in 
belgian public law. Shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of 
belgium in 1830, the Court of Cassation, in a judgment of 23 July 1849, 
had reiterated the principle that, in view of the trust the constituent 
assembly had placed in the legislature, it was not up to the courts to 
review the constitutionality of legislation. Such review should remain a 
prerogative of the legislature. This ruling set a precedent that would be 
upheld for more than 130 years. Indeed, this “inviolability of the law” 
principle would govern relations between the legislative and judicial 
branches for well over a century.
The “inviolability of the law” principle was partially overruled by 
the 1971 Le Ski case, a landmark decision of the Court of Cassation. The 
Court held that the lower courts must refuse to enforce legislation that 
conflicts with provisions of self-executing international treaties. This 
was the first exception to the “inviolability of the law” principle and 
led to the rather paradoxical situation that belgian courts henceforth 
refused to apply a statute that conflicted with fundamental rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by self-executing international treaties, such as 
the European Convention on human Rights, but, on the other hand, 
did not have authority to review national legislation for compliance 
with the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the belgian 
Constitution.
The real breakthrough occurred with the transformation starting in 
1970 of the traditional territorially decentralized unitary state into a 
federal state composed of three communities and three regions. Leg-
islative powers were distributed among the federal, community, and 
regional parliaments. The equal status of the legislation enacted by 
these parliaments made it necessary to find an arbitrator to resolve 
disputes involving conflicting powers. Obviously, it could not be left 
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to each legislature on its own to determine whether its rules complied 
with the constitutional division of powers. This would have resulted in 
diverging interpretations of the Constitution, jeopardizing the existence 
of the state itself.
A solution was instituted by the 1980 constitutional reform, which 
established the “Court of Arbitration” (Arbitragehof/Cour d’arbitrage/
Schiedshof), a constitutional body with judicial authority but separate 
from the judiciary.47 The court was officially established on 1 October 
1984 and heard its first case on 19 March 1985. While the name may 
appear somewhat misleading, it reflected the first function of the new 
court as an “arbitrator” between the newly established legislatures, as 
well as the reluctance in parliament to establish a full-blown constitu-
tional court.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration was initially limited to 
conflicts of powers between the legislatures. The Court originally had 
jurisdiction only to review the compliance of federal, regional, and 
community law with the constitutional division of legislative pow-
ers. however, only five years later, during the 1988–9 state reform, the 
court’s jurisdiction was extended.48 In addition to its jurisdiction with 
respect to conflicts of powers, the court acquired jurisdiction to review 
the compliance of federal, community, and regional legislation with 
three constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, namely, the prin-
ciples of equal treatment and non-discrimination (Art. 10 and 11) and 
freedom of education (Art. 24). This extension of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion was closely linked to the transfer to the communities of additional 
legislative powers in the area of education, the court being entrusted 
with reviewing compliance by the communities with the principle of 
equal treatment of Catholic and state schools.
According to Article 142 of the Constitution, the court’s jurisdiction 
may be further extended to other constitutional provisions, by means of 
a special majority act. The legislature made use of this option to extend 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration to all articles in Part II of the 
 47 Art. 142, then Art. 107 ter. Article 142 of the Constitution was implemented by the 
Act of 28 June 1983 on the Court of Arbitration and the Act of 10 May 1985 on the 
consequences of judgments of the Court of Arbitration setting aside legislation. 
These acts have since been replaced by the Special Majority Act of 6 January 1989 on 
the Court of Arbitration, see below.
 48 Art. 142 Const. as amended and the Special Majority Act of 6 January 1989 on the 
Court of Arbitration.
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Constitution (“The belgians and Their Rights”) as well as to Articles 
170, 172 and 191.49 Previously, the Court had jurisdiction to review only 
compliance with Articles 10, 11 and 24. Article 170 relates to the princi-
ple of legality in tax matters; Article 172 confirms the principle of equal 
treatment in tax matters; Article 191 guarantees the equal treatment 
of foreigners. In 2007, the name “Court of Arbitration” was replaced 
by “Constitutional Court,” reflecting this extended jurisdiction of the 
court. The jurisdiction of the court was finally extended at the sixth 
state reform to review compliance of statutory legislation with the con-
stitutional principle of federal loyalty (Art. 143).
2. Specific Issues regarding the Division of Powers
a. a broad interpretation of the powers allocated  
to the communities and the regions
As noted above, the federal government holds residual powers, at least 
until the entry into force of Article 35 of the Constitution. Until then, the 
powers of the communities and the regions are limited to those mentioned 
expressly in the Constitution or in the special majority legislation imple-
menting constitutional provisions. The Constitutional Court nevertheless 
supports a broad interpretation of the community and regional powers. 
The Court has put it this way: “Unless indicated otherwise, the Constitu-
ent Assembly and Special Majority Legislature should be deemed to have 
granted to the communities and regions all powers to enact those rules that 
are proper to their allocated powers, without prejudice to Article 10 of the 
Special Act of 8 August 1980.”50 In effect, the Constitutional Court takes 
the autonomy of the communities and the regions as its starting point. 
Using standard methods to review the division of powers (literal, his-
toric, systematic, or teleological interpretations), and taking into account 
the extension of the autonomy of the communities and the regions by the 
1980 state reform, the Court has thus foregone a restricted interpretation 
of their powers in favour of a broad-based approach. According to the 
Court, the powers of the communities and regions should be deemed to 
have been completely and integrally transferred to them. This also means 
 49 Special Majority Act of 9 March 2003, amending the Special Majority Act of 6 January 
1989 on the Court of Arbitration.
 50 See, e.g., Constitutional Court, no. 25, 26 June 1986. Article 10 of the Special Act on 
Institutional Reform provides so-called implied powers to the communities and 
regions (see below).
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that limitations on the allocated powers should be interpreted very nar-
rowly and cannot deprive the communities and regions of their right to 
exercise those powers.51
b. implied powers of the communities and the regions
As a consequence of the very broad interpretation given to the allocated 
powers of the communities and regions, it is usually not necessary for 
them to have recourse to their implied powers. In belgium, the implied 
powers of the communities and regions are laid down expressly in Article 
10 of the Special Majority Act on Institutional Reform, a provision similar 
to the “necessary and proper” clause in the U.S. Constitution.52 Article 10 
provides that community and regional legislation “may contain meas-
ures relating to matters for which the parliaments of the communities 
and regions have no authority, provided such provisions are necessary 
for the exercise of their powers.” In other words, Article 10 explicitly rec-
ognizes the existence of implied powers in favour of the communities 
and the regions. Implied powers being basically a rule of interpretation, 
the Constitutional Court has ruled that despite the absence of a similar 
explicit recognition, the federal government is also entitled to take meas-
ures necessary for the exercise of its powers, even if the matters in ques-
tion are allocated to the communities and the regions.53
The Constitutional Court has made the use of implied powers by the 
communities and regions subject to the following conditions. First, the 
envisaged measure must be “necessary” to the useful exercise of pow-
ers allocated to the region or community concerned. In other words, 
there must be a close connection between the allocated power and the 
measure to be taken on the basis of implied powers. however, recent 
case law indicates that the Constitutional Court performs only a lim-
ited review of this necessity requirement. The Court will uphold the 
reasons cited by the community or region, unless they are “manifestly 
erroneous.”54 Second, the matter in which the implied powers are to be 
 51 See, e.g., Constitutional Court, no. 172/2006, 22 November 2006.
 52 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution: “To make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
department or officer thereof.”
 53 Constitutional Court, no. 90/94, 22 December 1994; no. 166/2003, 17 December 2003; 
no. 49/2008, 13 March 2008.
 54 Constitutional Court, no. 189/2002, 19 December 2002; no. 49/2003, 30 April 2003.
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exercised must lend itself to diverging regulation.55 A need to maintain 
uniformity may, for instance, be derived from European law, belgian 
monetary and economic union (see below), or the existence of federal 
regulation.56 Third, the concrete measures to be adopted by the com-
munities and regions on the basis of their implied powers cannot have 
more than a marginal impact on the federal matter in question. This 
means that no harm may be caused to the essential principles of the 
(federal) matter in question.57
c. exclusivity of powers
As pointed out earlier, the prevailing system is one of exclusive pow-
ers. This choice is closely connected to the grant of a large degree of 
autonomy to the communities and regions. Only one authority (the 
federal government, the communities, or the regions to the exclusion 
of all the others) is authorized to regulate any given matter. The prin-
ciple of exclusive powers also reflects the goal of fundamental equality 
between the federal and federated entities. At least in theory, such a 
system makes it easier to avoid conflicts of powers.
In most federal states, the residual powers of one government can-
not prevent another (federal) government from exercising its expressly 
allocated powers. In belgium, however, the (federal) residual powers 
are considered limits on the expressly allocated powers of the commu-
nities and regions. The division of powers is thus based on “spheres of 
mutually exclusive powers.” In other words, the powers of one govern-
ment delimit the powers of another.
Taken to an extreme, this system recalls the theory of mutual exclu-
sivity used in the United States in the nineteenth century to explain 
the “dual federalism” of the union and its constituent states: “a great 
factory wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their revolving 
wheels apparently intermixed, their bands crossing one another, yet 
each doing its own work without touching or hampering the other.”58 
 55 See, e.g., Constitutional Court, no. 6/96, 18 January 1996; no. 68/96, 28 November 
1996; no. 105/2000, 25 October 2000.
 56 J. vanpraet, De latente Staatshervorming: De bevoegdheidsverdeling in de rechtspraak van 
het Grondwettelijk Hof en de adviespraktijk van de Raad van State (bruges: die Keure, 
2011), 122.
 57 See, e.g., Constitutional Court, no. 67, 9 November 1988; no. 109/2000, 31 October 2000.
 58 J. bryce, The American Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1888), 1:432, cited in  
G. Sawer, Modern Federalism (Melbourne: Pitman, 1976), 53.
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Dual federalism is closely associated with the notion of residual pow-
ers, as laid down in the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.59 
The amendment was enacted in 1791 at the urging of anti-federalists 
threatened by the unpredictability and uncertainty surrounding the 
scope of the states’ residual powers. The enumerated powers of the 
federal government, coupled with the “necessary and proper” clause 
in Article 1, § 8,60 and the supremacy clause in Article 6, s 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution,61 could lead to a situation whereby each time the federal 
government succeeds in justifying a provision on the basis of its allo-
cated or implied powers, any conflicting act passed by a constituent 
state is considered null and void. Under the theory of mutual exclusive-
ness, the Tenth Amendment would become the basis for the original, 
sovereign powers of the states. In addition to the Union, the states are 
also independent, within their respective spheres of authority, and are 
on an equal footing with one another.
The theory of mutual exclusiveness implies a strict separation of the 
federal and state spheres of power. In order to prevent overlapping 
powers, the powers of the federal government and the states must be 
construed restrictively, in such a way as to render impossible all inter-
ference in the other’s authority: “a mutual delimitation of the state and 
federal spheres insofar as […] the government which acts does not push 
the outer limit of its own powers.”62 In belgium, the division of powers 
on the basis of the principle of mutual exclusivity has never been inter-
preted in such an extreme way. In belgium, the notion of exclusivity 
simply means that every matter or situation can be addressed by one 
legislature only. Jurisdiction of one legislature excludes jurisdiction of 
any other legislature.63 As noted, this principle is applied both ratione 
materiae and ratione loci. With respect to subject-matter exclusivity, the 
 59 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
 60 Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
 61 Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution.
 62 K. Lenaerts, “het leefmilieubeleid in de verenigde Staten van Amerika: de 
bevoegdheidsverdeling tussen Unie en Staten,” in De grondwettelijke bevoegdheidsverdeling 
inzake leefmilieu, ed. h. bocken (brussels: Story-Scientia, 1986), 188–9; see also  
P. Freund, “Umpiring the Federal System,” Columbia Law Review 54, no. 4 (1954): 561: 
“It is the theory of two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of powers, the 
governmental occupants of which confront each other as equals”; see also E.S. Corwin, 
The Commerce Power versus the States’ Rights: Back to the Constitution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1936), 135.
 63 See, for instance, Constitutional Court no. 146/2001, 20 November 2001.
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Constitutional Court has ruled that a given matter can be addressed 
by one legislature only.64 If a matter falls within the scope of authority 
of more than one legislature, the Court will decide where the centre of 
gravity lies.65 From a territorial point of view, the Court has ruled that 
the Constitution is based on a system of exclusive territorial powers. This 
holds true for both the regions and the communities. This means that the 
subject-matter of a legislator’s regulation must be located in the territory 
for which it is competent, so that in any situation only one legislature 
will be authorized to act at any given time.66 The Constitutional Court 
thus upholds a closed system of exclusive powers. The Court has settled 
the highly debated question in the case law and literature regarding the 
possibility of conflicting norms or antinomies (i.e., the mutual incompat-
ibility of two laws enacted by different legislatures without breaching 
a rule on the division of powers). The chances of the Court finding that 
such a conflict exists are quite low. It should be noted, though, that the 
possibility of such conflicts is not ruled out completely. The Constitu-
tional Court has jurisdiction to review such conflicts between federal 
and community or regional legislation, even if there is no violation of 
the division of powers.67
Contrary to the dual federalism concept, the system of mutually 
exclusive powers applied in belgium does not completely rule out 
the possibility of interference. In this respect, the Constitutional Court 
applies the proportionality rule. The Court assesses the power of the 
legislature concerned (federal or federated) both in terms of subject-
matter and territory. When exercising its powers, the legislature may 
not take any measures that would render the policy of another legisla-
ture impossible or extremely difficult to execute.68
In practice, there are numerous exceptions to the principle of exclusive 
powers of the federal government, the communities, and the regions. 
 64 See, for instance, Constitutional Court no. 184/2002, 11 December 2002; no. 25/2010, 
17 March 2010.
 65 Constitutional Court, no. 76/2000, 21 June 2000; no. 184/2002, 11 December 2002; no. 
109/2006, 28 June 2006; no. 2/2009, 15 January 2009; no. 87/2009, 28 May 2009.
 66 Constitutional Court, nrs. 9 and 10, 30 January 1986; no. 17, 26 March 1986; no. 29, 
18 November 1986; no. 56/96, 15 October 1996; no. 51/2006, 19 April 2006, and no. 
33/2011, 2 March 2011.
 67 Art. 26 (1) (2) of the Special Majority Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional 
Court.
 68 See, for instance, Constitutional Court, no. 54/96, 3 October 1996; no. 109/2006,  
28 June 2006; no. 12/2004, 21 January 2004.
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The only example of completely concurring power, however, is the 
general power to tax. The federal government, the communities, and 
the regions all have the general power to tax. however, a federal act 
can provide for exceptions to this rule with respect to community and 
regional taxes, provided it is necessary to do so (Art. 170, § 2(2)). The fed-
eral legislature thus has the power to prevent, limit, or repeal certain com-
munity or regional taxes. Since the Constitution is silent on the territorial 
scope of the taxation power of the Flemish and the French Communi-
ties, especially in the brussels-Capital Region, neither the Flemish nor the 
French Community has exercised its taxation power. When a tax pursues 
not only financial objectives but also substantive policy (such as an envi-
ronmental tax), the Constitutional Court reviews whether this non-fiscal 
aim (the environmental objective) is the primary objective of the tax and, 
if so, whether the tax does infringe upon the competences of the other 
authorities in a disproportionate way.69
The use of federal framework laws was noted earlier. Pursuant to the 
case law of the Constitutional Court and the Council of State, this tech-
nique can be applied even in cases where no provision has been made 
expressly to this effect by the special majority legislature. For instance, 
the communities can complement the federal rules on fire safety in 
facilities for the elderly.70 Further, the communities and the regions are 
entitled to complement and specify the federal legislation on the for-
mal justification of government acts.71 The communities and regions 
are entitled only to strengthen the federal rules, not weaken them. This 
case law illustrates the role of the Constitutional Court in combining 
the unity of federal policy with the autonomy of the communities and 
the regions.
The so-called parallel powers are also considered to be exceptions to 
the principle of exclusivity. Parallel powers can be exercised by several 
authorities cumulatively and independently. For example, the federal 
government, the communities, and the regions are, within the frame-
work of their respective powers, each competent for scientific research.72 
Parallel powers can sometimes also be inferred from the Constitutional 
Court’s case law. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has ruled that public 
 69 Constitutional Court, no. 31/92, 23 April 1992.
 70 Constitutional Court, no. 79/92, 23 December 1992; no. 6/96, 18 January 1996.
 71 Constitutional Court, no. 55/2001, 8 May 2001; no. 128/2001, 18 October 2001.
 72 See Article 6bis(1)(2)(1) of the Special Majority Act on Institutional Reform.
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industrial policy is a parallel power of the federal government and the 
regions, each within its respective sphere of authority, in relation to its 
respective territory, and with its own means and institutions.73
The Constitutional Court seems to accept in recent case law74 that 
both the federal and the federated legislatures can sometimes enact 
the same legal norm. This case law looks similar to what is known as 
the “double aspect doctrine” in Canada.75 For instance, the regions can 
make the export of nuclear material subject to regional licences on the 
basis of their competence for the import and export of weapons,76 while 
the federal authority is empowered to impose a prior federal authoriza-
tion on the basis of its competence for nuclear infrastructure.77 Another 
recent example in the case law of the Constitutional Court78 is “care 
insurance” (zorgverzekering), which can come under the legislative 
power of the communities for aid to persons79 and under the federal 
legislative power for social security.80 The double aspect doctrine rein-
forces the autonomy of the legislatures in their competence spheres. 
Application of the double aspect doctrine may, however, not result in 
antinomies (i.e., the mutual incompatibility of two laws enacted by dif-
ferent legislatures without breaching a rule on the division of powers). 
There is room for double aspect only if the laws enacted by the different 
legislatures can be applied cumulatively. Otherwise, the Constitutional 
Court will determine to which competence matter the law in question 
has the closest link. This will result in the single qualification by the 
Court of the law in question under this competence matter.81
On the other hand, EU law has brought the Constitutional Court 
to deviate from constitutional power allocation principles. After a 
 73 Constitutional Court, no. 11, 25 February 1986. This case law has been confirmed 
afterwards by Art. 6(1), vI, (1) of the Special Majority Act on Institutional Reform.
 74 Constitutional Court, n° 168/2011, 10 November 2011.
 75 vanpraet, De latente staatshervorming, 127; vanpraet, “het dogma van de exclusieve 
bevoegdheden gerelativeerd: de meervoudige bevoegdheidskwalificatie in het federale 
belgië,” in België, quo vadis? Waarheen na de zesde staatshervorming?, ed. P. Popelier, Dave 
Sardinet, Jan velaers, and bea Cantillon (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2012), 209.
 76 Art. 6(1), vI, (1), 4° of the Special Majority Act on Institutional Reform.
 77 Federal Act of 9 February 1981 on the conditions for export of nuclear material and 
nuclear infrastructure.
 78 Constitutional Court, n° 33/2001, 13 March 2001; n° 51/2006, 19 April 2006; and  
n° 11/2009, 21 January 2009.
 79 Art. 5(1), II of the Special Majority Act on Institutional Reform.
 80 Art. 6(1), vI, 5th para., 12° of the Special Majority Act on Institutional Reform.
 81 vanpraet, “het dogma van de exclusieve bevoegdheden gerelativeerd,” 223.
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judgment of 1 April 2008 rendered by the European Court of Justice 
on a request for a preliminary ruling,82 the Court held that the prin-
ciple of exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the Flemish Community 
takes nothing away from the principles of free movement of employees 
as guaranteed by EU law. Therefore, the Court ruled that the Flemish 
Community did not legislate ultra vires by extending the territorial 
scope of its care insurance legislation marginally to persons living in 
the French- or German-speaking language region in order to guarantee 
the free movement of employees.83
d. economic and monetary union as a general limitation  
on the powers of the communities and the regions
The broad interpretation of the powers of the communities and the 
regions has not prevented the Constitutional Court from developing a 
limitation on the exercise of powers by each legislature, namely, eco-
nomic and monetary union. In a landmark decision of 25 February 1988, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that it follows from the 1970 and 1980 
constitutional reforms that “the new structure of the belgian state is 
vested in an economic and monetary union, by which it is meant that the 
institutional framework of an economy is built on constituent units and 
is characterised by an integrated monetary union.”84 The Court ruled 
that the concept of an economic and monetary union limits the consti-
tutional powers of the regions to impose taxes. In economic matters, the 
regions must exercise their respective powers without hindering the free 
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital between the federal 
and federated entities. For example, the Court found that a water tax 
imposed by a Walloon regional law violated the principle of the free 
movement of goods.85 On the occasion of the 1988–9 state reform, the 
concept of economic and monetary union was officially enacted in the 
special majority acts on institutional reform. Economic and monetary 
union (EMU) thus operates as a general limitation on not only the pow-
ers of the regions but also those of the other orders of government. The 
belgian concept of economic and monetary union refers to the general 
framework of the economic and monetary union at the European level. 
The European and belgian EMUs are not identical, however. National 
 82 ECJ 1 April 2009, C-212/06.
 83 Constitutional Court, no. 11/2009, 21 January 2009.
 84 Constitutional Court, no. 47, 25 February 1988.
 85 Ibid.
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freedom of movement standards may impose stricter restrictions on the 
jurisdiction of regions and communities than would result from Euro-
pean law. In addition, European rules on the freedom of movement do 
not necessarily apply to internal national situations.86
e. principle of federal loyalty: from a political rule of 
conduct to a rule of jurisdiction
In 1993, a new article was introduced into the Constitution. It reads,
Article 143, § 1. In order to prevent conflicts of powers, the federal govern-
ment, the communities, the regions and the joint Community Commission 
shall take into account federal loyalty when exercising their respective 
powers.
The principle of federal loyalty was originally meant to clarify the divi-
sion of powers and counterbalance the intention to transfer the residual 
powers to the communities and the regions.87 It was clearly inspired 
by the case law of Germany’s Constitutional Court on the federal com-
ity (Bundestreue) principle. This goal was, however, abandoned during 
the parliamentary debate. As finally enacted, federal loyalty was not 
meant by the Constituent Assembly to become a criterion for review 
by the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, or any other judicial 
body. Some have therefore argued that this principle was merely a “soft 
form of constitutional law,” “a political construction,” or a rule of con-
duct, which, in accordance with the wording of Article 143, § 1, of the 
Constitution, applies only “for the purpose of preventing conflicts of 
interests” (i.e., conflicts of a political rather than legal/constitutional 
nature).
however, more than one decade after the introduction of the consti-
tutional principle of federal loyalty, the Constitutional Court accepted 
in a decision (no. 119/2004) of 30 June 2004 the principle of federal loy-
alty as a ground for review, thus manifestly contradicting the express 
intent of the constitutional assembly. The Court’s statement that judi-
cial review on the basis of federal loyalty takes place “in conjunction 
with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality” does not 
detract from this conclusion.
 86 Constitutional Court, no. 11/2009, 21 January 2009.
 87 See Art. 35 Const.
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The Court has clarified what should be understood by this principle 
with reference to the legislative history, in the following terms:
b.3.2. Pursuant to the legislative history to this constitutional provision, the 
principle of federal loyalty entails an obligation for the federal authority 
and the federated entities not to disturb the federal structure in its entirety 
when exercising their powers; it entails more than the mere exercise of 
powers and indicates the spirit in which this should be done.88
In later judgments,89 the Court expressly reviewed compliance with the 
principle of federal loyalty, ex officio and without any reservation, when 
examining contested legislative provisions against the Constitution. 
This case law of the Constitutional Court was confirmed by the Insti-
tutional Agreement on the sixth State Reform of 11 October 2011 and 
subsequently by an amendment of the Special Majority Act of 6 January 
1989 on the Constitutional Court expressly entrusting the Constitutional 
Court with ensuring oversight of the principle of federal loyalty as an 
independent norm. An important role is thus reserved for this constitu-
tional provision in the future.
3. Review with Regard to Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is not limited to review of 
compliance with provisions on the division of powers, as laid down in 
the Constitution and the legislation on institutional reform. In the 1988 
constitutional reform, the Court was also granted the power to rule on 
violations by federal, community, and regional legislation of three fun-
damental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, namely, 
the principle of equal treatment (Art. 10), the prohibition on discrimina-
tion (Art. 11), and freedom of education (Art. 24).
The Court has used this extension of its powers to review statutory 
provisions not only for compliance with Articles 10 and 11 but also with 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in other constitutional provisions, 
international treaties, and general rules of law “read in conjunction with 
those Articles 10 and 11.” In this regard, it should be noted that the Con-
stitutional Court does not limit itself to the self-executing provisions 
 88 Parliamentary Documents, Senate, extraordinary session 1991–2, no. 100-29/2.
 89 Constitutional Court, no. 95/2010, 29 July 2010, and no. 124/2010, 28 October 2010.
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of a treaty. It is sufficient that the rights and freedoms concerned be 
derived from international treaties that are binding on belgium.
Since the entry into force on 21 April 2003 of the Special Majority Act 
of 9 March 2003, the Constitutional Court can directly review the compli-
ance of a statutory provision with all rights and freedoms in Part II of 
the Constitution and with Articles 170, 172, and 191. hence, a “detour” 
via Articles 10 and 11 is no longer required. As a result of the extension 
of the Court’s jurisdiction to compliance with all fundamental rights and 
freedoms laid down in Part II of the Constitution, the Court is increas-
ingly conducting its review based on analogous guarantees in interna-
tional treaties. This follows from the Court’s case law, which states that, 
when reviewing compliance with the constitutional rights laid down in 
Part II of the Constitution, the analogous rights and freedoms laid down 
in provisions of international treaties that bind belgium are also taken into 
account.90 hence, the Court considers the case law of the European Court 
of human Rights when overseeing compliance with constitutional provi-
sions for which an analogous guarantee exists in the European Conven-
tion on human Rights. In this way, the Constitutional Court guarantees a 
coherent and evolving interpretation of the Constitution.
In addition to the broad interpretation by the Constitutional Court of 
the powers allocated to the communities and the regions (see above), 
the Court has played a major role in upholding community and regional 
legislation in “reserved matters.” The Constitution contains several 
provisions, especially in the field of fundamental rights and liberties, 
reserving a regulatory power to the legislator: the matter has to be regu-
lated “by an Act” or “by authority of an Act.” Traditionally, this refer-
ence to “Act” was understood as a reference to the federal legislator 
only, excluding community or regional legislation in those matters. The 
Constitutional Court held that constitutional provisions dating before 
 90 In a judgment no. 189/2005 of 14 December 2005, the Court found that it “does not 
have jurisdiction to directly review the compliance of statutory provisions with  
the … indicated provisions of the treaty. When a provision of a treaty which is binding 
on belgium has a bearing which is analogous to that of a constitutional provision 
on the basis of which the Constitutional Court is conducting its review and the 
violation of which is claimed, the guaranties laid down in that treaty provision 
shall however form an inseparable whole with those laid down in the constitutional 
provision concerned. It follows that the Court, when supervising compliance with 
the […] constitutional provisions mentioned, shall take into account the international 
provisions guaranteeing analogous rights or freedoms.”
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the 1970 constitutional reform could not have the meaning of reserving 
legislative powers to the federal legislator. The reference to “Act” could 
for these provisions mean only that regulation of the said matters can 
in principle not be delegated to the executive.91
V. Conclusion
Although constitutional change in belgium is primarily the result of formal 
changes to the Constitution and special majority legislation, the Constitu-
tional Court has played a decisive role in securing the equilibrium between 
the federal government and the communities and the regions. The Court 
has been a safeguard of the autonomy of the communities and regions. 
Taking into account the devolutionary nature of the belgian federal state 
and the ever-increasing powers that were devolved to the communities 
and regions in successive stages, the Court supports a broad interpretation 
of community and regional powers. The Court has also upheld a closed 
system of mutually exclusive powers, while leaving at the same time sub-
stantive room for implied powers for the communities and the regions. In 
addition, recent application of the double aspect doctrine reinforces the 
autonomy of the community and regional legislatures in their spheres of 
competence. At the same time, the Constitutional Court has paid attention 
to the necessary cohesion of the federal state. It has introduced the notion 
of the economic and monetary union as a general limitation on the powers 
of the communities and regions. More recently, it has accepted the prin-
ciple of federal loyalty as a ground for judicial review. This case law was 
subsequently confirmed expressly by the Special Majority Legislator. The 
Constitutional Court is also playing a major role in securing individual 
human rights and liberties. In line with its federalist approach, the Court 
has limited the scope of the theory of reserved matters, thus upholding 
community and regional legislation with respect to fundamental rights 
and liberties contained in constitutional provisions dating before the 1970 
constitutional reform. In addition to this, by taking into account case law 
of the European Court of human Rights when overseeing compliance 
with constitutional provisions for which an analogous guarantee exists 
in the European Convention on human Rights, the Constitutional Court 
guarantees a coherent and evolving interpretation of the Constitution.
 91 Constitutional Court, no. 35/2003, 25 March 2003; no. 115/2004, 30 June 2004 and no. 
95/2005, 25 May 2005.
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I. Introduction
Since enactment of the Constituição da República Federativa do brasil 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of brazil) on 15 October 1988, judges 
of the Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court) and other supe-
rior courts have exercised an important role in shaping brazil’s federal 
system. Remarkably, however, the relationship between federalism and 
the judiciary rarely enters academic or political debate, or even debates 
about the judiciary itself. Perhaps this is due to the fact that brazilian fed-
eralism has always been highly centralized, and the contemporary judici-
ary has largely maintained this centralization.1 The Supreme Federal 
Court has not, therefore, articulated any extensive, comprehensive, 
 1 For a comprehensive analysis of brazil’s federation, see Augusto Zimmermann and 
Fabio de Macedo Soares P. Condeixa, Direito Constitucional Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro/
RJ: Lumen Juris, 2014), 2:577–652. See also Marcelo Piancastelli, “Federal Republic 
of brazil,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar 
Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and Douglas M. brown, 66–90 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); and Fernando Rezende, “Federal Republic of 
brazil,” in The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Anwar Shah, 
73–97 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007); Luis Cesar 
de Queiroz Ribeiro and Sol Garson, “Federal Republic of brazil,” in Local Government 
and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems, ed. Nico Steytler, 75–105 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); Marcus Faro de Castro and Gilberto 
Marcos Antonio Rodrigues, “brazil,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries, ed. Luis 
Moreno and César Colino, 76–108 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2010); and Marta Arretche, “Intergovernmental Relations in brazil: An Unequal 
Federation with Symmetrical Arrangements,” in Intergovernmental Relations in Federal 
Systems: Comparative Structures and Dynamics, ed. Johanne Poirier, Cheryl Saunders, and 
John Kincaid, 108–13 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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or sophisticated federalism jurisprudence. Instead, the federal courts 
have been more preoccupied with human rights and rule-of-law issues. 
At the same time, the judiciary suffers from legitimacy deficits due to 
public concerns about a lack of accountability in the judicial system.
II. Federal System
1. Broad Characteristics
brazil is a vast country consisting of 8,514,876 square kilometres of ter-
ritory or 47 per cent of South America’s landmass. It has a population 
of approximately 206 million, of which 84 per cent are concentrated in 
urban zones. The country’s population is ethnically diverse, with 50 per 
cent consisting of Afro-brazilians (self-declared) and a little less than 
one per cent consisting of indigenous peoples. Most brazilians are pro-
fessed Christians, 60 per cent of whom are Roman Catholics.2
Possessing plentiful oil and gas reserves, and marine life, as well as 
very extensive agricultural lands, brazil is the world’s ninth-largest 
economy and the biggest in Latin America.3 brazil’s per capita GDP is 
about US$12,100. Moreover, economic and political stability during the 
2000s enabled the country to undertake an increasing role as a regional 
leader in South America.
brazil is one of the four Latin American countries that adopted fed-
eralism.4 brazilian federalism has passed through five phases: (1) the Old 
Republic (1889–1930); (2) the authoritarian rule of Getúlio vargas (1930–45); 
(3) the Democratic Experiment (1945–64); (4) the Military Regime (1964–
1985); and (5) the New Republic (1985 to present).5 Generally, however, 
 2 The source of the country’s data is based on the last national census (2010) conducted 
and updated by the brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IbGE). See its 
website in English, http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/. The IbGE estimates that the 
population reached 204 million in 2015. See http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/.
 3 “brazil and the IMF,” International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/
country/bRA/.
 4 There are four formally federal countries in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Argentina, brazil, venezuela, and Mexico.
 5 For a historical account of brazilian federalism, see Augusto Zimmermann, Teoria 
Geral do Federalismo Democrático, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2005), 289–386. 
For a critical analysis of brazilian constitutionalism, see Zimmermann, “Constitutions 
without Constitutionalism: The Failure of Constitutionalism in brazil,” in The Rule 
of Law in Comparative Perspective, ed. Mortimer Sellers and Tadeusz Tomaszewski, 
101–45 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010).
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the country’s federal system has always been highly centralized. As 
Keith S. Rosenn points out,
brazilian federalism, like that of the other Latin American federalist nations, 
is far more centralized than it is in Canada or in the United States. british 
colonization synthesized Protestantism, Locke’s social compact theory, and 
the natural rights of Englishmen. This North American inheritance of theol-
ogy and political theory was far more conducive to the structured dispersal 
of power among many regional centers than brazil’s inheritance of the cen-
tralized, hierarchical organization of Roman Catholicism coupled with the 
absolutism of the Portuguese monarchy.6
After independence from Portugal, a constitutional monarchy was estab-
lished and remained throughout the period of the brazilian Empire (1822–
89). The empire was a unitary state comprising twenty provinces created 
by the territorial division of the former Portuguese colony.7 The existence 
of provinces dates back to the colonial period when the land was divided 
into many capitainces under the control of a few landowners. Each prov-
ince was governed by a president chosen and appointed directly by the 
emperor. The emperor could veto legislative bills passed by the Imperial 
Parliament, and dissolve the Chamber of Deputies by calling for new elec-
tions of its members. An electoral college chosen by citizens appointed 
members of the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) for a three-year term, 
while the emperor appointed members of the Senate (upper house) from 
a list consisting of the names of the three highest-vote winners in each 
province. These members of the Senate were given life tenure.
The judiciary was constitutionally divided into a Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice, provincial tribunals, municipal and district judges, and elected 
judges of the peace with powers limited to the area of municipalities. 
There were also lay jurors who analysed the facts alleged in lawsuits, 
although only professional judges were authorized to pass final judg-
ment. Under nomination by the emperor and protected with life tenure, 
judges could be dismissed only if they were found guilty on formal 
charges by the higher courts. In contrast, municipal judges were nomi-
nated for a fixed term of four years. Overall, the court system was 
 6 Keith S. Rosenn, “Federalism in brazil,” Duquesne Law Review 43 (2005): 579.
 7 See Miriam Dolhnikoff, O Pacto Imperial: Origens do Federalismo no Brasil (São Paulo: 
Globo, 2005).
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relatively well structured, although the corruption of the judiciary was 
a “notorious fact, bitterly condemned by many contemporaries.”8
With the proclamation of the republic on 15 November 1889, the 
political elite established a federal system out of the existing prov-
inces. The principal leaders of the November coup were army officers 
backed by disgruntled former slave-owners. As a rule, neither of these 
groups supported liberal democracy, nor did they have any concern 
for the welfare of the emancipated black population. As a result, with 
the establishment of the republic, freed slaves were left to their own 
fates, and the nation’s first president, Field-Marshal Deodoro da Fon-
seca, nominated army generals to administer the old provinces. he also 
instituted severe restrictions on speech, forbidding the press to criticize 
the republican government.
Powerful foreign countries, especially the United Kingdom, were 
reluctant to recognize the new republican government, thus forcing the 
military leaders to look for institutional ways to obtain greater inter-
national recognition and secure access to foreign credit. In its search 
for legitimacy, the government convened an Assembléia Constituinte 
(Constitutional Assembly), and Ruy barbosa, a renowned lawyer and 
liberal statesman, was invited to prepare a draft constitution to be used 
as a model by the members of the Constituent Assembly.9 The result 
was a well-advanced federal document by the standards and expecta-
tions of the time. besides establishing a relatively decentralized federal 
system, the 1891 Constitution declared numerous civil rights, including 
freedom of expression, natural justice, habeas corpus, due process of 
law, and a popular jury.
Under the 1891 regime, all federal powers were constitutionalized.10 
The federal legislature was divided into two chambers, the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate, as is common in federations. Senators were 
directly elected by citizens to represent the new states (former provinces 
of the old empire) for nine-year terms. The country was the first federa-
tion in the world where citizens could vote directly for their senators. 
 8 victor Nunes Leal, Coronelismo: The Municipality and Representative Government in 
Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 106.
 9 Jordan young, “brazil,” in Political Forces in Latin America: Decisions of the Quest for 
Stability, ed. b.G. burnett and K.F. Johnson (belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1968), 456.
 10 See Celina Souza, “Federative Republic of brazil,” in Constitutional Origins, Structure 
and Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, 77–102 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).
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Furthermore, a presidential system was introduced, and voters could 
elect the chief executive directly to a four-year mandate. he was not 
allowed to dissolve the National Congress, and he could be impeached 
by the Senate after approval of such proceedings by the Chamber of 
Deputies. The 1891 Constitution also introduced a dual court system 
made up of federal and state judiciaries. In addition, it provided a 
general description of the federal judiciary, including procedure and 
jurisdiction. Federal judges were appointed to life tenure, and only 
the Senate could impeach the judges on grounds of corruption or poor 
behaviour. The judges were also protected against reductions in salary. 
The Supreme Federal Court consisted of fifteen justices appointed by 
the president following approval by the Senate. The court had powers 
to invalidate unconstitutional laws and administrative acts. Indeed, at 
the behest of any litigating party, any judge could review legislation on 
grounds of unconstitutionality. Moreover, each state had its own court 
system regulated by state laws and constitutions.
Although state judges were technically granted formal guarantees 
of life tenure and irreducibility of salary, especially as a consequence of 
a 1926 amendment to the federal Constitution, in practice state judges 
remained “at the mercy of the exigencies and seductions of ruling groups 
and less mindful of the independence and dignity of the judiciary.”11 
Indeed, as jurist victor Nunes Leal observed, “There were various meas-
ures taken by state governments to keep the magistrates in a state of 
submission, such as allocating, altering the boundaries of, or abolishing, 
judicial territories, withholding salaries, etc. As for the local legal officers, 
they were generally nominated to their posts and as easily dismissed, 
so that the prosecutors and their assistants habitually became agents of 
party politics. Through these large doors the judiciary passed to collabo-
rate unscrupulously in the party politics of the states.”12
The Constitution of 1891 remained in force for more than forty years. 
The trouble with the Constitution, although inspired by clauses and 
ideas from the U.S. Constitution, lay in the fact that it was divorced 
from the context of brazil’s society.13 In contrast to the socio-political 
reality of the United States, brazil was an illiberal country with no tra-
dition of self-government. barbosa expected to see his “progressive” 
 11 Leal, Coronelismo, 109.
 12 Ibid.
 13 Francisco de Oliveira vianna, O Idealismo da Constituição (São Paulo: Cia Editora 
Nacional, 1939), 93.
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liberal constitution change his country’s illiberal political culture. 
however, he was soon confronted by the authoritarian behaviour of 
elites, consisting largely of landowners, politicians, and army officers 
who often acted in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the 1891 
Constitution.
In a 1938 article, Alvin Martin explained that one of the “most strik-
ing shortcomings” of the 1891 Constitution was “the blameworthy 
intervention of the executive power in the states for the purpose of forc-
ing upon them the rule of factions favored by the authorities in Rio de 
Janeiro, and the toleration of flagrantly unconstitutional acts by state 
governments enjoying the favor of the national executive.”14 Another 
frequent problem was that the presidential system had created “a new 
kind of centralization of power, infinitely greater than anything existing 
under the empire.”15 Through the suspension of constitutional guaran-
tees and other means, the president had been able for relatively long 
periods to arrogate to himself virtually dictatorial power.16
The Old Republic was followed by the authoritarian rule of President 
Getúlio vargas (1930–45), who strongly centralized power in the fed-
eral government. In 1937, vargas further concentrated power through 
the Estado Novo (new state), which has been broadly described as a form 
of personal dictatorship in which the states lost their independent bases 
of taxation and were converted essentially into administrative divi-
sions of a unitary state. vargas publicly burned the state flags, closed 
Congress and the state legislatures, and replaced the state governors 
with intervenors.17 To give legitimacy to his populist regime, he invited 
Francisco Campos, a respected lawyer, to write the constitution of the 
Estado Novo. The result of his work was promulgated on 15 November 
1937.
The charter of 1937 not only expanded presidential powers dramati-
cally but also outlawed state ensigns, banners, and flags. State consti-
tutions were abolished, and state governors were replaced by federal 
intervenors. The charter also represented a total eclipse of civil liber-
ties. In a 1938 speech, vargas openly declared that his dictatorial regime 
would no longer recognize the individual rights of the citizen against 
 14 Percy Alvin Martin, “Federalism in brazil,” Hispanic American Historical Review 18, 
no. 2 (1938): 157.
 15 Ibid.
 16 Ibid.
 17 Rosenn, “Federalism in brazil,” 580.
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the state because (in his words) “individuals do not have rights; they 
only have duties. Rights belong to the collective.”18 Nevertheless, con-
temporary brazilian historians tend to see the vargas period through a 
different lens when looking at rights. As Jose Murilo de Carvalho points 
out, “The period between 1930 and 1945 was the great momentum for 
social legislation.”19 In fact, labour and pension rights were strongly 
developed and represent an important legacy of social rights in brazil’s 
legal system.
In 1945, a military revolt overthrew the vargas regime and re- 
established a federal democracy. With the end of the Estado Novo, special 
legislation in November 1945 conferred on both houses of Congress the 
power to meet jointly in an Assembléia Constituinte (Constituent Assem-
bly), held in 1946 at which a new constitution was drafted. Under the 
briefly effective 1946 Constitution, the state and local governments 
received substantial autonomy, state governors were popularly elected, 
and federal intervention became a rarity. The states were given signifi-
cant powers, including the power to tax, although they were forced to 
share tax revenues with the municipalities.20
Another coup in 1964, favoured by the anti-communist U.S. foreign 
policy during the Cold War, produced a further period of strong cen-
tralization under a military regime. This regime, which lasted from 
1964 to 1985, can be divided into three phases. The first phase, last-
ing from 1964 to 1968, was a time in which the influence of politicians 
declined steadily. The second phase, from 1969 to 1978, was the worst 
in terms of political repression. The final phase, from 1979 to 1985, was 
a period of transition towards restoration of federal democracy. Unlike 
vargas’s dictatorship, the military permitted the Congress and state 
and local governments to function, albeit with restrictions. Presidential 
elections were formally held, but the franchise was restricted to army 
generals. State governors were initially appointed by the military, and 
federal intervention into the states increased significantly.21 The same 
happened to some municipalities declared as national security zones 
(e.g., Santos, a port city).
 18 See E. bradford burns, A History of Brazil (New york: Columbia University Press, 
1970), 298.
 19 Jose Murilo de Carvalho, Cidadania no Brasil: o longo caminho (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização 
brasileira, 2002), 110.
 20 Rosenn, “Federalism in brazil,” 580.
 21 Ibid., 581.
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In 1984, brazil elected by indirect means and through the National 
Congress its first civilian president since 1960, and a new constitu-
tion was drafted in 1988. Despite these significant gains, the Con-
stitution of 1988 is a highly centralist document, which confers a 
vast array of powers on the federal government. Perhaps for this 
reason, federalism issues have never been in themselves a central 
theme in brazil’s law schools. Professors of constitutional law devote 
most of their teaching to the federal Constitution and federal laws.22 
Although each state has its own constitution, very little attention is 
devoted to state constitutionalism, except for very specific themes 
such as taxation and environment. Moreover, judges do not share a 
culture that values the federal system per se. While state autonomy is 
broadly taken into consideration, there is almost no consideration of 
the federal-state balance itself. This is largely because brazil does not 
have a tradition of states’ rights arising out of the state constitutions 
and laws. Although the people of many brazilian states are proud 
of their culture and traditions, there are no calls for further political 
decentralization.
Indeed, since the 1990s, new federal regulatory bodies and agen-
cies have been established over numerous important fields such as 
electric power, petroleum, gas and biofuels, telephony, and trans-
portation. Centralization has also occurred in public security and 
human rights, through the Attorney General’s Office for the “fed-
eralization” of human rights and the creation of a National Public 
Security Force.
2. Structural Features
because brazil has a civil law system that gives primacy to statutory 
legislation, the federal Constitution is the starting point in legal mat-
ters. however, the text is rigid and cannot – at least in theory – be mod-
ified easily. Proposals to amend the Constitution must be discussed 
and voted on twice in each house of Congress and can be approved 
only if they obtain a three-fifths majority in both rounds of parliamen-
tary discussion. There are also temporal limitations for amending the 
Constitution. It cannot be done during times of federal intervention 
 22 Paulo bonavides is an exception. See Paulo bonavides, Curso de Direito Constitucional, 
27th ed. (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2011).
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(over any state) or if estado de sitio (martial law) is in place; rejected 
proposals cannot be considered a second time in the same year; and 
the Constitution forbids any amendment intended to abolish or sub-
stantially change the federal system, the system of direct, universal, 
and periodic elections, the separation of governmental powers, and 
the protection of individual rights. Over the last twenty-eight years, 
however, formal rigidity has not been a political obstacle to changing 
the Constitution. It had been amended ninety-one times as of June 
2016.23
The document’s formal rigidity has done little to prevent the mul-
tiplication of constitutional amendments, and nor has the complexity 
of the amendments helped the Constitution preserve its stability as 
the basic law. Rather, politicians have been able to change it read-
ily, despite its difficult-to-amend design. In practice, therefore, the 
Constitution is considerably flexible.24 It may be possible to point out 
at least three reasons for the incongruence. First, brazilians are the 
heirs of a centralist tradition that lacks a proper understanding of 
the rule of law and expects too much from the central government. 
Second, the Constitution’s legislators in 1988 were convinced of the 
need to include as many rights and regulations as possible so as to 
protect them, under a constitutional shield, against authoritarian 
usurpations. This necessitated constant changes in order to enable 
the charter to respond to the demands of brazil’s evolving reality. 
Third, the Constitution was approved with a clear statist profile just 
before the beginning of a neoliberal era inaugurated by the Washing-
ton Consensus in 1990, which led to major constitutional and legal 
changes in Latin America to enable state reforms in various areas. 
This happened in brazil mainly during President Fernando henrique 
Cardoso’s years (1995–2002).
Three orders of federative entities are explicitly defined, empow-
ered, and regulated by the Constitution: the union, the states, and 
the municipalities.25 The Constitution is, however, highly central-
ist, providing the federal government with a wide array of general 
and specific powers, including exclusive, common, and concurrent 
 23 Amendment 91 (February 2016), http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/
constituicao/Emendas/Emc/emc90.htm.
 24 Miguel Schor, “Constitutionalism through the Looking Glass of Latin America,” 
Texas International Law Journal 41 (2006): 29.
 25 braz. Const., Art. 1.
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competences.26 The states are left with almost nothing in terms of 
“reserved powers.” Articles 21 and 22 grant the central government a 
variety of exclusive and concurrent powers, some of which overlap. 
These include the power to legislate with respect to civil, commer-
cial, criminal, procedural, electoral, agrarian, maritime, aeronautical, 
space, and labour law; to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, 
ports, and navigation, the postal service, foreign exchange, expro-
priation, mining, informatics, national transportation, naturaliza-
tion, social security, nuclear activities, and commercial advertising. 
With respect to all these powers, Article 23 stipulates that Congress 
may adopt complementary laws (approved by an absolute majority) 
authorizing the states to legislate on specific matters in these areas of 
exclusive competence.27
In regard to concurrent powers, the federal power is limited to estab-
lishing general rules.28 When this occurs, the states can adopt only sup-
plementary legislation. In the absence of federal legislation, the states 
are in principle free to regulate a subject, although federal law prevails 
over the state law to the extent of any inconsistency. Like the U.S. Con-
stitution, brazil’s Constitution does not grant exclusive power to the 
states. Rather, it reserves to the states the powers not forbidden to them 
by the basic law. This approach was borrowed from the Tenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, even though when the brazilian federa-
tion was originally created, the provinces had no powers of their own. 
however, the powers granted to the central government are so vast and 
all-encompassing that the states are left with virtually no matters about 
which they can legislate free from the constraints of federal legisla-
tion. Indeed, the supremacy of the federal government is so powerfully 
 26 Common competences are administrative functions that must be commonly 
exercised by all the tiers of government (union, states, and municipalities). Such 
competences are defined in Article 23 and they include, for example, the common 
administrative power to provide for health and public assistance; to provide the 
means of access to culture, education, and science; to protect the environment 
and to fight pollution, etc. by contrast, a competence is constitutionally defined as 
concurrent when it creates general norms that allow either the union or the states to 
legislate concurrently on the particular subject-matter. hence, Article 24 grants the 
union, the states, and the federal district the concurrent power to legislate on areas 
such as judicial procedure, education, and sports, as well as taxation, financial and 
economic law, penal law, urbanistic law, etc.
 27 braz. Const., Art. 23.
 28 braz. Const., Art. 24 (XvI), ¶11.
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manifested that the very idea of any legislative power being reserved to 
the states is effectively meaningless.29 As Rosenn points out, “virtually 
all important legislation in brazil, such as the civil code, commercial 
code … criminal code, procedural codes, labor code, consumer protec-
tion code, the corporation law, financial markets law, and electoral law 
are all federated statutes that apply uniformly throughout brazil.”30
The federal parliament is called the Congresso Nacional (National 
Congress) and is bicameral. by contrast, all the state legislatures are 
unicameral. These Assembléias Legislativas (legislative assemblies) com-
prise deputados estaduais (state deputies) who are directly elected by the 
citizens. Municipalities are governed by city councils whose vereadores 
(city councillors) are also directly elected. brazil uses proportional vot-
ing systems.
The Federal Senate (Senado Federal) represents brazil’s states sym-
metrically; three senators per state are chosen through direct election. 
Formally, the Senate does not represent the municipalities, but some 
constitutional provisions allow the Senate to approve municipal poli-
cies.31 According to 2013 census data, the state of Roraima had only 
488,000 inhabitants, while São Paulo, brazil’s most populous state, had 
43.6 million inhabitants. hence, São Paulo has eighty-nine times as 
many inhabitants as Roraima, yet each state has three senators. Each 
senator from São Paulo represents approximately 14.5 million inhabit-
ants; each Roraima senator represents only about 162,666 inhabitants. 
As Alfred Stepan points out, the result is that small states representing 
only 13 per cent of the total electorate have 51 per cent of the votes in the 
Senate, giving them an effective veto over the majority.32 The house of 
Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados) represents the people propor-
tionally and by means of direct election. however, the Constitution also 
requires that smaller states be represented by a minimum of eight depu-
ties, while no state can have more than seventy deputies.33 As a result, 
 29 See Augusto Zimmermann, Curso de Direito Constitucional, 4th ed. (Rio de Janeiro: 
Lumen Juris, 2006), 415–16.
 30 Rosenn, “Federalism in brazil,” 583.
 31 braz. Const., Art. 52.
 32 Alfred Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, 
Multinationalism, and Democracy: beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Federalism and 
Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Gibson (baltimore, MD: Johns hopkins 
University Press, 2004), 58.
 33 braz. Const., Art. 45, ¶ 1.
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São Paulo, which on a truly proportional system would have 60 times 
as many representatives as small states like Roraima, Acre, and Amapá, 
has only 8.75 times as many.
Deputies are elected in each state for a four-year term; senators are 
elected for an eight-year term. both deputies and senators enjoy parlia-
mentary immunity, and they have the right to a special trial before the 
Supreme Federal Court.34 Their immunities are preserved even during 
martial law (estado de sitio).35 Parliamentary privileges can be removed 




brazil belongs to the same tradition of civil law developed by European 
countries such as Portugal, France, and Italy.36 however, the constitu-
tional framework based on a combination of federalism and presiden-
tialism is inspired by the United States. The judicial system is divided 
into regular courts and special courts (the latter being divided into 
labour, military, and electoral), as well as federal and state Courts of 
Justice.37 The various divisions within the court system include a 
Supreme Federal Court, a Superior Court of Justice, regional federal 
courts, federal labour courts, electoral courts, military courts, state 
courts, and federal district courts.38
The composition of each court is determined by the federal Con-
stitution. The number of courts and judges varies in each state. The 
appellate system is divided into ordinary and special courts. In special 
 34 braz. Const., Art. 53.
 35 A new precedent established in 2015 by the Supreme Federal Court was the 
detention of Senator Delcidio do Amaral, who was caught attempting to obstruct 
justice. 
 36 It is important to acknowledge the deep influence exerted by Italian jurists over 
brazilian recent law development, e.g., Giuseppe Chiovenda, Piero Calamandrei, 
Francesco Canelutti, Enrico Tullo Liebman in procedural law; Tullo Ascarelli in 
commercial law.
 37 For a more comprehensive, critical analysis of the judiciary, see Augusto 
Zimmermann, “how brazilian Judges Undermine the Rule of Law: A Critical 
Appraisal,” International Trade and Business Law Review 11 (2008): 179–217.
 38 braz. Const., Art. 92.
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appeals,39 jurisdiction is vested only in the Superior Court of Justice. 
The purpose is to render uniform the decisions by lower courts con-
cerning the enforcement of federal laws and the federal Constitution. 
however, dissenting opinions are published together with the court’s 
official decisions, and in some cases these dissents afford the opportu-
nity of filing additional appeals pursuant to the federal procedural law.
brazil’s courts have authority to construe constitutional and ordinary 
norms and to order compliance therewith by the executive and legisla-
tive branches, in both the state and federal orders of government. In 
2004, a constitutional reform vested the Supreme Federal Court with 
the power to establish binding precedents (súmulas vinculantes) by a 
quorum of eight justices (out of a total of eleven). The contents of such 
decisions bind all the other federal and state courts and branches of 
government. Currently, there are fifty-three such binding precedents.40 
Among them, at least twelve are related to, or directly affect, the fed-
eral system. For example, binding Precedent No. 2 restricts the ability 
of state governments to establish and regulate gambling and lotteries. 
Similarly, binding Precedent No. 13 provides that federal legislative 
rules against nepotism bind all three orders of government. binding 
Precedent No. 14 confirms basic elements of due process of law, which 
affect both federal and state court proceedings.41
The country’s second-highest court, the Superior Court of Justice 
(Superior Tribunal de Justiça), was established by the Constitution to 
enforce federal laws.42 This is primarily a court with powers of appel-
late jurisdiction. As a court of appeal, it decides cases in which the final 
decision of a lower court judge is contested by a litigating party because 
it is contrary to an international treaty or federal law, it would uphold 
the validity of state or local law that is inconsistent with federal law, or 
 39 The special appeal (recurso especial) allows applicants to contest before the Superior 
Court of Justice a decision from a state court or a federal court that (1) is against a 
treaty or a federal law; (2) supports a local government decision against a federal 
law; (3) gives an interpretation of a federal law that is different from one already 
given by another court. braz. Const., Art. 105, III.
 40 Supreme Federal Court, binding Precedents, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/
jurisprudencia/menuSumario.asp.
 41 binding Precedent 14: The attorney is entitled, in the interests of the litigant, to be 
allowed full access to the elements of proof that, being already documented at an 
investigation proceeding conducted by an agency vested with competence of judicial 
police, relates to the exercise of the right of defence.
 42 braz. Const., Art. 105, I (g).
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the decision is based on an interpretation of the federal law that contra-
dicts the court’s own precedent.
In relation to constitutional matters, the Supreme Federal Court 
resolves disputes between branches of the federal or a state govern-
ment, disputes and conflicts between the federal government and states, 
disputes between the federal government and the federal district, and 
disputes between states themselves.43 The court’s primary function is to 
be a guardian of the federal Constitution. To achieve this, it possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction over direct actions of unconstitutionality, declara-
tory actions on the constitutionality of federal and state laws or adminis-
trative acts, and actions of unconstitutionality by omission.44
2. Constitutional Status of Courts and Judicial Officers
brazil does not have dual jurisdictions (as in the United States). 
Although judicial organization and the exercise of jurisdictional power 
are decentralized and exercised under pre-established rules of compe-
tence, the judicial branch is regarded as a single body administering a 
single body of law.
brazil’s courts abide by the liberal-democratic tradition of the rule 
of law. Central to this tradition is the conviction that a division of 
government functions constitutes a critical aspect of every system of 
government that hopes to combine efficiency and the greatest possible 
protection of individual rights and freedoms. The idea rests on the con-
ception that whenever the power of the state becomes too highly con-
centrated in the hands of an individual or political agency, the risk of 
arbitrariness increases accordingly. A truly independent judiciary may, 
therefore, compel government authorities to respect the proper limits 
of legality.
because all courts in brazil must be independent and impartial, they 
have acquired administrative autonomy and can also propose their own 
budgets by submission to the legislative branch (in both the federal and 
state arenas) for approval prior to the fiscal year. The executive branch 
does not exercise any direct legal influence on the courts’ budgets, 
although it can impose political pressure regarding the courts’ overall 
impact on the general budget. It is the executive’s role to transfer to the 
 43 braz. Const., Art. 102, II.
 44 braz. Const., Art. 102, I, a.
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judiciary the approved budget resources, a fact that leads to a certain level 
of operational dependence between the two branches of government.
Were it just a matter of financial resources, brazil would possess one 
of the world’s best and most efficient court systems. brazil’s judiciary 
receives more funds as a percentage of the budget than the judiciar-
ies of most developed countries.45 Prior to Constitutional Amendment 
No. 45, judges notoriously disrespected their budget limits by claiming 
that judicial independence gave them the right to do so. This forced the 
executive to provide supplemental funds to the courts. however, the 
new amendment requires that during the execution of the budget, there 
must be no expenditure or assumption of commitments that exceeds 
the limits established by the law of budgetary directives, except if 
authorized by special or supplementary credits.46
The selection of judges for trial courts is exclusively incumbent upon 
the respective federal and state judiciaries, whereas the selection of 
one-fifth of all state and federal judges is determined by the federal 
executive. The composition of the Superior Court of Justice as well as 
of the other highest special courts is determined by a formula stated in 
the Constitution that combines members of state and federal courts and 
members of the federal and state public prosecution offices and attor-
neys, whose appointment must be approved by the federal Senate and 
nominated by the executive.
To enter a judicial career, both the federal and state judiciaries hold 
periodic competitive examinations and credentials. Examination 
boards consist primarily of judges, although lawyers, members of the 
public prosecution office, and legal academics are also members. Dur-
ing these highly competitive examinations, neither the executive nor 
the legislature participates. Candidates must hold a law degree and 
possess the minimum background of three years of legal practice. In 
some states, “schools of magistracy” offer training and continuing edu-
cation to judges whose appointment is approved in such competitive 
examinations.
The state justices (desembargadores) serving on state courts of appeals 
(Tribunais de Justiça) are selected by the respective courts and pursuant 
to the criteria of career seniority and merit. however, one-fifth of such 
 45 William Prillaman, The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America: Declining 
Confidence in the Rule of Law (London: Praeger, 2000), 170.
 46 braz. Const., Art. 99,  ¶ ¶ 3, 4, and 5.
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courts consists of members of the public prosecution office and lawyers 
appointed by state bars. A list of six nominees is initially submitted to 
the courts, which, in turn, submit to the executive a list of three cho-
sen appointees, whose appointment is ultimately approved by the state 
legislature. A similar mechanism operates in relation to federal courts.
For special courts, there are specific appointment rules. The Federal 
Labour Court holds competitive examinations and selects judges for 
courts pursuant to criteria similar to those of the federal courts. The 
Federal Electoral Court is permanent – unlike in many countries in 
which it operates only during the electoral process – and consists of 
judges from federal and state courts of law, as well as lawyers. The state 
and federal military courts also have their own career path.
All federal and state judicial officers are constitutionally protected by 
rights of tenure. They can be removed from office only upon a special 
judicial order, and their salaries cannot be reduced while in office. All 
judicial careers, whether state or federal, are well remunerated. Indeed, 
states have increased their court fees to finance judicial privileges, 
including special medical benefits for judges and expenses such as 
weekend retreats for court personnel. Similarly, federal judges receive 
benefits such as a free apartment, a car with private driver, and a gaso-
line allowance. While normal workers receive a thirty-day vacation, 
judges enjoy sixty days of fully paid annual leave.
Members of the judiciary and, indeed, of any other branch of govern-
ment, may not have earnings higher than those of a Supreme Federal 
Court justice.47 Judges, at any level of court, are not allowed to engage 
in any other paid activity, except for that of professor. In addition, they 
may not be affiliated with any political party. Nonetheless, taking the 
Supreme Federal Court as an example, the executive exercises formal 
power over the nomination of its members and informal power over 
the acting judges. There is no culture of substantive and strict control 
by the legislature over the nominations to the Supreme Federal Court. 
The executive’s choice is usually ratified by the Congress. The con-
ditions for eligibility to the Supreme Federal Court are provided by 
the federal Constitution and are restricted to nationality (i.e., having 
been born in brazil or born of a brazilian parent), age (minimum of 
thirty-five years, the same criterion as that for a senator), outstanding 
legal knowledge, and a good reputation. The president of the republic 
 47 A Supreme Federal Court justice earns an equivalent to US$10,000 per month.
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is vested with plenary power in selecting the judges, and there is no 
further rule or tradition conditioning their eligibility, except that the 
appointee must be less than sixty-five years old at the time of taking 
office. Once pre-selected, the executive submits the name to the Senate 
for the conduct of an oral examination prior to approval. As mentioned, 
there has been historically a tradition of easy approval by the Senate of 
appointments by the executive. All federal and state judicial officers, 
including the Supreme Federal Court justices, are required to retire at 
the age of seventy-five. This is the compulsory retirement age for all 
public officers, including federal and state magistrates.48
An analysis of the current composition of the Supreme Federal Court 
suggests some issues related to federalism. There is a prevalence of jus-
tices from the southeast, where the three most populated and wealthi-
est states (São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro) are located. For 
instance, the State of São Paulo, which is equivalent to the Republic of 
Argentina in GDP and population, has three judges (i.e., one-fourth of 
the court’s composition). The second-largest representation is that of 
the southern region, the country’s most developed area. The northeast, 
which comprises the greatest number of states (nine) and the northern 
region, the largest region in territory and the least populated, have no 
representatives. That said, although no formal criteria have been insti-
tuted in order to create federal symmetry in the selection of Supreme 
Federal Court justices, there has been a certain balance between fed-
erative diversity and population representation in nominations. Rather, 
the contemporary debate over the selection of judges involves affirma-
tive action on the basis of gender and race. The first woman to be a 
member of the Supreme Federal Court, Justice Ellen Gracie, was nomi-
nated by President Fernando henrique Cardoso in 2000; the second, 
Carmem Lúcia, was nominated by President Lula da Silva in 2006; and 
the third, Rosa Weber, was nominated by President Dilma Roussef in 
2011. There are expectations that new nominations may bring more 
gender balance to the Supreme Court. Regarding affirmative action on 
grounds of race,49 Joaquim barbosa was the first Afro-brazilian justice 
 48 Constitutional amendment no. 88 (2015).
 49 Although there was no formal rule for affirmative action of race related to the SFC, 
Lula’s government created a federal executive branch – the Presidential Equal Racial 
Secretary – and new racial public policies were then created. In this federal and 
public environment, Joaquim barbosa was chosen, and his credentials also applied 
the two formal constitutional requirements.
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appointed to the Court, on the nomination of President da Silva in 2003. 
he was chief justice during 2012–14.50
There has been ongoing debate over the control and transparency of 
state and federal courts. Judges acquired from the 1988 Constitution an 
impressive degree of administrative, financial, and disciplinary inde-
pendence.51 They prepare their own budgets, organize their secretariats, 
and draw up their internal regulations. Since 1988, they have been able 
to strike down any act of questionable legality enacted by the public 
authorities. Such independence, however, may paradoxically be seen 
as having not been altogether beneficial for the rule of law. Indeed, 
the judiciary is severely affected with corruption, and judges are often 
accused of crimes that range from diverting funds intended for court-
houses to passing lenient sentences on dangerous criminals in return 
for payment.52 A question constantly being raised is whether brazil’s 
judicial elites have become an entrenched and unaccountable “bureau-
cratic oligarchy.”53
On the issue of budget, as noted, the federal Constitution gives the 
judiciary the power to prepare its own budget. but judges have not 
always administered their funds responsibly. In 1995, for example, 
the new building of the Superior Court of Justice, a courthouse for 
just thirty-three magistrates, was finished at a cost of US$170 million. 
The building has an indoor theatre, exercise rooms, two restaurants, 
a ballroom, a bar, and even a swimming pool.54 One might suspect 
that judges sanction the excessive costs of constructing and furbishing 
courthouses in order to obtain a share of the proceeds. Indeed, a 1999 
fact-finding enquiry carried out by the National Congress found at least 
two cases supporting such suspicion.55 Although judges had strongly 
opposed the congressional inquiry, declaring that elected politicians 
could not meddle in judicial affairs, the inquiry went ahead and found, 
among other things, that the Federal Labour Court chief justice in São 
 50 For a comprehensive analysis of the composition of the Supreme Federal Court, see 
Fabiana Luci de Oliveira, Supremo Tribunal Federal: do autoritarismo à democracia (Rio 
de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio vargas, 2012).
 51 braz. Const., Arts. 96 and 99.
 52 For an analysis of judicial corruption, see Zimmermann, “how brazilian Judges 
Undermine the Rule of Law,” 196–9.
 53 Prillaman, Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America, 85.
 54 Ibid., 88.
 55 Ibid.
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Paulo state, Nicolau dos Santos Neto, became a multi-millionaire by 
constructing a new courthouse for his labour-law court. The final cost 
of the courthouse was at least ten times above market rates. The inquiry 
also found that the Federal Labour Law Court chief justice in Rio de 
Janeiro, Mello Porto, had authorized projects at his court at costs that 
exceeded 340 per cent of market rates.56
Judicial corruption, lack of accountability, and arbitrariness are obsta-
cles to realizing the rule of law. In an attempt to improve judicial account-
ability, a constitutional reform in 2004 (constitutional amendment 
no. 45, 8 December 2004) led to the creation of a “judicial watchdog” 
called the National Justice Council (Conselho Nacional de Justiça – 
CNJ). As justification for its establishment, the government suggested 
that the courts had become an “impenetrable black box” that resisted 
social change and were rife with corruption. Advocates of external 
control argued that the CNJ would be a valid mechanism to monitor 
judicial performance and discipline wayward judges who otherwise 
are protected by the corporate interests of other court members. They 
also argued that judicial independence cannot serve as an excuse for 
irresponsibility, so that the CNJ can even be seen as a “democratic pre-
requisite” that would ensure that a judge’s misbehaviour will no longer 
go unpunished. One who enthusiastically supports this view, Profes-
sor Dalmo de Abreu Dallari, has argued that the CNJ could somehow 
“transform the judiciary into a truly democratic power.”57
The CNJ is conceived as a body external to the court system, with full 
powers to oversee internal court rules and handle complaints against 
all members or organs of the judiciary, including its auxiliary services, 
employees, and agencies rendering notarial and registry services. 
Under the relevant amendment, Article 93, provision vIII, a judge can 
be removed, placed on paid availability, or compulsorily retired by the 
decision of the majority of CNJ members. Article 103-b further states 
that the CNJ has the power to control the administrative and financial 
acts of the courts, as well as “the fulfilment of functional duties” by all 
members and bodies of the judiciary. Chaired by the chief justice of the 
Supreme Federal Court, the CNJ comprises not just members of the 
federal and state judiciaries but also members appointed by the Cham-
ber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, as well as representatives of the 
 56 Ibid.
 57 Dalmo de Abreu Dallari, O Poder dos Juízes (São Paulo: Saraiva, 1996), 74.
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brazilian bar Association (OAb) and the Department of Public Pros-
ecution (Ministério Público) from both federal and state levels. Apart 
from a member of the state judiciary being appointed by the Supreme 
Federal Court, as well as a member of the state Department of Public 
Prosecution being appointed by the department, there are no further 
state representatives on this external body of control over both federal 
and state judges.
The proper limits of the CNJ’s competences are being debated cur-
rently, the definition of which will depend on the Supreme Federal 
Court. There is evident tension between the CNJ and the state courts in 
relation to administrative control and inspection. One notorious exam-
ple is the resistance by state courts to being transparent about the cost 
of state judges’ salaries. Using the argument of state autonomy, many 
state courts have refused to disclose this information upon request by 
the CNJ. Another important example is the investigation into miscon-
duct by state judges. The CNJ has argued that it has concurrent compe-
tence with state courts to investigate state judges, but the state courts 
deny that. however, the Supreme Federal Court decided that the CNJ 
has both original and concurrent competence in such matters.
Regarding the influence of public opinion on the courts, with the live 
television broadcast of trials at superior courts (as of the 2000s), the 
general public is much more able to know and criticize the judiciary’s 
operation and decisions. With the greater exposure of court operations 
and methods, as well as through exposure of court rulings themselves, 
the level of trust in the judiciary has been decreasing. According to a 
quarterly report produced by the Getulio vargas Foundation (FGv) in 
2013, the judiciary was ranked at the seventh position in terms of the 
level of trust in brazilian institutions, with 37 per cent, a result well 
below the army (71 per cent), the Catholic Church (56 per cent), the 
Public Prosecution Office (53 per cent), the press (45 per cent), big com-
panies (43 per cent), and the federal government (41 per cent).58
The ability of the judiciary to uphold standards of public integrity 
was recently tested by the controversial decision of the Supreme Fed-
eral Court to reopen a notorious corruption scandal that revealed a 
“voting for money” scheme involving the leaders of the ruling Workers’ 
 58 See Relatório ICJbrasil (São Paulo: Direito FGv, 2013), http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.
br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/11221/Relat%C3%b3rio%20ICJbrasil%20-%20
Ano%204.pdf?sequence=1.
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Party (PT) who were caught bribing members of other political par-
ties in return for their votes in Congress. brought to light in 2005 dur-
ing the first term of President Lula, the court gave its final verdict in 
December 2012 after a long deliberation. Of the thirty-seven accused, 
twenty-five were found guilty of a range of charges including money-
laundering, corruption, and accepting bribes. They received penal-
ties of up to forty years in prison. On the occasion, Attorney General 
Roberto Gurgel described the whole incident as “the most daring and 
outrageous corruption scheme and embezzlement of public funds ever 
seen in brazil.”59
The landmark decision seemed to mark the end of the country’s cul-
ture of impunity. As the bbC explained, “This case attracted major cov-
erage as brazilians watched to see if those found guilty of corruption 
would be held accountable and the country’s long history of impunity 
ended.”60 The Mensalao Case, as it is popularly known, is considered a 
turning point by many brazilian social and legal analysts. The Supreme 
Federal Court’s image benefited from a difficult and complex case, 
which finally put in jail no less a person than Jose Dirceu, chief of staff 
of former president Lula da Silva.61 A strong public expectation arose 
that the Supreme Federal Court would address similar cases involv-
ing major personalities of other political parties, including those of the 
opposition, with the same fortitude.62 Conducted by federal judge Ser-
gio Moro and by Justice Teori Zavascki of the Supreme Federal Court, 
the Lava Jato (car wash) judicial task force opened a new chapter on 
brazilian politics regarding the role of the judiciary. A set of arrests and 
detentions, including high-ranking executives of Petrobras (brazil’s 
state-owned oil company), as well as many other executives and own-
ers of a contracting firm, brought up allegations of widespread corrup-
tion involving almost every political party and politicians from both 
government and the opposition.
 59 “brazil Corruption Trial from Lula Era Starts,” bbC, 3 August 2012, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19091137?print=true.
 60 “Q&A: brazil’s ‘big Monthly’ Corruption Trial,” bbC, 16 November 2012, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19081519?print=true.
 61 About 700 senior politicians and all 594 members of Congress enjoy special judicial 
standing.
 62 At the conclusion of the Mensalao Case, the Supreme Federal Court included four 
justices appointed by President da Silva and four justices appointed by President 
Rousseff, which means two-thirds of the court, showing the actual level of political 
independence of the court.
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3. Institutional Role of the Courts
Conceptually, jurisdiction is a power carried out by means of compe-
tences established by criteria such as matter, place, and entity. brazil’s 
judicial system is complex, being divided into ordinary courts and 
special courts, as well as federal and state courts. In addition, politi-
cal agents and some administrative agents of the federal government, 
states, and municipalities have, in some cases, privileges of venue. The 
determination of competence is determined by both federal law and the 
federal Constitution.
As a general rule, brazil’s courts do not operate as a consultative 
agency. They operate only in litigation. The aspect that most resembles 
a consultative character is the concentrated control of constitutional-
ity actions (such as the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality, the Direct 
Action of Constitutionality, and the Claim of breach of Fundamental 
Precept), in which the Supreme Federal Court and the state courts 
appraise the law in general terms.63 In such cases of judicial review of 
legislation, there is no adverse party, because this model of review rests 
on the judicial interpretation of legal norms in the abstract. Final deci-
sions on such abstract actions produce erga omnes effects and cannot 
be appealed. To avoid the proliferation of direct actions of unconstitu-
tionality, the Supreme Federal Court adopted the criterion of pertinência 
temática (thematic relevance).64 Pursuant to this, the Court can refuse to 
decide cases having no “objective link” between the plaintiff’s institu-
tional duties and the content of the challenged legislation. This crite-
rion, however, is not applied to actions filed by the Procurator-General 
of the Republic, the bar Association, the Senate, the Chamber of Depu-
ties, and political parties, because these entities are seen as possessing a 
broader interest in constitutional issues.65
4. Curial Procedures
In civil jurisdiction, only the holder of a substantive right has standing 
to sue. Federative entities (e.g., the union, states, or municipalities) may 
 63 See Gilmar F. Mendes and Paulo G.G. branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, 7th ed. 
(São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012).
 64 Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, Jurisdição Constitucional (São Paulo: Saraiva, 1996), 138.
 65 Keith S. Rosenn, “Judicial Review in brazil: Developments under the 1988 
Constitution,” Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 7 (2000): 301.
The Supreme Federal Court of brazil 125
be either plaintiffs or defendants to judicial proceedings, and will rely 
on a body of career lawyers to represent them (such as municipality 
attorneys, state attorneys, and federal government counsel). As juris-
diction needs to be invoked, the plaintiff will always be required to 
commence the proceeding.66
In addition, brazil has a highly developed system for protecting 
trans-individual or collective interests inspired by North American 
class actions. however, only the Public Prosecution Office, federative 
entities (the union, states, and municipalities, as well as coalition of 
municipalities, such as the Municipal National Front – Frente Nacional 
de Prefeitos), the brazilian bar Association, civil associations, and other 
association bodies have standing to file actions of this kind. In the crim-
inal field, the Public Prosecution Office (federal or state, in accordance 
with the crime) always has standing to sue. For proceedings against 
political agents, the attorney general (the ultimate authority of the state 
or federal public prosecution office) has the prerogative to file the suit-
able lawsuit.
Whenever the litigation involves an entity of the federal govern-
ment, the action must be judged by a federal court. In addition to those 
actions provided in the procedural law for each and every person, 
the Constitution provides legal remedies for guaranteeing people the 
protection of fundamental rights (such as writ of mandamus, habeas 
corpus, habeas data, writ of injunction, and class action). Courts are 
competent to enforce their decisions and may request support from the 
state or federal police (a body of the executive branch).
because all the proceedings held at the three branches are in Por-
tuguese, any document or testimony in a different language must be 
translated by a sworn translator or official interpreter at the expense of 
the interested parties in civil cases. In this respect, court communica-
tion is homogeneous, although there is the exception of cases in which 
the parties are indigenous, where anthropologists and interpreters are 
required in order to guarantee communication with minorities in their 
own languages. As a general rule, federal courts conduct these cases.67
From a procedural perspective, the use of technology by the judiciary 
has enhanced the quality of access to information, as well as providing 
 66 See Antonio Carlos de Araújo Cintra, Ada Pellegrini Grinover, and Cândido Rangel 
Dinamarco, Teoria Geral do Processo (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2005).
 67 As an exception, when there are no federal judges and federal prosecutors to 
conduct those cases, state judges.
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for transparency of proceedings. All superior federal courts are based in 
the national capital, brasília, and receive appeals online from the states, 
with great autonomy of resources and facilitation of appeal handlings. 
The same applies to federal and state judicial electronic portals, which 
allow the parties and their counsel to follow up proceedings from any 
location, at any time. For a still developing country with “continental” 
dimensions such as brazil, the deployment of e-government is a sig-
nificant factor in democratizing access to the judiciary and improving 
procedural and cost efficiency.
Other access points to the judiciary are small-claim courts. They were 
inspired by the small-claims courts of the city of New york; however, 
they were adapted to brazilian judicial culture by Law No. 9099/95, 
which provides the possibility of filing civil judicial actions worth up to 
forty minimum wages.68 Among its peculiarities, only individuals and 
small businesses (microempresas) may be the plaintiffs to such claims. 
It is possible to file a claim without retaining a lawyer. before trial, an 
attempt at conciliation must be made so that only a portion of these 
claims is solved through a judicial ruling.
The same law provides that small-claim courts settle criminal claims 
of a small offensive character (punishments with imprisonment up 
to two years). These cases are judged by state judges, although the 
law provides for the existence of a lay judge. In 2001, a new law was 
enacted69 establishing federal small-claim courts to deal with claims 
worth up to sixty minimum wages to which the defendant is the fed-
eral government.70 Issues involving social security, in particular those 
regarding the amount of pensions, are the most frequent claims at such 
federal small-claim courts. More recently, state civil small-claim courts 
have been created by federal law.71
5. Judicial Culture
Although brazil abides by the tradition of civil law (of Romano- 
Germanic origin) inherited from the Portuguese colonizers, the country’s 
legal system has also been influenced by other Western legal systems. 
For instance, there is the influence of German and U.S. constitutional 
 68 Up to US$10,000.
 69 Federal Law no. 10.259/2001.
 70 Up to US$15,000.
 71 Federal Law no. 12.153/2009.
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law, French administrative and private law, North American consumer 
law, and Italian procedural law.
brazil is a secular state, but its society is deeply religious, and the 
preamble to the federal Constitution of 1988 explicitly invokes God’s 
protection.72 The Supreme Court has in its plenary sitting room a cruci-
fix hanging on the wall behind the chief justice’s chair, which has raised 
questions in trials in which the Roman Catholic Church was the inter-
ested party, such as the case involving the authorization for stem-cell 
research in 2008.
The teaching of law in brazil has been traditionally focused on the theory 
and practical application of the civil law in litigation. The baccalaureate in 
law is of five-year duration, and no less than two-thirds of the program 
is devoted to the study of legislation and court decisions, while very lit-
tle is dedicated to the study of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). As 
a consequence of excessively resorting to state court systems to settle all 
sorts of conflicts, the judiciary faces a huge backlog of cases. A resolution 
by the National Justice Council has attempted to address the problem by 
determining the inclusion of subjects that teach ADR in the law schools.73
The main mode of judicial reasoning is legal positivist, whereby 
judges simply apply the black letter of the law, regardless of any possi-
ble consequences. The Introductory Law to the brazilian Legal System, 
article 4, states, “In the absence of law, judges can apply analogy, cus-
toms and general principles of law.”74 This implies that the application 
of analogy, customs, and general principles occurs only if the written 
law does not provide a clear answer to the problem. Moreover, the bra-
zilian Civil Procedure Law Code states in its article 8, “When apply-
ing the legal system, the judge should attend the social aims and the 
needs of the common good, protecting and promoting the dignity of 
the human beings and taking into account the principles of proportion-
ality, reasonableness, legality, publicity and efficiency.”75
 72 The Preamble of the Federal Constitution declares, “We, the representatives of the 
brazilian People, convened in the National Constituent Assembly […] promulgate, 
under the protection of God, this Constitution.”
 73 CNJ, Resolution N.125, 2010.
 74 Introductory Law to brazilian Legal System (Lei de Introdução às Normas do Direito 
Brasileiro, Decreto-Lei 4657/1942, updated by Lei 12.376/2010). http://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/Del4657compilado.htm.
 75 brazilian Civil Procedure Code (Código de Processo Civil, Lei n. 13105/2015). http://
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2015/lei/l13105.htm.
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brazil’s judicial culture emphasizes logic, especially syllogism. Logical-
systematic, teleological, and grammatical approaches to interpretation 
tend to prevail, although historical interpretation is used as well. There 
is also a tendency towards excessive technicality in the teaching of law, 
reducing the time for humanistic and philosophical subjects. In this 
regard, there has been an increasing impoverishment of the legal philo-
sophical culture and an increasing prevalence of a more technical or 
strictly procedural culture.
On the other hand, there has been a considerable proliferation of 
postgraduate courses in law, which arguably foster greater scientific 
rigour in the conduct of legal research. These programs are accredited 
by a special agency of the Ministry of Education called CAPES, and they 
require faculty and students to publish their research periodically and 
systematically. Master’s and PhD programs in law have been regarded 
as forms of professional development for judges, public attorneys, and 
prosecutors. They are also considered important credentials for both 
entry and advancement in the career path of magistrates and other 
legal state careers. This of course applies even more strongly to anyone 
wishing to pursue an academic career in law, because university law 
programs evaluated by the Ministry of Education take into account the 
number of academic staff holding a PhD and/or an LLM.
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
1. General Tendencies
The final arbiter of the meaning of state law can be either a state or fed-
eral court, depending on the parties or the matter involved. The basic 
codes are federal, but whether litigants bring a case in state or federal 
courts does not depend on the legislation applied. Rather, it depends on 
the federal government having an interest in the outcome, or if one of 
its federal agencies is a party in the litigation. In such a case, the matter 
is brought to the federal court.
If a court decision is alleged to contravene a treaty or federal law, or 
a court interprets the federal law differently from another court, the 
decision can be reviewed on special appeal by the Superior Court of 
Justice, the second-highest federal court. If the decision conflicts with a 
provision of the federal Constitution, or declares a treaty or federal law 
unconstitutional, or upholds the constitutionality of a state or local act, 
then an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Federal Court may also 
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be taken. The Supreme Federal Court frequently strikes down state and 
municipal constitutional or statutory provisions because of conflicts 
with the federal Constitution or federal law, or invasions of powers 
delegated to the federal government.76 Curiously, however, one rarely 
finds any case law invalidating federal legislation for invading powers 
reserved to the states. As Rosenn explains,
This is because brazilian Constitutions have granted far greater powers 
to the federal government than the U.S. Constitution. In addition, brazil 
has no analogue to the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, nor 
has it had a group of Supreme Court judges who have assumed the role 
of protecting state’s rights from infringement by the federal legislation.77
The Supreme Federal Court has selected a set of cases and has called 
them “historical trials.”78 These cases date back to the colonial period, 
but include cases decided during the republican and federal eras. The 
court has identified at least four different cases directly related to fed-
eralism. They are (1) the case of the Federalist Revolution (1892–95), 
which involved two political groups in the State of Rio Grande do Sul 
and concerned claims for greater state autonomy from the federal gov-
ernment; (2) the case of the Municipal Council of the Federal District 
(then in Rio de Janeiro) during the presidential term of Nilo Peçanha 
(1909), which concerned a dispute between two legislatures that had 
been established for the same purpose; (3) the Contestado War (1900–
16), involving a dispute over territorial boundaries between the States 
of Santa Catarina and Paraná; and (4) President Nilo Peçanha’s case 
on the duplicity of government in Rio de Janeiro in 1914. During these 
periods, unitarism and centralism prevailed as a result of the increasing 
role of the federal government in settling such regional conflicts.
More recently, and especially since the 1990s, the theme of state reform 
has permeated discussion of the country’s federal system. Subject mat-
ters such as privatization, distribution and transfer of funds to states 
 76 See, e.g., ADI 1472 (D.J. 25 Oct. 2002); ADI 1918 (D.J. 1 Aug 2003); ADI 2487 (D.J. 1 
Dec. 2004).
 77 Rosenn, “Federalism in brazil,” 585. See also vanessa Elias de Oliveira, “Poder 
Judiciário: árbitro dos conflitos constitucionais entre estados e união,” Lua Nova, 2009, 
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0102-64452009000300011&script=sci_arttext.
 78 “Julgamentos históricos,” Supremo Tribunal Federal, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/
cms/verTexto.asp?servico=sobreStfConhecaStfJulgamentohistorico.
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and municipalities, the social security system, fiscal wars between the 
union and the states and among the states, basic sanitation, transpar-
ency and accountability, and assurance of minority rights are examples 
of some of the leading themes triggering conflicts between the federal 
government and the states and/or municipalities.79
2. Specific Issues
There are three critical areas in which the courts, especially the Supreme 
Federal Court, have shaped brazil’s federal system: (1) human rights, 
particularly the rights of indigenous minorities; (2) the distribution of 
gas-and-oil royalties from offshore exploitation; and (3) “fiscal federal-
ism,” especially the theme of a “fiscal war” between the union and the 
states. Other themes involve the coordination of elections and referen-
dums and the control of state court activities.
In relation to fiscal federalism, the Constitution of 1988 increased 
the revenue capacity of states and municipalities by transferring fis-
cal resources from the federal government to these orders of govern-
ment. yet such a significant transfer of resources to these governments 
was not followed by a proper redefinition of responsibilities between 
the different orders of federative power. Indeed, brazil’s federal sys-
tem remains extremely centralized because the current Constitution 
did not expand the areas that fell under the responsibility of state and 
municipal governments in the same proportion that it increased their 
revenues.
On indigenous rights, the case of Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous 
Reserve Demarcation decided in 2009 has set an important precedent 
in the acknowledgment of an extensive indigenous area in the State of 
Roraima (northern region of the Amazon), and the legality of its demar-
cation, performed by the National Indian Foundation and approved 
by the Ministry of Justice (bodies of the federal executive branch). by 
means of a class action filed by two senators, the case defined the conflict 
between the interested parties, the State of Roraima, and the municipali-
ties, on the one part, and the federal government, on the other, abiding 
by the criterion of the model of continued demarcation of indigenous 
 79 See Gilberto M.A. Rodrigues, “Impacts of Globalization on Strategies for Competition 
in Subnational Governments: The Case of brazil” (Paper presented at Forum of 
Federations, Federalism in a Globalizing World, New Delhi, 5–6 Aug. 2003), http://
www.forumfed.org/libdocs/InFedGlob03/302FGlob0308-Rodrigues.htm.
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lands, as adopted by the federal government to the advantage of indig-
enous peoples.80
The decision on indigenous rights preserved the model of continued 
demarcation and preservation of indigenous lands for indigenous peo-
ples, which is said to be critical to the survival of ethnic groups that 
historically have been living therein, dismissing state and municipal 
claims that invoked loss to legal rights in the determination and the use 
of their territories. but the judgment has gone further and has deter-
mined that hereafter the demarcation process of indigenous lands shall 
require the participation of the affected states and municipalities (prin-
ciple of participatory federalism). Furthermore, the federal government 
is authorized to enter the indigenous territory in order to fight organ-
ized crime and safeguard national security, as it is located in areas that 
border neighbouring countries.
Another issue of a federal nature is the “fiscal war” between the union, 
states, and municipalities. The matter involves several claims that have 
been filed in the Supreme Federal Court. One of them deserves special 
attention. It is related to the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI-
875) filed by the governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul against the 
president of the republic in order to plead that the criteria for appor-
tionment of the States Participation Fund were unconstitutional. The 
federal Constitution requires that these criteria be defined by a sup-
plementary law with a view to promoting social-economic balance 
among the federative entities. In justifying its decision, the Supreme 
Federal Court declared the unconstitutionality of the acts performed, 
and defined a period of almost two years (i.e., until 12 December 2012) 
for the National Congress to reduce conflict between the states and the 
federal government in relation to the transfer of funds. This mediat-
ing conduct adopted by the court denotes, on one hand, respect for the 
federal legislative branch as the original jurisdiction for settlement of 
an issue that carries strong political connotation, while it ensures, on 
the other, compliance with the constitutional provision that defines the 
criteria to be established for such a theme.81
One of the most significant cases in the current debate over federal-
ism involves the distribution of royalties from oil and gas exploitation. 
 80 Raposa Serra do Sol (Indigenous Peoples’ Land Case), Pet. N. 3.338-RR (D.O.U.,  
25 September 2009).
 81 Supreme Federal Court, ADI-875, http://www.sbdp.org.br/arquivos/material/970_
ADI_875_-_Inteiro_teor.pdf.
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Pursuant to the federal Constitution and the rules established by ordi-
nary legislation, the states and coastal municipalities were to receive a 
percentage of such benefits. however, considerable discoveries in 2006 
of oil and gas off brazil’s Atlantic coast triggered a legal and politi-
cal battle between the union, states, and municipalities. Considering 
the location of those newly discovered reserves, only three states were 
allowed to enjoy the benefits of royalties arising out of the exploitation 
of such resources: Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, and São Paulo. As a 
result, the National Congress passed Federal Law No. 12.734/2012 (on 
23 March 2013) amending the former rules of Federal Law No. 9.478/97. 
This amendment drastically changed the criteria for distributing royal-
ties, with a view to benefiting all the remaining states.
The change has affected not only future exploitation contracts but 
also those currently in effect. Since the State of Rio de Janeiro was the 
most adversely affected by the new mode of distribution, it challenged 
the new rules by means of a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality before 
the Supreme Federal Court, requesting a provisional remedy in order to 
invalidate the effects of the law. Reporting on the action, Justice Car-
mem Lucia commented, “This is an issue whose seriousness is specific 
to large federative themes.” She decided to grant a provisional remedy 
ad referendum to the court in plenary session, but also anticipated her 
position by criticizing the change to the system in light of federative 
principles. Justice Lucia stated, “Some federated entities – States and 
Municipalities – in whose territory there is oil or natural gas exploi-
tation, or which is bordering the exploitation area, have been consti-
tutionally protected in the sharing of resources arising out of such an 
activity.”82 In May 2015, Justice Carmen Lucia issued another provi-
sional measure to suspend the effects of the equal distribution of royal-
ties amongst the states that had been introduced by the Law of Gas and 
Oil enacted by President Dilma Roussef. by June 2016, the case had yet 
to receive a final ruling, but it shows how the interests of states border-
ing the oil and gas exploitation territory are potentially shaped by the 
federal system. The case is highly significant in bringing federal issues 
before the Supreme Federal Court to an extent that has never been seen 
before in brazil.
Regarding the organization and coordination of electoral processes, it 
is important to consider the role played by the Superior Electoral Court 
 82 ADI 4917 (D.J. 18 Mar. 2013).
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(Tribunal Superior Eleitoral). The creation of new states, as well as the 
dismemberment of existing states, can occur only by referendum, which 
must be organized and coordinated by the Superior Electoral Court. 
Any conflict involving the boundaries between two or more municipal-
ities, however, is settled by the state courts, not federal courts. In view 
of the unavoidable political pressures arising out of electoral disputes, 
the role of the Superior Electoral Court in providing stability, legal 
security, and reliability in brazil’s elections has been very significant.
Finally, implementation of the National Justice Council (NJC) has 
caused several federative conflicts concerning the extent of its powers 
vis-à-vis the autonomy of state courts. In particular, in the Direct Action 
of Unconstitutionality (ADI-4638) filed by the brazilian Association 
of Magistrates against the NJC, a six-to-five majority of the Supreme 
Federal Court decided, in a plenary judgment delivered in 2012, that 
the NJC has original and concurrent powers to oversee the activities 
of both federal and state judges, and therefore the power to establish 
disciplinary proceedings against any member, federal or state, of the 
judiciary. This court ruling has obvious federal implications because it 
reveals that the NJC, in exercising its external control over the activi-
ties of state judiciaries, is not restricted to any considerations regarding 
state autonomy. According to the court, the NJC’s Office of the Inspec-
tor General may conduct an investigation of a state court whose state 
inspector’s office has not yet concluded an investigation on the same 
subject. In short, the NJC does not hold only subsidiary powers, but 
rather holds original and concurrent powers with those of state courts.
V. Conclusion
because brazil’s federation is highly centralized, federal issues tend to 
be of lesser importance than issues concerning human rights and the 
rule of law. Indeed, most of the recent decisions of courts, while reaffirm-
ing their commitment to the rule of law and democracy, tend to operate 
in apparent conflict with the principle of state autonomy. In the field of 
human rights, advocates of a more centralized state have prevailed over 
federalists because many violations of human rights have occurred due 
to omission or action by brazil’s states.
The judiciary, and the Supreme Federal Court as its highest instance, 
has been a middling actor in shaping federal arrangements. As noted 
above, its role has been much more effective in empowering the cen-
tral government and federal policies, purportedly as a guardian of 
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democracy, human rights, and transparency, rather than in protecting 
states’ competences, acts, and interests.
This chapter has addressed some important aspects of the federal tra-
dition in brazil. It has explained how the country has always possessed 
a highly centralized federal system. It has also discussed the histori-
cal role of the judiciary as a guardian of the federal Constitution. As a 
constitutional court, the Supreme Federal Court has regularly exercised 
its basic role as the guardian of a highly centralized constitution that 
accords virtually all legislative power to the central legislature, either 
by enforcing constitutional rules (such as in the case of Raposa Serra do 
Sol) or by paving the way for legislative solutions involving federal-
state-municipal conflicts (such as in the case of the “fiscal war”). Faced 
with the opportunity to decide on the gas-and-oil case, the Supreme 
Federal Court will be able to deliberate on important federal issues, 
thus raising the prospect that practical solutions might be presented, 
which could then be applied to resolve any future conflict between the 
different orders of government.
5  The Supreme Court of Canada:  
The Concept of Cooperative Federalism  
and Its Effect on the balance of Power
eugénie brouillet
I. Introduction
Canada is one of the world’s oldest democratic federations. Its birth 
in 1867, and its evolution over time, were both marked by the coex-
istence of communities with distinct languages and cultures, whether 
Aboriginal, French-speaking, or English-speaking. The federation later 
accepted immigrants with many ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The 
country’s past as a british colony also left its mark on its institutions, 
including its constitutional monarchy, parliamentary regime, and sys-
tem of judicial organization.
Changes to the Canadian federation have been mainly the work of 
the courts, primarily because of the huge difficulties faced by the fed-
eral and provincial governments in formally amending the constitu-
tional texts. The courts of final resort in the constitutional field have, in 
performing their duties, developed extensive jurisprudence in the area 
of federative disputes.1 The dualistic approach to power-sharing pro-
moted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London (the 
court of final appeal for Canadian cases until 1949) has been followed 
by the more cooperative approach to Canadian federalism exempli-
fied in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. The original 
*  I would like to thank all the participants in the Canadian round table on 28 March 
2012 in Montreal that discussed the theme examined in this book. Many of the ideas 
from the discussion were useful in preparing this chapter.
 1 The term federative disputes refers here to disputes about sharing legislative powers 
and disputes that involve a fundamental aspect of the country’s federative structure, 
such as the constitutional amendment procedure, the legal status of the federal and 
federated entities, or the territory of a federated entity and its authority to secede.
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federative system, essentially based on the principle of exclusive pow-
ers, has been gradually transformed into a system of overlapping 
powers. This mutation has had significant consequences for the bal-
ance of power between the federal and provincial governments.
II. The Federative System
In this section, we will outline the general and structural characteristics 
of Canada’s federation.
1. General Characteristics of the Federation
Territorially, Canada is the world’s second-largest country, with an area 
of almost 10 million square kilometres. It stretches east to west from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, and northwards to the Arctic Ocean. In 
2011, it had a population of 33.5 million people, concentrated mainly in 
the south along the U.S. border, and a per-capita gross domestic prod-
uct of $52,367.2 Canada, with one of the lowest population densities in 
the world, is composed of ten provinces and three territories. It has a 
wealth of natural resources and freshwater reserves, and is one of the 
world’s largest suppliers of agricultural products.
Canada defines itself as a bilingual, multicultural nation. Its official 
languages are French and English. According to the 2011 census, people 
having English as their mother tongue constitute 57 per cent of the popu-
lation, followed by those with French as their mother tongue at 22 per 
cent, and those with another language as their mother tongue at 19.8 per 
cent. A total of 90 per cent of Canada’s French-speakers live in the prov-
ince of Quebec, where they make up 79.7 per cent of the population. The 
country’s remaining French-speakers are found mainly in New brun-
swick (32.5 per cent of the population), and then in Ontario, which has a 
French-speaking population of 4.4 per cent. Outside Quebec, 4.2 per cent 
of the Canadian population speaks French as its mother tongue. Accord-
ing to the 2006 census, Aboriginals make up 3.8 per cent of Canada’s 
population and live mainly in northern and western Canada.3
 2 Statistics Canada, bank of Canada, “Canada – Economic Indicators,” n.d., http://
www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/assets/pdfs/Data/indicators-
indicateurs/Annual_Ec_Indicators-ENG.pdf.
 3 Statistics Canada, “2011 Census Program,” http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-
recensement/2011/dp-pd/index-eng.cfm.
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During the course of its history, Canada has always welcomed large 
numbers of immigrants, with each succeeding wave increasing the 
country’s ethnic and cultural diversity. The Canadian population today 
comprises over 200 different ethnic communities. In 1971, the Canadian 
government introduced a policy of multiculturalism, first as part of a 
statute, and then, in 1982, as part of the Canadian Constitution, where 
it is one of the principles used to interpret the provisions of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (s. 27).4
Prior to French colonization of North America in 1608, the territory 
of Canada had been occupied for several thousand years by roughly 
500,000 Aboriginals from various historical and linguistic nations. The 
side-by-side presence of French and English communities began when 
the territory of New France (a French colony from 1608 to 1759) was 
conquered by the british, a victory consecrated in legal terms by the 
1763 Treaty of Paris. The same year, part of the conquered territory became 
the Province of Quebec under the Royal Proclamation. In 1774, the Quebec 
Act extended the boundaries of the province to match those of the for-
mer New France. The act also authorized the application of French civil 
law within the province; hence, Quebec, unlike the other provinces that 
function under a common-law system, still uses civil law. The years 
1776–87 saw the arrival of large numbers of british immigrants, fol-
lowed by American loyalists fleeing the War of Independence, who 
settled mainly in the western portion of Quebec. In 1791, the british 
Parliament passed an act that modified the territorial boundaries of 
its colony to match the new socio-cultural order. The western part of 
Quebec was detached to form a new province, Upper Canada, while 
Quebec became Lower Canada, retaining a large French-speaking, 
Catholic majority, in contrast to Ontario, which was overwhelmingly 
English-speaking and Protestant. Each of the two new provinces was 
given its own legislative assembly (Constitutional Act, 1791).
During the 1830s, a broad-based movement to obtain the administra-
tive independence of the colonies from the mother country led to armed 
popular uprisings that were quickly suppressed by the british army. To 
quell the calls for autonomy that were far more insistent in Lower Can-
ada (today’s Quebec), the british Parliament decided by the Act of Union 
of 1840 to combine Lower and Upper Canada into a single colony, with 
the avowed intention of assimilating the French-speaking population by 
 4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Schedule b of the Constitution Act, 
1982, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, no. 44.
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making it the minority in a united parliament. Despite London’s plans, 
however, the united Province of Canada remained composed of two sep-
arate groups in sociological, cultural, and political terms. The legislative 
union was transformed by the facts of the situation into a federative-type 
regime in which each of the two cultural entities administered its own 
affairs5 in the part of the province in which it formed the majority, leading 
the way to the adoption of a formally federative regime in 1867.
The Canadian federation was created by the British North America Act, 
1867, a statute of the british Parliament at Westminster enacted after three 
colonies (the Province of Canada, consisting of present-day Quebec and 
Ontario, New brunswick, and Nova Scotia) expressed the wish to join 
under a federative government.6 One key factors in the selection of the 
federative principle as the foundation for the new constitution was the 
presence within the founding colonies of groups from different cultures 
as the result of the earlier French and then English colonization.7
The federative regime of 1867 represented a compromise between 
various ideologies and visions for the new country. While many English-
speaking political representatives would have preferred the establish-
ment of a legislative union,8 the French-speaking representatives of 
Canada East (today’s Quebec) made the creation of a federation the con-
dition sine qua non for their support for the project, because it would 
give them full autonomy in certain matters while allowing them to join 
the other british colonies in North America in a structure that would 
lead to the emergence of a shared political nationality.9 The federative 
principle was finally chosen as the basis for the new constitution by all 
its founders. The Preamble to the 1867 Act is unequivocal; it states that 
“the Provinces … have expressed their Desire to be federally united,” 
although it also states the intention to adopt a “Constitution similar in 
Principle to that of the United Kingdom.” As for the actual shape of the 
new regime, the act provided for the establishment of a federation in 
 5 Jacques-yvan Morin and José Woehrling, Les constitutions du Canada et du Québec du 
régime français à nos jours (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 1994), 1:149.
 6 Known, since 1982, as the Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. (1985) App. II, no. 5.
 7 Christopher Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1997).
 8 Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American 
Provinces, 3rd Session, 8th Provincial Parliament of Canada. Printed by Order of the 
Legislature (Quebec: hunter, Rose, Parliamentary Printers, 1865), 30.
 9 Samuel Laselva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996).
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the legal sense of a distribution of legislative power between two orders 
of government, each autonomous in its own sphere of jurisdiction.10
In the decades following the creation of the federation, six other 
provinces came into being through an agreement between each prov-
ince and the federal government and parliament: Manitoba (1870), 
british Columbia (1871), Prince Edward Island (1873), Alberta (1905), 
Saskatchewan (1905), and Newfoundland and Labrador (1949). 
Northern Canada is divided into three federal territories – Northwest 
Territories, yukon, and Nunavut – populated mainly by Aboriginal 
nations. Each territory wields powers delegated by federal legislation, 
although in practice the powers are similar to those of the provinces.
Formally, the federation is a constitutional monarchy with a parlia-
mentary regime. The head of the Canadian state is Queen Elizabeth II, 
represented by the governor-general at the federal level and by the 
lieutenant- governors in the provinces. however, by constitutional con-
vention, the powers of the monarch’s representatives must be exercised 
today as directed by the ministers who are responsible to their respective 
parliaments.11
 10 Ss. 91–5.
 11 For more extensive general information about the Canadian federation, see Rainer 
Knopff and Anthony Sayers, “Canada,” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change 
in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and Alan Tarr, 103–42 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005); Richard Simeon and Martin Papillon, “Canada,” 
in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald 
L. Watts, and Douglas M. brown, 91–122 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2006); Thomas O. hueglin, “Canada,” in Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, 101–34 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); Robin badway, “Canada,” in The 
Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Anwar Shah, 98–124 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007); André Lecours, “Canada,” 
in Foreign Relations in Federal Countries, ed. hans Michelmann, 114–40 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); Robert young, “Canada,” in Local 
Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems, ed. Nico Steytler, 106–35 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); Alain-G. Gagnon and Richard 
Simeon, “Canada,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries, ed. Luis Moreno and César 
Colino, 110–38 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010); Marc-
Antoine Adam, Josée bergeron, and Marianne bonnard, “Intergovernmental Relations 
in Canada: Competing visions and Diverse Dynamics,” in Intergovernmental Relations 
in Federal Systems, ed. Johanne Poirier, Cheryl Saunders, and John Kincaid, 135–73 (Don 
Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015); and William Cross, “Canada: A Challenging 
Landscape for Political Parties and Civil Society in a Fragmented Polity,” in Political Parties 
and Civil Society in Federal Systems, ed. Wolfgang Renzsch, Klaus Detterbeck, and John 
Kincaid, 70–93 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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2. Structural Characteristics of the Federation
The Constitution expressly establishes the autonomy of the two orders 
of government by listing the matters in which they may legislate (open-
ing paragraphs of ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867). Sections 91 
to 95 allocate legislative authority over various subjects to each order, 
and this allocation concerns both legislative and executive authority. 
Each order of government is responsible for enforcing its own laws. 
In this respect, the Canadian federation is different from, for example, 
Germany and Switzerland.
Unlike many other federations, where a list of specific powers is allo-
cated to one order of government and all residual powers remain with 
the other (such as the United States and Australia), Canada’s Constitu-
tion contains two lists of matters coming under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal government (s. 91) and the provincial governments 
(ss. 92 and 93) respectively. There is also a short list of powers under 
shared jurisdiction (ss. 92A(3), 94A and 95).12 The residual power is 
given to the federal Parliament (opening paragraph of s. 91).13 The list-
ing of the powers under the jurisdiction of the federal government, 
in addition to its residual power, apparently resulted from the broad 
scope of the powers kept by the provinces, especially the jurisdiction 
over “property and civil rights,”14 which included some matters that 
the political representatives of the period wished to assign to the central 
government (e.g., jurisdiction over trade and commerce, bankruptcy 
and insolvency, and copyrights). The list of federal powers was there-
fore designed to remove these powers from provincial jurisdiction.
As in any federation, the distribution of legislative powers was based 
on a distinction between matters of shared interest and matters of a 
so-called local nature, reflecting, at least in part, the principle of sub-
sidiarity. Given that the main objective of the federative union was to 
provide for the economic and military needs of the new federation, leg-
islative authority over these matters was given to the federal Parliament. 
 12 They concern only agriculture and immigration (s. 95), old age pensions and 
supplementary benefits (s. 94A), interprovincial trade in natural resources (s. 92A(3)).
 13 The opening paragraph of section 91 states that the federal Parliament may “make 
Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all 
Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to 
the Legislatures of the Provinces.”
 14 S. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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For this reason, the constituent provinces agreed that the federal Parlia-
ment would be given exclusive jurisdiction notably to raise money by 
any mode or system of taxation, and to legislate in order to regulate 
trade and commerce, banking, legal tender, navigation, militia, military 
service and defence (s. 91). The federal Parliament also was given the 
power to create a general court of appeal for Canada (s. 101). We will 
return to this point below.
The matters under exclusive provincial jurisdiction concerned life in 
general in each province, that is, all matters connected to the province’s 
lifestyle. Thus, each province retained the exclusive competence to leg-
islate, within its boundaries, in connection notably with the constitution 
of the province, property and civil rights, education, municipal institu-
tions, the solemnization of marriage, local works and undertakings, the 
administration of justice, and generally all matters of a merely local or 
private nature. The provinces also were authorized to raise money by 
direct taxation for provincial purposes (ss. 92 and 93).
This is the dualistic model that, for the most part, guided the distri-
bution of legislative powers in Canada. however, this legal framework 
has not prevented the courts from developing doctrines for the imple-
mentation of the rules allocating jurisdiction that stem, rather, from a 
form of cooperative federalism favourable to overlapping powers.
Since the birth of the federation, two main trends can be identified 
in the approach taken by the courts to the principle of exclusivity. The 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council opted for a dualistic approach 
by seeking to limit overlaps of power between the two orders of gov-
ernment and by preserving each government’s sphere of autonomy. 
The committee used the nautical image of “watertight compartments” 
to illustrate the need to protect the autonomy of each order of govern-
ment and balance its powers.15 beginning in the mid-twentieth century, 
however, the Supreme Court of Canada gradually moved away from 
the dualistic stance of the Judicial Committee to embrace a so-called 
cooperative approach to federalism, open to overlapping powers. In 
a number of decisions, it stated that the principle of exclusive powers 
was not imperative, and that intergovernmental cooperation was the 
 15 A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, p. 354, which included Lord 
Atkin’s comment: “While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into 
foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential 
part of her original structure.”
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“dominant tide”16 of modern federalism. The expressions flexible, coop-
erative, and modern federalism are used frequently in its jurisprudence, 
emphasizing the idea that the separation between the orders of govern-
ment is not absolute. The Court “should favour, where possible, the 
ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government. In 
the absence of conflicting enactments of the other level of government, 
the Court should avoid blocking the application of measures which 
are taken to be enacted in furtherance of the public interest.”17 The 
adoption of a cooperative approach has led to an increase in the num-
ber of overlaps between equally valid provincial and federal statutes 
that then trigger the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy 
if they prove incompatible. This will be discussed below.
In pursuit of this cooperative approach, the Supreme Court has 
affirmed the ability of each order of government to incidentally affect 
matters under the jurisdiction of the other order when both are leg-
islating in their own area of jurisdiction (incidental effects rule).18 It 
considers that certain matters may include both federal and provincial 
aspects, and it upholds legislation by both orders of government in rela-
tion to these matters (double aspect doctrine).19 It also has maintained 
the constitutional validity of provisions that overlap a matter under the 
jurisdiction of the other order of government if they are integrated into 
an otherwise valid legislative whole (ancillary powers doctrine).20
With regard to the fiscal relations between the two orders of gov-
ernment, Canadian federalism has, since the late 1950s, been moving 
away from the dualistic model. Within Canada, as also in many other 
federative regimes, fiscal powers are becoming increasingly central-
ized. The Canadian situation is due in part to an agreement temporarily 
transferring to the federal Parliament the entire sector of personal and 
corporate income tax during the Second World War. In addition, the 
 16 Ontario (Attorney General) v. OPSEU, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, par. 27.
 17 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, par. 37 and 42. See also Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 14; Reference re Securities Act, 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, pars. 9, 57, 131, 132; Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 457, pars. 139, 152; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 
453, par. 119; Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624, par. 32.
 18 See particularly, Attorney General (Que.) v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada et al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 
211.
 19 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, par. 4.
 20 General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641; Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453.
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cost of the provinces’ constitutional responsibilities (e.g., health care, 
education, and social services) following the advent of the welfare state 
continued to rise.
The combined effect of more centralized fiscal powers and the major 
increase in the cost of provincial responsibilities has led to a vertical 
imbalance in the practice of Canadian federalism, that is, a gap between 
the financial resources available to each order of government and the 
cost of their constitutional responsibilities. The federal government has 
revenues over and above what it needs to implement its powers, while 
the provinces face major shortfalls.21 The federal surplus gives the fed-
eral government leeway to spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction and 
thereby impose its policy preferences.
This “power to spend” refers to the ability of one order of govern-
ment to spend in areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the other 
order of government, “provided it does not, at the same time, legislate 
with respect to, regulate, or govern such matters.”22 Using its spend-
ing power, one order of government can allocate financial resources 
to certain objectives, whether under its own responsibility or that of 
the other order of government. This is possible because spending is 
not subject to the distribution of legislative powers and constitutes a 
material, rather than a normative, act. Although the Supreme Court of 
Canada has not yet been asked to rule directly on the constitutionality 
of conditional spending by the federal government in areas of exclu-
sive provincial jurisdiction, several obiter dicta suggest that it does not 
consider the spending as a normative act requiring an assessment of 
constitutionality.23
 21 Quebec, Commission on Fiscal Imbalance, Report of Commission on Fiscal Imbalance 
and Supporting Documents, 2002, http://www.groupes.finances.gouv.qc.ca/
desequilibrefiscal/en/document/publication.htm; Conference board of Canada, Vertical 
Fiscal Imbalance: Fiscal Prospects for the Federal and Provincial/Territorial Governments 
(Ottawa, 2002, updated February 2004): http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/
abstract.aspx?did=413; Alain Noël, “Équilibres et déséquilibres dans le partage des 
ressources financières,” in Le fédéralisme canadien contemporain, Fondements, traditions, 
institutions, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 305–38 (Montreal: Les Presses de l’Université de 
Montréal, 2006).
 22 henri brun, Guy Tremblay, and Eugénie brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. 
(Cowansville: Éditions yvon blais, 2014), 439 (my translation).
 23 Y.M.H.A. Jewish Center of Winnipeg Inc. v. Brown, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1532, 1549; Reference 
Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, 567; Auton (Guardian ad litem of) 
v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, Appendix b.
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The original division of powers has in practice undergone significant 
alteration as the decades have passed, even though it can be formally 
modified only by using a complex amendment procedure. In general, 
amendments to the federal Constitution require consent from the fed-
eral government and from the governments of seven provinces mak-
ing up 50 per cent of the Canadian population (the so-called general 
formula) or the unanimous consent of the federal government and all 
ten provinces (ss. 38, 41, and 42, Constitution Act, 1982).24 In addition 
to this complex amendment procedure, further constraints have been 
added since 1982, including the passage by the federal Parliament of 
the Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments,25 which gives a veto to 
each of the five Canadian regions26 over any constitutional amend-
ment that formally requires only the application of the general formula. 
Several provinces have, in addition, passed laws making consultative 
referenda necessary before the adoption of resolutions targeting an 
amendment to the Constitution.27 All these legal obstacles to constitu-
tional change go a long way towards explaining why only one consti-
tutional reform of any importance has taken place since the birth of the 
federation in 1867. This reform, in 1982, involved patriating Canada’s 
constituent power, at that time still in the hands of the british Parlia-
ment, and incorporating a charter of human rights and freedoms into 
the Canadian Constitution. Quebec is the only province that has never 
consented to these constitutional amendments, which nevertheless 
apply within its territory.
The provinces have the power to amend their own constitutions as 
they wish, provided they comply with the prescriptions of the Canadian 
Constitution (Constitution Act, 1982, s. 45).28 The same applies to the 
 24 Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, no. 44.
 25 S.C. 1996, c. 1.
 26 Namely Quebec, Ontario, british Columbia, two or more of the Atlantic provinces 
(having, according to the latest general census, combined populations of at least 
50 per cent of the population of all the Atlantic provinces), and two or more of 
the Prairie provinces (having, according to the latest general census, combined 
populations of at least 50 per cent of the population of all the Prairie provinces).
 27 This is the case in british Columbia and Alberta. Several other provinces have 
decided to follow this lead by making such referenda possible (but not compulsory); 
the process has been in place in Quebec since 1978.
 28 They do not have formal written constitutions, unlike the states of the United States 
and Australia; therefore, the “constitutional law” of each province is embodied in 
nothing more than ordinary statutes of each provincial legislature.
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federal Parliament with respect to the rules forming part of the fed-
eral Constitution (Constitution Act, 1982, s. 44) and that are not subject 
to a complex amendment procedure, in other words requiring consent 
from more than one entity. This applies, for example, to any amend-
ment affecting the powers of the Senate and the selection of senators 
(Constitution Act, 1982, s. 42(1)b), which requires the application of the 
general formula. The provincial and federal constitutions are not, for 
the most part,29 independent documents, comparable to American state 
constitutions. They are formed by a set of scattered rules that govern the 
organization and functioning of the provincial and federal legislative, 
executive, and judicial institutions. They must all be compatible to the 
Canadian Constitution.
The Senate defies all generally admitted notions of what a federa-
tive chamber should be. First, the senators are appointed for life by the 
federal government (s. 24). Second, the composition of Canada’s upper 
house is not based on equal representation of the provinces, but rather 
on regional parity: Quebec, Ontario, the Maritime provinces, and, later, 
the Western provinces, are each represented by twenty-four senators 
(s. 22). The reason most often given by commentators to explain this 
choice by the original drafters is that the lifetime appointment of mem-
bers of the Senate allows the upper house to play a temporizing, con-
servative role with regard to the lower house, whose members are 
elected by the population; in other words, the Senate is a counterbalance 
to the democratic element in the government system.30 Today, although 
the second federal chamber has, in formal terms, the same powers as 
the house of Commons (the lower chamber), including the power to 
pass federal bills, it practically never exercises its right of veto because 
of its characteristic deficit of democratic and federative legitimacy.
III. The Judicial System
Under the Constitution, both orders of government can legislate with 
respect to the courts. The provinces have jurisdiction concerning the 
 29 As an exception, the province of british Columbia: Constitution Act, R.S.b.C. 1996, c. 66.
 30 The Senate “was intended to provide ‘sober second thought’ on the legislation adopted 
by the popular representatives in the house of Commons … however, it played the 
additional role of providing a distinct form of representation for the regions that had 
joined Confederation and ceded a significant portion of their legislative powers to the 
new federal Parliament”: Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, par. 15.
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administration of justice, extending to the constitution, maintenance 
and organization of provincial courts of both civil and criminal juris-
diction, and including procedure in civil matters in those courts. The 
provincial courts divide into two categories: the superior courts and the 
inferior courts. The superior courts contain a division of first authority 
(called “Superior Court” in Quebec and “Supreme Court” in a number 
of the other provinces) and a Court of Appeal. They are courts of inher-
ent jurisdiction.31 The provinces cannot abolish them either directly 
or indirectly by withdrawing their inherent jurisdiction. These courts 
have the jurisdiction to apply both provincial and federal law. The infe-
rior provincial courts have only the jurisdiction conferred by their con-
stitutive law.
Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, attributes to the federal 
Parliament the power to create its own courts and to give them exclu-
sive jurisdiction in certain domains of federal law, which means 
subtracting these domains from the jurisdiction of provincial courts. 
The Parliament exercised this power when it created the Federal 
Court in 1971, which includes a trial division and an appeal divi-
sion. Article 101 also gives the federal Parliament power to create 
and to organize a Supreme Court. The existence, the general jurisdic-
tion, the composition, and the other essential features of the Supreme 
Court of Canada (created by federal statute in 1875) has been con-
stitutionalized (Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 41 and 42).32 The general 
appellate jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court means that, as 
in  Australia but unlike the United States, there is one common law 
for the whole of Canada, except that the civil law, statutory-based 
system is preserved in Quebec.
The federal government has the discretion to appoint all the judges 
of the superior courts, including the Supreme Court (ss. 96 and 101),33 
with no formal participation by the provinces. Several authors have 
concluded that the lack of provincial involvement in the appointment 
of judges to the Supreme Court is a major infringement of the federative 
 31 In other words, the dual jurisdiction recognized under common law: a residual 
jurisdiction that allows them to hear any matter not assigned exclusively to inferior 
courts, and the power to scrutinize and control the inferior courts and public 
administration.
 32 This has been recently confirmed by the Supreme Court: Reference re Supreme Court 
Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21.
 33 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4(2).
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principle.34 Since the 1960s, reform of the Supreme Court of Canada has 
been a recurring topic in the legal and political worlds. It has appeared 
on the agenda of major federal-provincial constitutional conferences, 
and it has been the focus of numerous reports and White Papers.35 The 
effort expended over several decades to consider the status, the role, 
and the method for appointing the judges of the country’s highest court 
tends to indicate that it faces a legitimacy deficit as a component of the 
Canadian legal system.36
Despite the federative distribution of powers in the field of justice, 
Canada’s judicial system is characterized above all by integration. This 
can be seen in the lack of watertight distinctions between the consti-
tutional, administrative, criminal, and civil jurisdictions, an approach 
inherited from the british. Above all, though, in the federative context, 
it is revealed by the fact that all cases, whether they originate under 
provincial or federal law, end up in final resort before the same federal 
court, the Supreme Court of Canada, even if the provincial courts can 
in principle enforce both federal and provincial laws.37
Scrutiny of a provincial and federal law’s constitutionality is 
entrusted to the judicial system as a whole (the judicial-review model). 
The Supreme Court, placed at the summit of the judicial hierarchy, is 
 34 See, in particular, K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1947), 55, 56, and 71; Morin and Woehrling, Les constitutions du 
Canada et du Québec, 546.
 35 To name but a few, Final Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the 
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972) 
(referred to as the Molgat-McGuigan Report); Canadian bar Association Committee 
on the Constitution, Towards a New Canada (Montreal: Canadian bar Foundation, 
1978); Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together (hull: Supply and Services 
Canada, 1979) (Pepin-Robarts Report); Government of Quebec, Québec-Canada: 
A New Deal, The Québec Government Proposal for a New Partnership between Equals: 
Sovereignty-Association (Quebec: Official Editor, 1979); Constitutional Committee 
of the Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian Federation (Montreal: Quebec Liberal 
Party, 1980). The issue of the method used to appoint judges was addressed by 
proposed constitutional amendments in the Meech Lake (1987) and Charlottetown 
(1992) Accords, which provided for the appointment of Supreme Court judges by 
the federal government on a proposal by the provincial governments. These two 
proposals failed.
 36 Eugénie brouillet and yves Tanguay, “The Legitimacy of the Constitutional 
Arbitration Process in a Multinational Federative Regime: The Case of the Supreme 
Court of Canada,” University of British Columbia Law Review 45 (2012): 47–101.
 37 brun, Tremblay, and brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 829–50.
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the court of final resort for all cases, including federal disputes. Until 
1949, however, the Supreme Court’s decisions could be appealed to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. Only when this 
appeal route was abolished in 1949 did the Supreme Court become 
the final arbiter of federal disputes.
The Supreme Court can be asked to review constitutionality a pos-
teriori, in a specific case brought to its attention in the form of an 
appeal from an existing decision, or a priori,38 in the case of provi-
sions that have not yet been promulgated by the federal or provincial 
political organs. In the latter case, under the Supreme Court Act, the 
federal government requests the Court’s opinion through a reference 
procedure.39 The Court is required to respond, unless the question or 
questions posed are essentially political, in which case it must justify 
its refusal. Although, in principle, the Court’s response is simply an 
opinion, it is considered to have the same legal force as a decision 
rendered in a specific case. The dividing line between judicial and 
political functions in this context is difficult to identify. The reference 
jurisdiction involves the Court in political decisions, which it would 
not allow itself to get involved in with respect to individual disputes, 
because the reference procedure enables the government to request 
the Supreme Court’s opinion concerning the constitutionality of leg-
islative bills and to ask theoretical or politically charged questions. 
One of the most important examples of this procedure was Reference 
re Secession of Quebec.40
The Supreme Court’s general appellate jurisdiction requires it to 
decide cases from two different legal traditions. Canada has a dual 
legal system for private-law cases; common law is applied in the nine 
provinces with an English-speaking majority, while civil law is used 
in Quebec. In 1774, the authorities in britain expressly maintained 
the use of French civil law in the territory of the Province of Quebec 
(Quebec Act, s. 8).41 In 1867, when the federation was created, the rec-
ognition given to exclusive provincial jurisdiction over property and 
 38 Fabien Gélinas, “La primauté du droit et les effets d’une loi inconstitutionnelle,” 
Revue du Barreau Canada 57 (1988): 455, 459.
 39 Supreme Court Act, s. 53. Provincial governments also have a procedure for references 
to the Court of Appeal (the highest provincial court). Provincial laws provide for the 
possibility of appealing the court’s opinion to the Supreme Court.
 40 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 235, and following.
 41 R.S.C. 1985, App. II, no. 2, s. 8.
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civil rights (s. 92(13)) continued this legal duality. Interaction between 
the two legal cultures is not always easy, and has given rise, to some 
extent, to “Canada’s dual legal solitudes.”42 To ensure the presence, 
on the Supreme Court, of judges trained in Quebec’s civil law, the 
Supreme Court Act requires the federal government to appoint three 
judges from Quebec, out of a total of nine.43 This may also indicate 
an underlying desire to provide for adequate representation from 
Quebec because of its distinct culture. The six remaining judges 
are usually from Ontario (three), the Western provinces (two) and the 
Atlantic provinces (one). however, except for the rule regarding rep-
resentation from Quebec, the federal government has no other limits 
on the exercise of its power to appoint judges. Although the Supreme 
Court has always, in fact, been made up of both French-speaking and 
English-speaking judges, bilingualism is not a criterion for appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s decisions are not always unanimous. Dissent-
ing or concurring opinions are expressed frequently. In the area of fed-
eral disputes, the years 1970 to 2000 were marked by a movement from 
decisions expressing a centralizing mindset to those more favourable 
to provincial autonomy. After a long period of consensus during the 
early 2000s, recent years have seen the re-emergence of a clear division 
between two groups of judges, one more centralizing, the other more 
decentralizing in outlook.44
Canadian constitutional law guarantees the independence of the 
courts and the judiciary from political interference. The constitutional 
principle of judicial independence is strongly rooted and has several 
aspects, covering both the independence of the judges themselves (e.g., 
security of tenure, financial security, immunity, and non-compellability) 
and that of the courts (i.e., institutional independence).45
 42 Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Les solitudes du bijuridisme au Canada (Montreal: 
Éditions Thémis, 2007).
 43 Supreme Court Act, s. 6.
 44 bruce Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search 
for balance in the Interpretation of the Division of Powers,” Supreme Court Law 
Review (2d) 54 (2011): 565. Two decisions have been decided unanimously: Reference 
re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community 
Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134.
 45 See particularly Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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IV. Federative Jurisprudence
The enormous difficulty of amending the Constitution has made con-
stitutional jurisprudence the preferred way to modify the regime. It is 
essentially up to the courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to adapt 
the constitutional texts to new societal conditions. This gradual evolu-
tion, less easily perceptible and less spectacular than formal amend-
ments, has nevertheless had a determining influence. Maintaining the 
federative balance and providing equal protection for the autonomy 
of each order of government are two tasks that depend especially on 
the constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court. Its diktats in 
federative matters have the same force and the same normative value 
as the constitutional texts. As a result, they are binding on all federal, 
provincial, and local political organs and on all other courts.
The question of whether the Supreme Court’s federative jurispru-
dence has a centralizing or decentralizing effect has no unanimous 
answer in Canada, where different and indeed divergent views exist on 
what federalism actually is. Two approaches have developed alongside 
each other. The first, especially noticeable in Canada outside Quebec, 
is territorial and mono-national in nature; the second, generally promi-
nent in Quebec, is based on a pluri-national view of the country. Super-
imposed on this divergence is the fact that Canadians outside Quebec 
have a generally distinct understanding of how the country’s political 
system emerged originally. For the first group, Canada’s federation is 
first and foremost the result of an imperial act; for the second group, 
it stems from a pact between the three original territorial entities and 
between separate national communities, which was then ratified by the 
british authorities. Nor is there a consensus on the nature of the original 
regime. In general, while Canadians outside Quebec highlight what they 
perceive to be a highly centralized federative system,46 Quebecers see it 
as a genuine federative regime that guarantees protection for the auton-
omy of each order of government. Furthermore, the English-Canadian 
literature generally assesses the evolution of the regime from a prag-
matic and functional viewpoint based on an analysis of the effectiveness 
 46 Some authors have spoken of a quasi-federation: Wheare, Federal Government, 18–20. 
The two elements most often cited in support of this viewpoint are the power of 
each lieutenant governor (appointed by the governor general) to reserve provincial 
legislative bills and the power of the governor general to disallow them. These powers 
fell into disuse many years ago through the effects of constitutional convention.
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of public policy; authors in Quebec are more likely to adopt a norma-
tive approach and to measure compliance with the rules governing the 
allocation of powers in light of the principle of provincial autonomy.47
Whatever the truth in each divergent vision, there is broad agreement 
that Canada is founded on federative principles that require, in norma-
tive terms, a division of powers between orders of government that are 
autonomous but still coordinated. It is therefore important to assess the 
jurisprudence of the highest court in terms of the essential corollary 
of federalism, the principle of equal autonomy for each order of gov-
ernment. In the words of bruno Théret, “An ‘authentic’ federal system 
can … be defined as a system that includes a self-preserving mechanism 
for the federal principle that permanently regulates the constitutive con-
tradiction between unity and diversity: if unity triumphs over diversity, 
or if diversity triumphs over unity, the term federalism can hardly be seen 
to apply.”48 The federative nature of Canada’s Constitution has been rec-
ognized many times by the courts. The Privy Council clearly stated this 
fact on many occasions, notably in a passage that has since become a 
classic: “The object of the Act was neither to weld the provinces into one, 
nor to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority, but to 
create a federal government in which they should all be represented, 
entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in which they 
had a common interest, each province retaining its independence and 
autonomy.”49 The Supreme Court has expressed itself in similar fash-
ion, in particular in Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which it states that 
federalism is one of the constitutional principles underlying the written 
Constitution, and that “there can be little doubt that the principle of fed-
eralism remains a central organizational theme of our Constitution.”50 
For this reason, the Court considers that federalism can be used not only 
to guide the courts in the interpretation and application of the provisions 
of the constitutional text, but also to fill any gaps.
 47 On these differences, see François Rocher, “La dynamique Québec-Canada ou le 
refus de l’idéal fédéral,” in Gagnon, Le fédéralisme canadien contemporain, 93–146.
 48 bruno Théret, “Du principe fédéral à une typologie des fédérations: quelques 
propositions,” in Le fédéralisme dans tous ses états: Gouvernance, identité et méthodologie, 
ed. Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens and Fabien Gélinas (Cowansville: Éditions 
yvon blais, 2005), 128 (my translation).
 49 Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick, [1892] 
A.C. 437, 440–2.
 50 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 250–1.
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The jurisprudence from the Supreme Court contains several passages 
in which it states that the autonomy of each order of government lies at 
the heart of the federative principle.51 It also refers, in several places, to the 
need to preserve a balance between the respective powers of each order.52 
Concerning its role in preserving that balance, the Court considers that it 
“falls primarily to governments,” adding that the way in which powers 
are shared must, as a result, promote the practice of a type of cooperative 
federalism open to the overlapping of powers. Its role in maintaining this 
balance involves, in the Court’s view, defining and applying doctrines 
for the implementation of power-sharing that promote “the legitimate 
interplay between federal and provincial powers.”53
however, despite these general statements highlighting the norma-
tive implications of the principle of federalism, the jurisprudence of 
Canada’s highest court tends to favour the federal government (see Iv, 2). 
We will look, first, at some specific issues concerning the distribution 
of legislative powers, before turning to some general trends that can be 
observed in the Supreme Court’s federative jurisprudence.
1. Specific Issues
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council interpreted the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867, as an ordinary statute, applying the rules of statutory 
interpretation. One of the most important is the principle of literal 
interpretation, which postulates that the constituent power always 
expresses itself clearly and that the words used match the result sought. 
The search for legislative or constitutive intent is therefore based pri-
marily on the letter of the law. If the terms used are not clear, or where 
there may be doubt as to their meaning, they must be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the statute as a whole. To put this another way, 
the provisions must be read one with the other in order to give effect to 
each. Although the Judicial Committee began to show more openness, 
beginning in the 1930s, to an evolving or flexible interpretation of the 
Constitution, it did not, in general, question the application of the rules 
of statutory interpretation to the Constitution Act, 1867.
 51 For example, Reference re Secession of Quebec, par. 58.
 52 To list only some recent decisions: Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, 
par. 7; Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457, par. 43, 74; 
Canadian Western Bank, op. cit., par. 24.
 53 Canadian Western Bank, par. 24, 36.
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From 1970 onwards, the Supreme Court gradually moved away from 
literal interpretation to embrace the so-called evolving or dynamic 
method of interpretation. Referring to the famous metaphor compar-
ing the Canadian Constitution to a “a living tree capable of growth and 
expansion within its natural limits” first expressed by the Judicial Com-
mittee,54 the Court stated that if there is a gap between the constitu-
tional text and the societal conditions to which it is meant to apply, the 
courts are responsible to adapt its impact accordingly.
In 2005 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to reiterate its preference 
for the evolving approach in Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), 
ss. 22 and 23.55 It was asked to examine the constitutional validity of the 
federal legislative provisions governing parental leave, by determining 
whether the provisions encroached upon provincial legislative compe-
tency over property and civil rights and matters of a merely private or 
local nature (ss. 92(13) and (16)), or if they came under federal legislative 
competency over unemployment insurance (s. 91(2A)). The Court used 
the living tree to identify the extent of federal competence over unem-
ployment insurance and found that it can cover assistance measures. The 
Quebec Court of Appeal, which had used an approach based on original 
intent, had concluded that the evidence showed that the constitutional 
amendment of 1940, which transferred provincial jurisdiction over unem-
ployment insurance to the federal Parliament, was not intended to extend 
jurisdiction over social security and assistance measures, which remained 
with the provinces. If this had been the case, the provinces would have 
refused to agree to the constitutional amendment.56 According to the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, the principle of evolutionary interpretation 
could not be applied if it involved ignoring the intent of the constituent 
authority in 1940.57
As we have seen, the rules governing the division of legislative and 
executive powers are unusual in that they include two lists, one of 
 54 Edward v. A.-G. for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124, 136: “The british North America Act 
planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural 
limits.” On constitutional interpretation, see Grant huscroft and bradley W. Miller, 
eds., The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation (New york: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Aileen Kavanagh, “The Idea of a Living 
Constitution,” Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 16 (2003): 55–89.
 55 [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669.
 56 Québec (Procureur général) c. Canada (Procureur général), (2004) R.J.Q. 399 (C.A.Q),  
par. 73
 57 Ibid., par. 92.
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exclusive provincial powers and one of exclusive federal powers, with 
residual powers being allocated to the federal government. The items 
in each list have often required interpretation by the Judicial Commit-
tee and later by the Supreme Court. Generally speaking, while the Judi-
cial Committee tended to interpret in a restrictive way certain federal 
powers – which, if interpreted literally, might have emptied some 
provincial powers of much of their meaning – the Supreme Court has 
tended to broaden their scope.58 Examples include the federal govern-
ment’s power to legislate in the fields of trade and commerce, unem-
ployment insurance, and criminal law. The same has applied to the 
general powers of the federal Parliament.
Concerning trade and commerce (s. 91(2)), the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the exclusive federal competence as including not only the 
power to legislate in connection with international and interprovin-
cial trade,59 but also the right to govern trade in general. On the basis 
of this latter component, it has recognized the federal government’s 
power to legislate with respect to competition and trademarks.60 In 
2005, it broadened the scope of the federal power to legislate in the 
area of unemployment insurance beyond what the constituent power 
had specified, allowing it to legislate not only in connection with jobs 
lost for economic reasons but also for interruptions of employment 
for personal reasons, by recognizing a power to legislate with respect 
to maternity and parental leave.61 The same result was achieved with 
respect to federal competence over the criminal law, which now covers 
not only legislation pursuing a valid criminal law objective by imposing 
a prohibition,62 but also regulatory schemes, provided they contribute to 
the achievement of the law’s penal objective.63
The Constitution Act, 1867, gives the federal Parliament the power to 
“make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in 
 58 As Peter W. hogg wrote, “Judicial interpretation since the abolition of appeals has 
permitted some growth of federal power, and this may well continue”: Peter W. hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf edition (Toronto: Thomson Carswell), 5–18.
 59 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, (1881) 7 A.C. 96.
 60 General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641; Kirkbi AG v. 
Gestions Ritvik Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302.
 61 Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, op. cit.
 62 Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914.
 63 R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 
199; Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457.
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relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this 
Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces” (opening 
paragraph, s. 91). This formula gives the federal government a residual 
power concerning anything not awarded exclusively to the provinces. 
Three categories of federal actions that, today, appear to be completely 
independent of one another are based on this general federal power: 
those based on residual power, those based on emergency power, and 
those based on the power to legislate on matters of national interest.
The residual power itself has been limited by the courts to matters 
foreseeable in 1867, rather than extended to include all the new legisla-
tive fields that have appeared since then. This explains why it has sel-
dom been used as the basis for federal legislation, despite the substantial 
development of governmental activities. On the basis of the same para-
graph, however, the jurisprudence has consistently recognized the fed-
eral government’s power to deal with emergencies. In these cases, the 
federal Parliament is allowed to legislate in all areas, including those 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces, but only temporar-
ily. Furthermore, the courts recognized at an early date, on the basis 
of the same paragraph, the federal Parliament’s power to legislate on 
any matter of national importance or presenting a matter of interest for 
the federation as a whole. This so-called doctrine of national interest 
had, for more than a century, applied only potentially to distinctive and 
indivisible matters (as opposed to aggregates of provincial and federal 
matters) that were not included in any class of subjects assigned to the 
provinces.64 Since a 1988 decision by the Supreme Court, the doctrine 
now applies “to both new matters which did not exist at Confederation 
and to matters which, although originally matters of a local or private 
nature in a province, have since, in the absence of national emergency, 
become matters of national concern.”65 The doctrine operates only cen-
tripetally and has permanent effects; the competence acquired by the 
federal government following a judgment validating its legislative 
intervention is definitive.
Despite the broadening nature of these interpretations, the courts 
have, over the decades, confirmed the validity of a number of provincial 
legislative interventions under the classes listed or related powers, and 
found certain federal statutes invalid. however, none of these decisions 
 64 Re: Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373.
 65 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401.
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has led the Supreme Court to extend the jurisdiction of the provinces 
beyond the parameters traditionally set by the jurisprudence. This asym-
metry in the judicial interpretation of the federal and provincial jurisdic-
tions is, in large part, attributable to the omnipresence of the value of 
efficiency in federative jurisprudence, which favours the federal govern-
ment to the detriment of regional diversity.66 Efficiency is at the core of 
the scope given by the Supreme Court to the doctrine of national inter-
est, the power to encroach, and federal jurisdiction over trade in gen-
eral. however, in all these cases and in contrast to the European notion 
of subsidiarity, efficiency has an ascending application only, generates 
permanent effects, and can apply to matters not placed under the com-
petence of the federal Parliament.67 The Supreme Court stated that the 
cooperative approach to Canadian federalism goes hand in hand with 
the perceived need to promote efficacy over formalism.68
2. Asymmetrical Effects of Cooperative Federalism
Two different approaches to federalism can be identified in Canadian 
jurisprudence: the dualist and the cooperative approaches. Dualism is 
based on the idea that the powers conferred by sections 91 and 92 con-
stitute “watertight compartments” and that, as far as possible, the over-
lapping of federal and provincial powers must be avoided or limited. 
As a result, the notion of exclusive legislative jurisdiction plays a key 
role. In contrast, under cooperative federalism, the principle of exclu-
sive jurisdiction is far more restricted, creating broad areas of concur-
rent jurisdiction. Overlapping between the two orders of government 
is considered not only normal but advisable.
In 1867, the dual model was largely followed when legislative pow-
ers in Canada were shared out, creating only a few areas of overlapping 
jurisdiction. This legal situation, however, has not prevented the courts 
from developing doctrines for the implementation of power-sharing 
rules that reflect a cooperative approach to federalism and promote 
overlapping powers.
 66 Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the 
Expense of Diversity,” Queen’s Law Journal 28 (2003): 411–53.
 67 Eugénie brouillet, “Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should 
We Open Pandora’s box?,” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 54 (2011): 601–32.
 68 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 
536, par. 44.
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The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, in its inter-
pretation of the constitutional text, opted clearly for dualism when it 
sought to limit overlaps in order to preserve the sphere of autonomy 
of each order of government and a balanced sharing of powers. how-
ever, from the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
moved gradually away from the federative jurisprudence established 
by the Judicial Committee to embrace a cooperative vision of feder-
alism. The adoption of a cooperative or “modern” approach to feder-
alism has led to a multiplication of the number of zones of de facto 
competition between the federation and the provinces. Even though, in 
principle, maximizing the number of areas in which each order of gov-
ernment can intervene affords equal protection for their autonomy, the 
actual situation is different because of various doctrines governing the 
implementation of the rules for the sharing of legislative powers that 
undermine this essential corollary of the federative principle.
The rules used to resolve conflicts between laws may have profound 
implications for the balance of power. According to the doctrine of 
federal paramountcy, any conflict between a provincial and a federal 
statute, where both are valid, will see the provincial statute declared 
inoperative, while the federal statute will alone be applied. The effects 
of the provincial statute are suspended to the extent that they are incom-
patible with the federal statute, for as long as they remain incompatible. 
The doctrine is expressly set out in connection with matters of concur-
rent jurisdiction (ss. 92A(3) and 95); in only a single case, the advantage 
is given to the provincial statute (s. 94A). however, the application of 
the rule of federal paramountcy has been extended by the court’s juris-
prudence to all conflicts between equally valid statutes.
The effect of this doctrine on the balance of legislative power between 
the federal and provincial governments depends on the meaning of 
“conflict” as seen by the courts. For many decades, Canadian courts 
required proof that it was impossible to comply with both statutes; 
complying with one meant breaching the other.69 by applying such 
a strict test of incompatibility, the Supreme Court attempted to give 
precedence, as far as was possible, to the regular application of laws 
passed by both orders of government by preserving the operability of 
valid provincial statutes. This approach was consistent with the mod-
ern conception of power-sharing, which, as mentioned previously, 
 69 Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161.
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supports overlapping laws. however, the jurisprudence today has the 
effect of making a provincial statute inoperative (of no effect) if it pre-
vents a federal statute from achieving its object or, in other words, if it 
thwarts the intentions of the federal Parliament. This criterion makes 
the application of the rule of federal paramountcy conditional simply 
on the expressed intention of the federal legislator to block a provin-
cial legislative intervention, however valid.70 The introduction of this 
criterion is more characteristic of the classical approach to power shar-
ing, which protects the exclusivity of the federal powers alone, than of 
a modern approach open to overlapping, which is what the Supreme 
Court claims to support. In an attempt to limit the concern that the frus-
tration of the federal legislative purpose criterion poses a threat to pro-
vincial autonomy, the Supreme Court has stated that the paramountcy 
doctrine should be applied with restraint.71
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is also at odds with the 
cooperative approach when it applies the doctrine of interjurisdic-
tional immunity, under which a valid law cannot have an effect on a 
person, thing, or undertaking under the jurisdiction of the other order 
of government. The goal is essentially to prevent a valid law from hav-
ing effects that significantly encroach on the core of a subject under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the other order of government.72 As a result, 
the doctrine represents an exception to the modern approach to power 
sharing because it is designed to preserve an area of exclusive jurisdic-
tion in certain circumstances. Until 2007, the courts required proof only 
of the existence of an effect, regardless of its importance, on an essen-
tial element under the jurisdiction of the other order of government in 
order to conclude that a provincial statute was inoperable. Since 2007, 
following a shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the doctrine 
applies only if there is an impairment of a vital or essential part of the 
other government’s jurisdictional authority.73
however, although the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity may, 
in theory, be invoked to restrict the application of both provincial and 
 70 Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, par. 21; Canadian 
Western Bank, op. cit, par. 74. For a criticism of this doctrine, see Peter W. hogg, 
“Paramountcy and Tobacco,” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 34 (2006): 335–44.
 71 Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake Logging Ltd., [2015] 3 S.C.R. 419, para. 
23–7; Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, par. 72.
 72 brun, Tremblay, and brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 472–7.
 73 Canadian Western Bank c. Alberta, op. cit.
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federal statutes, so far it has been used only against provincial laws. Its 
effect has been asymmetrical, a fact recognized explicitly by the Supreme 
Court.74 In addition, even though the introduction of the impairment 
criterion was intended to re-establish a federative balance, subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions based on interjurisdictional immunity have 
not provided concrete examples of this potential rebalancing.75
3. Fundamental Aspects of Federative Life in Canada
In addition to disputes about the rules governing the sharing of powers 
between the two orders of government, the Supreme Court has been 
asked to rule on more unusual questions, touching on fundamental 
aspects of the country’s federative life, that have given it the delicate 
task of weighing considerations of legality (or constitutionality) against 
considerations of legitimacy. Examples occurred in 1981 and 1982, in 
references concerning the patriation of the constituent power, and in 
1998, in Reference re Secession of Quebec.
Canada’s patriation of full sovereignty from Great britain was the 
end of a long process. Canada’s legal order gradually became detached 
from the british order, but with no definitive break. Prior to the consti-
tutional reform of 1982, although there was no longer any doubt that 
Canada was a fully sovereign country both domestically and interna-
tionally, the constituent power was still vested in britain’s Parliament. 
however, there had been an understanding for many years that the 
british Parliament would legislate on Canadian constitutional matters 
only in accordance with instructions from Canada.76
The project to bring the constituent power back to Canada was 
frequently discussed by the federal government and the provinces 
between the 1930s and 1980, but the discussions failed because of a lack 
of agreement about the amendment procedure to be included in the 
 74 Ibid., par. 45.
 75 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 
536; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453; Canada (Attorney 
General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134; Carter v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, par. 49–53.
 76 As early as the 1860s, an imperial policy had developed requiring a degree of consent 
by a british colony to any constitutional change planned by the mother country. 
Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster 1931, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, no. 27, later confirmed 
this convention.
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constitutional text. In the early 1980s, the federal prime minister, Pierre 
Trudeau, launched a new project to patriate the constituent power, 
which would include the insertion of an amendment formula and a 
charter of human rights and freedoms into the Constitution. These 
changes were intended to have a significant effect on the powers of the 
provinces, because they potentially would, on one hand, give the prov-
inces a say in constitutional amendment decisions and, on the other 
hand, limit the powers of the provinces (and the federal government) 
by reference to the charter of rights.
The project was initially opposed by eight of the ten provinces. After 
the federal government had announced that it would still go ahead 
with the project by submitting a request to the british Parliament, 
three provinces (Quebec, Manitoba, and Newfoundland) asked their 
respective courts of appeal to rule on the constitutionality of the gov-
ernment’s action, from a strictly legal point of view and also in light of 
constitutional conventions. The Supreme Court was required to make 
the final ruling. This was the first time in Canada’s constitutional his-
tory that the court of final appeal was asked to make such a direct and 
fundamental decision concerning the actual basis of the constitutional 
structure of the Canadian state and, more specifically, on its federative 
nature.
In a majority decision, Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution,77 the 
Supreme Court ruled that as a matter of law, the federal government 
could request the patriation of the Constitution and thereby alter the 
powers of the provinces, despite the opposition of a majority of prov-
inces. The Supreme Court’s answer to the question concerning the 
conventional aspect was, however, completely different. Although the 
federal Parliament could act legally without consent from the provinces, 
to do so would be to violate a constitutional convention.78 On this aspect, 
the Supreme Court majority considered that Canadian law included a 
constitutional convention that required the federal Parliament to obtain 
“a substantial degree of provincial consent”79 before asking the british 
 77 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
 78 A constitutional convention is a rule defined by agreement between governing 
authorities or politicians that is not sanctioned by the courts but is applied and complied 
with by the parties by reason of political necessity. Its existence depends on the 
answers to three questions: First, what are the precedents? Second, did the actors in the 
precedents believe that they were bound by a rule? Third, is there a reason for the rule?
 79 Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, 905.
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Parliament to make a constitutional amendment that would affect the 
powers of the provinces. The Court stated, “The federal principle can-
not be reconciled with a state of affairs where the modification of pro-
vincial legislative powers could be obtained by the unilateral action of 
the federal authorities,” and that to admit the contrary would be to 
allow them to obtain by simple resolution what they could not validly 
accomplish by statute.80 In this way, the Supreme Court recognized the 
principle of equal autonomy of the orders of government, but confined 
its effects to the conventional dimension of constitutional law.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the federal government 
resumed its negotiations with the provinces and, thanks to a small 
number of changes to the initial project, was able to obtain the con-
sent of the nine provinces with an English-speaking majority, but not 
of Quebec. The federal government and the signatory provinces to the 
agreement began the process leading to the patriation and amendment 
of the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the Quebec government referred a constitutional question 
to the Court of Appeal of Quebec concerning the existence of a consti-
tutional convention requiring consent from Quebec for amendments to 
the Constitution that would affect its powers or status within the federa-
tion. The Court of Appeal answered the question in the negative, and the 
decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Re: Objection by Quebec to a 
Resolution to amend the Constitution 81 eight months after the constitutional 
amendment came into force. According to the Supreme Court, although 
an analysis of the precedents showed that all the previous proposed fed-
eral changes affecting the rights of the provinces had failed because, in 
two instances, of opposition from a number of provinces including Que-
bec and, in two other instances, of opposition from Quebec alone, the 
Quebec government failed to show that the political actors in those cases 
felt themselves bound by the need to obtain Quebec’s consent.
This decision by Canada’s highest court laid to rest the claim, con-
tinuously expressed by Quebec governments, that Quebec had a power 
of veto over amendments that affected its power or position within the 
federation. It also retired, at least on the legal level, the idea that the 
Canadian federation was based on an agreement between two equal 
founding peoples. As a result, although the Constitution Act, 1982, 
 80 Ibid., 905, 906, and 908.
 81 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793.
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applies legally to Quebec just as it does to all the other provinces, it suffers 
from a major lack of political legitimacy from the point of view, at least, 
of Quebec, for one of the federation’s founding provinces, the cradle of 
French culture in North America, has never consented to the act.
In 1998, the Supreme Court was again asked to rule on a similarly fun-
damental question, namely the secession of a province. Prior to Refer-
ence re Secession of Quebec, Canadian constitutional law was silent about 
this issue. In its decision, the Court first stated that it would limit itself 
to clarifying the legal framework within which a democratic decision 
could be taken. The Supreme Court answered the question, whether 
Quebec could secede unilaterally, in two stages. First, the Court held 
that Quebec secession is possible within the framework of Canadian 
constitutional law; that is, a clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear 
question in favour of sovereignty would create a constitutional obliga-
tion on Quebec and Canada to negotiate a constitutional amendment on 
secession and its possible terms. Second, if the negotiations fail, unilat-
eral secession would be possible outside the scope of the Constitution, 
supported by recognition from the international community. In other 
words, Quebec could achieve independence outside the scope of the 
Canadian Constitution under the aegis of the international community, 
provided it had previously attempted to negotiate its secession in good 
faith with Canada. This is not a specific right in either Canadian consti-
tutional law or international law, but a possibility based on the principle 
of effectivity.
The Supreme Court identified four principles underlying the constitu-
tional texts that, in its opinion, were relevant in answering the question 
posed: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism (rule of law), and the 
protection of minorities. On the basis in particular of the principles of 
federalism and democracy, the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile 
the considerations of legality and legitimacy by creating a constitutional 
obligation to negotiate. It was held that Quebec could not invoke the 
democratic principle in order to secede from Canada unilaterally, and 
the federal government could not rely on the principles of federalism 
and constitutionalism to ignore a democratically expressed desire to 
secede.
V. Conclusion
As a result of their fundamental importance in the normative hierar-
chy, constitutional texts can be amended only by using a formula that 
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is more stringent than the requirements for amending an ordinary 
statute. In a federative context, the relative untouchability of the Con-
stitution means that in many federations it evolves mainly through 
judicial interpretation. This is especially true in Canada because of 
the huge difficulty of formally amending the constitutional texts. As 
a result, the Supreme Court has the delicate task of maintaining a bal-
ance between the powers of the two orders of government. however, 
in many respects, the Supreme Court of Canada is an exception among 
its counterparts in federal states. All its members, like all the judges of 
the provincial superior courts, are appointed unilaterally by the federal 
government.82
In terms of judicial independence and impartiality, the unilateral 
appointment process creates problems for the Supreme Court as the 
“umpire of federalism” because it prevents the judges from being 
perceived to be independent from the federal government. A reform 
that would allow the provinces to formally participate would make 
the Court an institution much more consistent with Canada’s federal 
nature.
Over the decades, the decisions of the Supreme Court in connection 
with the distribution of powers have created an asymmetric degree of 
protection for the autonomy of each order of government. While the 
cooperative approach to federalism has allowed the federal government 
to maximize, and even extend, its legislative domain, the same cannot 
be said of the provinces. At a time when state intervention is becoming 
more widespread and more complex, it is clearly impossible to avoid all 
overlapping of powers between the two orders of government. however, 
federalism cannot survive over the long term if legislative powers are 
completely decompartmentalized.
The trend towards centralization that is generally apparent in the 
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence is, perhaps, a reflection of the nat-
ural propensity of all democratic societies to strengthen their centre. 
however, it constitutes a problem in a multinational federative context. 
In Canada, the coexistence of two forms of nationalism, one for Canada 
 82 In most federations, the federal entities are associated to varying degrees with the 
designation process of the constitutional judges or the members of the Supreme Court, 
in particular by means of the role recognized by the upper house (or federal chamber). 
Exceptions are federations whose constitutional law is of british inspiration, such as 
Canada, India, and Australia, where the federal government has exclusive power to 
appoint the judges.
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and one for Quebec, requires that the balance of power between the 
federal and provincial governments be preserved. The federative prin-
ciple and its essential corollary, autonomy for each order of govern-
ment in the exercise of its legislative powers, is seen in Quebec as more 
than just a technique for governance; it also is the guarantee that Que-
bec will be able to take its rightful place as a national group within the 
Canadian federation.
6  The Supreme Court of Ethiopia: 
Federalism’s bystander
gedion t. hessebon and abduletif k. idris
One influential description of federalism is that of a covenant of constit-
uent units that stipulates the terms for self-rule and shared rule.1 Nor-
mally, the terms of a federal covenant are enshrined in a constitution, 
which is regarded as the supreme law of the land. Furthermore, when 
disputes arise concerning the meaning and implication of the covenant, 
courts play the role of an umpire between the parties in dispute.2 Usu-
ally, the highest court of the land or a constitutional court interprets the 
constitution and adjudicates controversies pertaining to the ambit of 
self-rule and shared rule. Therefore, in many federal countries, the judi-
ciary plays an important role in delineating the spheres of competence 
of the different orders of government. The jurisprudence developed in 
this process is indispensable to understanding the nature of federalism 
in most countries.
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia provides an excep-
tion to the preceding claim. After more than two decades of federal-
ism, Ethiopia has very little federalism case law, and the federal and 
state judiciaries have had virtually no role in shaping the development 
of Ethiopian federalism. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to 
explain the reasons for this perhaps peculiar state of affairs. To facili-
tate this discussion and provide some background, the next section will 
 1 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987); 
Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds.,The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theology 
to Modern Federalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington books, 2000); and Michael burgess, 
Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 49.
 2 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd rev. ed. (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 159.
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describe Ethiopian federalism. That section will be followed by a dis-
cussion of the judiciary and of the house of Federation, which is one of 
the two federal houses and the ultimate authority with the mandate to 
interpret Ethiopia’s Constitution. The final section of the chapter will 
discuss and analyse the extra-legal explanations for the lack of federalism 
jurisprudence in Ethiopia.
I. The Ethiopian Federal System
1. Background to Ethiopian Federalism and Country Profile
The population of Ethiopia is more than 96 million, making it Africa’s 
second-most populous country.3 The latest official census shows con-
siderable diversity in both religion and ethnicity. More than eighty eth-
nic groups live in Ethiopia, and almost all of them speak their own 
language.4 Despite the overwhelming ethnic and linguistic diversity, 
the four largest ethnic groups make up 73.7 per cent of the total popula-
tion (the two biggest ethnic groups being the Oromo and the Amhara, 
constituting 34.5 per cent and 26.9 per cent respectively of the total pop-
ulation). There are only ten ethnic groups with a population exceeding 
one million.5 With the exception of major urban centres such as Addis 
Ababa, there is a high degree of ethnic concentration in the settlement 
patterns of the population.
Almost half the population adheres to Ethiopian Orthodox Christi-
anity, a third of the population is Muslim (33.9 per cent), and a fifth of 
the population comprises Protestant Christians (18.6 per cent).6 These 
religions crosscut ethnicity, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam have 
ancient roots in Ethiopia going back to the fourth and seventh centuries, 
respectively.7 Although Ethiopia is one of the lowest ranking countries 
on the UN’s human Development index, during the past decade, its 
economy has been on the rise. As of 2014, its GDP was US$51 billion, 
 3 See World bank, “Ethiopia: Country at a Glance,” http://www.worldbank.org/en/
country/ethiopia.
 4 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Population Census Commission, Summary 
and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census, 16–17, http://ecastats.
uneca.org/aicmd/Portals/0/Cen2007_firstdraft.pdf.
 5 Ibid.
 6 Ibid., 17.
 7 John S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 38–42.
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and its per capita income adjusted for purchasing power parity was 
about $1,430.8 Relatively speaking, the disparity in wealth is not sub-
stantial among the population at large, but inequality is increasing 
because of growing urban income inequality.9 There also is a disparity 
in the level of development between the more populated central high-
lands and the peripheral lowlands, which have historically benefited 
very little from public investment in the provision of social goods and 
services.
Since 1995, the Ethiopian state has been reconfigured with a federal 
constitutional dispensation. The Constitution of the Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), establishes nine “national regional 
state” governments and a federal government.10 The Constitution does 
not provide for administrative units below the state level but obliges 
the regional states to establish subregional administrative units with 
adequate powers to enable the people to participate directly in their 
own governance.11 An important and perhaps distinguishing feature of 
Ethiopia’s federal system is that it is established with a view to ensure 
the right to self-determination of the nations, nationalities, and peoples 
of Ethiopia.12 The right to self-determination of the country’s ethno- 
linguistic groups is considered to be the cornerstone of Ethiopia’s 
federal system.13 because self-governance is provided as one of the com-
ponents of the right to self-determination,14 there has been an attempt 
to provide each major ethnic group with its own regional state or sub-
regional administrative unit. While six ethnic groups in the country 




=region&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false, last updated 2 June 2016; and http://data.
worldbank.org/country/ethiopia.
 9 See “Global Gini Index (Distribution of Family Income) Ranking by Country,” 
Mongabay.com, 2010, http://data.mongabay.com/reference/stats/rankings/2172.html.
 10 FDRE Constitution Articles 47(1) and 50(1).
 11 FDRE Constitution Article, 50(4).
 12 See Fasil Nahum, Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect (Trenton, 
NJ: Red Sea, 1997). “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples” is the phrase used in the 
Constitution to refer to ethnic groups. No distinction is provided between the three 
terms.
 13 See Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A 
Comparative Study (Oisterwijk, Netherlands: Wolf Legal, 2006).
 14 FDRE Constitution Article 39(3).
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have eponymous national regional states, where in five of which they 
constitute the overwhelming majority,15 the other regional states have 
very diverse ethnic make-ups, necessitating a complex arrangement of 
special sub-state territorial administrative units.16
The Constitution explicitly provides for only two orders of govern-
ment: the federal or national order and the regional state governments. 
The zonal, wereda, and kebele administrations are established by the 
regional state constitutions. Addis Ababa is accorded a special status in 
the Constitution as the capital city of the federal government.17 The Con-
stitution grants residents of Addis Ababa the right to self- governance 
while recognizing the special interest of the Oromia National Regional 
State over Addis Ababa.18 Even though the Constitution does not fore-
see the establishment of territories to be directly administered by the 
federal government, the city of Dire Dawa has also, through federal 
legislation, become a chartered city and federal territory just like Addis 
Ababa.19 This arrangement was meant to be provisional resolution of an 
intractable dispute between Oromia and Somalia regional states, both 
of which claimed Dire Dawa (an important commercial and industrial 
hub) as falling within their territory.20
The FDRE Constitution was adopted in 1994. The Constitution was 
drafted and adopted during a three-year transition that started in 1991 
at the end of a long civil war that pitted the Marxist-military junta, pop-
ularly referred to as the Deurg, against various armed ethno-national 
political groups.21 The end of the civil war brought these victorious 
liberation fronts to power. In particular, the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation 
 15 The harari people make up a minority in the state with the same name.
 16 See also Tsegaye Regassa, “Sub-National Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards 
Entrenching Constitutionalism at State Level,” Mizan Law Review 3 (2009): 63; Zemelak 
Ayitenew Ayele, “The Constitutional Status of Local Government in Federal Systems: 
The Case of Ethiopia,” Africa Today 58 (2012): 89–109.
 17 FDRE Constitution Article 49.
 18 Ibid.
 19 See The Diredawa Administration Charter Proclamation No. 416/2004.
 20 John Markakis, “The Somali in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy 23 
(1996): 567.
 21 For an overview of Ethiopia’s constitution-making process, see Kifle Wedajo, “The 
Making of the Ethiopian Constitution,” in The Making of the Ethiopian Constitution, 
ed. Göran hydén, 132–43 (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001); see also 
Theodore M. vestal, “An Analysis of the New Constitution of Ethiopia and the 
Process of Its Adoption,” Northeast African Studies 3, no. 2 (1996): 26.
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Front (TPLF), which was a principal protagonist of the civil war, and 
its allies, which together formed the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolution-
ary Democratic Front (EPRDF),22 established the new federal system. 
Arguing that the formation of the modern Ethiopian state at the turn 
of the twentieth century was an imperial project that had resulted in 
the subjugation and assimilation of various ethnic groups, the EPRDF 
championed the right to self-determination up to and including seces-
sion and an identity-based federalism as solutions for these historical 
injustices. The EPRDF argued that while breaking up the Ethiopian 
state was undesirable, its radical reorganization was necessary to save 
Ethiopia from dissolution and chaos. The Constitution proclaims the 
“Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia” as the sovereign con-
stituent powers who came together to enter into a covenant and form 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. These legal and political 
propositions give Ethiopia’s federal system the appearance of a coming 
together federalism in which sovereign nations, nationalities, and peo-
ples came together to form the federation while, in reality, federalism 
was adopted as a means of holding together a country that was on the 
brink of disintegration.23
The EPRDF was the major proponent of federalism, contending 
that it was imperative to adopt federalism and embrace the right to 
self-determination in order to hold the country together and stave off 
its disintegration.24 The option of federalism, particularly its ethnic 
component as introduced in Ethiopia, was found to be objectionable 
by those who considered it a harbinger to the total dismemberment 
of Ethiopia.25 Traumatized by Eritrea’s independence and the break-
down of yugoslavia, Ethiopian nationalists had a hard time accepting 
the new federal setup. Nevertheless, the EPRDF, which was leading 
a transition government until the adoption of the FDRE Constitution, 
adopted the new Constitution through a constituent assembly in which 
 22 For a brief description of the party composition of the EPRDF, see below.
 23 Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia, 211.
 24 Andreas Eshete, “The Protagonists in Constitution Making in Ethiopia,” in 
Constitution-Making and Democratization in Africa, ed. Göran hydén, 69–78 (Pretoria: 
Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001).
 25 See Minase haile, “The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact on Unity, human 
Rights and Democracy,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 20, no. 1 (1996–7): 68. See 
also John young, “Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia,” Third World Quarterly 
19 (1998): 191, 194.
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its dominance was absolute. Although the constituent assembly was 
popularly elected through first-past-the-post elections conducted in 
more than 500 single-member district constituencies, and although 
there were many forums of direct participation in which public opinion 
was sought, the EPRDF was virtually the only organized political group 
taking part in the constitution-making process.26 The assembly deliber-
ated on the draft constitution and adopted its provisions through sim-
ple majority votes.27 All other significant political actors were either in 
exile or looking from the margins during the adoption of the FDRE 
Constitution. This was true for groups that opposed and groups that 
favoured the adoption of a federal system.
Since its adoption, the federal system has undergone no major 
constitutional, structural, or territorial reforms. Significant politi-
cal developments have affected federalism in Ethiopia, however. 
During the early days of the federation, the dominance of the TPLF 
within the EPRDF as well as that of the federal government over 
the regional states was very visible and overwhelming.28 After the 
TPLF’s accumulated experience in the armed struggle against the 
Deurg, it had the most organized, disciplined, and cohesive leader-
ship among the four members of the EPRDF. Furthermore, the TPLF 
had firm control over the newly established military and security 
services, which were formed largely by former TPLF fighters. The 
TPLF was therefore visibly dominant and played the role of tutor 
and overseer to the other parties within the EPRDF. Senior TPLF 
members who were assigned to be informal political advisers in the 
regional states played a prominent role in running the regional state 
governments.29
Over time, the dominance of a single party within the EPRDF as well 
as that of the federal government over the regional states has become less 
 26 See Meaza Ashenafi, “Ethiopia: Process of Democratization and Development,”  
in Human Rights under African Constitutions: Realizing the Promise for Ourselves,  
ed. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2003), 31–3.
 27 Article 11, Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia No. 1.
 28 John young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy  
23 (1996): 538.
 29 International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, Africa 
Report no. 153, 4 September 2009, 17, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/
Files/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/Ethiopia%20Ethnic%20Federalism%20
and%20Its%20Discontents.ashx.
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visible (although still very much present).30 This change has been a result 
of two developments. First, the other parties within the EPRDF recruited 
members who were more educated and qualified than their original found-
ers. Second and perhaps more important was the split within the TPLF in 
2001, which led to the expulsion of many of its senior leaders. Together 
these developments reduced what had been a lopsided relationship 
between the TPLF and the other members of the EPRDF and allied parties.
When the FDRE Constitution was adopted, the very idea of a federal 
system was controversial.31 Although they were not part of the constitu-
tion-making process, there were significant political actors who argued 
that maintaining a unitary system was essential to ensure the state’s 
territorial integrity. however, over the past two decades, it has become 
quite clear that federalism will stay, at least as long as the EPRDF is in 
power. In May 2015, the EPRDF won 500 of the 547 seats in the house 
of Peoples’ Representatives, while EPRDF allies won the other 47 seats. 
None of the political actors in the mainstream consider a unitary state 
to be a viable option. In principle, federalism has come to be seen as 
the most appropriate compromise between Ethiopia’s centrifugal and 
centripetal forces.32 Almost all major opposition political groups and 
even the most vehement critics of the EPRDF seem to support the idea 
of federalism, although they would prefer a federalism with less pro-
nounced or no ethnic component. Some criticize the ethnic dimension 
of the federal system, the distribution of powers among the different 
orders of government, as well as the inclusion of a secession right that 
entitles nations, nationalities, and peoples to secede from the FDRE.33 
 30 Jan Záhořík, “Ethiopian Federalism Revisited,” in Africanists on Africa: Current 
Issues, ed. Patrick Chabal and Peter Skalník (berlin: LIT verlag, 2009), 136. See also 
Christophe van der beken, “Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: 
The Case of Ethiopia,” in Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on African Studies, 
2009, 14; Jon Abbink, “Ethnic-based Federalism and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing 
the Experiment after 20 years, ”Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, no. 4 (2011): 596–618.
 31 Aaron Tesfaye, Political Power and Ethnic Federalism: The Struggle for Democracy in 
Ethiopia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), 5.
 32 All major opposition political groups and even the most vehement critics support 
the idea of federalism these days, although they would prefer a federalism with less 
pronounced or no ethnic component.
 33 See Assefa Mehretu, “Ethnic Federalism and Its potential to Dismember the 
Ethiopian State,” Progress in Development Studies 12 (2012): 113–33; and Alem 
habtu, “Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the 
Constitution,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 35 (2005): 313–35.
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however, there are those who are happy with the federal arrangement 
as it is provided in the Constitution but who criticize the practice on the 
ground that the system is neither federal nor democratic. These groups 
contend that behind the rhetoric of federalism and empowerment of 
hitherto oppressed ethnic groups, the Ethiopian state is still centralized 
and oppressive.
Ethiopia’s federal system is unusual in that the judiciary has no sig-
nificant role in devising the system’s doctrines, principles, and rules. 
This is so because, as will be discussed below, the Constitution and sub-
sequent laws regarding constitutional interpretation have precluded 
the judiciary from undertaking constitutional review and interpreting 
the Constitution.34 The role of interpreting the Constitution and resolving 
constitutional disputes has been entrusted to the house of Federation.35 
The house of Federation is a non-legislative federal house with signifi-
cant powers, particularly over the functioning of the federal system. 
These powers include the authority to interpret the Constitution, deter-
mine the formula for distributing federal transfers to the regional states, 
resolve disputes between regional states, determine matters of civil law 
on which there is need for federal legislation, and authorize federal 
intervention into regional states.36
2. Structural Features of Ethiopian Federalism
As indicated earlier, the FDRE Constitution provides only for federal 
and state governments. The Constitution does not provide for a third 
order of government; it allows the regional states to determine their 
own subregional administrative structures. The only constitutional 
obligation the states have in organizing their internal administrative 
structure is the duty to ensure that “adequate power shall be granted 
to the lowest units of government to enable the People to participate 
directly in the administration of such units.”37 Of course, this right is 
relevant only to ethnic groups constituting a minority in a regional state 
where another ethnic group constitutes a majority or in regional states 
 34 See Article 83(1) of the FDRE Constitution. See also “Consolidation of the house of 
the Federation and Definition of Its Powers and Responsibilities Proclamation No. 
251/2001” and “Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No. 250/2001.”
 35 FDRE Constitution Article 62(1).
 36 See FDRE Constitution Article 62.
 37 FDRE Constitution Article 50(4).
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constituted by various ethnic groups. Taking their cue from these pro-
visions of the Constitution, the state constitutions guarantee at least a 
two-tier system of local government.38 They also provide special local 
governance units to accommodate minority ethnic groups or different 
ethnic groups that have no regional state of their own.39
The FDRE Constitution allocates legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers to both orders of government.40 The allocation of powers is 
based principally on an extensive list of subject matters designated to 
fall within the jurisdiction of the federal government.41 The Constitu-
tion also provides concurrent powers mainly with regard to taxation.42 
All powers that are not given expressly to the federal government or 
designated to be concurrent powers are reserved by the Constitution 
to the states.43 Even though all residual powers are allocated to the 
states, the Constitution, perhaps superfluously or for good measure, 
still lists some powers belonging to the states. One reading of the list of 
state powers under Article 52(2) is that it partially fleshes out residual 
state powers. Furthermore, it is also possible to think of it as fortifying 
some of the essential powers of the regional states and also providing 
the states with administrative jurisdiction on matters such as land and 
natural resources over which the federal government has legislative 
jurisdiction. had it not been for Article 52(2), the federal legislature’s 
competence to enact laws on these matters would have given the fed-
eral government executive jurisdiction, because, in principle, executive 
and legislative powers go hand in hand in the Ethiopian federation, just 
like other countries that have a system of legislative federalism.
The powers given to the federal government include the usual 
subjects, such as defence, foreign affairs, regulation of interstate and 
 38 See the Revised Constitution of the Oromia National Regional State Constitution, Articles 
70–101; the Revised Constitution of the Somali National Regional State, Articles 74–98; 
the Revised Constitutions of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional 
State, Articles 80–114; the Revised Constitution of the Gambella People’s National 
Regional State, Articles 75–109; the Constitution of the National Regional State of Tigray, 
Articles 68–69; the Revised Constitution of the Amhara National Regional State, Articles 
73–107. See also Tsegaye Regassa, “Sub-National Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards 
Entrenching Constitutionalism at State Level,” Mizan Law Review 3 (2009): 61.
 39 Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia, 435.
 40 FDRE Constitution, Article 50(2).
 41 FDRE Constitution, Articles 51 and 55.
 42 FDRE Constitution, Article 98.
 43 FDRE Constitution, Article 52(1).
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foreign commerce, and transportation.44 They also include some very 
broad powers stated in quite general terms, including but not limited to 
the power to formulate policies for overall economic and social devel-
opment, draw up and implement plans and strategies of development, 
and establish national standards and basic criteria for the evaluation of 
policies in public health, education, science, technology, culture, and 
the protection and preservation of historical legacies.45 Even though 
residual powers belong to the states, given the long list of federal pow-
ers and how some of these powers are expressed in broad terms, the 
balance of power seems to tip to the federal government. This is so 
particularly when we take into account the fact that most of the lucra-
tive sources of revenue are allocated to the federal government, such as 
the power to “levy and collect custom duties, taxes and other charges 
on imports and exports” and to “levy and collect income, profit, sales 
and excise taxes on enterprises owned by the Federal Government.”46
The Constitution’s division of power allows for some flexibility. In 
addition to the vague and broad language that lists some of the powers 
of the federal government, the possibility of delegating federal powers 
to regional states provides additional flexibility in the distribution of com-
petences between the two orders of government.47 Although the Constitu-
tion provides that federal powers can be delegated to the states, it does 
not stipulate the procedure through which such delegation is to be made; 
hence, no formal delegation has been made yet. however, though not for-
mally designated as delegations of federal power, there are some instances 
in which regional states execute federal legislation. The difficulty is that 
there is no indication that the states have consented to such arrangements. 
As such, instead of federal powers being delegated to regional states, it 
could be seen that regional state structures are being commandeered 
to execute federal policies and laws. For example, some environmental 
protection legislation adopted by the federal legislature imposes an obli-
gation on the regional states to establish environmental agencies and 
enforce environmental standards adopted by the federal government.48 
 44 FDRE Constitution, Articles 51(6, 8, and 12).
 45 FDRE Constitution, Articles 51(2 and 3).
 46 FDRE Constitution, Article 97(1) and (3).
 47 FDRE Constitution, Article 50(9).
 48 See Environmental Protection Organs Establishment Proclamation No. 295/2002, 
Article 25; Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation No. 299/2002, Article 12; 
and Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation No.300/2002, Article 7.
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Given that the federal legislature unilaterally imposed this duty on the 
regional states, it is difficult to characterize this as a delegation of powers.
The Constitution is also silent on delegation of state powers to the 
federal government. however, in practice, the federal government has 
started to exercise the important power of administering land, which is 
expressly a power given to the states by the Constitution.49 The federal 
government claims that it is exercising this power because it has been 
delegated authority by the concerned regional states.50 Unfortunately, 
this matter has not been brought before the house of Federation; hence, 
there is no authoritative pronouncement on the constitutionality of fed-
erally administered land banks. This and similar practices show that 
the allocation of power by the Constitution is construed rather loosely, 
and its interpretation is determined largely by political actors through 
practice and usage.
What lies beneath is the centralized power structure of the ruling 
party, which is underpinned by the principle of democratic central-
ism.51 This has meant that regardless of the distribution of powers in the 
Constitution, senior leaders of the ruling party who control the federal 
government can use the party channel to circumvent or, when neces-
sary, ignore the constitutional allocation of powers. Another important 
inbuilt flexibility in the Constitution is a provision that empowers the 
house of Federation to authorize enactment of federal legislation on 
any civil matter that needs to be regulated by federal legislation in order 
to foster the creation of one economic community.52 So far this power 
has been exercised only once, with regard to urban land registration.53
 49 FDRE Constitution, Article 52(2)(d).
 50 Getnet Alemu, Rural Land Policy, Rural Transformation and Recent Trends In Large-Scale 
Rural Land Acquisitions In Ethiopia, European Report on Development, 2012, 15, http://
erd-report.eu/erd/report_2011/documents/dev-11-001-11researchpapers_alemu.pdf. 
See also Alemu, “Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa Country Report: 
Ethiopia” (Oakland Institute, 2011), 27. The matter has not been presented to the 
house of Federation; therefore, the house’s position on the issue is not known.
 51 Theodore M. vestal, Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Publishing, 1999), 104.
 52 FDRE Constitution, Article 62(2).
 53 The house of the Federation was called upon to resolve a dispute among 
parliamentarians on whether the house of Peoples’ Representatives has the power 
to legislate on nationwide urban land registration. See Getnet Alemu, “Rural 
Land Policy, Rural Transformation and Recent Trends in Large-scale Rural Land 
Acquisitions in Ethiopia,” https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/erd-
consca-dev-researchpapers-alemu-20110101_en.pdf.
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An important area on which the Constitution envisions federal legis-
lation and state execution is land. The Constitution empowers the fed-
eral government to enact a federal land-law while providing the states 
the power to administer land and implement that law.54 Although the 
constitutional language used does not imply that the law enacted by 
the federal government should be framework legislation, in practice 
states have adopted their own land administration law, and the federal 
land-law is seen as framework legislation.55 In fact, some states have 
even adopted land laws on the basis of which they have redistributed 
land. This issue is of particular importance because all land is publicly 
owned and agriculture is the mainstay of the country’s economy, pro-
viding livelihood for nearly 80 per cent of the population.
Another area involving the execution of federal law by the states 
is criminal law. The Constitution empowers the federal legislature to 
enact a criminal code and authorizes the states to adopt criminal laws 
on matters not covered specifically by federal criminal laws.56 On this 
basis, the federal government has adopted a comprehensive criminal 
code. Given that this is federal legislation, one would expect its enforce-
ment to be the task of the federal police, prosecutor, and judiciary. In 
reality, the Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation has indirectly 
left the application of a large part of the criminal code to the regional 
states. The proclamation has designated some crimes as federal crimes, 
but all other crimes are understood to be non-federal, and their investi-
gation and prosecution are left for the regional states.57
Similarly in other areas, such as environmental law, the federal gov-
ernment has enacted laws that are predicated partially on the adminis-
trative apparatus of the regional states for their execution.58 While these 
practices could be seen as instances of delegation, there is no indication 
that the consent of the states has been secured in advance or that the 
federal government provides the financial compensation it is constitu-
tionally required to provide to the states when it delegates its powers 
 54 FDRE Constitution, Articles 51(5) and 52(2)(d).
 55 Abebe Mulatu, A Review and Analysis of Land Administration & Use Legislation and 
Applications of Tthe Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia and the Four Regional States 
of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigrai, Ethiopian Civil Society Network on Climate 
Change (2011), 7.
 56 FDRE Constitution, Article 55(5).
 57 Federal Court Proclamation No. 25/1996, Article 4.
 58 See Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation No. 300/2002
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and responsibilities.59 however, such issues do not give rise to public 
disagreements between the states and the federal government. The rul-
ing party and its affiliates have absolute control over both regional and 
federal governments, so the trend so far is that neither the states nor 
the federal government jealously guard their competences and seem to 
accept in equanimity acts of the other that could be seen as deviations 
from the constitutional allocation of power.
An interesting aspect of the allocation of power between the states 
and the federal government is the constitutional delegation of federal 
judicial powers to the regional states. During the adoption of the Con-
stitution, mindful of the lack of trained legal professionals who could 
fill parallel federal and state judiciaries, the constitutional drafters del-
egated the powers of the federal high courts and federal first-instance 
courts to the regional supreme courts and high courts respectively.60
The Constitution does not have a provision equivalent to the U.S. 
federal supremacy clause and does not clearly say which law will pre-
vail in the case of inconsistency.61 however, the most convincing view 
on this question is that federal law should prevail where federal and 
state powers overlap. In all other cases where the matter falls within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal or state government, inconsist-
encies are to be resolved by invalidating the law that was enacted in 
contravention to the constitutional delineation of powers. This posi-
tion is supported by the constitutional provision that obliges states and 
the federal government to respect each other’s sphere of competence.62 
because the power of interpreting the Constitution is vested in the 
house of Federation, in theory, this house has the ultimate power to 
decide the competences of the states and the federal government.
II. The Ethiopian Judiciary and the House of Federation
The FDRE Constitution establishes a Federal Supreme Court invested 
with “supreme federal judicial authority,” and it mandates regional 
states to establish their own supreme, high, and first-instance courts.63 
 59 FDRE Constitution, Article 94(1).
 60 FDRE Constitution, Article 78(2) and Article 80(2) and (4).
 61 Assefa Fiseha, “Federalism and the Adjudication of Constitutional Issues: The 
Ethiopian Experience,” Netherlands International Law Review 52 (2005): 1, 10.
 62 FDRE Constitution, Article 50(8).
 63 FDRE Constitution, Article 78(2) and (3).
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The Constitution gives the house of Peoples’ Representatives (hPR) 
the power to establish the federal high court and first-instance courts 
it deems necessary, either nationwide or in some parts of the country 
only.64 Until the establishment of federal high and first-instance courts 
by the house of Peoples’ Representatives, the Constitution provided 
that the powers of the federal high court and first-instance courts would 
be exercised by state supreme courts and state high courts respectively.65 
This arrangement was seen as temporary because the Constitution 
gave the federal legislature the option of establishing federal high and 
first-instance courts and put an end to the delegation of judicial pow-
ers. Accordingly, the federal legislature has established high courts and 
partially revoked the delegated judicial powers of five of the regional 
states where the regional judiciaries were deemed lacking in techni-
cal competence.66 The hPR has also established federal courts in the 
capital city Addis Ababa and in the city of Dire Dawa.67 The Constitu-
tion mandates regional states to establish their own supreme, high, and 
first-instance courts.68
In addition to ordinary state and federal courts, other organs exer-
cise judicial power. In Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, there are munici-
pal courts with their own first-instance authority and appellate courts 
established by the respective charters of the cities enacted by the 
regional house of Representatives.69 The cities also have their own 
small-claims social courts as well as a number of quasi-administrative 
tribunals.70 Disputes over jurisdiction among federal and municipal 
courts of the two cities are resolved by the Federal Supreme Court.71 
Furthermore, both the state and federal orders of government include 
 64 Ibid.
 65 Ibid.
 66 Federal high Court Establishment Proclamation No. 322/2003. This proclamation 
establishes federal high courts in the states of Afar, benshangul, Gambella, Somali 
and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples.
 67 Federal Court Proclamation No. 25/1996, Article 24(2).
 68 FDRE Constitution, Article 78(3).
 69 Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation No. 361/2003, Article 43; 
and the Dire Dawa Administration Charter Proclamation No. 416 12004, Article 35.
 70 Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation No. 361/2003,  
Articles 46–50; and Dire Dawa Administration Charter Proclamation No. 416 12004, 
Articles 38–41.
 71 Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation No. 361/2003, Articles 
42(1); and Dire Dawa Administration Charter Proclamation No. 416 12004, Article 34(1).
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sharia courts that decide on family and succession disputes among 
parties who have agreed to settle their disputes in accordance with 
Islamic law.72
In the federal judicial hierarchy, the Federal First Instance court exer-
cises only original jurisdiction, while the Federal high Court has both 
original and appellate jurisdictions.73 The Federal Supreme Court has 
very limited original jurisdiction and serves as the highest court of 
appeal in the federal judiciary.74 The cassation division of the Federal 
Supreme Court exercises the power of cassation review when petition-
ers contend there has been a fundamental error of law in the final deci-
sion of either a federal or state court.75 The decision of the cassation 
division, which is decided with a panel of five or more judges, sets a 
binding precedent both for federal and state courts.76 The Constitution 
does not lay down in detail the structure and powers of the judiciary. 
As a result, the power and the structure of the federal judiciary are pro-
vided for largely by a proclamation enacted by the house of Peoples’ 
Representatives.77 There are many constitutionally problematic issues 
arising out of this proclamation from the perspective of federalism. One 
could point to four such issues in particular.
The first problematic aspect of the proclamation is the blurring of the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of federal and state courts. The Constitution 
stipulates that the Federal Supreme Court shall have the highest and 
final judicial power over federal matters and that state supreme courts 
shall have the highest and final judicial power over state matters.78 The 
Constitution does not really say what constitutes state matters or fed-
eral matters for the purpose of the judiciary. Logically one would sup-
pose that federal courts will adjudicate disputes arising under federal 
law, and state courts will adjudicate matters arising under state law. 
The Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation provides something 
 72 See Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation No. 188/1999; see also Mohammed 
Abdo, “Legal Pluralism, Sharia Courts, and Constitutional Issues in Ethiopia,” Mizan 
Law Review 5, no. 1 (2011): 72.
 73 Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996, Articles 11–15 as amended by Federal 
Courts (Amendment) Proclamation No. 138/1998 and Federal Courts Proclamation 
Re-amendment Proclamation No. 454/2005.
 74 Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996, Article 8 and 9.
 75 Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996, Article 10.
 76 Federal Courts Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation No. 454/2005, Article 2.
 77 Federal high Court Establishment Proclamation No. 322/2003.
 78 FDRE Constitution, Article 80(1 and 2).
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along these lines in principle.79 Then, after laying down the principle, 
the proclamation goes on to enumerate the civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion of federal courts.80 The enumerated criminal matters leave a sig-
nificant swathe of the criminal code, which is a federal law, outside the 
jurisdiction of federal courts. On civil matters, the proclamation pro-
vides that depending on who is a party to a civil litigation (e.g., in suits 
involving a foreign party), federal courts should assume jurisdiction 
even when the applicable law is a state law. Such allocation of judicial 
power has not been provided for in the Constitution, and the Federal 
Courts Establishment Proclamation seems to be an attempt to fill these 
constitutional gaps.
The second difficult issue is the cassation power of the Federal 
Supreme Court over the decisions of the state courts on matters that fall 
squarely within state jurisdiction.81 This practice is based on the Federal 
Courts Establishment Proclamation and entitles the federal judiciary 
not only to interpret state laws but also to set binding precedents that 
must be followed by state courts in interpreting their own state law.82 
This is so despite the fact that state supreme courts have their own cas-
sation divisions to review basic errors of law, which, according to the 
FDRE Constitution, have power of cassation “over any final court deci-
sion on State matters which contains a basic error of law.”83
Those who argue in favour of the constitutionality of federal cas-
sation over state matters invoke Article 80(3)(a) of the Constitution, 
which provides: “The Federal Supreme Court has a power of cassation 
over any final court decision containing a basic error of law.”84 Those in 
favour of the practice have interpreted “any final court decision” as 
including decisions by state courts on matters falling within state juris-
diction. Those opposed to this practice argue that the power of cassa-
tion of the Federal Supreme Court should not extend beyond decisions 
of state courts exercising constitutionally delegated federal judicial 
authority. This practice, in effect, gives an organ of the federal judiciary 
 79 Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996, Article 3.
 80 Ibid., 4 and 5.
 81 See Muradu Abdo, “Review of Decisions of State Courts over State Matters by the 
Federal Supreme Court,” Mizan Law Review 1, no. 1 (2007): 61–74.
 82 Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996, Article 10; and Federal Courts 
Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation No. 454/2005, Article 2.
 83 FDRE Constitution, Article 80(3)(b) (emphasis added).
 84 Emphasis added. See Abdo, “Review of Decisions of State Courts,” 68.
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the opportunity to have the last say on questions of state law. Taken 
together with the legally binding precedent-setting power of the cassa-
tion division of the Supreme Court, this practice enables the cassation 
division of the Federal Supreme Court to dictate the interpretation of 
state law by state courts. This is very problematic and seems to run 
counter to the spirit and logic of the federal arrangement established in 
the Constitution.
The third constitutionally problematic issue, from the perspective of 
federalism, is the language of adjudication in state courts that exercise 
constitutionally delegated federal judicial authority. Although these 
courts are applying federal law and acting as federal courts exercising 
a delegated power, they normally do not use the working language of 
the federal government; instead, they use the working language of their 
respective states. This is particularly the case in states and sub-state 
autonomous administrative units that have working languages different 
from the federal working language. The matter is further complicated 
because most of these cases end up before the Federal Supreme Court for 
appellate or cassation review where Amharic is the working language.
When we come to substantive laws, almost all of the substantive 
legal codes of Ethiopia are taken from the civil law tradition, while pro-
cedural laws are modelled after common law countries. English is the 
most widely spoken foreign language in Ethiopia and given it is the 
medium of instruction in higher education, so Ethiopia’s legal profes-
sionals have very limited access to materials and commentaries from 
civil law countries. So comparative learning and research as well as 
legal education are highly influenced by American common law litera-
ture, which is relatively more accessible. The influence of the common 
law is also due to the historical and contemporary links of legal educa-
tion in Ethiopia with common law countries such as the United States.
Ethiopia’s Constitution of 1994 stands apart from most constitutions 
adopted during the twentieth century in that it does not provide for 
judicial review or a specialized constitutional court. Some members of 
the drafting commission proposed the establishment of a constitutional 
court or decentralized judicial review, but the driving force behind the 
making of the new constitution, the EPRDF, rejected both proposals.85 
 85 See Minutes of the 94th Regular Session of the Council of Representatives of the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (unpublished), 213–17; and Minutes of the 
Constitutional Assembly (unpublished) 5:4–19, 1994.
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Instead of a constitutional court or constitutional review by the ordi-
nary judiciary, those who adopted and ratified the Constitution pro-
vided for a system of constitutional interpretation in which the upper 
house of parliament (i.e., the house of Federation) with the help of the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) serves as the authoritative and 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.86
The house of Federation is a non-legislative house in which every 
ethnic group in the country is represented by at least one representative, 
with one additional representative for every one million of each group’s 
population.87 Members of the house of Federation can be elected by the 
state councils of the regional states or be directly elected by members of 
the ethnic group they represent (the practice so far is election by state 
councils).88 Although the house of Federation is supposed to provide 
the final and authoritative interpretation of the Constitution, the CCI is 
an auxiliary organ that is supposed to provide expert assistance to the 
house of Federation on the task of constitutional interpretation. This 
council is composed largely of lawyers and includes as ex officio mem-
bers the president and the deputy president of the Federal Supreme 
Court.89 Constitutional disputes arising in ordinary courts or raised 
outside the courts are supposed to be presented to the CCI first, and the 
council is expected to issue a recommendation that can be adopted or 
rejected by the house of Federation.90
The CCI can also reject a request of constitutional interpretation or 
a constitutional issue submitted before it if it is of the opinion that the 
matter does not require constitutional interpretation.91 In such cases, the 
petitioner for interpretation or the applicant can appeal to the house of 
Federation.92 In practice, most petitions brought before the CCI are rejected 
as not necessitating constitutional interpretation; so far, therefore, only a 
few of such appeals have been successful.
The number of petitions submitted before the council is small and 
many of them are rejected, so the house of Federation has decided only 
a handful of cases. Such decisions, however, are binding in all similar 
 86 FDRE Constitution, Articles 62(1), 82 and 83.
 87 FDRE Constitution, Articles 61(1) and (2).
 88 FDRE Constitution, Article 61.
 89 FDRE Constitution, Article 82(2).
 90 FDRE Constitution, Article 84(1).
 91 Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No. 250/2001, Article 17(3).
 92 Ibid., Article 18.
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cases and set a precedent.93 Unfortunately, the house has so far published 
only three of its decisions.94 Apart from constitutional law scholars, the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the house of Federation receive 
very little attention from legal practitioners and the media. Members of 
the CCI engage with the council part-time, and most have full-time jobs. 
Their meetings are never public and their proceedings are not published. 
Normally, the house of Federation also meets only twice a year,95 and the 
press and the public at large pay very little attention to its activities as 
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Cognizant of the problems 
in the institutional set up of constitutional interpretation, a bill to reform 
the organization of the CCI was adopted in August 2013.96
Given that the system of constitutional interpretation described above 
is unusual, why did the framers of the Constitution adopt this system? In 
the debates leading up to the Constitution’s adoption, proponents of the 
system presented arguments to reject constitutional review by ordinary 
courts or a constitutional court. One major argument revolved around 
the nature of constitutional interpretation. Proponents argued that 
the power to interpret a constitution is, in effect, the power to amend 
a constitution in the guise of giving meaning to a constitutional text.97 
They also contended that giving unelected judges such a power over 
a document that is an expression and embodiment of the sovereignty 
of the nations, nationalities, and peoples (NNPs) of Ethiopia would be 
undemocratic.98 They argued further that the Constitution is not just 
a legal document but also a pre-eminently political document; hence, 
its interpretation cannot be considered a mere technical exercise to be 
left to professionals but a political act in which the nations, nationali-
ties, and peoples of Ethiopia in whom all sovereign power reside should 
have the final say.99 So the arguments against constitutional review by 
judges were rooted in the equation of constitutional interpretation with 
 93 Consolidation of the house of the Federation and Definition of Its Powers and 
Responsibilities Proclamation No. 251/200, Article 11(1).
 94 See Journal of Constitutional Decisions 1, The house of the Federation of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1.2007 (2000 Ethiopian calendar).
 95 FDRE Constitution, Article 67(1).
 96 Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No. 798/20, 13.
 97 See Minutes of the 94th Regular Session of the Council of Representatives of the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (unpublished) 213–17; and Minutes of the 
Constitutional Assembly (unpublished), 5:4–19, 1994.
 98 Ibid. See also FDRE Constitution, Article 8(1).
 99 Ibid.
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constitutional amendment, in the nature of the constitution as a political 
document, the need to maintain the sovereignty of Ethiopia’s NNPs, and 
the perceived undemocratic nature of constitutional review by judges.
Therefore, Ethiopia’s constitutional system entrusts a political organ, 
namely, the house of Federation, not courts, with the task of resolving 
disputes that might arise in the allocation of powers between the orders 
of government.100 While constitutional courts or the ordinary judiciary 
serve as umpires for these kinds of disputes in most other federal states, 
in Ethiopia there is neither an ordinary court nor a specialized consti-
tutional court with a mandate to interpret the Constitution in order to 
resolve federalism-related disputes.
The framers of the Constitution were very suspicious of the judici-
ary and feared that the new constitutional order could be undermined 
through the guise of interpretation by judges. To understand this fear, it 
is important to realize the political and sociological reality of the period 
in which there was a huge gap between those who were framing the 
Constitution and those who staffed the judiciary. The political spon-
sors of the Constitution were mainly ethno-nationalist rebels who had 
fought for almost two decades to overthrow the Dergue. They viewed 
those who staffed the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and academia as mem-
bers or sympathizers of the previous regime. The political forces behind 
the new Constitution were rebels interested in a complete overhaul of 
the system; they saw the judiciary as an establishment institution with 
views that were not aligned with the new federal dispensation.
There has been much controversy among constitutional law scholars 
regarding whether or not the ordinary judiciary has residual or inher-
ent power to interpret the Constitution. Some have also argued that 
the drafters of the Constitution did not intend to strip the judiciary of 
all power to interpret the Constitution. These arguments, though ani-
mating and interesting in academia, have not been well received in 
practice. Not to leave any doubt on the matter, the house of Peoples’ 
Representatives has adopted two proclamations that unequivocally 
bar the ordinary judiciary from entertaining constitutional disputes.101 
Contrary to some views and even indications from the Council of Con-
stitutional Inquiry that the constitutionality of administrative acts, as 
 100 Adem Kassie Abebe, “Umpiring Federalism in Africa: Institutional Mosaic and 
Innovations,” African Studies Quarterly 13, no. 4 (2013): 65–7.
 101 Assefa Fiseha, “Separation of Powers and Its Implications for the Judiciary in 
Ethiopia,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, no. 4 (2011): 706.
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opposed to legislative acts, could be reviewed by ordinary courts, the 
proclamations clearly provide that all constitutional disputes concern-
ing acts of legislatures (federal and state) or acts of executives (federal 
and state) are to be decided by the house of Federation.
The courts have shown little inclination to carve out a role for themselves 
in the interpretation of the Constitution.102 To avoid the trouble of being 
referred to the house of Federation, lawyers normally prefer to rely on 
statutory as opposed to constitutional provisions when they make claims. 
Courts also are careful not to be seen as usurping the power of the house 
of Federation; hence, they refrain from expounding on the meaning and 
implication of constitutional provisions. If and when they do refer to con-
stitutional provisions, it is normally on matters considered to be politically 
non-sensitive or in perfunctory declarations of the constitutionality of a leg-
islative or executive action in question. Therefore, the ordinary courts have 
not played a significant role in developing a constitutional jurisprudence.
III. Federalism Jurisprudence
Although it has been more than two decades since the FDRE Constitu-
tion came into force, very little constitutional jurisprudence has been 
developed in Ethiopia. This is particularly true in relation to feder-
alism. The house of Federation has yet to determine a “division of 
power” dispute in exercising its authority as the final interpreter of 
the Constitution.103 The few federalism-related constitutional disputes 
disposed of by the house were mainly related to the question of self- 
determination104 and other parts of the bill of Rights. The structural 
 102 Takele S. bulto, “Judicial Referral of Constitutional Disputes in Ethiopia: From Practice 
to Theory,” African Journal of International and Comparative Law 19, no. 1 (2011): 100.
 103 Though, strictly speaking, we might not call them constitutional disputes, the 
house has also been called upon to resolve border disputes among the regional 
states. The most contentious and famous example is the Oromia-Somali Regional 
States border case (2002). See A Decision Rendered Regarding the Identity Claim of the 
Silte People. See Journal of Constitutional Decisions 1.
 104 A good example is the Silte Case (2001), which concerned whether the Silte constitute 
a distinct nation, nationality, and people. Until then, the Silte were regarded as 
a subgroup of the Gurage ethnic group. Representatives of the Silte successfully 
petitioned the house of Federation for their right to self-determination and were able to 
get recognition as a distinct ethnic group. See Ahmed Shide, “Conflicts along Oromia-
Somali State boundaries: The Case of babile District,” in First National Conference on 
Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building (Addis Ababa: United Printers, 2003), 96–112.
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parts of the Constitution and those related to the allocation of powers 
between the federal and state governments have yet to be interpreted by 
the house. During the early days after the adoption of the Constitution, 
the CCI was presented with a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
land redistribution undertaken by the state of Amhara. The petitioners 
argued that a regional state does not have the power to redistribute land 
without a federal law authorizing such a measure, because the Consti-
tution allocates the power to enact legislation for the regulation of land 
to the federal government and assigns to the regional states the power 
to administer land. The petitioners argued that the land redistribution 
carried out by the state is inconsistent with the constitutional distribu-
tion of competences between the two orders of government. The CCI 
dismissed the petition because it decided that Amhara was within its 
power to administer land when it undertook the redistribution of rural 
land; therefore, there was no need for constitutional interpretation, and 
it rejected the petition without referring it to the house of Federation.105 
The Council also pointed out that the house of Peoples’ Representa-
tives has adopted a land law that retroactively endorses state laws on 
land administration as long as they are not contrary to the federal Land 
Administration Proclamation of 89/1989.106 The house of Federation 
did not, therefore, need to decide on the petition. The house of Peoples’ 
Representatives followed up this decision by enacting a federal land 
administration law that retroactively endorsed the land law issued 
by Amhara and by other regional states as well. In the end, the case 
was not presented to the house of Federation and was dismissed after 
review by the CCI.
Although it is not a decision emanating from an adversarial case and 
is not widely reported, the house of Federation has issued an advisory 
opinion on the respective competence of the regional states and the fed-
eral government to enact legislation on family matters.107 The advisory 
opinion was issued on the basis of a request by the Office of the Prime 
Minister of the FDRE. In its opinion, the house expressed the view 
that while the federal government can adopt a family law for the two 
 105 Biyadglegn Meles et al. v. the Amhara National Regional State (Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry, 1998); case unpublished, on file with the author.
 106 Ibid.
 107 Constitutional Inquiry Raised regarding the Promulgation of Family Law and the 
Decision of the house of Federation (April 2000), unpublished and available on file 
with the author.
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chartered federal cities, the regional states can adopt family laws for 
the rest of the country on the basis of their residual power. Accordingly, 
the Federal Family Code adopted by the house of Peoples’ Representa-
tives is applicable only in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Meanwhile, 
all regional states, except Afar and Somali, have adopted their own 
family laws.
Another recurrent federalism-related case the house of the Federation 
has to entertain involves to the right to self-determination. because 
the Constitution recognizes the right of ethno-linguistic communi-
ties to full self-government, including the right to establish their own 
state within the federation, the petition of a group to be recognized 
as a separate community is directly related to the federal system. In 
dealing with these petitions, every group’s effort to be recognized as a 
separate ethnic community necessarily involves the application of the 
constitutional criterion of peoplehood. however, the house, true to its 
political nature, has never systematically dealt with the meanings of the 
criteria laid down in the Constitution. hence, even in this most recur-
rent of federalism cases, the house has not developed a meaningful 
jurisprudence.108
As can be seen from this discussion, save for an advisory opinion and 
a case that could have (perhaps should have) made it to the house of 
Federation, there is very little federalism case law in Ethiopia. With the 
enactment of the proclamations consolidating the powers of the house 
of Federation and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, the house of 
Peoples’ Representatives unequivocally expressed its view that the judi-
ciary has no power to adjudicate constitutional disputes. While some 
scholars have argued that these proclamations are of dubious consti-
tutionality, the judiciary has shied away from assuming a substantial 
role in resolving constitutional disputes. Occasionally the courts inter-
pret some provisions of the constitutional bill of rights they consider 
to be innocuous, such as those concerning the rights of children,109 but 
they have not shown any inclination to invoke other provisions of the 
Constitution.
 108 For the most recent of these petitions, see Minutes of the house of the Federation, 
4th Parliamentary Period, 5th year, 2nd Ordinary Session, 24 June 2015.
 109 See, for example, Tsedale Demissie v. Ato Kifle Demissie, Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division Cassation file no. 23632, 5 October 2007, where the Cassation 
Division Cassation interpreted and applied the principle of the best interest of the 
child as enshrined in the FDRE Constitution.
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Formally speaking, the house of Federation assisted by the CCI is 
expected to serve as the constitutional umpire and settle federalism-
related disputes. however, the house cannot be said to have discharged 
this function either. If neither the courts nor the house of Federation are 
resolving federalism-related disputes, who is resolving disputes? This 
brings us to another peculiar aspect of the Ethiopian federal system as 
it has evolved during the last two decades.
Normally, federalism-related disputes arise in either of two scenar-
ios. In the first scenario, the federal government and states disagree 
about the boundaries of their respective powers. In the second scenario, 
private entities aggrieved by an act of a federal or state government 
challenge the constitutional competence of a federal or state govern-
ment to take the administrative or legislative measure that they are 
complaining against. In Ethiopia, neither scenario is likely to lead to 
litigation before a court of law or the house of Federation.
Such disputes are unlikely to end up in courts for the obvious reason 
that the Constitution and subsequent legislation have denied the courts 
the power to adjudicate them. These disputes are unlikely to be pre-
sented to the house of Federation for several reasons. The most impor-
tant is that the ruling party, the EPRDF, controls directly or through 
its affiliates all regional state governments, the house of Federation, 
and the federal government. Formally, the EPRDF is a coalition of 
four regional and ethnic parties, each administering a major national 
regional state. Three of these parties – the TPLF, the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement, and the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organi-
zation – are supposed to represent the three biggest ethnic groups in 
Ethiopia. The other member of the coalition is the Southern Ethio-
pian People’s Democratic Movement, which is an amalgam of parties 
that ostensibly represent the ethnic groups that comprise the South-
ern Nations Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State. The remaining 
regional states are administered by other parties that are not formal 
members of the EPRDF but are affiliated with it in the status of part-
ners. These parties are also included in the federal government, which 
has been controlled by the EPRDF since the inauguration of the FDRE. 
Formally, this gives the impression that Ethiopia has a very pluralistic 
federalism in which no party is administering more than one regional 
state.
however, despite this appearance of pluralism and decentralization, 
the EPRDF is a very centralized and hierarchical party. The top leader-
ship of the party controls member organizations of the EPRDF as well 
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as its partner organizations.110 All major policy decisions and initiatives 
emanate from the centre or must secure the approval of the central 
party leaders. Furthermore, in response to the principle of “democratic 
centralism,” which is strictly observed within the EPRDF, despite inter-
nal disagreements and debate before decisions are made by the party 
leadership, once a decision has been adopted, the rank and file as well 
as the leaders of the party are expected to fully endorse the decision 
as if they had agreed with it from the beginning. These debates are 
often concealed from the public and even from ordinary members of 
the party. Usually only the top party leaders are privy to these debates. 
Once the debate is over and a decision has been adopted, it is the duty 
of all party members to implement the decision to the best of their abili-
ties. No dissent or reservation is aired in public. Given this practice and 
culture of the EPRDF, which is rooted in the ideological views of the 
party as well as its genesis as an armed group that needed to maintain 
its cohesiveness for survival, dissent and debate in the party are not 
encouraged and are hidden from the public whenever possible.
It is unlikely therefore that EPRDF member organizations who con-
trol regional states will engage in legal wrangling with the federal gov-
ernment in front of the house of Federation. Any legislation, policy, or 
measure of the federal government or the regional states is usually sanc-
tioned by the party. Protests and objections to such policies, measures, 
or legislation are unwelcome and unusual once the party’s top leaders 
have adopted the decision. Democratic centralism leaves little room for 
second-guessing the party leadership, especially when such second-
guessing would challenge the constitutionality of the acts endorsed by 
the top leaders. Any possible difference that member organizations of 
the EPRDF might have is addressed inside the party, seldom becomes 
public, and is not framed as a legal constitutional issue. This is a pri-
mary reason that not a single case has been brought before the house 
of Federation in which the different orders of government were pitted 
against one another. Furthermore, considering the fact that the EPRDF 
reigns supreme in the house of Federation, there is little to be gained 
by the members and partners of the EPRDF to take their disputes to the 
house of Federation.
 110 See, for example, Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism and Regional 
Autonomy: The Somali Test,” Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 5, 
no. 1 (2005), 63–7.
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To illustrate how this dynamic works, consider the abortive attempt 
by Oromia to adopt its own criminal procedure code.111 The Oromia 
Regional State drafted a criminal procedure law as part of its judicial 
reform program. The process of drafting the criminal procedure code 
was undertaken after regional state authorities reached an understand-
ing with federal authorities that regional states have the constitutional 
authority to adopt their own criminal procedure code. however, after 
the draft was complete, the federal government changed its position. 
The federal minister of justice notified state authorities that the power 
to adopt a criminal procedure law belongs to the federal government 
and that the regional state should not adopt its own criminal proce-
dure law. Although the state had expended considerable resources in 
drafting its criminal procedure law, taking the matter to the house of 
Federation and challenging the position of the federal government was 
not a realistic option for the state.
This discussion still leaves unanswered the question of why private 
actors do not challenge the constitutionality of government actions 
based on the federal distribution of powers in the Constitution. There 
are several explanations for the lack of this kind of constitutional case. 
One is that the house of Federation is not an impartial arbiter of dis-
putes. The house is clearly and by design a political organ, and since 
its inauguration, it has been controlled by the ruling coalition, whose 
cohesiveness and strict discipline are the attributes of a single party. As 
a result, challenging the constitutionality of a government act before 
this house – which is controlled by the same party that controls both 
the executive and the legislature in all orders of government in the 
country – make it a futile exercise. For example, in the general elec-
tion of May 2015, the EPRDF and its allies won all contested seats at 
the federal and regional level, enabling it to continue its monopoly of 
seats in the house of Federation. hence, almost no one pursues a con-
stitutional case against the regional states or the federal government, 
because the house of Federation is not seen as an impartial umpire. 
however, although the house of Federation is not an impartial arbiter, 
some cases based on the bill of rights of the Constitution are presented 
to the house, while none based on the federal distribution of powers 
 111 The information for this paragraph was obtained from a judicial official from the 
Oromia National Regional State who was involved in the Justice Sector Reform of 
the state and who wishes to remain anonymous.
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have been presented; therefore additional factors might explain the 
absence of federalism cases decided by the house of Federation.
One reason is the broad nature of federal powers under the Constitu-
tion. Many of the provisions that distribute powers between the federal 
government and the states are vague and general. Although there is 
an enumerated list of federal and concurrent powers, few matters can 
be considered federal subjects if the pertinent constitutional provisions 
are stretched a little. In addition to the reasons discussed above, the 
chances of any constitutional challenge to the constitutionality of the 
acts of the federal government on the basis of federalism are very slim.
The lack of real political plurality among the parties that control the 
orders of government also discourages proceedings on federal aspects 
of the Constitution. Such challenges are likely to be frustrated because 
the federal and state governments would stand together and render 
the case moot. If a third party challenged the actions of regional states, 
alleging that they had usurped federal powers, the federal government 
would somehow endorse the act of the regional states. The federal gov-
ernment could easily do so by delegating its power to the regional state. 
Another avenue to accomplish the same end would be for the federal 
government to adopt the same law or to take the same administrative 
measure itself. Any challenge to the actions of the federal government 
on the basis of the constitutional distribution of powers could be easily 
frustrated in a similar fashion. Although the Constitution says noth-
ing about the delegation of state powers to the federal government, in 
practice the federal government has assumed the power of giving land 
to foreign investors, claiming that this function has been delegated to it 
by the regional states. Furthermore, the regional states can be counted 
on to do the bidding of the federal government if need be.
IV. Conclusion
The Constitution presents itself as a covenant among the nations, 
nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia. Fearful that the covenant and 
its objectives would be subverted by professional judges, the Constitu-
tion’s framers entrusted constitutional interpretation to a political organ 
in which Ethiopia’s nations, nationalities, and peoples are supposed to 
be represented. This has precluded the judiciary from interpreting the 
Constitution and delineating the constitutional scope of the powers of 
the regional states and the federal government. The EPRDF has absolute 
control of both the federal and state governments, so disputes about the 
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scope of power of the two orders of government have been muted and 
resolved through the party apparatus. As a result, there is hardly any fed-
eralism case law. The centralized party structure in which commands 
are issued from the top has left little room for pluralistic interaction 
among orders of government and has obviated the need, as well as the 
opportunity, to develop a federalist jurisprudence.
Would the current arrangements function properly if the different 
orders of government were controlled by different political parties? In 
this eventuality, the absence of an impartial arbiter and the inherently 
partisan nature of the constitutional interpreter could create serious 
problems. So long as the same party or coalition of parties controls the 
house of Federation, intergovernmental disputes between the regional 
states and the federal government can be solved within the party coali-
tion or settled by the house of Federation (of course, with the assis-
tance of the experts in the Council of Constitutional Inquiry). but if the 
federal government and one or more regional states were controlled 
by rival parties, and if one of these parties controlled the house of 
Federation, it would be very difficult for the house of Federation to 
settle constitutional disputes among such parties. Given the mistrust 
and antagonism that characterizes the relationship of political parties 
in Ethiopia, the house of Federation would easily become entangled in 
the antagonism between the political parties. This would mean that it 
would not have the respect and trust of the parties in dispute necessary 
to resolve their conflict. Therefore, it might be necessary to consider 
this problem seriously and learn from the experiences of other federal 
countries before a crisis materializes.
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Powerful federal courts are often assumed to be driving forces towards 
centralization and unitarism. If this is indeed a tendency observable in 
many federations, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is 
an important exception. In comparative terms, Germany’s constitu-
tion (the basic Law) assigns the FCC a very significant role within the 
political system. Moreover, because redistributive conflicts between 
governments and party political conflicts are difficult to settle by “joint 
decision-making” between federal and Land representatives, judgments 
of the FCC often overcome governance problems. This role of the Court 
has injected a strong element of legalism into German politics and has 
made it a key political player. In performing this role, while the FCC has 
supported unitarism in some respects, in other important respects it has 
supported federalism. In particular, the Court’s rulings on individual 
and social rights have usually reinforced unitarism while its rulings on 
most other matters, since about 1980, have usually supported decentral-
ized federalism. The FCC’s effect on the operation of German federalism 
has involved a dynamic interplay between the courts and the political 
branches of government. This chapter explains the way German courts, 
especially the FCC, have contributed to the evolution of German federal-
ism with important political consequences in several respects.
A significant feature of German federalism is that the division of pow-
ers and intergovernmental relations are regulated by relatively detailed 
constitutional norms. because the application of law is often a matter 
of dispute, one might expect courts to be decisive actors in the opera-
tion of German federalism. One also might assume that legalism and 
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powerful courts maintain the status quo and contribute to the rigidity 
of the federal system.
There is some truth in these assumptions. however, law and courts 
have not made German federalism especially inflexible. After a period 
of centralization and the evolution of joint decision-making during the 
first two decades of the Federal Republic, there has been an incremental 
but steady trend towards decentralization, especially since the 1980s, 
either through changes in policymaking or through formal constitu-
tional change. Different forces have contributed to this dynamic, but 
given the legalist tradition of the German state, the application and 
interpretation of the law by the courts has been an essential factor. In 
particular, the powerful FCC has to be taken into account. The Court 
has supported changes initiated by the federal and Land governments 
by settling conflicts between them and by interpreting the constitution. 
Decisions of the Court have also set the agenda for constitutional amend-
ments and have induced the legislature to make statutory changes that 
have shaped the federal system in important ways.
Although a federal institution, the FCC has never straightforwardly 
favoured the federal government. Overall, the impact of its decisions has 
been ambivalent. On one hand, the Court stipulated a clear separation 
of powers and emphasized the statehood prerogatives of the Länder. 
yet it refrained from intervening in allocation-of-powers disputes on 
the ground that such issues were “political” and thus supported the 
federal government’s attempts to expand its powers. Since 1994, when 
a constitutional amendment introduced a new procedure compelling 
the Court to determine intergovernmental competence conflicts, it has 
followed the opinions prevailing in political debates. Accordingly, the 
Court has supported decentralization with its decisions on the applica-
tion of the subsidiarity principle in legislation. On the other hand, the 
Court has encouraged partnership and solidarity among governments 
and has clearly favoured unitary solutions by its decisions on human 
and civil rights. In particular, judgments on the principle of equal-
ity have required federation-wide policies. Thus, although the Court 
seems to have shaped its federalism doctrine generally in favour of the 
Land governments, it still supports unitary federalism with its deci-
sions on constitutional complaints filed by individual citizens.
Throughout the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Con-
stitutional Court has secured ever-increasing power in politics. This 
power has been challenged by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) since 
Germany became part of an ever-closer European Union. While the ECJ 
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has strengthened citizen rights and uniform regulation or deregulation, 
the German Court has defended the integrity of the constitutional foun-
dation of German government, including federalism. The Europeaniza-
tion of the court system has thus reinforced contradictory dynamics. 
This ambivalence of court decisions between territorial diversity and 
uniformity (or equality) reflects contrasting forces currently shaping 
the dynamics of German federalism. The following sections explain 
these developments and effects on federalism.
II. Federal System
1. General Characteristics
German federalism emerged from struggles for power among rulers and 
governments. For centuries the “German Empire” existed as a confedera-
tion of states. After the Thirty years War (1618–48), the states prevailed 
over the German emperor. In 1806, this construction was formally dis-
solved and replaced by a weak confederation. A federal state came into 
being with the unification of Germany in 1871. The constitutional frame-
work of the federal system as it now exists is set forth in the basic Law, 
which was established in 1949 in the West German Federal Republic and 
in 1989 remained the basis of unified Germany without major amend-
ments. both the ratification of the constitution and the unification process 
reflected the federal character of the German state. In 1949, the Land par-
liaments approved the basic Law. In 1989, the governments of the Länder 
that were created after the collapse of the centralized communist regime 
in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) decided to join the Federal 
Republic. In legal terms, the federal and Land governments constitute 
the federation, as two orders of “statehood.” The constitution recognizes 
the autonomy of local governments. Although in legal terms, they are 
administrative units of the Länder, local governments have the right to 
defend their autonomy by initiating proceedings before the FCC.
Germany’s federal system combines a territorial division of powers 
with a highly uniform legal system operating within a relatively homo-
geneous society. Deep concern for equality of economic and social con-
ditions is expressed by state-wide parties and interest organizations.1 
 1 Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign 
State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
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Germany’s approximately 80 million inhabitants are rather evenly dis-
tributed across the country, living mostly in smaller cities and towns 
developed from the early European “city belt from Italy to the North 
Sea.”2 There have always been economic disparities between East and 
West Germany and between the North and the South. These inequalities 
increased during the forty years of communist rule in the GDR, from 
which the five eastern Länder are only slowly recovering. Nevertheless, 
the country is not deeply divided in economic terms. Redistributive 
welfare policies, made feasible by continuous economic growth, find 
support in a territorially integrated nation. Wealth inequality, social 
problems, and immigration are more intense within than between the 
Länder.
The unitary characteristics of German federalism have their roots in 
the Reformation and the late nineteenth century. The Reformation pro-
duced a confessional division of territories, but also supported a homog-
enization of the German language through Martin Luther’s translation 
of the bible. The former caused political decentralization in culturally 
homogeneous Länder, which later developed into modern states. The 
German language constituted the basis of social integration across the 
Länder and the later emergence of German nationalism. For centuries, 
the German Empire experienced the rise of cultural movements pro-
moting the idea of one nation accompanied by a decline of central rule 
challenged by powerful administrations among the Länder. Unification 
of the German nation state was secured under the hegemony of Prussia 
only in 1871. In those days, centralization was promoted by the eco-
nomic pressure of industrialization and by emerging “national” par-
ties. however, administrative capacities were retained by the Länder, 
which maintained those powers pursuant to the federal bargain.3 Later, 
a functional division of power developed, which involved centrali-
zation of legislation together with decentralization of administration 
and the participation of the Land governments in federal legislation 
through the federal council (the bundesrat). This highly characteristic 
feature of German federalism requires close cooperation between gov-
ernments. In many policy fields, federal legislation has to be coordi-
nated with Land governments, and to implement its laws, the federal 
 2 Stein Rokkan, State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of 
Stein Rokkan, Based on His Collected Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 158.
 3 Daniel Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of 
Federalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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government has to rely on Land or local government administration. 
Cultural diversities among Länder going back to the Reformation and 
persisting during the nineteenth century4 were levelled in the course of 
the twentieth century when two world wars and dictatorships radically 
transformed society.
how German federalism works is highly influenced by the logic of 
democracy.5 During the First World War, Germany evolved from a con-
stitutional monarchy into a parliamentary democracy, which collapsed 
in 1933 and was restored after 1949 in the West German Republic. Since 
then, intergovernmental negotiations have usually been shaped by 
political competition between state-wide parties operating at both lev-
els of the federal system. More often than not, the federal executive 
and its supporting majority in parliament have been confronted by a 
bundesrat in which a majority of votes has been controlled by Land 
executives supported by the opposition parties. In such cases, politi-
cal actors representing competing parties have to find agreements and 
are accountable to their electorates for the result. This particular form 
of democratic federalism poses a serious dilemma for political actors.6 
They have to choose between competitive and cooperative behav-
iour without being able to calculate the effects. One way to avoid this 
dilemma, which is applied more often than not in cases of serious con-
flict or especially salient issues, is to pass the decision to the Federal 
Constitutional Court.
2. Constitutional and Legal Framework
As in every modern federal system, law is essential to the practical 
working of German federalism. The particular history of Germany, how-
ever, explains why its constitutional and legal framework has been espe-
cially important. Drawing on its distinctive legalistic state tradition, the 
German experience of dictatorship has made the territorial division of 
 4 Derek W. Urwin, “Germany: From Geographical Expression to Regional 
Accommodation,” in The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism, 
ed. Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, 165–249 (London: Sage, 1982).
 5 Gerhard Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat: Regelsysteme und 
Spannungslagen im Institutionengefüge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3rd ed. 
(Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher verlag, 2000).
 6 Arthur benz, “Making Democracy Work in a Federal System,” German Politics 24,  
no. 1 (2015): 8–11.
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powers and the constitutional guarantee of rights and procedures bind-
ing on governments of particular relevance. Accordingly, the division 
of the federation into Länder and the participation of the Land govern-
ments in federal legislation are protected against constitutional amend-
ments (basic Law, Art. 79 Sec. 3). The rule of law is also constitutionally 
entrenched as the third fundamental principle of the political system 
supporting federalism and democracy. All powers are subject to law. 
Citizens have a right to appeal to courts, which are the guardians of the 
constitution. As a consequence, law and politics are closely entwined.
The division of powers between the federal, Land, and local govern-
ments and procedures of intergovernmental relations are determined 
by the basic Law. The principles of subsidiarity, solidarity, and mutual 
trust among governments (“federal comity”) constitute guidelines of 
the federal order. Uniformity of the law and of public services is also of 
considerable importance. Constitutional rules providing for the shar-
ing of tax revenues, joint tasks, and fiscal equalization aim to achieve 
balanced living conditions in all regions of Germany. Although resid-
ual powers are located in the Land governments, most areas of legisla-
tion are allocated to the federal order and, as a rule, the Land and local 
governments implement federal law. Thus, cooperative federalism is 
not an informal practice but is rooted in the constitution. When they 
believe that their powers are being adversely affected by proposed fed-
eral laws, the Land governments have a right to veto the proposed laws 
through the bundesrat.
Although federalism might be thought to imply that the federal and 
Land governments share sovereignty on an equal basis, Germany’s 
legal system, like that of most modern federations, is structured hierar-
chically insofar as federal law has supremacy over laws passed by Land 
legislatures (Art. 31). however, a constitutional amendment introduced 
in 2006 took a step towards greater plurality of law by allowing Land 
parliaments to pass laws deviating from a federal regulation in enu-
merated matters of concurrent legislation (Art. 72, sec. 3, as amended). 
because Germany is a member of the European Union, federal and 
Land law is also subject to European law. however, the supremacy of 
European law introduced by rulings of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has been disputed by the German FCC. In practice, the hierarchi-
cal structure of the legal order clearly outweighs the concurrence of law 
both in the EU and in German federalism.
Constitutional law and federalism nonetheless remain matters of 
dispute. Indeed, there is in Germany an increasing tension between 
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uniformity of law or of living conditions on one hand and diversity of 
policymaking in the Länder on the other. Since the turn of the century, 
this tension has triggered serious conflicts among governments, and 
constitutional reforms have so far failed to solve them. This has pro-
vided an additional impetus for the FCC to be increasingly involved in 
adjudicating federalism-related legal issues.
Since coming into force in 1949, the basic Law has been amended 
sixty times (as of July 2016) with the required two-thirds majority in 
the federal parliament and the bundesrat. Most amendments have con-
cerned the federal order, in particular the allocation of powers and the 
fiscal relations between the orders of government.7 however, despite 
recent attempts to “modernize” German federalism, the basic features 
of the federal constitution have hardly been transformed. The weigh-
ing of votes of individual Land governments in the bundesrat was 
modified after German unification, but the institution as such remained 
intact. With the exception of the creation of baden-Württemberg, the 
territory of the Länder was not reorganized as provided in Article 29. 
Fiscal federalism, which had evolved incrementally into a complex 
system of sharing revenues and expenditures, was barely modified by 
the recent reforms. What have changed are the conditions affecting how 
federalism operates. Germany is not only unified, it is also part of the 
still evolving EU. German society has also developed, one of the con-
sequences being an increasing differentiation of the party system and 
the increasing tendency of citizens to defend their rights as individu-
als. Finally, transnational deregulation of the economy has dissolved 
national coordination in corporatist patterns and given rise to increas-
ing regional differentiation. Constitutional amendments aimed at 
adjusting federalism to these developments, however, have produced 
only limited effects.
because of numerous incremental amendments and compromises 
between parties, the constitutional framework of the federal system 
has become burdened with very specific and detailed regulations. 
This development reveals a tendency to resolve tensions and conflicts 
by law. The length of the basic Law has increased significantly as the 
result of attempts to distribute powers more clearly and to protect the 
 7 Andreas busch, “verfassungspolitik: Stabilität und permanentes Austarieren,” in 
Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Manfred G. Schmidt and Reimut 
Zohlnhöfer, 33–56 (Wiesbaden: vS verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006).
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jurisdiction of Land and local governments against federal encroachment. 
To an important extent, this “overregulation” of German federalism8 has 
been caused by an interchange between politics and court decisions. A 
detailed account will be provided in the following sections.
III. Court System
Federalism is not only founded on law, it also constitutes a structure 
supporting the application of law. both the hierarchy of the legal order 
and the division of powers in the federal system are reflected in the 
German court system, which in addition is functionally differentiated. 
At its centre, the FCC and constitutional courts of the Länder fulfil a 
special function as guardians of the constitution.
The court hierarchy is intended to guarantee the impartial and con-
sistent application of law to individual cases. In general, plaintiffs have 
to submit their complaints to a court of first instance, which, depend-
ing on the issue at stake, is a local (Amtsgericht) or a regional (Landge-
richt) court. Courts of appeal can revise or dismiss decisions of the first 
instance. Under particular provisions, the issue under dispute can be 
passed to one of the six supreme courts established for particular fields 
of law.9 The federal division of powers serves as an additional device to 
safeguard the independence of judges. Courts of the first instance and 
courts of appeal are established by Land governments, which, since 
2006, also decide on the payment of their judges. The Land department 
of justice selects judges of the courts falling under their jurisdiction. The 
federal government is responsible for the supreme courts. Their judges 
are selected by a committee of sixteen members of the federal parlia-
ment and the sixteen ministers of justice of the Länder and appointed by 
the federal minister for justice. Courts of both levels form an integrated 
appellate system that is based on federal statutes. beyond this vertical 
differentiation, the court system is divided into specific branches such 
as civil and criminal law (jurisdiction on “ordinary” matters), labour 
law, social law, fiscal law, and administrative law (“specific” matters).
 8 Arthur benz, “From Joint-Decision Traps to Over-Regulated Federalism: Adverse 
Effects of a Successful Constitutional Reform,” German Politics 17, no. 4 (2008): 441–8.
 9 Bundesarbeitsgericht (labour law) in Erfurt; Bundesfinanzhof (financial law) in 
Munich; Bundesgerichtshof (civil and criminal law) in Karlsruhe; Bundessozialgericht 
(social law) in Kassel; Bundespatentgericht (law on property rights) in Munich; 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (administrative law) in Leipzig.
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The federal structure and the functional division of power also shapes 
the system of constitutional courts. They are not part of the ordinary 
judicial hierarchy and appeal system, but fulfil a particular purpose, as 
they decide only matters of constitutional law. These matters include 
conflicts between constitutional bodies or complaints of individuals 
who claim to be affected in their basic rights by authorities. The respon-
sibilities of the Land constitutional courts vary, depending on the par-
ticular regulations of each Land. Not all of them can be addressed by 
individuals, some decide on conflicts only between public authorities.
According to the constitution, the independence of judges and courts 
is an essential precondition of the rule of law. The federal organization 
of the court system is meant to enforce this principle and, in practice, 
it is strictly respected. Influencing a judge by the executive or by inter-
est groups is not only illegal but also prevented by attentive media. 
Moreover, judges are embedded in a structure of communication in 
jurisprudence supported by an association of judges and relations with 
university law faculties. These relations support an institutional setting 
providing for a clear separation of powers between courts on one hand 
and legislative and executive powers of government on the other hand.
With its decisions on individual lawsuits, each court contributes to 
the interpretation of law, which in most cases is made by the federal 
legislature. As every single court is independent, its decisions cannot 
bind other courts in different sectors of the court hierarchy. Therefore, 
diverging opinions by local or regional courts or by courts in the dif-
ferent sectors cannot be ruled out. Decentralization and differentiation 
of the court system generates a certain plurality of jurisdiction, while 
mutual adjustments of decisions and the supremacy of higher courts 
contribute to coherence. In this way, the law is made sufficiently flex-
ible and can be adjusted to particular cases without becoming subject 
to arbitrary court decisions.
Thus federalism has an important impact on Germany’s court sys-
tem. Its differentiation allows for flexibility without causing diversity 
in interpretation or application of the law. The specific content of court 
decisions can also influence federalism. While lower courts are not in 
a position to have an impact, higher-court decisions can have conse-
quences for the public expenditures or tax revenues of the federal and 
Land governments, and the FCC has a very significant capacity to affect 
the federal system as a whole, particularly through its decisions on the 
constitutionality of legislation and other governmental acts. In order 
to understand the role of courts in German federalism, it is therefore 
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necessary to focus in particular on the crucially important functions of 
the FCC within the German political system as a whole.
1. The Federal Constitutional Court
Like many democracies established after the fall of dictatorships, 
Germany introduced the institution of a constitutional court to tame 
executive governments and parliamentary majorities. In accordance 
with the legalist interpretation of federalism, such courts exist at the 
federal and the Land levels. In a certain way, Land courts influence 
the evolution of federalism when they decide matters concerning local 
government. however, due to the legal superiority of federal constitu-
tional law, the FCC has the final say in cases of conflict between federal 
and Land law, and it can overrule decisions of constitutional courts of 
the Länder. As a federal institution, the FCC is responsible to resolve 
disputes between governments of all levels, while Land courts deal 
only with conflicts between Land and local governments. The power 
of the FCC may be constrained by the ECJ when it decides matters con-
cerning the German constitution, except to the extent that the German 
court insists on its claim to be the final interpreter of the basic Law. 
Whatever the case, the judgments shaping German federalism so far 
have been those of the FCC. It has turned out to be a central player in 
the federal system.
Inaugurated in 1951 and located in Karlsruhe, at a certain distance 
from the sites of government and parliament, the FCC soon became a 
powerful and widely accepted institution. Formally, its powers are lim-
ited compared to some other supreme courts, such as those in Canada 
and Australia, because it does not deal with disputes on the application 
of normal law. Its sole function is to defend the constitution against 
infringements by any holder of government power, including parlia-
ment, and it decides issues only according to constitutional law.
The organization of the FCC developed during the first two decades 
of its existence. Since 1971, it has consisted of sixteen judges. Court 
decisions are prepared and made by one of the two senates, with each 
assembling eight judges. Most of them are law professors, but three of 
the eight judges of each senate must have served as judges in the other 
federal courts. Each senate is responsible for particular matters. In its 
domain, each senate decides independently from the other and speaks 
for the whole Court. Only in very rare cases when senates disagree on an 
issue does a plenary sitting of the Court decide the matter. The plenary 
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Court also determines the responsibilities of the senates. Usually a 
senate comes to a unanimous judgment, but majority decisions are 
possible and individual judges can publish dissenting opinions. The 
internal organization of the Court does not follow any regional or fed-
eralist logic, even though it is the second senate of the Court that usu-
ally decides conflicts between constitutional bodies and thus often the 
fundamental issues of federalism.
Judges are elected by a two-thirds majority of the bundestag10 and 
the bundesrat for a twelve-year term without the possibility of re- 
election. In practice, a strict rule of proportionality applies in the selec-
tion process. Each house of the legislature elects half of the judges, and 
both determine the president and the vice-president of the Court. With 
the Land governments being involved via the bundesrat, the election of 
the judges seems to that extent to be guided by territorial criteria. how-
ever, there is no empirical evidence that the Land governments aim at 
regional proportionality, which would be difficult to apply in practice. 
Neither are judges elected by the bundesrat prone to represent Land 
interests, nor are those elected by the federal parliament biased towards 
the federal level. Conflicts on the nomination of a candidate occur from 
time to time, but they never concern particular Land interests; instead, 
they reveal different opinions about the positions, attitudes, or back-
grounds of a candidate. Party politics has the most obvious impact on 
the selection of judges. yet in order to find a qualified majority, par-
ties have to come to a consensus. Following an informal agreement, 
the right to fill a vacant Court position is assigned to the party that 
had nominated the judge who is to be replaced. Nominations may be 
rejected by other parties, and political disputes have overshadowed 
some of the recent elections of judges, but this is an exception. All in 
all, it is the professional reputation of a lawyer that counts,11 and judges 
hardly follow the line of a political party or a government.12
 10 For a long time, the bundestag did not vote on candidates in plenary session, but in a 
special committee of twelve members elected by the parliament. Since 2015, the plenary 
votes without debate on the proposal of the committee (Art. 6, Law on the FCC).
 11 See Christoph hönnige, “The Electoral Connection: how the Pivotal Judge Affects 
Oppositional Success at European Constitutional Courts,” West European Politics 32, 
no. 5 (2009): 963–84.
 12 Sascha Kneip, Verfassungsgerichte als demokratische Akteure: Der Beitrag des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Qualität der bundesdeutschen Demokratie (baden-baden: 
Nomos, 2009).
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2. Jurisdiction, Procedure, and Remedies
The basic Law defines different areas of jurisdiction of the Court. 
Depending on the type of conflict, proceedings can be initiated by 
governments, parliaments, party groups, or citizens who claim to be 
affected in their fundamental rights. The most important areas are the 
following.13
First, the Court is responsible for constitutional review of laws. 
“Abstract judicial review” (independent of the application of a law) 
can be initiated by the federal government, a Land government, or a 
group of one-third of the members of the bundestag (Art. 93, sec. 1, 
no. 2). In addition, all courts can call upon the FCC to decide whether 
in a specific case the relevant law conforms to the constitution (“con-
crete judicial review”: Art. 100). A dispute on legislative competence 
may provide reason for instituting these proceedings of constitutional 
review.
Second, the Court can be called by the federal parliament, the execu-
tive, or the federal president or by members of these bodies vested with 
rights in order to settle conflicts between these constitutional bodies. 
Issues may concern the law on political parties, electoral law, or parlia-
mentary proceedings. Moreover, in cases of conflict between different 
orders of government usually concerning the allocation of powers or 
fiscal equalization, the federal or Land government or a Land parlia-
ment can initiate proceedings. Notably, if a body of a Land government 
feels affected in its constitutional rights, it does not need a majority in 
the bundesrat but can act individually. This also applies if the need for a 
federal law in matters of concurrent legislation is disputed. In this par-
ticular case, the bundesrat also can initiate legal proceedings (Art. 93, 
sec. 1, no. 2a, and sec. 2). This explains why all important decisions on 
federal-Land disputes have been initiated by Land governments.
Third, any person alleging that his or her basic rights have been 
violated has recourse to the Court, provided that he or she has failed 
in inferior courts responsible for the matter. Introduced in 1951 and 
entrenched in the basic Law in 1969, constitutional complaints as of 
 13 Other areas of jurisdiction, not relevant for federalism, aim to maintain democratic 
procedures and institutions, such as the ban of a political party, the impeachment 
of the federal president or of judges, and the verification of elections. With the 
exception of two successful and one failed attempt to ban extremist parties, these 
procedures have not been of practical relevance.
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2014 numbered 207,088 (96.6 per cent of all judicial proceedings).14 With 
only 2.34 per cent of all complainants realizing their goals, the success 
rate is quite low. Issues of federalism can be raised in this context, 
in particular if the competence of the federal legislature is disputed. 
Moreover, indirect effects on the federal system can result if the FCC 
decides in favour of an equal treatment of citizens, especially in matters 
of taxation.15
In principle, the FCC can declare a law invalid if the Court believes it 
infringes constitutional norms. For this reason, the Court can be char-
acterized as a conditional veto-player in the political process. As it can-
not act in its own right, however, its power depends on other actors 
willing to bring disputes before the Court. The sheer number indicates 
that citizens address the FCC in relation to many issues. Not unlike in 
other democratic states, this trend to go to courts reflects a change in 
relations between politics and citizens and a declining trust in govern-
ment. For the Court, this extends opportunities not only to settle a legal 
dispute, but also to check legislative decisions of parliaments. If con-
sidered to be particularly relevant, the Court can accept a constitutional 
appeal before other courts have decided the matter. The Court has thus 
secured for itself the capacity to define its own jurisdictional agenda.
3. Institutional Role of the Court
As mentioned above, government actors often initiate constitutional 
review of legislation. In a legalist political culture as it has developed in 
Germany, parties also refer to the constitution when debating on a bill. 
Consequently, opposition parties in the federal parliament in particular 
tend to challenge majority decisions in proceedings before the FCC,16  
 14 Federal Constitutional Court, “Annual Statistics 2014,” http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Statistik/
statistics_2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
 15 Matthias Jestaedt, Oliver Lepsius, Christoph Möllers, and Christoph Schönberger, 
“Die maßstabsetzende Gewalt,” in Das entgrenzte Gericht: Eine kritische Bilanz nach 
sechzig Jahren Bundesverfassungsgericht, ed. Mattias Jestaedt, Oliver Lepsius, Christoph 
Möllers, and Christoph Schönberger (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2011), 250–1.
 16 The right to initiate an “abstract constitutional review” is a significant right of the 
opposition parties in parliament. After the 2013 elections, a Grand Coalition formed, 
with the two opposition parties being left with about 20 per cent of seats. A bill to 
amend the Constitution, aimed to reduce the existing threshold of one-third of the 
members, has been rejected by the majority parties.
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and more often than not these political conflicts, which sometimes for-
mally involve federal-Land issues, are settled by the Court. In cases 
of joint decision-making, initiating legal proceedings can allow an 
executive to signal to its parliament and its citizens that it is seek-
ing to secure their interests by all means at its disposal. Moreover, 
governments see benefit in shifting responsibility to the Court as final 
arbiter of contentious political issues. Framing issues as matters of the 
constitution also suggests that norms rather than interests will guide 
decisions.
An additional reason explains the powerful position of the FCC in 
German politics. In its self-perception expressed in a memorandum 
issued in 1952, the Court defined itself as a constitutional body of equal 
standing with the federal parliament.17 Significantly, this interpretation 
is accepted and enshrined in the law on the FCC. Moreover, the Court 
has adopted a wide-ranging interpretation of constitutionality. Instead 
of applying constitutional law to a particular case by context-sensitive 
balancing of conflicting norms, it derives abstract standards from the 
constitution and evaluates the law accordingly.18 As a consequence, the 
Court does not only decide specific cases but also defines principles 
that are expressed to be binding on executives and parliaments. More 
often than not the decisions and reasoning of the Court provide man-
datory guidelines for legislation. In this way, the FCC has a profound 
influence on the agenda of governments and parliaments, including in 
matters of federalism.
The power and legitimacy of the FCC is debated among law profes-
sors and political scientists.19 however, in public the Court is highly 
respected. Its reputation is higher than that of other institutions of 
government, including the federal parliament.20 backed by this public 
 17 bundesverfassungsgericht, “Denkschrift des bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 27. 
Juni 1952. Die Stellung des bundesverfassungsgerichts,” Jahrbuch des öffentlichen 
Rechts der Gegenwart 6 (1957): 144–8.
 18 Lepsius, “Die maßstabsetzende Gewalt.”
 19 Jestaedt et al., Das entgrenzte Gericht; Kneip, Verfassungsgerichte als demokratische 
Akteure.
 20 hans vorländer and André brodocz, “Das vertrauen in das bundesverfassungsgericht: 
Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen bevölkerungsumfrage,” in Die Deutungsmacht des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ed. hans vorländer, 259–96 (Wiesbaden: vS verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2006).
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support and as the result of politicians’ willingness to accept its deci-
sions, the Court has secured a central position in the political system.
This position has to some extent been challenged by the ECJ. With 
its interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination derived from 
the aim to create a common market in Europe, the ECJ has extended its 
jurisdiction into matters of individual rights and equality.21 In addition, 
the ECJ maintains the principle of supremacy of EU law, a principle 
never explicitly accepted by the German FCC. So far, the courts have 
pragmatically avoided open conflict by not articulating directly con-
tradicting decisions.22 however, the German court has transferred its 
interpretation of federalism and subsidiarity to the European Union. 
Accordingly, it has tried to define the boundaries of integration and 
repeatedly threatens to veto European legislation.23 In addition, it 
clearly demarcated its domain against an active ECJ. In its famous 
decision on the Lisbon Treaty, for example, the FCC claimed respon-
sibility for defending the “identity” (i.e., the core rules) of the German 
constitution:
If legal protection cannot be obtained at the Union level, the Federal 
Constitutional Court reviews whether legal instruments of the European 
institutions and bodies, adhering to the principle of subsidiarity under 
Community or European law (Article 5.2 ECT; Article 5.1 sentence 2 and 
5.3 TEU Lisbon), keep within the boundaries of the sovereign powers 
accorded to them by way of conferred power … Furthermore, the Federal 
Constitutional Court reviews whether the inviolable core content of the 
 21 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity,” European Political 
Science Review 1, no. 2 (2009): 173–204; Susanne K. Schmidt and R. Daniel Kelemen, 
eds., The Power of the European Court of Justice (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
2013); Alec Stone Sweet, “The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization 
of EU Governance,” Living Reviews in European Governance 4 (2010), http://
europeangovernance-livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2010-2/.
 22 Arthur Dyevre, “European Integration and National Courts: Defending Sovereignty 
under Institutional Constraints?,” European Constitutional Law Review 9 (2013): 139–68.
 23 Monica Claes and Jan-herman Reestman, “The Protection of National Constitutional 
Identity and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler 
Case,” German Law Journal 16, no. 4 (2015): 917–70; Arthur Dyevre, “The German 
Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics,” West European Politics 34, 
no. 2 (2011): 346–61; Susanne K. Schmidt, “A Sense of Déjà vu? The FCC’s Preliminary 
European Stability Mechanism verdict,” German Law Journal 14, no. 1 (2013): 1–20.
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constitutional identity of the basic Law pursuant of Article 23.1 sentence 3 
in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the basic Law is respected.24
While judicial federalism in Germany is clearly dominated by the 
FCC, in the EU the relation between courts of the different orders is 
still in flux. A competition of courts has been prevented by communica-
tion among judges in what the president of the FCC recently charac-
terized as a network of constitutional courts.25 Regarding federalism, 
judgments of the ECJ may affect Länder governments when they are 
responsible for implementing European law, but these decisions hardly 
change the basic structures of German federalism. Moreover, the FCC 
has safeguarded core principles of the basic Law in European integra-
tion. For these reasons, neither decisions of the ECJ nor its interplay 
with the FCC have so far had direct repercussions on German feder-
alism, even though the process of European integration has changed 




before unification in 1989, the federal structure of the West German 
republic was endorsed but hardly shaped by decisions of the FCC. 
Despite the tradition of state legalism and despite a variety of oppor-
tunities for constitutional review, “most federal-state conflicts never 
reached the Constitutional Court. They [were] usually resolved politi-
cally through the mechanisms of collaborative federalism.”26 however, 
when considering the evolution since unification, this conclusion has 
to be revised. various “mechanisms of collaborative federalism” have 
 24 Lisbon Treaty case (2009), bverfGE 123, 267, headnote 4 (bverfGE: “Entscheidungen 
des bundesverfassungsgerichts,” issued by an association of the members of the 
FCC, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, since 1952. Since 1998, decisions are published on the 
Court webpage, at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-Gericht/
das-gericht_node.html).
 25 Andreas vosskuhle, “Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts. 
Der Europäische verfassungsgerichtsverbund,” European Constitutional Law Review  
6, no. 2 (2010): 175–98.
 26 Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 87.
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in fact been hampered by intense conflicts, and the Court has gained 
significant influence through its adjudication of disagreements.
During the first three decades after the founding of West German federal 
republic, continuous economic growth allowed an expansion of welfare 
services and financial support of less developed regions. Under these con-
ditions, the federal and Land governments were able to settle their conflicts 
by avoiding redistributive decisions. Legal proceedings having a lasting 
impact on the political system concerned mainly the protection of demo-
cratic institutions and individual rights. The FCC developed its powerful 
position and gained its legitimacy by its jurisprudence on fundamental 
rights. It interpreted these rights entrenched in the basic Law as an objec-
tive normative order binding all institutions of government, including the 
federal and Land legislatures, instead of applying them as rights protecting 
the freedom and individual rights of citizens against governments.
by this interpretation of the constitution, the Court reinforced the 
uniformity of law against diversity in federalism. In accordance with 
this jurisprudence, Konrad hesse, who later was elected as a judge of 
the FCC, elaborated his influential theory of unitary federalism.27 While 
an integrated nation and equality of public goods and services in the 
welfare state were unanimously acknowledged as principles guiding 
governance, principles to which many ascribed a constitutional status, 
federalism was justified as a device to constrain government by a verti-
cal division of powers. In many proceedings initiated by courts under 
the concrete judicial review procedure, the FCC took the opportunity to 
demarcate the powers of the two orders of government, but never tried 
to modify the basic structure of federalism.28
Certainly, federal-Land disputes arose and were brought to the 
FCC.29 however, rulings of the FCC generally confirmed the existence 
 27 Konrad hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller, 1962).
 28 Philip M. blair and Peter Cullen, “Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality: The 
Record of the Federal Constitutional Court,” in Recasting German Federalism: The 
Legacies of Unification, ed. Charlie Jeffery (London: Pinter, 1999), 121–2.
 29 Philip M. blair, Federalism and Judicial Review in West Germany (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981); 
blair and Cullen, “Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality”; bert-Sebastian Dörfer, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht und Bundesstaat (berlin: Duncker & humblot, 2010); Gunter 
Kisker, “The West German Federal Constitutional Court,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
19, no. 4 (1989): 35–52; Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany; Stephan Korioth, “Die Rechtsprechung des bundesverfassungsgerichts zum 
bundesstaat,” in Handbuch Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System, 2nd ed., ed. 
Robert Ch. van Ooyen and Martin h.W. Möllers, 393–412 (Wiesbaden: Springer vS, 2015).
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of federalism as it had developed in reality. In its federalism juris-
prudence, the Court tried to find a balance between uniformity and 
diversity by supporting the autonomy of Land governments and also 
accepting extensive use of concurrent powers by the federal legislature. 
As a rule, a pragmatic balance of different interests and ideas charac-
terized its decisions. If they revealed a doctrine of federalism, then it 
resulted from highlighting the idea of partnership or federal comity 
(bundestreues Verhalten)30 and the division of powers.31 The first principle 
expressed political realism, whereas the second followed from a legalist 
theory of the state defined mainly by territory and sovereignty. With 
the constitutional entrenchment of federalism, German lawyers had to 
discard the prevailing view that a state is an integrated legal body and 
the centre where supreme power is located. They had to accept the idea 
that sovereignty can be divided.32 In line with this reasoning, the FCC 
emphasized the statehood of the Länder and defended an inviolable 
set of core powers to be assigned to them. Already in those days, the 
concept of distinct areas of jurisdiction of the federal and the Land gov-
ernments was formulated. This concept still influences court decisions.
however, although the Court outlined the principle of federalism, 
it neither unambiguously defended powers of the Länder against cen-
tralization nor clearly marked the boundaries of jurisdiction of gov-
ernments. This does not mean that it failed to safeguard federalism. 
It has to be noted that representatives of the Land governments in the 
bundesrat rarely prevented an extension of federal legislative powers, 
while the Court, for instance, rejected an attempt by Konrad Adenauer’s 
government to introduce federal television.33 yet in cases of conflicts on 
the application of concurrent powers, the Court refrained from revising 
political decisions. It declared the principle of subsidiarity expressed 
in Article 72, sections 1 and 2, as a political norm not to be interpreted 
by legal reasoning. On the other hand, the Court extended the powers 
 30 Dörfer, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Bundesstaat, 68–86.
 31 hans-hugo Klein, “Der bundesstaat in der Rechtsprechung des 
bundesverfassungsgerichts,” in Handbuch Föderalismus: Föderalismus als demokratische 
Rechtsordnung und Rechtskultur in Deutschland, Europa und der Welt, Band 3, ed. Ines 
härtel (berlin: Springer, 2012), 479–86.
 32 For a comprehensive discussion of how legal theory on federalism developed in 
Germany, see Stefan Oeter, Integration und Subsidiarität im deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht 
(Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1998).
 33 Television case (1961), bverfGE 12, 205.
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of the bundesrat when it endorsed an interpretation implying that if 
a law affects the Länder in their administrative competences, their 
right to veto extends to the law as a whole and not only to those parts 
regulating administrative organization or procedures.34 Consequently, 
the FCC reinforced the tendencies towards intense intergovernmental 
relations and joint decision-making. Until the late 1960s, “cooperative 
federalism” was considered as a modern form of federalism, in particu-
lar among German lawyers. Court decisions reflected this prevailing 
opinion.35
During the 1960s, the apparent conflict between a division of power 
and cooperation in federalism was debated. A solution was not found 
by the FCC but by constitutional amendment. In those days, it was 
not joint decision-making in legislation that was under debate but the 
informal use of federal funds to subsidize Land policies. This practice 
was said to be unconstitutional. Notwithstanding the doctrine of a 
separation of jurisdictions, in 1967 the federal legislature changed the 
constitution, with the required assent of the bundesrat, and introduced 
joint tasks (Art. 91a and b) allowing the federal and Land governments 
to cooperate in promoting regional policy, agriculture, and research. 
Federal grants, tax sharing, and fiscal equalization were also extended 
by the reform. Thus, the concept of cooperative federalism took prec-
edence over the idea of a separation of powers, without any involve-
ment of the FCC.
The Länder soon realized the trap they had run into by legalizing 
cooperative federalism. While they profited from federal grants, they 
complained about the loss of autonomy. After German unification, the 
Länder saw an opportunity to “re-federalize” the political system.36 
Governments of the rich southern Länder took the lead, while other 
Land governments followed suit: those in West Germany reluctantly 
and those in East Germany with scepticism. but frustrated by political 
debates to no avail, they increasingly took recourse to constitutional 
review. One issue was fiscal equalization, the other the allocation of 
powers. Faced with an increasing burden in fiscal equalization, Land 
governments contributing to the equalization fund questioned the 
 34 Price Act case, bverfGE 8, 274, 294
 35 Kisker, “West German Federal Constitutional Court,” 50–2.
 36 hartmut Klatt, “Centralizing Trends in West German Federalism, 1949–1989,” in 
Recasting German Federalism: The Legacies of Unification, ed. Charlie Jeffery (London: 
Pinter, 1999), 47–51.
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constitutionality of the law. In 1986, 1992, and 1999, the FCC deter-
mined challenges to the law, but without inducing major changes.37 
Against this background, legal action concerning fiscal equalization, 
initiated in 2013 by the governments of bavaria and hesse, appears to 
be a strategic move by these governments in the current negotiations 
on a reform of the existing law. In relation to the possible reallocation of 
powers, the 1994 revision of the constitution, launched in the wake of 
German unification, ended without the federal and Land governments 
agreeing on any significant decentralization of legislative powers, a fail-
ure due partly to disputes among representatives from rich and poor 
Länder. however, the Land governments did achieve a constitutional 
amendment requiring the FCC to determine disputes over the revised 
rule on concurrent legislative powers of the federal government. What 
the Court in its earlier rulings had defined as a matter of politics now 
turned into an issue of law and legal reasoning.
In the newly unified Germany, federalism was burdened by tensions 
between governments, not the least because of an increase in the eco-
nomic and social divergences between Länder. Political disputes on the 
consequences of these disparities gave rise to a growing number of legal 
proceedings involving the FCC in the form of federal-Land and inter-
Land conflicts. yet characterizing this development as a rise of judicial 
federalism would be misleading. In fact, what we observe is an interplay 
between the Court and politics, between interpretation of the constitu-
tion and constitutional amendment. Confronted by threatened or actual 
deadlocks in joint decision-making, both the federal government and 
many Land governments questioned the existing structures of coopera-
tive federalism and policy uniformity. In order to escape the looming 
blockades, they discussed an overhaul of the federal system and started 
a process of “modernizing federalism.” At the same time, some Länder 
tried to achieve more autonomy through proceedings before the FCC, 
and other Länder aimed at securing more federal support to manage 
fiscal crises, also through court proceedings. In spite of commitments to 
solidarity, “the aim of each Land was, on every possible count, to secure 
a larger slice of the cake for itself and/or to refute the arguments of the 
other applicant Länder which were trying to do the same.”38
 37 Fiscal Equalization cases I (bverfGE 72, 330), II (bverfGE 86, 148), and III (bverfGE 
101, 158).
 38 blair and Cullen, “Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality,” 145.
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On balance, the jurisdiction of the FCC on federalism remained as 
ambivalent as ever, as did the evolution of German federalism. On the 
one hand, the Länder gained more legislative powers. Persuaded by 
the 1994 constitutional amendment to depart from its former judicial 
restraint, the Court now defined the conditions allowing the use of con-
current powers by federal legislation in a restrictive way. The practical 
effect of its judgments was to alter the status quo in favour of the Land 
governments, all in the context of ongoing negotiations concerning the 
modernization of German federalism. Following a fourth decision of 
the FCC on legislative competences in 2004, the federal government, 
aware of the consequences of this new constitutional environment, con-
ceded a catalogue of legislative competences that were to be transferred 
to the Land parliaments. A large majority of Land representatives in the 
bundesrat accepted the proposal, and the amendment of the basic Law 
decentralizing twelve competences was passed by both houses of the 
federal legislature in 2006.
At the same time, the FCC defended Germany’s federal order in the 
context of European integration, in particular the right of the bundesrat 
to participate in European affairs. by acting as a guardian of national 
statehood against the evolution of a European federal state, the Court 
emphasized the constitutional framework of German federalism. In 
its 1993 decision on the Maastricht Treaty, the Court argued that the 
process of European integration should not weaken basic principles of 
the German constitution entrenched in Article 79, section 3 of the basic 
Law.39 In this context, the federal and Land governments negotiated a 
constitutional amendment intended to guarantee the participation of 
Land governments in European policymaking. In a similar vein, the 
Court’s decision on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 laid down the constitu-
tional conditions of European integration. The decision stipulated a 
revision of procedures concerning the role of the federal parliament, 
and also required the participation of the bundesrat in particular mat-
ters.40 The federal legislature immediately responded by changing the 
respective law accordingly.
On the other hand, decisions on fiscal issues came with mixed bless-
ings for the Länder. Regarding fiscal equalization, the Court had lim-
ited leeway to adjust the existing law, given the detailed nature of the 
 39 Maastricht Treaty case (1993), bverfGE 89, 155.
 40 Lisbon Treaty case.
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relevant constitutional rules. With its 1999 decision on fiscal equali-
zation, the FCC demanded a more explicit and precise definition of 
norms of distributive justice in the form of a law setting out these 
norms explicitly.41 As a political consequence, this decision launched a 
debate among governments as to how the level of equalization might 
be justified. This debate still continues and affects intergovernmental 
politics significantly. A similar interplay between governments and 
the Court influenced the agenda of the second Federal Reform Com-
mission established in 2007. This was prompted by the government 
of berlin attempting to compel the federal government to bail out the 
debt-ridden city state. Deviating from an earlier judgment, the FCC 
ruled against the Land of berlin and emphasized the responsibility 
of governments for their own fiscal policies. The Court confirmed the 
constitutional principles of fiscal equalization and the existing law. 
however, it called for an improved constitutional regulation to pre-
vent excessive public debt.42 The commission working on a reform of 
fiscal federalism reacted to this “clear order of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court”43 and eventually proposed a new “debt brake,” which 
has been in force since 2009. The new Stability Council supervising 
the Land budgets can be regarded as an institution conforming to the 
concept of cooperative federalism.
Moreover, the FCC did not alter its tendency to support uniformity 
of legislation through its jurisdiction on fundamental rights.44 In legal 
disputes concerning the application of the right of equal treatment in 
social policy and taxation, the Court encouraged harmonized public 
policies throughout Germany. Moreover, its decisions on cultural dis-
putes such as the exposition of religious symbols in public schools 
(crucifix in bavarian schools, headscarves of Muslim teachers) have 
prevented Land governments from adopting divergent policies. Thus, 
the integration or harmonization of policy through court decisions, a 
 41 Fiscal Equalization case Iv (1999), bverfGE 101, 156.
 42 budget Crisis berlin case (2006), bverfGE 116, 327.
 43 Peter Struck and Günter Öttinger, “Eckpunkte zur Modernisierung der bund-Länder 
Finanzbeziehungen, Kommission von bundestag und bundesrat zur Modernisierung 
der bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen”; Kommissionsdrucksache 128 (2008): 3, 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1374&id=1136.
 44 Jutta Kramer, “Federal Republic of Germany,” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, 
and Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 144, 174.
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tendency that scholars have observed within the European Union,45 is 
also a driving force in German federalism.
In a nutshell, the FCC has not developed a consistent “doctrine” of fed-
eralism in the sense of a “set of standards, maxims, tests, and approaches 
to the interpretation of the law,”46 at least insofar as this implies a “model 
of federalism.” Despite the supremacy of the FCC over Land courts, the 
use of its jurisdiction does not reveal a particular trend in favour of either 
the federation or the Länder. Rather, the Court seems to be guided by a 
combination of political realism and legal pragmatism, in accordance 
to the plurality of its modes of legal reasoning.47 Judges apply accepted 
methods of interpretation but also consider political exigency. In gen-
eral, they tend to follow prevailing discussions in the public sphere.48 
Therefore, after supporting unitary and cooperative federalism until 
the 1970s, the Court now emphasizes decentralization, the autonomy of 
governments, and a clear division of powers. It is the interplay between 
politics and jurisdiction that explains the practical evolution of German 
federalism. “The rulings of the Court may accelerate or delay a particu-
lar development. Sometimes they may even be able to tip the scales, but 
they can hardly set the trend. As a matter of fact, the power of the Court 
to act as a kind of co-pilot of the political system is dependent upon the 
willingness of the judges to adapt to the basic political trend, though 
certainly not to the surface trends of day-to-day politics.”49
Despite the important role of courts and a FCC endowed with sig-
nificant powers to interpret the constitution and constrain political 
institutions, the evolution of German federalism is not determined by 
jurisdiction. Compared to the United States or the European Union,50 
 45 Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Anne-Marie burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe before the Court: A Political 
Theory of Legal Integration,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 41–76; Alec 
Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
 46 Gerald baier, Courts and Federalism, Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia and 
Canada (vancouver: UbC Press, 2006), 4.
 47 Uwe Kranenpohl, “Die bedeutung von Interpretationsmethoden und Dogmatik in der 
Entscheidungspraxis des bundesverfassungsgerichts,” Der Staat 48, no. 3 (2009): 387–409.
 48 Georg vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
 49 Kisker, “West German Federal Constitutional Court,” 41.
 50 Christopher banks and John blakeman, The U.S. Supreme Court and New Federalism: 
From the Rehnquist Court to the Roberts Court (Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2012); Marcus höreth, Die Selbstautorisierung des Agenten: Der Europäische Gerichtshof 
im Vergleich zum U.S. Supreme Court (baden-baden: Nomos, 2008).
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judges exert a modest influence on the allocation of powers or on inter-
governmental relations in Germany. here, the dynamics of federalism 
are driven more by an excessive legalism in politics, for which the Court 
is only partly responsible. As a consequence, German federalism tends 
to become more rigid and trapped in constitutional disputes, with the 
FCC often needed to escape deadlock. The following specific cases tend 
to illustrate this.
2. Specific Issues
In academic discourses on the location of sovereignty in the federal 
system, German lawyers distinguished two models. According to the 
first one, federalism constitutes a hierarchical order and the federal 
government is superior to Land governments. The second model 
assumes a federation encompassing both the central state and the 
Länder. On this view, both orders of governments are of an equal foot-
ing.51 The FCC has never unambiguously joined either of these camps. 
On the one hand, it acknowledged the precedence of the federal gov-
ernment in deciding on the territory of the Länder and in defining 
constitutional rules of federalism. On the other hand, it has accented 
the statehood of the Länder and has formulated a theory of separate 
constitutional spaces. Consequently, in cases of a territorial reorgani-
zation of Länder, the Court has required both a federal law and a ref-
erendum in the affected territories allowing citizens to express their 
will.52 It thus confirmed a principle guiding the procedural rules set 
down in Article 29 of the basic Law. Accordingly, any territorial change 
requires the agreement of both houses of the federal legislature and a 
majority of the citizens living in the affected territory. The bundestag 
and the bundesrat tried to circumvent these high hurdles for a ter-
ritorial reorganization by introducing particular procedures for par-
tial territorial reform. Some politicians have proposed the abolition of 
the obligatory referenda. but apart from a more detailed regulation 
in Article 29, neither court decisions nor constitutional amendments 
have resulted in changes of the territorial structure since the creation 
of baden-Württemberg in 1952.
 51 Kisker, “West German Federal Constitutional Court,” 48–50.
 52 Citizens Initiative in baden case (1956), bverfGE 5, 34.
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany  217
The FCC and Land constitutional courts were also called to protect 
the autonomy of local governments.53 In dialogue with various univer-
sity professors, the courts formulated different criteria and principles 
to define the scope of local powers immune from federal or Land inter-
vention. Nevertheless, in particular policy sectors, including both fis-
cal policies and territorial reforms, conflicts emerged again and again. 
As a consequence, a constitutional amendment extended the guarantee 
of local self-government, which now includes a guarantee of the fiscal 
funds necessary to fulfil local tasks (Art. 28, sec. 2). Moreover, since 
2006, the constitution prevents the federal government from delegat-
ing tasks to local governments (Art. 84, sec. 1). We can thus observe 
incremental change in the legal framework. however, neither rulings of 
courts nor the constitutional amendments have notably improved the 
status of local governments within the federal system.
Changes in the allocation of legislative powers between the federa-
tion and the Länder have revealed similar patterns and effects. As noted 
above, during the forty years of the West German federal republic, con-
stitutional amendments extended the enumerated powers of the federal 
government. The 2006 constitutional reform reversed this trend. One of 
the driving forces of decentralization was the FCC. Its new interpretation 
of the necessity clause of Article 72, section 254 favoured the Länder as the 
Court allowed the use of concurrent powers by the federal parliament 
only to avoid the problematic consequences of a fragmentation of the law 
or if there were considerable disadvantages for the economy and serious 
disparities between the Länder.55 These rulings not only put the federal 
parliament “on a short lead,”56 they also caused considerable uncertainty 
 53 Martin burgi, “Federal Republic of Germany,” in Local Government and Metropolitan 
Regions in Federal Systems, ed. Nico Steytler (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2009), 136–64.
 54 Summarized by Dörfer, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Bundesstaat, 118–56.
 55 Geriatric Nursing Act case (2002), bverfGE, 106, 62; Fighting Dogs case bverfGE 110, 
141; Junior Professor case (2004), bverfGE 111, 126; Student Fees case (2005), bverfGE 
112, 226. Following the reasoning applied in these decisions, the FCC recently denied 
federal legislative power to provide child care allowance intended for parents who 
raise their children at home (decision of 21 July 2015), 1 bvF 2/13; see “No Federal 
Legislative Competence for Child Care Allowance,” news release, 21 July 2015, 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/
EN/2015/bvg15-057.html.
 56 Markus Rau, “Subsidiarity and Judicial Review in German Federalism: The Decision 
of the Federal Constitutional Court in the Geriatric Nursing Act Case,” German Law 
Journal 4, no. 4 (2003): 223, 234.
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about the application of concurrent powers. Politics responded to this 
situation by changing the wording of the constitution. The compromise 
between the federal and Land governments implied a differentiation 
of competence categories and detailed regulation of concurrent powers 
(Art. 72). In other policy areas, governments also changed the constitution 
in order to overcome court rulings. When the FCC, following its approach 
to the division of powers, denied the constitutionality of cooperation 
between federal and local administrations in employment policy,57 the 
federal parliament introduced a new joint task (Art. 91e), discarding all 
criticism of joint decision-making.
In short, conflicts concerning the application of legislative and 
administrative powers have occurred regularly in German federalism. 
however, instead of letting the Constitutional Court make the final 
decisions, as in the United States, governments in Germany more often 
than not amend the constitution, sometimes following the guidelines 
of the Court, sometimes deviating from Court opinions, or overruling 
constraining interpretations of the basic Law. Over time, the catalogue 
of competences became longer and longer. yet the opportunities for 
disputes have not decreased.
A difficult problem in federal systems arises in foreign policy, espe-
cially when the powers of regional or local governments are affected.58 
In Germany, a first constitutional dispute arose in the 1950s when the 
federal government asked the FCC to declare unconstitutional the abo-
lition of confessional education by Lower Saxony, which affected an 
existing contract of the German government with the vatican. The Court 
decided in favour of the Land and defended its powers.59 It pointed to 
the need of an accommodation between the orders of government.60 In 
the course of European integration, constitutional amendments tried 
to square the circle of interfering foreign and domestic powers. how-
ever, by introducing detailed rules on the participation of the Länder in 
European affairs, they hardly solved the underlying wicked problem of 
coordinating international and federal-Länder policymaking. In reality, 
only pragmatic cooperation enabled the federal and Land governments 
 57 Joint Labour Market Administration case (2007), bverfGE 119, 331.
 58 hans Michelmann, ed., Foreign Relations in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
 59 Concordat case (1957), bverfG 6, 309.
 60 blair and Cullen, “Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality,” 134.
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to find a balance between their legitimate interests. Therefore, they have 
so far avoided instituting court proceedings on this issue.
A further issue of political dispute concerned the veto rights of the 
bundesrat. As mentioned above, the participation of Land representa-
tives in federal legislation is a basic principle protected against consti-
tutional amendments. This does not rule out an institutional change of 
federal representation, however. This question has never been addressed 
in court proceedings. however, the FCC has had to determine certain 
procedural matters related to the issue. One such case concerned voting 
in the bundesrat. Representatives from each Land government have to 
cast their votes unanimously. In very rare cases of divided or unclear 
voting of a Land, it has been up to the Constitutional Court to decide 
whether a law was passed according to constitutional provisions or 
whether it is invalid.61 More important has been the delimitation of the 
veto rights of the bundesrat. With its theory that the substantial and 
procedural parts of a law cannot be separated,62 the Court contributed 
to the fact that more than half of all federal bills needed the assent of the 
bundesrat, in most cases because these laws have included regulations 
on implementation by the Länder. The federal government has tried to 
reduce the share of these “assent laws” by constitutional amendment. 
The amendment, which has been in force since 2006, qualifies the veto 
powers of the bundesrat, but hardly produced the intended effects.63 In 
those matters of legislation where distributive conflicts cause serious 
problems of joint decision-making, the Länder holding a majority of 
votes in the bundesrat can still block a bill passed by the bundestag.
These examples illustrate how constitutional law and politics are 
closely coupled in Germany.64 On the one hand, the FCC is often 
involved in intergovernmental politics and influences the evolution 
of federalism. On the other hand, the basic Law is relatively easy to 
amend.65 Together, constitutional review and constitutional politics 
have led to a rather dense system of rules. As a consequence, the power 
 61 Immigration Law case (2002), bverfGE 102, 310.
 62 Price Law case (1958), bverfGE 8, 274.
 63 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Community, Diversity and Autonomy: The Challenges of 
Reforming German Federalism,” German Politics 17, no. 4 (2008): 509–21.
 64 Christoph Möllers, “Legalität, Legitimität und Legitimation des 
bundesverfassungsgerichts,” in Jestaedt et al., Das entgrenzte Gericht, 309–11.
 65 Astrid Lorenz, “how to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two 
Alternatives,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 17, no. 3 (2005): 339–61.
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of the FCC tends to increase since it has become a player in federal poli-
tics; with its decisions, the FCC contributes to adjustments of the federal 
system. but the Court does not determine the evolution of federalism 
on its own. It fulfils its functions of an impartial “non-political” arbiter, 
albeit in close relation with politics. Parties and governments use Court 
proceedings to continue politics by other means. Court rulings and poli-
tics mutually constrain each other, but they also enable decisions and 
policy change in a highly interlocked federal system. Constitutional pol-
itics regularly produces formal constitutional amendments but rarely 
substantial change.
In view of the close interplay between Court rulings and constitutional 
politics, the problems of practical compliance and of the coherence of the 
legal order hardly matter. Compliance rests not only on the acceptance 
of Court rulings but also on the potential to correct them by constitu-
tional amendment. It also rests on institutional conditions of cooperative 
federalism that make politicians interested in receiving guidance and 
justification for joint decisions from an independent Court. Coherence is 
achieved through a hierarchical court structure. Accordingly, “a federal 
court of last resort always can enforce the federal law against misinter-
pretation by Land judges.”66 This also applies to the relationship between 
constitutional courts of the Länder and the FCC.
V. Conclusion
In Germany, federalism is reflected in the court system, but the courts 
in general have a limited impact on federalism. Only the Federal Con-
stitutional Court is a major actor empowered to influence dynamics of 
federalism. It stabilizes the federal order by maintaining the constitu-
tional framework, but it also induces change by setting the agenda or 
giving reasons for constitutional amendments. Judicial review “has not 
assumed the wildcard role it has played in the American, Canadian 
or Australian systems,” as Thomas hueglin and Alan Fenna correctly 
observe.67 but to conclude that federalism does not mean legalism in 
Germany is misleading. It is the interplay of politics and jurisdiction 
that shapes and drives German federalism, and the intense interaction 
 66 Kisker, “West German Federal Constitutional Court,” 37.
 67 Thomas O. hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 
2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 332.
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between constitutional review and constitutional policy results in legal-
ism, which is probably more pronounced than in other countries.
The particular effects of court jurisdiction on German federalism 
and the political consequences caused by them have been ambivalent. 
The FCC has contributed to an increase in the legitimacy of federalism, 
in particular during the first two decades after the foundation of the 
federal republic, when neither the political elite nor the public showed 
strong interest in decentralization or in accepting regional diversity of 
public policy. At the same time, Court rulings have shifted the federal 
balance towards uniformity in policies, despite the FCC’s disposition 
to defend the institutional autonomy of the Länder and local gov-
ernments. In general, jurisdiction of the Court has contributed to the 
necessary balance of stability and flexibility and thus has worked as a 
safeguard of a robust federation.68 but in close interaction with politics, 
it has also induced an over-regulation of the constitutional framework 
of federalism. As a consequence, while federalism and decentralization 
seem to be widely acknowledged, rigidity of the law might increasingly 
impede necessary changes.
In order to explain the role and impact of courts in federalism, theo-
ries point to two principal causal mechanisms. First, the institutional 
position of courts in a federal system and the procedures for select-
ing members of courts are hypothesized to determine the attitudes of 
judges and, as a consequence, the exercise of judicial power.69 On this 
view, the FCC arguably should tend to favour the federal government 
in conflicts with Land governments. however, the general trend as well 
as certain recent rulings tend to disconfirm this theory. A second theory 
seems better to explain the role of the FCC in Germany.70 This theory 
states that courts tend to follow general trends in political discus-
sion. In this way, they enhance the likelihood of their decisions being 
implemented in legislation or constitutional amendments. As outlined 
above, by emphasizing decentralization, the autonomy of governments 
or intergovernmental partnership, and uniformity, the FCC has clearly 
responded to changing trends in public discussion about German 
federalism.
 68 Jenna bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (New york: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
 69 E.g., André bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal high Courts: A Political 
Theory of Judicial Review,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 26, no. 1 (1993): 3–29.
 70 E.g., vanberg, Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany.
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While this second theory better explains decision-making in the 
Court, it is not sufficient to understand the close interaction of jurisdic-
tion and politics in the evolution of German federalism. At least two 
further aspects have to be added.
First, the societal foundation of German federalism – a homogeneous, 
economically well-developed society with increasing, but still mod-
erate, interregional disparities – is the reason why conflicts between 
governments usually concern the allocation of power and finances, and 
hardly ever concern fundamental values or identities. Indeed, when it 
comes to proceedings of the FCC, the general public rarely pays atten-
tion. People do not feel immediately affected, and the Court is highly 
respected as an institution pursuing the common interest. This may 
explain why in politics the FCC is accepted as an arbiter of conflicts and 
why it is so frequently called upon to do so.71 but this also explains why 
it can engage in highly political disputes without risking its legitimacy.
Second, the institutional structures of German federalism have con-
tributed to make the FCC a central player in politics. Confronted by 
the apparent contradictions between cooperative federalism and par-
liamentary democracy, governments tend to refer to the constitution to 
justify their proposals or decisions. Moreover, when deadlocks in joint 
decision-making are imminent, governments find an escape route in 
proceedings of the FCC.
however, while interested in securing support from judges, govern-
ments are not willing to abandon power. For this reason, not only does 
the Court follow political debates, but governments communicate with 
the Court in order to have their opinions considered by it. This hidden 
interaction across the boundaries of formally separate institutional are-
nas generates the particular version of “political legalism” revealed in 
constitutional jurisdiction or “legalist politics” prevailing in intergov-
ernmental decision-making. Such a close interplay of law and politics 
increases the rigidity of the federal system, as the result of both the veto 
power of the FCC and the incremental extension of constitutional regu-
lation. To make federalism work in a flexible way, legal pragmatism 
in applying the constitution is essential in this context. It characterizes 
both the judicial culture in the FCC and the political culture in federal 
politics.
 71 Jan Erk, “The Sociology of Constitutional Politics: Demos, Legitimacy and Constitutional 
Courts in Canada and Germany,” Regional and Federal Studies 21, nos 4/5 (2011): 523–38.
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I. Introduction
The Indian federation, formed mainly by the division of a centralized 
unitary state after independence from british rule in 1947, operates 
under a parliamentary-federal constitution that establishes both the 
union and the constituent states and makes extensive provision for 
their respective institutions, powers, and functions within the federa-
tion. India’s constitutional courts – the Supreme Court and state high 
courts – play a very important role in defining and developing Indian 
federalism. They are expressly granted the power of judicial review 
predicated on the fundamental rights of citizens, federal division of 
powers in the Constitution, and limited separation of powers consist-
ent with the parliamentary form of government for both the union and 
state governments. Moreover, extra-constitutional factors like the crea-
tion of new states numbering over a dozen since the commencement 
of the Constitution in 1950 and the rise of approximately a dozen of 
new regional parties have had significant effects on the workings of 
the federal system. Arguably, these developments have increased the 
probability of intergovernmental jurisdictional conflicts creating a fertile 
ground for adjudication.
While the effect of rights review has generally been to foster nation-
wide policies and actions, thus reinforcing the parliamentary aspect of 
the Constitution, federalism adjudication has largely maintained the 
autonomy of state legislatures and governments, even though the con-
stitutional text contains no explicit theory of strong states’ rights. Espe-
cially since the emergence of the judicial doctrine of the unamendability 
of the basic structure of the Constitution in Keshavananda Bharati v. State 
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of Kerala (1973),1 the Supreme Court has extended its power of judicial 
review beyond legislative and executive acts to include constitutional 
amendments, arguably making it the most powerful constitutional court 
in the world.
The pre-eminence of the constitutional courts has also been facili-
tated by the relative weakening of Parliament and the executive branch 
of the union government due to the emergence of divided governments 
produced by India’s immense cultural, regional, and social diversities 
and the rise of a state-based multiparty system since the early 1990s, 
which necessitates recourse to federal coalition and/or minority gov-
ernments. Constitutional courts have in this way emerged as a power-
ful counter-majoritarian institution in an otherwise highly centralized 
parliamentary federal constitution, including a union executive armed 
with emergency powers to deal with national, state, and financial emer-
gencies. In the struggle for supremacy between Parliament and the 
courts, the courts have crafted a system of constitutional supremacy 
as finally interpreted by them. This has enabled the courts to become 
a significant factor in engendering a balance between a majoritarian 
democracy and constitutional and consensual federal governance. 
Whether the 2014 election, which gave the bharatiya Janata Party (bJP) 
control of the union government, will alter this trend remains to be 
seen.
The constitutional courts in India have, on the whole, gradually 
moved away from strict legalism and restraint to judicial activism in 
the post-Nehru era. In adjudication, the courts have, over time, avoided 
a consistently strict federalist or statist interpretative position. Its judg-
ments reflect a mixed and often non-partisan appraisal of the union that 
is sensitive partly to the constitutional text and partly to the changing 
contexts and times. Indeed, one analyst has argued that in the era fol-
lowing the1989 election and the demise of Congress Party dominance, 
“the Indian Supreme Court has struggled to develop neutral constitu-
tional rules that prevent the conflation of partisan political motivations 
with constitutionally valid federal interests.”2
 1 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R., 1973, Supreme Court.
 2 Sudhir Krishnaswamy, “Constitutional Federalism in the Indian Supreme Court,” 
in Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia, ed. Mark Tushnet and 
Madhav Khosla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 380.
The Supreme Court of India 225
II. Federal System
1. General Background
The total area of India is 3,287,263 square kilometres with a popula-
tion of about 1.2 billion. The largest state is Rajasthan, with 342,239 
square kilometres; the smallest state is Goa, with 3,702 square kilo-
metres. According to the 2011 census, the most populous state is Uttar 
Pradesh with 190.9 6million people; the least populated state is Sikkim 
with a population of 0.67 million. Economic disparity in annual per 
capita income ranges from Rs. 45,105 in Goa (the highest) to Rs. 5,108 in 
bihar (the lowest).3 hindus constitute 79.8 per cent of India’s popula-
tion, Muslims 14.23 per cent; Christians 2.3 per cent; Sikhs 1.72 per cent; 
Jains 0.4 per cent; and buddhists 0.7 per cent.4 Ethnic diversity includes 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) with 15 per cent and 
7.5 per cent of the population respectively. There are twenty-two official 
languages in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. hindi and Eng-
lish are the two official languages of the union and state governments 
(which can also use their regional language for state administration).
Major linguistic communities are regionally concentrated broadly 
along the lines of various states. Sizeable religious and hindu castes are 
generally spread across the board, though Muslims and Sikhs are more 
densely concentrated in Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab respectively. 
The STs have a larger concentration in two the central tribal belt from the 
Indo-Nepalese border down to the south and in the northeastern states. 
There are considerable economic disparities along class and regional 
lines. Major linguistic communities with their own states are hindi, 
bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Gujarati, Kannada, Malayalam, Oriya, 
Punjabi, Assamese, Manipuri, and Kashmiri. however, every state 
that has a linguistic majority also has significant linguistic minorities. 
Article 350A of the Constitution expects that every state and local author-
ity will endeavour to provide each linguistic minority with instruction 
in the mother tongue for its children at the primary stage. The union 
president may issue directions to this effect to a state government, if 
deemed necessary. Further, Article 350b provides for the appointment 
of a special officer for linguistic minorities by the president of India.
 3 Census of India, (State Census) data 2011.
 4 Census of India, 2001.
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India’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 at current prices (nomi-
nal) was $2.0 trillion; GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) was $7.3 
trillion, the world’s third largest; and the per capita GDP (PPP) was 
$5,777. The growth in per capita income nationally as well as in the 
states has been impressive since 1980–1. however, India harbours 
huge income and wealth inequalities in every possible dimension; the 
same is the case across groups and regions.5 In mid-2013, Maharashtra 
had the highest GDP per capita (US$1,496), while bihar had the low-
est (US $346). According to the Tendulkar Committee Report (2009),6 
the below Poverty Line (bPL) population is 29.8 per cent, with 33 per 
cent of India’s rural population and 20.9 per cent of its urban popu-
lation being poor. however, the incidence of poverty also declined in 
all states between 1983 and 2005, with the highest decline recorded in 
West bengal, followed by Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The rate of poverty 
decline has increased especially in the last five years, particularly in the 
villages. The highest incidence of poverty is found in Orissa, followed 
by bihar and Chhattisgarh.7
Under the Independence of India Act 1947, the british Parliament 
transferred power to the Constituent Assembly of India elected indi-
rectly by the provincial legislatures originally established by the Gov-
ernment of India Act 1935. The Indian federal union was formed by 
federating the british Indian provinces that were obliged under the 
India Act to be part of the independent Indian state. Under the act, 
Indian princely states under the suzerainty of the british Crown were 
granted freedom to stay independent or join either of the two succes-
sor states to british India: India or Pakistan. The integration of the 572 
princely states posed a serious challenge to India’s nationalist leaders 
during the early stages of constitution-making in 1946–9.
The Constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly (1950) is the 
common document for both the union and the states, barring Jammu 
and Kashmir, which has its own constitution (1957) that broadly con-
forms to the provisions of the Indian Constitution. There are also sev-
eral asymmetrical provisions in the Constitution relating to the states 
 5 Satyaki Roy, “Regional Disparities in Growth and human Development in India,” 
Working Paper no. 2012/05 (New Delhi: Institute for Studies in Industrial Development 
2012), 6 and 9.
 6 Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Estimation of Poverty, Government 
of India, chair Suresh D. Tendulkar (New Delhi: Planning Commission, November 2009).
 7 Roy, “Regional Disparities in Growth and human Development in India.”
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of Nagaland and Mizoram (Article 371 A and G). Acts of Parliament 
do not automatically apply to these states in certain matters unless 
endorsed by their legislatures. Further, the Constitution’s Fifth and the 
Sixth Schedules contain special provisions for the administration and 
protection of scheduled areas and scheduled tribes in some states (Fifth 
Schedule) and in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizo-
ram (Sixth Schedule) with greater autonomy than elsewhere.8
In making the Constitution, the political leaders of the Congress Party 
in the Constituent Assembly consisting of Jawaharlal Nehru, vallabhb-
hai Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Rajendra Prasad gave the 
political directions; the leading legal luminaries, such as b.R. Ambed-
kar, Alladi Krishnaawamy Aiyar, K.M. Munshi, and N. Gopalswamy 
Ayyangar, along with the legal adviser b.N. Rau, translated these ideas 
into constitutional provisions. The speed and the consensual process 
that marked India’s constitution-making may be attributed to the fact 
that all the major questions had already been discussed thoroughly dur-
ing the nationalist movement at various forums in the Indian National 
Congress (INC) and all-party conferences.
Ethno-linguistic demands became more intense soon after independ-
ence, however, and compelled the union government to set up the States 
Reorganization Commission (SRC) in 1953. Initially, the government 
resisted demands to create unilingual states, favouring the retention of 
multilingual states in the interest of promoting national integration. The 
SRC reflected similar views, conceding such demands only where it was 
necessary. The 1950s nevertheless saw the reorganization of south India, 
followed by the reorganization of states in western and northern India 
in the 1960s and of the northeast in the 1970s by the Parliament of India 
using its power to redraw the boundaries of the states under Article 3 of 
the Constitution.
In November 2000, the bJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government created three new states: Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and 
Uttarakhand. None of these new states follow linguistic or tribal lines 
per se. Although Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh have substantial tribal 
populations, the decisive factors in their creation appear to have been 
regional economic backwardness in their parent state and party political 
 8 balveer Arora, “Republic of India,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries, ed. 
Luis Moreno and César Colino, 201–26 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2010); and Rekha Saxena, “Is India a Case of Asymmetrical 
Federalism?,” Economic and Political Weekly, 14 January 2012.
228 Courts in Federal Countries
considerations. More recently, in 2013, the new state of Telangana was 
carved out of Andhra Pradesh by the Congress-led United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) II government. Telangana, which is Telugu-speaking, is 
the first non-hindi-speaking group to be given statehood on the basis 
of its linguistic identity. It is also unique in that while the region agi-
tated for bifurcation, the parent state opposed the move with equal 
determination, to the extent of rejecting the proposal by a majority in 
the state legislature. however, this resolution proved ineffective as the 
Constitution (Art. 3) requires the Indian Parliament only to consult the 
state and may create a new state without the consent of the parent state. 
In all previous cases, new states were created with the consent of the 
parent states.9
Apart from these far-reaching reorganizations of the states, and 
despite over 100 amendments to the Constitution, there have been no 
major structural or constitutional changes in the federal system. None-
theless, some major politico-economic changes since the early 1990s 
have considerably enhanced the political autonomy of the state gov-
ernments and redefined the hindu communalism of the bJP, which it 
prefers to call “cultural nationalism” (Hindutva). India functioned as a 
predominantly centralized parliamentary system until 1989, when the 
one-party dominance under the aegis of the INC was transformed into 
a multiparty system that produced minority or coalition governments 
at the national level. The Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy of economic 
development adopted at the time of the formulation of the second five-
year plan allowed the union government to take a prominent role in 
industrialization and scale the “commanding heights” of the economy. 
The year 1991 witnessed a paradigm shift from this “socialistic pat-
tern of economy” to business liberalism and globalization. Further, 
the Mandal Commission Report calling for a 27 per cent reservation 
in union government services for Other backward Classes (ObCs) (i.e., 
castes) in 1990, and the demolition of the babri Mosque by the Hindutva 
movement in 1992, gave rise to divisive identity politics.
 9 Government of India (Republic), Report of the States Reorganization Commission, chair 
Fazal Ali (New Delhi: Ministry of home Affairs, 1955), 203–4. Also see Ajay Kr. Singh, 
“Federalism and State Formation: An Appraisal of Indian Practice,” in Indian 
Federalism in the New Millennium, ed. b.D. Dua and M.P. Singh, 85–108 (New Delhi: 
Manohar, 2003); and M.P. Singh, “borderless Internal Federal Space? Reorganization 
of States in India,” India Review 6, no. 4 (2007): 233–50.
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All these factors together brought about a major reorientation in 
Indian political culture and voting behaviour. The national political 
parties have largely diminished, while regional parties have acquired 
unprecedented manoeuvrability as balancing or destabilizing forces, 
not only in state politics but also in federal coalition governments. The 
net effect has been greater regionalization and religious communal 
polarization in Indian politics and corresponding greater autonomy 
and influence of state governments in the federation.
Federalism has come to be generally valued by the political actors 
and general public as a means of finding a balance between national 
unity and regional diversity. however, certain insurgent activities aim-
ing at secession have surfaced in some parts of the northeast, northwest, 
and deep south. In some instances, such as Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and 
Mizoram, the secession movements abandoned their earlier positions 
and expressed allegiance to the union. Militancy persists in Jammu and 
Kashmir and some states of the northeast, though electoral processes 
and democratic governance have been restored in those areas.10
2. Broad Characteristics
India has a parliamentary-federal system consisting of twenty-nine 
states and seven union territories (UTs), including the National Capital 
Territory of Delhi. The three-tier structure of government includes the 
 10 For more background on Indian federalism, see Akhtar Majeed, “Republic of India,” 
in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid 
and G. Alan Tarr, 180–207 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2005); Govinda Rao, “Republic of India,” in The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: 
Comparative Perspectives, ed. Anwar Shah, 151–77 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2007); Amitabh Mattoo and happymon Jacob, “Republic 
of India,” in Foreign Relations in Federal Countries, ed. hans Michelmann, 168–87 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); George Mathew 
and Rakesh hooja, “Republic of India,” in Local Government and Metropolitan Regions 
in Federal Systems, ed. Nico Steytler, 166–99 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2009); Sandeep Shastri, “Republic of India: Emergence 
of a Competitive Party System and Civil-Society Space,” in Political Parties and 
Civil Society in Federal Countries, ed. Klaus Detterbeck, Wolfgang Renzsch, and 
John Kincaid, 121–46 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015); M.P. Singh 
and Rekha Saxena, “Intergovernmental Relations in India: From Centralization 
to Decentralization,” in Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems: Comparative 
Structures and Dynamics, ed. Johanne Poirier, Cheryl Saunders, and John Kincaid, 
239–71 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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union and state governments, which is based on the constitutional dis-
tribution of power, and local governments, based on a devolutionary 
model established in state legislation. The 73rd and 74th Amendments 
to the Constitution in 1992 sanctioned the existence of local govern-
ments, but their existence and form depends on state laws, provided 
they conform to the general requirements of the Union Constitution. The 
UTs are constitutionally demarcated but lack autonomy, in that they are 
governed directly by the union through administrators appointed by 
the union. The president holds diverse residuary powers over the leg-
islative and executive powers of the UTs. Two UTs, Delhi and Puduch-
erry, have semi-state status, with less autonomy than a state and greater 
autonomy than a UT.11
The form of government for the union and the states is parliamen-
tary in the sense that the executive is responsible to the legislature. The 
Union Parliament consists of two chambers: the Lok Sabha (house of 
People) and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States). The head of state is 
the president of India. The head of each constituent state is a governor. 
The prime minister and the chief ministers of the states with their 
respective Cabinets are the real executive authorities in the union and 
the states. The Indian federation is highly unified through a single court 
hierarchy, an integrated civil service, and a common citizenship. Federal 
laws and programs are implemented largely by the state governments. 
In addition, the Election Commission of India administers both union 
and state elections (Article 324), the comptroller and auditor general of 
India audit the accounts of both the union and the states (Article 148), 
and the Finance Commission (Article 280) is appointed to recommend 
principles and formulas of revenue sharing between the union and the 
states under the provisions of the Constitution. Intergovernmental rela-
tions are conducted largely in such forums as the Inter-State Council 
(ISC), the National Development Council (NDC), and ad hoc conferences 
of the prime minister and chief ministers, ministers, and secretaries of the 
union and state governments.12
 11 Rajeev Dhavan and Rekha Saxena, “Republic of India,” in Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, 165–97 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); and Rekha Saxena, 
“Treaty Making Power: A Case for ‘Federalisation’ and ‘Parliamentarisation,’” 
Economic and Political Weekly, 6 January 2007.
 12 Rekha Saxena, Situating Federalism: Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relations in 
Canada and India (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006).
The Supreme Court of India 231
A striking feature of the Constitution is its three types of emergency 
provisions: a national emergency due to foreign aggression or internal 
rebellion or both (Article 352); an emergency in a state in the event of 
the breakdown of the constitutional machinery (Articles 355 and 356); 
and a financial emergency in the union or a state (Article 360). In 1962, 
the Sino-Indian war led to the declaration of a national emergency and 
suspension of liberties. In 1975, an internal emergency was declared in 
the wake of agitation in the country, but it was later withdrawn and 
civil liberties restored before the parliamentary elections were called in 
1977. In 1978, it was laid down by the 44th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion that a general internal emergency can be imposed only if there is 
“an external aggression or armed rebellion.” A financial emergency has 
never been invoked. A presidential invocation of an emergency must be 
followed by parliamentary ratification.
The power of the union to take over the administration of a state 
under Article 356 on the recommendation of the state’s governor 
in the event of the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in a 
state is the most controversial provision of the Constitution. Minority 
political parties, especially regional parties, providing parliamentary 
support to the union government, have often put pressure on union 
governments to dismiss state governments controlled by parties to 
which they are opposed. The formation of coalition governments in 
New Delhi since 1989 added a new dimension to the controversy sur-
rounding president’s rule in states. The discordant bicameral political 
configuration in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha from 1989 to 2014 
brought about a political check on the misuse of president’s rule under 
Article 356, because such an act by the union executive is subject to 
parliamentary approval by both houses separately. Another con-
straint was added by the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court 
in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), in which the Court departed 
from tradition and made president’s rule subject to judicial review. 
As Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy (speaking for himself) and Justice 
Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (concurring with Justices P.b. Sawant and 
Kamal Narain Singh) observed, “The fact that under the scheme of 
our Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-à-vis 
the States does not mean that the States are mere appendages of the 
Centre. Within the sphere allotted to them, States are supreme. The 
Centre cannot tamper with their powers. More particularly, the courts 
should not adopt an approach, an interpretation, which has the effect 
of or tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved 
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to the States.”13 Similar remarks were made by Justice v. Ramaswamy 
(for himself and concurring with the two others, making it a majority 
view of five on a nine-judge bench). The Court further reiterated this 
point in Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006).14
Another important area of political contestation is that the union has 
an executive power to intervene in the legislative process of states by 
empowering the president to approve or disallow a state legislative bill 
reserved by the governor of a state for consideration by the union presi-
dent (Article 201). This presidential veto power has been controversial 
because presidents can delay approval or withhold assent for a decade 
or more. The Sarkaria Commission (1978–88) recommended that a gov-
ernor’s discretion to reserve a state bill should be exercised in “rare and 
exceptional cases” when such a bill is “patently unconstitutional.”15 The 
commission also recommended that a state bill so reserved should be 
disposed of within four months from the date of its receipt. This prac-
tice of reservation of state bills has continued, with occasional contro-
versies arising when divergent parties are in power in New Delhi and 
the concerned state. The M.M. Punchhi Commission on Centre-State 
Relations (2010)16 recommended disposal of a bill so reserved within 
six months. Absolute claims to deny federal assent have been curbed 
by some Supreme Court decisions. Presidential assent will override 
state legislation only with regard to those provisions of a state statute 
specifically brought to the president’s attention Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. 
National Textile Corporation Maharashtra North Ltd (2002).17
3. Structural Features
a. demarcation of powers
The demarcation of legislative powers between the union and the states 
heavily favours the union. Demarcation is set forth in three lists covering 
 13 S.R. Bommai & others v. Union of India, 1994, A.I.R. 1918, 1994 SCC (3) 1, pp. 146–7, 
para 276.
 14 Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1.
 15 Commission on Centre-State Relations, Report, Part I (Nasik: Government of India 
Press, 1988), ch. 5.
 16 Commission on Centre-State Relations, Report: Constitutional Governance and the 
Management of Centre-State Relations, chair Justice M.M. Punchhi, vol. 2 (New Delhi: 
Government of India Press, 2010), paras 7.4.01–02.
 17 Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation Maharashtra North Ltd., (2002) 8 
SCC 182.
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exclusive powers of the union, exclusive powers of the states, and concur-
rent powers. Union laws prevail over state laws unless a state law was 
enacted with the prior approval of the president of India. Certain subjects 
in the state list are made subject to those in the union list if the matter is 
declared to be of national and public interest by a union law. For example, 
industry and mines are allocated in the first instance to the state legisla-
tures but subject to the regulatory and development powers of Parlia-
ment. The original Constitution had ninety-seven items in the union list, 
sixty-six in the state list, and forty-seven in the concurrent list. The three 
lists allocate powers of legislation as well as taxation wherever power of 
legislation is explicitly combined with the power of taxation in the text 
of the Constitution. In pursuit of an integrated national economy, more 
flexible and high-yielding taxes payable by mobile persons and corpora-
tions are assigned to the union (e.g., income tax, trade and commerce, 
and welfare). Subjects requiring high investment or technological and sci-
entific skills have also been allotted to the federation. Likewise, matters 
amenable to territorial nexus and subject to interstate ramifications are 
assigned to the union or put in the concurrent list. Generally, matters of 
local import are left to the states, such as agriculture, health, local govern-
ment, and law and order. The concurrent list typically includes matters 
like criminal law, preventive detention, family law, contracts, economic 
and social planning, and legal, medical, and other professions.
A radical departure from the constitutionally prescribed division of 
powers between the two orders of governments would require a formal 
constitutional amendment. The amending formula is outlined under Arti-
cle 368. Citizens have no formal role in amending the Constitution. The 
courts are the ultimate interpreters or arbiters for determining the powers 
of the various orders of government. Parliamentary amending powers are, 
however, limited by the basic-structure doctrine, as mentioned above. This 
latter theory was invented by the Supreme Court in the context of Parlia-
ment’s power to amend the Constitution. It limits unrestrained and injudi-
cious alterations to the Constitution by Parliament. This theory was first 
advanced in I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967),18 which was reversed 
by Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973),19 which held that Parlia-
ment can amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental 
rights, but in doing so, it cannot destroy the Constitution’s basic structure. 
 18 Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R., SC 1967.
 19 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 1973, op. cit.
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The Supreme Court approved the first amendment that added the Ninth 
Schedule to the Constitution, making parliamentary legislation listed 
there immune from judicial review. however, since the date of the deliv-
ery of the Keshavananda judgment, any act in the Ninth Schedule has been 
open to judicial scrutiny. This position was further fortified by I.R. Cohelo 
(2007),20 which was a unanimous ruling compared to the Keshavananda 
ruling, which rested on only a 7–6 majority.
During the last half-century, the state list has lost some items to the 
concurrent and union lists. For example, education and forests, origi-
nally on the state list, were transferred to the concurrent list by the 42nd 
Constitutional Amendment in 1976. Most amendments in the three lists 
were made during the period of one-party Congress dominance when 
the party effectively transferred subjects from the state list to the con-
current or union lists. These changes were done because there was a 
perceived need for socio-economic planning under the directives and 
resources of the centre. India had also experienced external aggression 
during those decades, which contributed to centralization. In the phase 
of multiparty coalition governments from 1989 to 2014, constitutional 
amendments became extremely difficult to make on account of divided 
governments in the union and the states.21
Another federally relevant provision is Article 275 of the Constitu-
tion, which provides for mandatory central grants-in-aid to states that 
may need assistance. These grants are intended to remove fiscal asym-
metry among the states based on the recommendations of the Finance 
Commission. They may vary from state to state and are in the nature of 
block grants that are not subject to any conditions. In addition, Article 
282 provides for central assistance on a discretionary basis for any spe-
cific purpose or subject falling under union, state, or concurrent juris-
diction. A non-statutory Planning Commission was set up in 1950 to 
advise the centre on these matters.
The 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution gave constitu-
tional footing to village councils and municipal councils and assigned 
 20 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 SC 580.
 21 M.P. Singh, “Federal Division of Responsibilities in India,” Indian Journal of Federal 
Studies (January 2004), 1:109; Mahendra Prasad Singh, Indian Federalism: An 
Introduction (New Delhi: National book Trust, 2011); and George Mathew, “Republic 
of India,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar 
Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and Douglas M. brown, 155–80 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
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twenty-nine subjects to rural local bodies and eighteen to urban local 
bodies. These amendments have brought regularity to local govern-
ment elections conducted by the newly established state election com-
missions, local planning through the district planning committees and 
metropolitan planning committees, and regular fiscal transfers through 
the newly set up state finance commissions from the state governments, 
besides federal fiscal transfers.
The subjects assigned to the local bodies vary from state to state. Each 
state has devolved powers to levy certain taxes and fees to the local 
bodies and also set up a system of sharing their revenues and giving 
grants to localities. In addition, local bodies implement a number of 
central-government schemes, and funds earmarked for these purposes 
are sent to them by the union directly or through state governments.
The Finance Commission of India, being a constitutionally entrenched 
body, secured greater trust and legitimacy from the state governments 
than did the Planning Commission, which was established merely by 
a Cabinet resolution. The Sarkaria Commission had recommended 
that the Finance Commission be made a permanent body under the 
Constitution rather than being appointed every five years. It also sug-
gested that the Planning Commission be given a constitutional status. 
however, these recommendations have not been implemented. Some 
scholars have suggested that the formation of these bodies should be 
federalized by giving the state governments some say in their work 
processes. Soon after the 2014 general elections, the bJP/NDA coali-
tion government announced the government’s decision to abolish the 
Planning Commission. Initially announced as the National Develop-
ment Reforms Commission in the prime minister’s Independence Day 
Address from the ramparts of the Red Fort in Delhi, it finally came to be 
called NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India). Estab-
lished by Cabinet resolution, the policy think tank comprises a civil 
servant as the chief executive officer, two full-time experts (an econo-
mist and a defence research and development expert), six union minis-
ters (three ex-officio and three special invitees), free-market economist 
Arvind Panagariya as deputy chair, and the prime minister as the chair. 
Its role is to develop a “national agenda” to be used by the prime min-
ister and the chief ministers to foster a system of “cooperative feder-
alism.” Its Governing Council comprises all the chief ministers of the 
states and lieutenant governors of the union territories, with the prime 
minister again as chair. A significant method of federal fiscal trans-
fers to states is through the centrally sponsored development schemes 
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under five-year plans initiated by various union ministries in central, 
state, and concurrent competences.
A number of tax reforms have been on the anvil since the arrival 
of neoliberal economic reforms in 1991. Among these is a state value-
added tax (SvAT) that replaced the states’ sales tax. Negotiations were 
in a very advanced stage to introduce a goods and services tax (GST) by 
merging a number of central and state taxes. The states were unhappy 
about the draft constitutional amendments circulated by the union 
government because the amendments gave veto power to the union 
finance minister on issues relating to the state GST.22 Initially mooted 
and introduced by the Congress-led UPA, the proposal lapsed when 
the fifteenth Lok Sabha ended. The bJP/NDA government introduced 
the 122nd Constitutional Amendment bill in the winter session of the 
Sixteenth Lok Sabha in 2014. It sought to institute a seamless GST across 
the country by removing the cascading effect of several state and union 
taxes and levies, including excise duty, service tax, state and central 
vAT, central sales tax, purchase tax, entertainment and luxury taxes – 
subsuming them into a single tax. In July 2016, the bill was in limbo 
for lack of consensus between the federal government and the opposi-
tion, the states being divided along similar lines. The Congress, with 
other opposition parties in the Rajya Sabha, holds a virtual veto over 
constitutional amendments. It countervailed the bJP/NDA majority in 
the Lok Sabha. (Constitutional amendments require two-thirds major-
ity separately in both houses of Parliament.) however, by early August 
the Modi government worked out a consensus with the Congress party 
and non-Congress opposition. It was a rare moment of bipartisan sup-
port between the two major national parties – bJP and Congress – and 
virtual multipartisan unanimity on GST tax reforms, which promises 
to transform India into a common national market. India is a member 
of the WTO and of some free-trading regional blocs, but internal trade 
across state boundaries in India itself is not yet free, despite there being 
such an ideal in the Constitution and a provision for an Inter-State 
Commerce Commission. GST had been on the anvil for about a decade 
but blocked for lack of consensus between the two major national par-
ties. This consensus saw the constitutional amendment bill first cleared 
 22 Govinda M. Rao and Nirvikar Singh, Political Economy of Federalism in India (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); and Lawrence Saez, Federalism without a Centre: The 
Impact of Political and Economic Reform on India’s Federal System (New Delhi: Sage, 2002).
The Supreme Court of India 237
by the Rajya Sabha itself on 4 August, and also by the Lok Sabha the fol-
lowing day. The conforming parliamentary legislation by simple major-
ity and the ratification of the constitutional amendment by at least 
50 per cent of state legislatures by simple majority by the end of 2016 
is now only a matter of time. There are a few details, like the rate of the 
tax, still being worked out, with the Congress and the bJP billing for 
lower and the state governments for higher rates, but this most signifi-
cant indirect tax reform since the commencement of the Constitution in 
1950 and a fiscal reform in general since the economic liberalisation in 
1991 is now well on course, with the union finance minister optimistic 
about its enforcement from 1 April 2017. A general Inter-State Com-
merce Commission is, alas, still not in the offing; there is instead a pro-
posed GST Council representing the union and state finance ministers 
with a two-thirds majority for the state blocs. Another weakness of the 
GST dispensation is that petroleum products, electricity, and liquor are 
included in the list of exemptions that reduces the scope of the emerging 
national common market.
b. regional representation
Regional representation in Parliament is provided for in the federal sec-
ond chamber. The Council of States (Rajya Sabha) is indirectly elected 
by the elected members of the state assemblies in accord with the sys-
tem of proportional representation by means of a single transferable 
vote. Regional representation is nominal, however, because states are 
not represented qua states; they are represented in the Rajya Sabha not 
on the footing of formal equality, as in the United States of America, 
but on the basis of their population (Articles 4[1] and 80[2] read with 
the Fourth Schedule). Thus, Uttar Pradesh has thirty-one seats, whereas 
northeastern states like Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Manipur as well as 
Pudicherry and Goa have one seat each in the Rajya Sabha. The popu-
lar parliamentary chamber, the Lok Sabha, is elected in territorial con-
stituencies in various states through the plurality or first-past-the-post 
system of representation. because both houses are constituted on the 
basis of state populations, the smaller states are represented by smaller 
contingents in both houses.23 The Punchhi Commission on Centre-State 
Relations (2010)24 recommended equal representation of states, small or 
 23 Rekha Saxena, “Role of Rajya Sabha: The Federal Second or Secondary Chamber?” 
Indian Journal of Federal Studies (2007): 75–83.
 24 Commission on Centre-State Relations, Report (2010), paras 7.4.01 and 02.
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large, in the Rajya Sabha in order to bring about a greater federal bal-
ance in Parliament.
A constitutional amendment in the Representation of People Act of 
1951 was made by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) govern-
ment led by the bJP in 2003. It abolished the domiciliary requirement 
for members of the Rajya Sabha elected from a particular state. Another 
change required that voting in the Rajya Sabha be done openly rather 
than by secret ballot so that the party leaders can more effectively 
ensure that the state legislators do not transgress party lines in voting.
Following this amendment, the Rajya Sabha has often been used as 
the house to accommodate financiers and loyalists of various parties, 
even though they may not be residents of the states from where they 
are elected. Former Rajya Sabha member Kuldip Nayar filed a case in 
the Supreme Court arguing that this is destructive of the Rajya Sabha’s 
representative credentials as a federal second chamber. The Supreme 
Court, which in recent years had been exercising its powers of interpre-
tation and review to promote the federal principle, observed that “if the 
Indian Parliament, in its wisdom has chosen not to require a residential 
qualification, it would definitely not violate the basic feature of federal-
ism” (Kuldip Nayar and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2006).25
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitu-
tion and the M.M. Punchhi Commission Centre-State Relations both 
recommended that “in order to maintain the basic federal character of 
the Rajya Sabha, the domiciliary requirement for eligibility to contest 
elections to the Rayja Sabha from the concerned State is essential.”26
III. Court System
1. Courts System and Institutional Role of Courts
India’s judiciary is an integrated system bound at all levels by the law 
laid down by the apex court but with administrative autonomy of the 
high courts and lower courts in the states. The courts play an important 
role in interpreting the Constitution, which is particularly evident in at 
least two respects. First, the Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine of 
 25 Kuldip Nayar and Others v. Union of India and Others, Supreme Court Cases (2006), 7 SCC.
 26 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) 
(Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2002), 1:100; and Commission on Centre-State 
Relations, Report (2010).
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unamendability of the “basic structure” of the Constitution in Keshava-
nada Bharati (1973). Second, the constitutional courts – Supreme Court 
and state high courts – made the proclamation of president’s rule in 
a state under Article 356 subject to judicial review so as to check the 
political abuse of this power (e.g., S.R. Bommai, 1994, and Rameshwar 
Prasad, 2006).
India is part of the british common law tradition. The Constitution 
is the longest written text in the world, which is considered to give 
more latitude to the judiciary in interpreting it and settling federalism 
disputes. The court system is one integrated judicial structure, as in 
Canada, rather than a dualist federal-and-state system, as in the United 
States. The Supreme Court is a branch of the union government; high 
courts belong to the states, and district courts to the sub-state levels.
The Constitution invests the Supreme Court and high courts with 
original and appellate jurisdiction under Articles 131 and 131(A), 132, 
133, and 134(A). The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction includes 
union-state and interstate disputes regarding the federal division 
of powers and fundamental rights of citizens. The Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction includes appeals from high courts in civil, crimi-
nal, and other proceedings, when a high court certifies that the dispute 
raises substantial questions of law regarding interpretation of the Con-
stitution. The Supreme Court may also grant “special leave to appeal” 
in “any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the 
territory of India” (Article 136, Clause 1).
Parliament can further enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
by law vis-à-vis the union list (Article 138, Clause 1). Similarly, the 
Supreme Court may be invested with new jurisdiction by Parliament 
in relation to the state and concurrent lists as well as by an agreement 
between the union and states (Article 138, Clause 2). Further, there is an 
advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by presidential reference if 
the union executive considers it “expedient to obtain the opinion of the 
Supreme Court” (Article 143). Courts at all the levels are bound by the 
law laid down by the higher courts, though the high courts and lower 
courts in the states have considerable administrative autonomy. The 
highest court of appeal is the Supreme Court in constitutional, civil, 
and criminal cases. The state or local courts, legislatures, or executives 
cannot deviate, opt out, or refuse to comply with federal court rulings 
(Article 141).
Only the Supreme Court and the high courts can be called constitu-
tional courts, because they are the only courts that decide legal issues 
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having constitutional implications. In jurisdictional terms at least, the 
powers of the high courts and the Supreme Court are co-terminus in 
adjudicating intergovernmental disputes, though as the highest appel-
late court, the Supreme Court has the last word on any issue relating 
to interpretation of the law and the Constitution. The question whether 
the high courts are a major, middling, or minor actor in shaping federal 
jurisprudence or formal changes to the fundamental law is difficult to 
answer, for while the sheer corpus of judgments emanating from the 
high courts exceeds that produced by the Supreme Court, the latter is 
the highest authority and final arbiter.
India’s constitutional courts began more or less with the same powers 
as such courts in the Commonwealth parliamentary federations of Canada 
and Australia with judicial review of laws and executive orders. however, 
since 1973, the Supreme Court created a new power for it to review consti-
tutional amendments in the course of interpreting and adjudicating the 
power of Parliament to amend the Constitution, as noted above.
A justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the president of India 
after consultation with justices of the Supreme Court and the high courts 
as the president considers necessary for the purpose (Article 124). A 
high court judge is appointed by the president in consultation with the 
chief justice of India, the governor of the state, and the chief justice of 
the state high court (Article 217). Consultation with the chief justice of 
India has been interpreted as concurrence. In Supreme Court Advocates-
on-Record Association (SCAORA) v. Union of India 1993,27 a nine-judge 
bench of the Supreme Court (with a majority of seven) wrested control 
of appointments and transfers to the higher judiciary from the execu-
tive. The bench ruled that the president can make no appointment to 
the Supreme Court unless the appointee conforms to the “collective 
recommendation” of the chief justice of India in due consultation with 
four of his senior-most colleagues. For a state high court, the “collective 
recommendation” of the chief justice of the concerned high court in due 
consultation with two of his senior-most colleagues and endorsed by 
the “collective recommendation” of the chief justice of India is the basis 
of high-court appointments by the president.
In 1998, the president made a reference of this matter to the Supreme 
Court for its advisory opinion under Article 143. A nine-judge bench 
 27 Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 441; 
A.I.R. 1994 SC 268.
The Supreme Court of India 241
clarified that recommendations made by the chief justice of India in the 
name of the collegium of judges without complying with the “norms 
and requirements of the consultation process” does not bind the union 
government. The Supreme Court gave a detailed stipulation of a proper 
consultation process (Presidential Reference, 1999).28
For all practical purposes, India’s higher judiciary has become self-
appointing, even though the president retains the formal appointment 
power. Parliament has the power to impeach judges of the higher 
judiciary, but no impeachment has ever been concluded successfully. 
however, a half-impeached judge of the Calcutta high Court resigned 
midway through the process in order to escape the ordeal of the entire 
impeachment process.
both the Supreme Court and the high courts are empowered to issue 
writs under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution for the protection 
and enforcement of fundamental rights. A state high court also has the 
power to issue writs on matters other than fundamental rights. The 
Supreme Court needs special parliamentary authority to issue writs 
for a matter other than the enforcement of fundamental rights, but no 
such parliamentary enactment has been made. India’s courts are more 
or less equally involved in deciding federalism issues along with other 
issues, such as human rights, separation of powers, and structure of 
government. Union-state jurisdictional review also forms an important 
part of the exercise of judicial review, in addition to fundamental rights 
review and basic-structure-of-the-Constitution review, which applies 
to all forms of state action to ensure that such action does not “damage 
or destroy” “basic features of the Constitution.”29
The Supreme Court operates through three kinds of benches: division 
benches consisting of two to three judges, a larger three to five judge 
bench, and a Constitution bench that includes five to seven judges. In 
exceptional cases, benches have had as many as thirteen judges (Kesha-
vananda Bharati, 1973) or the entire Supreme Court sitting together, as 
happened with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s petition to review the 
Keshavanada Bharati judgment in which Chief Justice A.N. Ray issued 
notice to convene the entire Court, but dissolved it after two days of 
hearing. This dissolution followed after the attorney general could 
 28 Presidential Reference, A.I.R. 1999.
 29 Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic 
Structure Doctrine (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), x.
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not produce any satisfactory evidence to establish prima facie that the 
“basic structure” doctrine would obstruct the country’s social progress.
There is no requirement of consensual decision-making. The decision 
in a case of disagreement is made by majority rule, with dissenting 
minority opinions recorded. Law declared by the Supreme Court is 
binding on all courts in the territory of India (Article 141). Moreover, 
Article 144 obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to act in aid of the 
Supreme Court.
2. Constitutional Status of Courts and Judicial Officers
The courts are established under the Constitution; supplementary leg-
islation is made by Parliament or state legislatures. The union and state 
judicial structures are each administered with considerable autonomy. 
The lower courts are placed under the administrative supervision 
of the state high courts. In appointments and finances in these matters, 
the Supreme Court and high courts enjoy considerable freedom from 
political interference from the respective orders of government.
Judicial officers are recruited by the State Public Service Commis-
sion and trained in state academies. Examinations are held for judicial 
services, senior judicial services, and additional district judges. District 
judges are appointed by the governor of a state in consultation with the 
high court of the state. There is career mobility from the district courts 
to high courts and to the Supreme Court, but such mobility is more 
frequent from the middle level and the state apex court. In addition to 
the judicial officers recruited by the foregoing process, high court and 
Supreme Court judges are more commonly recruited from the bar and 
the bench.
The Constitution ensures the independence of the judiciary, especially 
in the cases of the judges of the high courts and the Supreme Court. The 
salaries of the judges are drawn on the Consolidated Fund of India and 
those of the high court judges on the Consolidated Fund of each state, 
which are not subject to legislative vote. Their salaries are not open 
for parliamentary or legislative sanction or cut, and once appointed, 
their emoluments and service conditions cannot be altered adversely. 
A justice of the Supreme Court and of a high court cannot be removed 
from office except by an order of the president passed after an address 
by each house of Parliament in the same session by a majority of the 
total membership of each house and at least a two-thirds majority of 
members present and voting. An attempt to remove a Supreme Court 
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justice on a charge of misbehaviour in 1993 failed because it fell short 
of the required majority. The autonomy of lower courts from political 
interference appears to be somewhat problematic in some states.
Following the 1977 elections, which removed the emergency regime 
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the higher courts also initiated what 
has come to be called public interest litigation to bring justice to the 
poor and underprivileged. The executive and Parliament have often 
complained about “judicial overreach” in terms of relationships among 
the three classical organs of the government, but a large constituency of 
the civil society and media has generally supported the courts.30
3. Curial Procedures
Procedures before courts are initiated by filing petitions by concerned 
parties, including governments. This conventional locus standi proce-
dure is still the norm, but the higher courts have relaxed it for public 
interest litigation, which can be initiated by third parties, which may be 
civic or non-governmental organizations or individuals intervening on 
behalf of victims suffering injustice. Such proceedings can be started by 
a postal letter to the court by the victim or by a suomotu cognizance of a 
matter taken by a judge or judges on a bench.
The attorney general or solicitor general has special statutory powers 
to file contempt or other proceedings on behalf of the executive. The 
law officers or concerned parties may request to transfer a case from 
one court to another for specific reasons. In certain cases, a Supreme 
Court bench can itself amalgamate similar cases to be heard together in 
the interests of efficiency and uniformity of justice.
Indian courts follow the system of adversarial adjudication prevalent 
in common law countries as distinguished from the inquisitorial sys-
tem practised in civil law countries. On complaints filed by appellants 
to the court, the respondents file their reply. After hearing the parties 
concerned represented by their advocates and examining witnesses, 
the court decides a case on its merits. Certain special remedies are used 
by the courts to resolve litigation or to get it enforced. Amicus curiae 
are occasionally appointed by the courts on behalf of an exceptionally 
aggrieved party to help reach a correct decision. The court can also 
 30 b.D. Dua, M.P. Singh, and Rekha Saxena, eds., Indian Judiciary and Politics: The Changing 
Landscape (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2006).
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appoint commissioners to find the facts on the ground during litigation 
and report on the implementation of the judgment after its delivery.
India’s record on the enforcement of courts’ judgments, especially in 
the post-emergency period, has been generally impressive. The courts 
are commonly respected by the political class as well as the general 
public. The constitutional courts exercise their jurisdiction in federal 
matters, because the Constitution provides for judicial review in most 
of these concerns. In a few matters, where the courts are supposed to be 
barred jurisdiction by convention (separation-of-powers matters) or by 
explicit provisions of the Constitution (president’s rule), the courts have 
been pitch-forked into action by vagaries of excessive political conflicts 
or abuse of constitutional powers by the executive or legislature.
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
Judicial interpretation of the Constitution has been generally centraliz-
ing. Initially, during the Nehru era, the courts were decidedly centrist. 
Cases relating to the protection of fundamental rights figured more 
prominently than protection of the states’ rights. The lesser number of 
states’ rights cases pinpoints the reality that union-state relations have 
been guided primarily by the spirit of “cooperative” federalism, in which 
the states are constitutionally obliged to conform to the directions of the 
centre under explicit overriding powers of the centre in certain matters, 
even during normal non-emergency periods. It is often the constituent 
units rather than the federal government that question the competence 
of the government on the other side in constitutional courts.
The superior courts have reconciled the competing claims of Parliament 
and the state legislatures and sorted out the principles of interpretation of 
constitutional provisions relating to union-state relations. This trend has 
been complicated, however, by other developments, resulting in mixed 
trends when the Court has tried to accommodate states’ positions within 
the framework of the complex intermeshing of powers in the Constitu-
tion’s union, state, and concurrent lists. In addressing these issues, the 
judiciary has laid down some guiding principles of adjudication. We will 
discuss the most important doctrines used in federalism adjudication.
1. Distribution of Legislative Competences
One of the most important federalism-related issues that India’s courts 
are asked to adjudicate involves the distribution of legislative and other 
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powers between the union and the states. Frequently, a law dealing 
with a topic plainly within a legislature’s powers also affects or relates 
to the subject matter of another legislature. In such situations, the Court 
examines the substantive character of the impugned law to identify its 
“pith and substance.” P.M. bakshi observes of this method, “Where the 
question arises of determining whether a particular subject mentioned 
is in one list or another, the court looks to the substance of the matter. 
Thus, if the substance falls within the Union List, then the incidental 
encroachment by the law on the State List does not make it invalid.”31
An illustration is F.N. Balsara (1951),32 which concerned the bombay 
Prohibition Act 1949. The act antedates the 1950 Constitution of India, 
and the case was decided on the basis of the Government of India Act 
1935. The question raised in the dispute was whether the bombay Pro-
hibition Act 1949 would fall under entry 31 of the provincial list of pow-
ers (production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase, and sale 
of intoxicating liquor and narcotics drugs) or entry 19 of the central list 
(import and export across customs frontiers as defined by the Domin-
ion Government of India). The Court decided that even though the pro-
hibition on liquor may affect its importation, this was incidental to the 
act’s major objective. On the basis of the pith-and-substance doctrine, 
therefore, the Federal Court of India ruled in favour of the provincial 
government.33 A somewhat similar doctrine is that of “colourable legis-
lation.” In deciding on the basis of this doctrine, the Court asks what in 
fact is the basic purpose and consequence of the impugned law rather 
than its apparent objective and effects.34
Judicial decisions reflect the broad principles of interpretation of 
union-state jurisdictions in such a way as to recognize the exclusivity 
of the union and state lists. The Constitution stipulates that in matters 
in the concurrent list, union laws prevail unless the state legislated with 
the prior consent of the union executive. The courts’ approach to inter-
preting residuary powers of the Union Parliament is to include eve-
rything not in the state list falling in this category, in accordance with 
Article 248, which states, “Parliament has exclusive power to make any 
 31 P.M. bakshi, The Constitution of India, 12th ed. (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 
2013), 246–7.
 32 The State of Bombay and others v. F.N. Balsara, SC 318: 1951.
 33 Madhav Khosla, Oxford India Short Introduction: The Indian Constitution (Oxford: Delhi, 
2012), 60–1.
 34 Ibid.
246 Courts in Federal Countries
law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the concurrent list or 
state list.” This is reflected in a unanimous judgment of a nine-judge 
bench in Attorney General for India v. Amrat Lal Prajivandas (1994),35 
which followed the precedent of Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon (1971).36 
The Court held that Parliament was competent to enact both of the two 
impugned laws relating to foreign exchange, smuggling, and security 
of generic state matters. The interpretative principle laid down by the 
Court was that where the legislative competence of Parliament is ques-
tioned, the Court will examine whether the statute is relatable to any 
of the entries in the state list. If it is not, no further inquiry is necessary, 
and it can be held that Parliament is competent to enact that statute by 
virtue of the entries in the union list and concurrent list under Article 
248 of the Constitution.
As mentioned above, several provisions in the state list have been 
made subject to provisions in the union list. There is no clear and con-
sistent line of interpretation on these matters. The courts have some-
times ruled in favour of the states (e.g., Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., 1956), 
at times in favour of the Union (e.g., State of West Bengal v. Union of 
India, 1963, and State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., 2004), and 
occasionally with mixed results (e.g., Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of 
Bihar, 1999).
A law relating to an Utter Pradesh sugar industry was in dispute in 
Tika Ramji.37 Entry 27 dealing with the production, supply, and distri-
bution of goods such as sugar is within the exclusive sphere of state 
legislatures in terms of the state list. but it is also subject to entry 33 in 
the concurrent list, which empowers Parliament to make laws on the 
same subject if it is considered “expedient in public interest.” The Court 
ruled that the U.P. Sugar Factory Act of 1953 was valid because it con-
fined itself to the regulation and supply of sugarcane required for use in 
sugar factories; it did not concern itself with controlling and licensing 
the sugar factories.
In earlier cases such as West Bengal v. Union of India (1963),38 the state 
challenged the constitutionality of the Coal bearing Areas (Acquisition 
and Development) Act enacted by Parliament in 1957. The state con-
tended that ownership of the land was vested in the state government. 
 35 Attorney General for India v. Amrat Lal Prajivandas (1994), 5 SCC 54.
 36 S. Dhillon, A.I.R. 1972 SC 1061: 1972.
 37 Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.A.I.R. 1956 SC 676.
 38 State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963).
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The Supreme Court ruled that the state’s right in the matter was sub-
ject to the union right and national interest under the Constitution. The 
courts have not generally objected to regulatory measures if they do not 
obliterate the right of the states to legislate over a primary concern in 
the field (Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 1962).39 
The underlying reasons the Court leans on are supposed to be construed 
harmoniously: (1) the national interest must be given primacy, and (2) the 
state legislature should not be summarily elbowed out.
The imposition of taxes on goods by states is permitted so long as 
they do not discriminate against trade and commerce coming from 
other states and thus do not adversely affect free trade, commerce, 
and intercourse across the states. The case is relatable to Article 304[a], 
which provides that restrictions on free trade among states are permis-
sible only if they are non-discriminatory and in the public interest. Any 
bill proposing to alter the free tax trade regime among states requires 
prior sanction of the president of India, which in effect means the union 
executive (Article 304[b]). Several cases have brought to the fore the 
problem that these provisions constrain states’ legislative freedom (e.g., 
India Cement v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1988, and Kalyani Stores v. State 
of Orissa, 1966).40 To limit these problems, the Sarkaria Commission rec-
ommended that the states’ leeway to impose this restriction should be 
taken away (Sarkaria Commission 1987–8).41
Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries (2004),42 the matter 
concerned coal, brick-field, and minor minerals in which entries in the 
state list are subject to the union’s power of regulation and development 
in the public and national interests. The Court argued, “The Union’s 
power to regulate and control does not result in depriving the States of 
their power to levy tax or fee within their legislative competence with-
out trenching upon the field of regulation and control.” Further, “Every 
effort should be made as far as possible to reconcile the seeming conflict 
between the provisions of the state legislation and the union legislation.”
Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1999)43 questioned the legality 
of the levy of market fees under the bihar Agricultural Produce Market 
 39 Automobile Transport (Rajasthan Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan), A.I.R. 1962, SC 1406.
 40 India Cement v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1988) 1 SCC 743; and Kalyani Stores v. State of 
Orissa A.I.R. 1966 SC 1686.
 41 Commission on Centre-State Relations, Report (1988), ch. 5.
 42 State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004).
 43 Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1999) 9 SCC 620.
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Act 1960. The Court reasoned that if the bihar Produce Market Act had 
contemplated only the regulation of the location of markets and man-
agement of markets and fairs relating to raw material supplied to the 
sugar factories, the matter would have fallen within the legislative com-
petence of the state legislature under entry 28 of the state list. however, 
the Market Act dealt with the supply and distribution of sugar prod-
ucts as well as trade and commerce therein, which falls within entry 33 
of the concurrent list by virtue of which the union law gets supremacy. 
Thus, the Court tried to accommodate the state law to a certain extent 
but declared it invalid beyond that point.
The interstate commerce clauses in the Constitution are union-centric, 
though they do give some leeway to the states. Article 301 stipulates that 
trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall 
be free, subject to the power of Parliament and state legislatures to impose 
restrictions in the public interest. A broad judicial view is that restrictions 
imposed on trade and commerce either by the union or by the states are 
generally ineffective (State of Madras v. Nataraja Mudaliar, 1967).44 This prob-
lem is concerned more with freedom from discriminatory taxation (India 
Cement v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1988)45 and not so much with incidental 
encroachment (State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, 1977).46
2. Executive Powers Relating to Emergencies and Treaty-Making
Jurisdictional disputes have arisen over the use of armed forces in trou-
bled areas. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958) was challenged 
in Naga Peoples’ Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1998).47 This 
act conferred special powers on security forces in several northeastern 
states. The case involved the fundamental rights of the Nagas as well 
as the federal question relating to the relationship between entry 2A 
in the union list (deployment of police or military in aid of civil order) 
and entry 1 of the state list (public order). On the federal question, the 
relevant point was that entry 2A in the union list – which was added 
by the 42nd Amendment (1976) and made the police power of the state, 
earlier an exclusive state jurisdiction, subordinate to the union’s power 
to deploy armed forces or central paramilitary forces in a state – was 
 44 State of Madras v. Nataraja Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1967, SC 147.
 45 India Cement v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1988) 1 SCC 743.
 46 State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471.
 47 Naga Peoples’ Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1998), 2 SC 109.
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made unilaterally without reference to the state government. This 
amounted to the use of emergency power governed by a separate part 
of the Constitution dealing with national, state, and financial emergen-
cies. The Court considered it questionable on the ground that “if the 
impugned legislation falls within the competence of the state legisla-
ture, the question of doing something indirectly which cannot be done 
directly does not arise.”
Another important concern of federalism jurisprudence has been 
the indiscriminate imposition of emergency rule on states by the union 
government under Article 356 of the Constitution. In State of Rajasthan v. 
Union of India (1977), the Court viewed the whole question as a “political 
thicket” left by the Constitution to determination by the union execu-
tive. The Court conceded that Article 74(2), relating to the powers of the 
president, prohibited courts from examining the advice of the council 
of ministers to the president. however, the Court reasoned that it did 
not preclude judicial scrutiny of the president’s action under Article 356 
on the basis of other available information, because it is a constitutional 
function of the president, which is subject to judicial review. A shift in 
approach was suggested by A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1981), however.48 
The Supreme Court there pointed out that after the repeal of Clause 
5 of Article 356 by the 44th Constitutional Amendment, the constitu-
tional theory under which the Rajasthan case was decided “cannot any 
longer hold good.” As noted above, S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 
marked a paradigm shift in judicial interpretation of the power of the 
union to take over the administration of a state under Article 356.49 In 
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006), the Court extended the rea-
soning in S.R. Bommai and ruled that if a state assembly is unconstitu-
tionally dissolved, the judiciary can revive the dissolved assembly. In 
this case, the Court restrained itself in view of the fact that the Election 
Commission had already notified the consequent elections. The use 
of Article 356 has undergone a marked decline due to factors like fear 
of judicial scrutiny, transformation of the party system, the advent of 
coalition and minority governments, and an opposition majority in the 
federal second chamber.
Many state tax laws have also been scrutinized for purporting to have 
an extra-territorial operation in other states (“legislative outreach”) 
 48 A.K. Roy Etc v. Union of India and Anr 1982 A.I.R. 710 1982 SCR (2) 272.
 49 S.R. Bommai and others v. Union of India, 1994.
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(e.g., Tata Iron & Steel Company v. State of Bihar, 1958).50 The Court has 
said there must be a “sufficient territorial nexus” between the legislat-
ing state and the extraterritorial matter being regulated. Observing that 
“the geographical applicability of a law does not by itself illustrate its 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality,” the Court pointed out that 
“to pronounce on its constitutionality, we must investigate the precise 
reasons why the law operates extra-territorially.”51 This principle was 
applied to laws such as the bihar hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 in 
State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi (1959),52 where the Supreme Court rea-
soned that even though the trust was registered and had headquarters 
in bihar, the act applied to all the properties of the trust in other states 
as well. The sufficiency of nexus test was restated in Shrikant Bhalachan-
dran Kurukar v. State of Gujarat (1994).53 In a review of important cases 
decided by the Supreme Court since 1950, M.P. Singh54 concluded with 
the view of the Court in a leading case on the topic, State of Bombay v. 
M.D. Chamarbaugwala (1957),55 that “sufficiency of the territorial connec-
tion involves a consideration of two elements, namely i.) the connection 
must be real and not illusory, and ii.) the liability sought to be imposed 
must be pertinent to that connection.”
Another issue is increasing controversy over the treaty-making 
power, which is an executive act performed by the government of 
India on behalf of Parliament. however, Article 253 of the Constitution 
requires enactment of a law by Parliament to give effect to international 
agreements. In Maganbhai Ishwarbhai v. Union of India (1969), the Court 
reasoned, “The effect of Article 253 is that if a treaty, agreement or con-
vention with a foreign State deals with a subject within the competence 
of the State Legislature, the Parliament alone has, notwithstanding Arti-
cle 246(3), the power to make laws to implement the treaty, agreement 
or convention or any decision made at any international conference, 
association, or other body.56 In P.B. Samant v. Union of India (1994),57 the 
Court overruled the contention that a treaty relating to GATT’s Dunkel 
 50 The Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 SC 452: 1958.
 51 Khosla, Oxford India Short Introduction.
 52 The State of Bihar v. Sm. Charusila Dasi, A.I.R. 1959 SC 1002: 1959.
 53 Shrikant Bhalachandran Kurukar v. State of Gujarat (1994).
 54 M.P. Singh and v.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, 10th ed. (Lucknow: Eastern book, 
2001), 631.
 55 The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, A.I.R. 1957 SC 699: 1957.
 56 Maganbhai v. Union of India, Hidayatullah CJ, A.I.R. 1969, Supreme Court: 784.
 57 P.B. Samant v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994, bombay 324.
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proposals will affect agricultural products, irrigation facilities, and raw 
cotton, which fall under the jurisdiction of state legislatures. The Court 
endorsed the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the Maganbhai 
Patel case. In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997),58 the Supreme Court 
ruled that international conventions signed by the government of India 
that are consistent with the spirit of the Constitution’s fundamental 
rights, even though not exactly in terms of letters of the Constitution, 
can be read into the fundamental rights, although the union and state 
legislatures may not have passed implementing laws to that effect. 
Thus, by entering into such international conventions, the government 
of India binds itself as well as the state governments. Similarly when 
India signed the World Trade Organization treaty, at least three peti-
tions, one each by governments of Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, and Orissa, 
were filed in the Supreme Court under Article 131 arguing that they 
were not consulted in areas that fell in their exclusive jurisdiction. The 
cases were later withdrawn on the assurance that in the future there 
will be consultations before entering into such treaties.
Similar state concerns have recurred as, for example, at the signings 
of the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Deal (2005), Free Trade Agreement 
with ASEAN (2012), and Foreign Direct Investment in Multi-brand 
Retail (2012). but states’ objections could not forestall these agreements.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the locus of sovereignty or 
constitutive authority was exercised by the Constituent Assembly of 
India and can likewise be exercised by a future Constituent Assembly 
of India. Parliament and state legislatures can exercise only limited 
amending power within the parameters of the “basic structure” of the 
Constitution. This formulation applies to formal constitutional amend-
ments including federalism-related changes such as reallocation of 
powers and the structures of the various orders of government. how-
ever, changes in representation in Parliament and state legislatures, 
alteration of boundaries of states, and admission of new states are areas 
in which Parliament can exercise plenary constitutive power subject to 
judicial review.
There have been some controversies regarding peoples’ or states’ 
representation in Parliament. For example, as discussed above, a con-
stitutional amendment that altered the domiciliary requirement for 
candidates seeking election to the Rajya Sabha was subject to litigation 
 58 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, 1997, 6 SCC 241.
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on the ground that it affected the regional representative nature of the 
federal second chamber. however, the Supreme Court validated the 
impugned amendment.
3. Institutional Role of the Courts
Adjudication by the courts has generally made a positive contribution to 
harmonious functioning of the system of cooperative federalism estab-
lished under the Constitution. The judicial review powers have been 
carried to the extent of judicial activism, especially since the emergence 
of the multiparty system and divided governments where courts’ inter-
ventions have enabled the system to deal with complex and highly con-
troversial situations. During the 1970s, several decisions of the courts 
were challenged by the government and Parliament by amending the 
Constitution itself and curtailing the powers of the courts. The courts, 
however, defended their review powers, at times with their backs to the 
wall. but after the party system transformation, a more competitive insti-
tutional arena of governance developed, and courts have been able to 
get away with the kind of activism that was not sustainable earlier. The 
courts have also been backed by civil-society institutions and the media. 
A national election survey in the late 1990s found that the Supreme Court 
and the Election Commission were rated by the respondents as the most 
legitimate institutions of the federal government.59
The constitutional courts have played a significant role in promoting 
a multicultural and federal conception of nationhood and state. both 
community rights and individual rights as well as human rights gener-
ally have received a great deal of judicial protection. In a series of recent 
judgments, the doctrine of the “basic structure” of the Constitution has 
been elaborated incrementally, and constitutional values and institu-
tions relating to democratically elected governments, secularism, and 
federalism have been declared to be part of the basic constitutional 
structure. The “basic structure” doctrine as a construction of the courts 
is unique to India. It casts a pervasive influence on federal adjudica-
tion and has been applied beyond constitutional amendments to other 
forms of state action, such as the use and abuse of emergency powers 
 59 S.K. Mitra and v.b. Singh, Democracy and Social Change in India: A Cross Sectional 
Analysis of the National Electorate (New Delhi: Sage, 1999).
The Supreme Court of India 253
by the union executive, the conduct of fair and free elections, and deni-
als of secular and cultural constitutional values.
Governments at various levels have generally responded positively 
to court decisions, though, in a few recent instances, the union gov-
ernment has appealed to the Court for a review of some of the courts’ 
decisions (e.g., the appointment by the Supreme Court of a commit-
tee headed by a retired Supreme Court justice to monitor government 
actions on the stashing of unaccounted money by Indian nationals in 
foreign banks on the plea that it is the domain of the executive). various 
proposals for reform have also been discussed. For example, there has 
been talk for some time about enhancing the accountability of judges 
through the establishment of a National Judicial Commission. In 2012, 
a National Judicial Accountability bill was introduced into Parliament 
by the Congress-led UPA-II government.60 It proposed to set up a panel 
for preliminary scrutiny of complaints concerning decisions of the 
Supreme Court and any high court. The panel was to comprise a for-
mer chief justice and two sitting judges. The Oversight Committee to 
which the Scrutiny Committee would refer cases for fuller inquiry was 
to consist of a retired chief justice of India as the chairperson, a judge of 
the Supreme Court, a chief justice of a high court, and an eminent per-
son appointed by the president. The bill did not proceed, but soon after 
coming to power in 2014, the bJP/NDA secured the passage of a consti-
tutional amendment and parliamentary act to establish a National Judi-
cial Appointments Commission (NJAC) to replace the previous system, 
which had given a judicial collegium consisting of the chief justice of 
India and four of his or her senior-most colleagues power to recom-
mend judicial appointments, with binding effect on the government.61 
The NJAC comprises the chief justice of India and two of his or her 
senior-most colleagues, the union minister of law and justice, and two 
“eminent persons” nominated by a committee consisting of the prime 
minister, the chief justice of India, and the leaders of the official oppo-
sition party or, in its absence, the largest opposition party in the Lok 
Sabha. The amendment was passed by the requisite two-thirds majori-
ties in each house of Parliament and ratified by at least 50 per cent of the 
 60 Manish Tewari, speech in the Lok Sabha, 21 May 2012; “Political Prism: NJAC bill 
Needs Some introspection,” Mail Today, 28 August 2014; and “beware the Tyranny of 
the Elected,” Asian Age, 30 October 2015.
 61 See Supreme Court Advocates on Record v. Union of India (1993) and its elaboration in 
Re-presidential Reference (1998), discussed above.
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state legislatures and received the assent of India’s president. however, 
its notification in the Gazette of India was postponed on account of a 
pending public interest litigation challenging its constitutional valid-
ity. Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared both the parliamentary 
act and the constitutional amendment unconstitutional on the ground 
that they violated the principle of judicial independence, which is part 
of the “basic structure” of the Constitution and therefore unamendable 
(SC Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, 2015).62 The pro-
posed system would have overturned the primacy of the judicial mem-
bers of the NJAC as any of its two members including the union law 
minister and two eminent persons nominated by the executive could 
veto a panel proposed by the judicial members.
V. Conclusion
The courts have generally enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy in the eyes 
of governments as well as civil society, especially in the post–internal 
emergency period. The governmental institutional balance has under-
gone a paradigm shift in the sense that since the 1980s, and especially 
the 1990s, the governmental system has come to be driven largely by the 
judiciary, whereas in the Nehru and Indira Gandhi eras, it was driven 
mostly by the executive and the legislature. The courts have generally 
supported centralist values, but in recent years, there has been a greater 
tendency to protect the states, at least in some important fields such 
as cases related to the exercise of the union’s power to take over state 
administration under emergency provisions of the Constitution.
In the context of the contention between the executive and Parlia-
ment, on one hand, and constitutional courts, on the other, on the ques-
tion of the amending power, Granville Austin figuratively argues that 
in the “struggle for custody of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
won.” he says that “despite occasional self-inflicted wounds, the Court 
has been the bastion of the Constitution. Parliament enjoys the author-
ity to amend the Constitution. The court has the authority to measure 
amendments against the basic structure doctrine.”63 Pratap bhanu 
 62 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association and Another v. Union of India, 2015.
 63 Granville Austin, “The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Custody of the 
Constitution,” in Supreme But Not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of 
India, ed. b.N. Kripal, Ashok h. Desai, Gopal Subramaniam, Rajeev Dhavan, and 
Raju Ramachandran (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13.
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Mehta concedes the contingent rise of judicial sovereignty but adds that 
“there is a profound inner conflict at the heart of India’s constitution-
alism: the question, who is the Constitution’s final arbiter, admits no 
easy answer. The Court has declared itself to be the ultimate judge, and 
has even assumed the power to override duly enacted constitutional 
amendments … In India, Parliament and Judiciary have been and are 
likely to remain competitors when it comes to interpreting the Consti-
tution.”64 This assessment has proved to be prophetic, as corroborated 
by the NJAC episode narrated above.
 64 Pratap bhanu Mehta, “India’s Unlikely Democracy: The Rise of Judicial 
Sovereignty,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 2 (2007): 74–5.
9  The Supreme Court of Mexico: 
Reconfiguring Federalism through 
Constitutional Adjudication and 
Amendment after Single-Party Rule
josé antonio caballero juárez
I. Introduction
Approximately twenty-five years ago, Mexico began a dramatic transi-
tion in its political system.1 The transformation included the development 
of a plural political arena that challenged the single-party rule of the Par-
tido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which had governed the country 
for sixty years. Gradually, politicians from other political parties began 
to occupy positions in state and municipal governments.2 In 2000, Mexi-
cans elected a federal president from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN).3 
These developments significantly altered the relationships between fed-
eral, state, and municipal authorities. The PRI’s party discipline, which 
had been one of the main instruments for resolving disputes within the 
political system, became useless when politicians from other parties 
assumed power. Eventually, the PRI’s internal discipline also weakened.4 
 1 See Rogelio hernández Rodríguez, “Los gobernadores y el federalismo. La 
descentralización del poder,” in Una historia contemporánea de México, vol. 3, Las 
Instituciones, ed. Ilan bizberg and Lorenzo Meyer, 195–217 (Mexico: Océano-El 
Colegio de México, 2009); and José Luis Reyna, “El sistema político: cambios y 
vicisitudes,” in ibid., 3:47–89.
 2 See Alberto Aziz Nassif, “La construcción de la democracia electoral,” in Una historia 
contemporánea de México, vol. 1, Transformaciones y permanencias, ed. Ilan bizberg and 
Lorenzo Meyer, 367–428 (Mexico: Océano-El Colegio de México, 2009); and María 
Amparo Casar, “Cien años de política,” in México 2010: El juicio del siglo, ed. María 
Amparo Casar and Guadalupe González, 50–62 (Mexico: Taurus, 2010).
 3 vicente Fox, president of Mexico (2000–6), came from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN).
 4 The most compelling example happened when Roderto Madrazo, governor of 
Tabasco, refused to follow the president’s order to step down. They were both from 
the PRI. See hernández Rodríguez, “Los gobernadores y el federalismo,” 211.
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In this context, constitutional provisions that had been overshadowed by 
politics now became noticed as ways of regulating relationships between 
the federal, state, and municipal orders of government. Soon litigation 
was adopted as the solution of choice for these kinds of conflicts.5 how-
ever, in many cases, the constitutional rules regarding intergovernmental 
relations were considered insufficient or out of date. Every year since the 
mid-1990s, new constitutional amendments have been passed to rear-
range the distribution of power among the three constitutional orders.6 
Many of these amendments have increased the powers of federal author-
ities.7 Consequently, constitutional law changed very rapidly during the 
late 1990s, not only as the result of constitutional amendments but also of 
new interpretations of the Constitution developed by the Supreme Court. 
Federalism in Mexico embarked on a new era based on enforcement of 
the Constitution in and through judicial interpretation.
From a federalism perspective, the role of Mexico’s courts has 
involved two key developments. The first is the growing relevance of 
judicial decisions concerning the meaning of the Constitution’s federal 
clauses. The second is the influence of federal courts over state courts. 
These two developments have rather opposite effects on the structure 
and operation of Mexico’s federal institutions. This chapter will explain 
both. The analysis will show how judicial interpretation, as well as cer-
tain constitutional amendments, are closely related in the day-to-day 
construction of Mexican federalism. The chapter also will show how 
judicial interpretation provides state and local authorities with new 
opportunities to exercise their powers. Certain unresolved problems 
created by the influence of the federal courts over state courts will also 
 5 The first case that contested state officials’ powers to rule over municipal issues arose 
in 1993 (Controversia Constitucional 1/93 Ayuntamiento de Delicias, Chihuahua). 
This case was based on a constitutional provision that regulated controversias 
constitucionales, a process mentioned in Article 105 of the Constitution, unregulated by 
statute and rarely used. Some other cases began immediately afterward. For a list of 
the cases from 1917 through 1994, see Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, http://
www.scjn.gob.mx/pleno/paginas/ControvConsti1917_1994.aspx.
 6 The Mexican Constitution has been amended more than seventy times since 1995. For 
a list of the amendments to the Mexican Constitution, see biblioteca Jurídica virtual, 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/.
 7 In this period, Article 73, which contains the federal legislature’s powers, has 
had more than twenty amendments. These amendments usually give the federal 
legislature new powers over state and municipal governments. For a list of the 
amendments, see biblioteca Jurídica virtual.
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be discussed. It will be seen that the centralism that characterizes Mex-
ico’s judicial system may help explain why the development of state 
courts has been limited.
The chapter approaches these questions beginning with a brief 
description of Mexico as a federation. It then explains the country’s 
court system, focusing on the centralism that prevails in the court sys-
tem and describing the problems generated by this centralism. Next, 
the chapter discusses the way in which the Mexican Supreme Court 
has interpreted federalism over the last fifteen years, and it concludes 
with some general remarks on the nature of the Supreme Court’s prec-
edents on federalism. It is argued that it is not possible to see a clear 
pattern in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Most of the Court’s 
decisions seem to be crafted in response to the circumstances of each 
case. As a result, the case law provides very little suggestion of an iden-
tifiable federalism doctrine. Consequently, Mexican federalism has to 
be analysed specifically by focusing on particular constitutional provi-
sions and Supreme Court interpretations concerning federal, state, and 
municipal authorities. If there is one general theme, it is a growing judi-
cial centralism facilitated by the increasing number of federal courts 
exercising supervisory jurisdiction over state court decisions.
II. Federal System
Mexico has a surface area of 1,964,375 square kilometres.8 As a federa-
tion, it is composed of thirty-one states and Mexico City.9 In 2012, the 
GDP was US$1.177 trillion with a GNI per capita of US$9,740.10 The 
country has a population of 112 million people, and Spanish is spo-
ken by more than 98 per cent of the population. Approximately 6 per 
cent of the population belongs to an indigenous ethnic group. These 
groups, which speak more than twenty-four languages, are distributed 
 8 Unless otherwise mentioned, general data for Mexico were drawn from the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Anuario estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
2011 (Mexico: INEGI, 2012), http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/productos/default.
aspx?c=265&s=inegi&upc=702825042448&pf=prod&ef=&f=2&cl=0&tg=8&pg=0.
 9 Constitutional amendment published on the Diario Oficial de la Federación 29 
January 2016. before this amendment the Constitution referred to the area occupied 
by Mexico City as a federal district.
 10 See “Data: Mexico,” World bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/mexico.
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throughout the country.11 Most of them live in the southern states of 
Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, and yucatán.
Mexico became a federation in 1824 after gaining independence from 
Spain in 1821. The federal system has been governed by three constitu-
tions.12 The current Constitution, enacted in 1917,13 establishes a federal 
system based on five legal orders: constitutional, federal, state, federal 
district, and municipal.14
The constitutional order governs every institution in the country. 
Article 1 of the Constitution states that every person in the United 
States of Mexico is entitled to the protection of the human rights recog-
nized therein. Article 133 contains the supremacy clause, which stipu-
lates that every law enacted in the country (by the federal Congress or 
a state congress) is subject to the Constitution. Every judge in the land 
also is bound by the Constitution.
The Constitution regulates the powers of the three federal branches 
of government. Article 40 and the first paragraph of Article 41 define 
the country’s federal system as deriving from the sovereignty of the 
people, exercised through the governing institutions of the union and 
the states. The powers of these two orders of government are deter-
mined by two articles of the Constitution: Article 73, which specifies 
the competences of the federal Congress, and Article 124 (the residual 
clause), which states that any attribution that is expressly granted not 
to the federation by the Constitution will be deemed to be within the 
 11 The 2000 census registered eighty-five indigenous languages. Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Geografía, La población indígena en México (Mexico: INEGI, 2004), 7. 
The 2011 national statistical yearbook considers twenty-four languages as the main 
indigenous languages.
 12 Mexico’s first Constitution (4 October 1824) stated that Mexico would become a 
federal state. In 1835 the federal system was substituted for a central system. It was 
reinstated in 1847 and then replaced by a new federal system based on the 1857 
Constitution (5 February 1857). This system was reformed by the 1917 Constitution 
(5 February 1917).
 13 See “The Political Constitution of the Mexican States,”  http://www.juridicas.unam.
mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf.
 14 orden jurídico municipal. principio de competencia (municipios como 
órganos de gobierno). Controversia constitucional 18/2008. Municipio de 
Zacatepec de hidalgo, Estado de Morelos. 18 January 2011. 10a. Época; SJF y su 
Gaceta; Libro I, October 2011, Tomo 1; page 294; Thesis P./J. 44/2011 (9a). For a 
complete account on Mexican federalism from a legal perspective, see José María 
Serna de la Garza, El sistema federal mexicano: Un análisis jurídico (Mexico: Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, 2008).
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competence of the states. Article 73 has been amended sixty-five times 
since 1917, expanding federal powers in several ways.15 In some cases, 
federal competence is limited to enacting legislation; in other cases, 
federal authorities are also responsible for enforcing the law.16 Other 
provisions of the Constitution grant to the federal branches of govern-
ment additional competences, such as Articles 103, 104, and 105, which 
regulate the federal judiciary.17 Other provisions establish shared com-
petences in areas such as education (Art. 3), health and environmental 
protection (Art. 4), public security (Art. 21), and housing and urban 
development (Art. 27).18
Articles 115, 116, 117, and 118 provide specific rules regarding the 
organization and powers of the state governments. Article 115 requires 
the states to adopt for their internal government a popular, representa-
tive, and republican form of government. Article 116 further requires the 
public power of the states to be divided among executive, legislative, 
and judicial organs. Articles 117 and 118 specify limits to state powers, 
including a prohibition on forming alliances or treaties with other coun-
tries. Subject to the limits stated in these articles, the residual powers 
(Art. 124) of the states are quite extensive, and include, for example, the 
authority to enact their own criminal and civil codes.19
Mexico City is defined in Article 44 and governed by Article 122, 
which provides the framework for the organization of the City’s three 
branches of government. This framework makes Mexico City’s govern-
ment equivalent to that of a state government. Thus, the City has its 
own court system; its assembly has vast powers to enact legislation; 
and its governor is elected by the people in the City.
 15 Amendments that incorporate sections to Article 73 are common. A clear example 
may be seen in section XXIX, which is now subdivided into seventeen new sections 
(XXIX-b to XXIX-Q). Each new section grants additional powers to the federal 
Congress. See note 8 for a list of the amendments.
 16 For example, in labour relations, the federal legislative branch is entitled to enact the 
labour statute, enforcement is divided between state and federal authorities (Art. 73,  
sec. X; and 123, part A, sec. XXXI). In some other cases, for instance, gambling, 
legislation, and enforcement is carried out by federal authorities.
 17 See next section.
 18 See section III.
 19 Since Article 73 does not give the federal Congress the power to enact a uniform 
civil code or a uniform criminal code, it is understood that under Article 124 that his 
power is left to state legislatures.
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Lastly, the municipal order is regulated by Article 115, sections I–vIII.20 
The intention is to limit state intervention into municipal affairs.21 Con-
stitutional litigation between states and municipalities over these issues 
is quite common.
The process to amend the Constitution is contained in Article 135. 
Amendments must be passed by at least three-quarters of the sitting 
members of each chamber of the federal Congress (Senate and house 
of Deputies) and then ratified by more than half of the state legislatures. 
Despite these apparently rigid requirements, the 1917 Constitution has 
been revised more than two hundred times.22
III. Court System
Mexico has a complex court system that includes thirty-three court 
subsystems and several other administrative courts.23 This section 
will first describe the court system and then explain how the system 
operates in practice, focusing on the impact of the federal judiciary 
on the rest of the courts through the use of the amparo directo (judicial 
review).24
 20 The Supreme Court recently recognized the municipal order as it is stated in the 
precedent cited in note 8: municipios. el artículo 115, fracciones i y ii, de la 
constitución federal reconoce la existencia de un orden jurídico propio. 
Controversia constitucional 14/2001. Municipio de Pachuca de Soto, Estado de 
hidalgo. 7 July 2005. Novena Época, SJF y su Gaceta, XXII, October 2005; page 
2070; Thesis P./J. 134/2005. Previous precedents recognized only four orders in the 
Mexican legal system. See, for example, controversia constitucional. el orden 
jurídico estatal comprende las relaciones entre los poderes locales y sus 
minicipios. Controversia constitucional 31/97. Ayuntamiento de Temixco, Morelos. 
August 9 1999. Novena Época, SJF y su Gaceta, X, September 1999, page 705; Thesis: 
P./J. 96/99.
 21 Article 115 of the Constitution has been recognized as the cornerstone of municipal 
government in Mexico since 1917. Amendments passed in 1983 and in 1999 
strengthened municipal governments, providing further limitations to state 
governments.
 22 See note 7.
 23 The system includes the federal judiciary, thirty-one state courts, and the Federal 
District’s courts. For a complete study of Mexico’s court system, see héctor Fix-
Zamudio and José Ramón Cossío Díaz, El poder judicial en el ordenamiento mexicano 
(Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999).
 24 Amparo directo is explained below in this same section. See also note 38.
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1. General Features
The Supreme Court heads the federal judiciary. below it there are three 
levels of federal courts: collegiate circuit courts, unitary circuit courts, and 
district courts (Art. 94).25 The Supreme Court has justices and hears cases 
en banc or in one of its two chambers.26 The president nominates justices 
by submitting three candidates to the Senate. The Senate appoints one of 
the candidates. The federal judiciary is distributed in 32 circuits. There are 
239 collegiate circuit courts with three magistrates each, 95 unitary circuit 
courts, and 391 district courts,27 each one headed by a judge.28 Magistrates 
and judges are appointed thorough a competitive process. Almost all of 
them have previous experience as clerks in the federal judiciary.
The federal judiciary has jurisdiction to hear constitutional and 
federal cases (Art. 103, 104, and 105). Federal jurisdiction (Art. 104) 
includes civil and criminal cases, maritime jurisdiction, controversies 
to which the federation is party, and conflicts affecting ambassadors 
and consuls, among others. Federal courts are also competent to hear 
commercial cases. however, section II of Article 104 mentions that state 
courts may also hear commercial cases.29
Until very recently, the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary 
were the only courts with jurisdiction to hear constitutional cases.30 
 25 The Federal Electoral Court is also part of the federal judiciary. Its organization and 
jurisdiction are separated from the rest of the federal judiciary (Article 99).
 26 Articles 94 through 98 provide several rules on the appointment of justices and the 
conditions under which they serve.
 27 Some of these courts are not called district courts. Still they constitute the first level of 
the federal and the amparo jurisdiction. For example, there are three judges specialized 
in supervising the inmates who are serving time after being declared guilty.
 28 Articles 97 and 100 regulate the appointment of judges and magistrates and 
service in the judiciary. For the complete list of circuit and district courts, see 
“Direccíon General de Estadística Judicial,” http://www.dgepj.cjf.gob.mx/
organosjurisdiccionales/numeroorganos/numorganoscir.asp.
 29 State courts hear most of the commercial cases. In fact, a historical claim by state 
courts is that they should receive federal resources as compensation for their 
participation in commercial litigation. José Antonio Caballero, Sergio López Ayllón, 
and Alfonso Oñate Laborde, Libro Blanco de la reforma judicial (Mexico: Suprema 
Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2006), 183.
 30 For a description of the concentrated system of constitutional control, see David 
García Sarubbi, “Federalism and Constitutional Judicial Review in Mexico and the 
United States: A Normative Assessment of Two Different Jurisdictional Schemes,” 
Mexican Law Review 4, no. 1 (2011): 42–3.
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A decision from the Supreme Court31 delivered in July 2011 opened 
constitutional control to state courts as well.32 As a consequence, the 
current constitutional control system is based on the concentrated 
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, which is complemented by 
limited judicial control carried out by state courts.33 The federal 
judiciary exercises constitutional control through three alternative 
procedures: the amparo (Arts. 103 and 107), the controversias con-
stitucionales (Art. 105 sec. I), and the acciones de inconstitucionalidad 
(Art. 105 sec. II).34
The writ of amparo is the most common method of judicial review.35 
The amparo may be used to argue against the constitutionality of 
statutes, administrative decisions, and, generally speaking, any act 
carried out by an authority, including judicial decisions delivered 
in federal jurisdiction or in state jurisdiction.36 District judges 
or collegiate circuit courts may hear amparos. If it is an amparo 
 31 Precedents in Mexico are referred to as jurisprudencia. Jurisprudencia may have 
a binding character or just an authoritative one. Jurisprudencia may refer to the 
whole text of a decision or to a specific passage that determines the judgment (ratio 
decidendi), or may even refer to passages that provide an opinion on a question that 
is not strictly related to the case (dictum). The most common way of publishing 
jurisprudencia is by selecting passages of decisions. Capital letters are used to give 
the passage a title. The federal judiciary publishes jurisprudencia monthly in the 
Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta (SJF y su Gaceta), http://ius.scjn.gob.
mx/paginas/tesis.aspx. A note on Mexican jurisprudence may be found in José 
María Serna de la Garza, “The Concept of Jurisprudencia in Mexican Law,” Mexican 
Law Review 1, no. 2 (2009): 131–45.
 32 sistema de control constitucional en el orden jurídico mexicano. varios 
912/2010. 14 July 2011. 10a. Época; Pleno; SJF y su Gaceta; book III, December 2011, 
volume 1; page 557; thesis P. LXX/2011 (9a).
 33 State judges and courts may exercise constitutional control by refusing to apply a 
statute that they consider to be unconstitutional. These decisions do not become 
binding precedents.
 34 For an overview of the constitutional control system in Mexico, see José Ramón 
Cossío Díaz, Sistemas y modelos de control constitucional en México (Mexico: Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, 2011).
 35 A study in English of the amparo that is still useful is Richard D. baker, Judicial Review 
in Mexico: A Study of the Amparo Suit (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971). A 
complete overview of the amparo appears in héctor Fix-Zamudio, Ensayos sobre el 
derecho de amparo (Mexico: Porrúa-UNAM, 2003).
 36 In these cases it is quite common to see that a federal judge’s decision in a federal 
case may be reviewed by another federal judge via the amparo under a constitutional 
jurisdiction. See subsection 2 infra.
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directo,37 it will go to a collegiate circuit court (Art. 107, sec. v). If it is an 
amparo indirecto,38 it will go to a district judge (Art 107, sec. vII). Amparo 
appeals may go to collegiate circuit courts or to the Supreme Court. The 
controversia constitucional (constitutional controversy) is a procedure 
designed to solve competence disputes among authorities of different 
branches or different orders of government.39 Controversias are heard 
directly by the Supreme Court. Acciones de inconstitucionalidad (uncon-
stitutionality actions) are used to challenge the constitutionality of stat-
utes.40 This method of constitutional control is available only to political 
parties, congressional minorities (federal or state), the federal attorney 
general, the national ombudsman, and state ombudsmen. Unlike the 
amparo, which may benefit only the party seeking the remedy (Art. 107, 
sec. II), the acción de inconstitucionalidad, if successful, results in a decla-
ration that the challenged statute is entirely void.
State judiciaries must be organized under the terms stated in sec-
tion III of Article 116 of the Constitution. Judges and magistrates are 
required to be independent, their remuneration must be adequate, and 
it may not be waived nor reduced. State judiciaries are usually divided 
into three levels: small claims, courts of first instance, and an appeals 
court. The docket of a state court includes civil, family, criminal, and 
commercial cases.41
In addition to the federal and state judiciaries, there are four other 
jurisdictions in Mexico. Federal administrative courts are organized 
under Article 73, section XXIX-h. State administrative courts are organ-
ized under Article 116, section v.42 There are no appeals to the federal 
administrative court from the decisions of state administrative courts. 
All of these courts are autonomous bodies that hear complaints filed 
 37 Amparo directo is used to challenge decisions delivered by administrative or judicial 
courts. Procedural or substantive arguments in the amparo directo are argued as 
constitutional violations that affect due process (Art. 14) or regarding the legal 
reasoning supporting the challenged decision (Art. 16). In some cases, challenges 
extend to questions regarding the constitutionality of statutes.
 38 An amparo indirecto is used to challenge the constitutionality of decisions delivered 
by administrative authorities as well as statutes.
 39 For an overview of controversias constitucionales, see José Ramón Cossío Díaz,  
La controversia constitucional (Mexico: Porrúa, 2008).
 40 For an overview of acciones de inconstitucionalidad, see Joaquín brage Camazano, La acción 
de inconstitucionalidad (Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, 2000).
 41 See note 31.
 42 Mexico City’s administrative court is organized under article 122, part A, section vIII.
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against administrative decisions. Labour conflicts are determined by 
the boards of Conciliation and Arbitration mandated by Article 123, 
section XX, part A. These boards are composed of an equal number of 
representatives of workers and employers, in addition to one govern-
ment representative. There is a federal board, thirty-one state boards, 
and an additional board for Mexico City. Article 123, section XXXI, 
part A, enunciates the areas and industries where labour conflicts must 
be reserved to the federal board. State and Federal District boards, subject 
to their territorial jurisdiction, hear the rest of the conflicts. Labour con-
flicts between the federal branches of government, as well as Mexico City, 
and their workers are to be solved in accordance to section XII, part b of 
Article 123. This section mandates that a Federal Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration must hear these cases. States have very similar arrange-
ments concerning bureaucratic labour disputes (Art. 116, sec. vI).
Electoral courts are organized under the terms detailed in Article 99 
(Federal Electoral Court) and Article 116, section Iv (state electoral 
courts). General provisions in these articles establish guarantees of the 
independence of electoral judges for the federation and the states. It 
is important to note that the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judici-
ary has an autonomous status within the federal judiciary.43 Article 99 
also empowers the Federal Electoral Court to review decisions handed 
down by state electoral courts. The supreme chamber of the electoral 
tribunal of the federal judiciary, as well as its regional chambers, pub-
lish jurisprudencia regularly.44 According to Article 233 of the Federal 
Judiciary Act, jurisprudencia are binding on federal electoral authorities. 
In cases where a state electoral issue is addressed, the precedent may 
also bind electoral authorities in that state.
The Agrarian Superior Court is founded in Article 27, section XIX. 
Agrarian jurisdiction is also defined in Article 27, section XIX. The 
agrarian court system hears cases that involve indigenous communi-
ties as well as other disputes that involve land rights. Agrarian jurisdic-
tion is federal. Thus, state courts will not hear such disputes. Decisions 
 43 Article 99 provides a framework for the government and administration of the 
Federal Electoral Court. This framework separates the Electoral Court from the rest 
of the federal judiciary.
 44 Article 232 of the Ley orgánica del Poder Judicial Federal (Federal Judiciary Act) 
regulates the integration of jurisprudencia. Jurisprudencia is published online at 
http://200.23.107.66/siscon/gateway.dll/nJurisprudenciayTesis?f=templates&fn=
default.htm. For further information on jurisprudencia, see note 33.
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handed down by the Agrarian Superior Court prevail over decisions 
issued by state courts in regard to property rights.45
Lastly, the military court system is based on Article 13 of the Consti-
tution. The Code of Military Justice describes the military court system 
as well as its proceedings. Until very recently, civil courts tended to 
defer to military courts in almost every case involving a member of the 
armed forces. In 2009, in light of the Rosendo Radilla decision from the 
Inter-American Court of human Rights, things began to change.46 The 
Supreme Court debated the merits and effects of the Inter-American 
Court’s decision in 2011, and a majority of justices decided that the res-
olution was binding on Mexican authorities, including judges, and that 
military jurisdiction had to be reviewed and perhaps limited.47 In 2012, 
the Supreme Court heard several new cases on military jurisdiction and 
concluded that the jurisdiction has to be restricted.48
2. The Amparo Directo and Judicial Centralism
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court began hearing com-
plaints against decisions delivered by state courts through amparos.49 
Lawyers who were not satisfied with a court decision began complain-
ing that judges who drafted it did not apply the law in a proper way 
 45 For example, a piece of land is sold under the Civil Code enacted in the state where 
the land is located. Any dispute regarding this sale will be heard by a state judge. 
however, if the said land is considered to be protected by the agrarian property 
regime under Article 27 of the Constitution, an agrarian court will hear any 
challenge regarding property rights without taking into account civil law.
 46 See Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs. Judgment of 23 November 2009. Series C No. 209.
 47 See Expediente varios 912/2010, Pleno, 14 July 2011.
 48 See Amparo en revisión 133/2012, Pleno, 21 August 2012; Conflicto Competencial 
suscitado entre el Juzgado Séptimo de Distrito en el Estado de Michoacán, y el 
Juzgado Militar, adscrito a la Quinta Región Militar 60/2012, Pleno, 14 August 2012; 
and Conflicto Competencial suscitado entre el Juzgado Quinto de Distrito en el 
Estado de Morelos y el Juzgado Quinto Militar, adscrito a la primera región militar 
38/2012, Pleno, 9 August 2012.
 49 Lawyers, legislators, and justices debated for several years the convenience 
of admitting the amparo as a means of challenging decisions of state courts. A 
description of this debate appears in José de Jesús Gudiño Pelayo, “La jurisdicción 
de amparo y la independencia del juez local,” in Derecho Procesal Constitucional, ed. 
Eduardo Ferrer MacGregor, 1:765–88 (Mexico: Porrúa-Colegio de Secretarios de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, AC, 2003).
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or that their reasoning had erred. These arguments were presented as 
constitutional violations. A successful complaint meant the Supreme 
Court had found a constitutional infringement in the decision being 
reviewed. Successful complaints were remanded to state courts for 
determination in accordance with the Supreme Court’s judgment. Law-
yers soon discovered that the amparo judicial or amparo directo, as it came 
to be known, could be used as a kind of third instance form of appeal. 
Amparos directos kept arising in the Supreme Court’s docket throughout 
the twentieth century.50 What began as a discussion over the merits of 
a constitutional remedy to challenge state court decisions soon evolved 
into a political discussion. Under these new premises, the amparo that 
challenged state court decisions was understood to be a remedy against 
unfair and corrupt judges and state courts. The draft 1917 Constitution 
addressed the amparo situation by admitting it as a necessary means to 
prevent abuses by state judges.51 This rhetoric is still employed to jus-
tify the amparo directo.52
The increasing use of amparo directos forced federal legislators and 
the Supreme Court to manage the growing caseload. They adopted two 
main strategies. The first focused on legal adjustments to increase the 
technical difficulty in having an amparo heard by the Supreme Court. 
The second was to increase the supply of judges available to hear com-
plaints, by increasing the number of justices on the Supreme Court and 
diverting amparos to lower courts. These strategies did not operate har-
moniously. Indeed, some reforms, as will be seen, actually increased the 
demand for the amparo procedure.
The Constitution of 1917 incorporated several technical innovations 
to limit the use of amparo directo. Article 107, section III, subsection a 
requires that the amparo directo be admitted only if it is challenging a 
final decision of a case delivered by a state appeal court.53 Section III 
also requires amparo challenges to be admitted only against decisions 
 50 Julio bustillos published statistics of the amparos admitted by the Supreme Court 
between 1869 and 2006. Julio bustillos, El amparo directo en México: Evolución y 
realidad actual (Mexico: Porrúa-UNAM, 2008), 197–200.
 51 venustiano Carranza, “Mensaje del primer jefe ante el constituyente: 1° de diciembre 
de 1916,” in Leyes constitucionales de México, 1808–1998, ed. Felipe Tena Ramírez 
(Mexico: Porrúa, 1998), 751.
 52 José María Serna de la Garza, “Apuntes sobre el debate relativo al amparo casación 
en México,” Reforma Judicial: Revista Mexicana de Justicia 1 (2003): 263–79.
 53 This rule was already considered in the 1908 Federal Code of Civil Procedure,  
article 661.
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where the law has been misapplied or where due process infractions 
have a direct impact on the outcome of a trial. Amparo plaintiffs also 
must prove that they had unsuccessfully sought to challenge the 
alleged violation through ordinary judicial procedures. In section vIII 
of Article 107, it is mandated that amparos challenging court decisions 
must be heard directly by the Supreme Court. Until this provision came 
into force in 1917, these cases were handled by district judges and then 
would go to the Supreme Court for review.54
As noted, one of the first measures to address the demand for 
the amparo procedure was to increase the number of justices on the 
Supreme Court. According to the 1917 Constitution’s original text, 
the Court had eleven justices (Art. 94). A 1928 amendment increased 
the number to sixteen. A 1934 amendment further increased the 
number of justices to twenty-one. Later, in 1951, five auxiliary justices 
were also appointed.55
In 1939, the Amparo Act was amended so that amparos could be dis-
missed for procedural inactivity (lapse of proceedings).56 This rule was 
later incorporated into section XIv of Article 107. In 1974, an amend-
ment to Article 79 of the Amparo Act ordered judges to adopt a strict 
approach to amparo suits in civil cases. Their decisions were limited to 
addressing only what the claimant had specifically argued, and judges 
could not correct or incorporate new claims to the suit.57 The amend-
ment to the Amparo Act also enabled judges to impose a fine against 
litigators who initiated frivolous amparo suits (Art. 81). The applicable 
fine was increased further in 1980 and 1984.
In 1951, the Supreme Court’s backlog was estimated to be around 37,000 
cases.58 That same year, sections v and vI of Article 107 were amended 
to open the way for federal collegiate circuit courts to hear amparos direc-
tos. however, this provision mandated that collegiate courts hear only 
 54 Ignacio burgoa, El juicio de amparo (Mexico: Porrúa, 1950), 635–6. Constitutional 
regulations limiting amparo were complemented by the Amparo Act of 1919 and then 
by the Amparo Act of 1936.
 55 See amendments published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 20 August 1928, 15 
December 1934, and 19 February 1951.
 56 Article 74, section v. Published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 30 December 
1939. This rule was considered in the 1908 Code of Civil Procedure. It was then 
removed by the 1919 Amparo Act (Ley Reglamentaria de los Artículos 103 y 104 de 
la Constitución Federal).
 57 Published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 4 December 1974.
 58 Romeo León Orantes, El juicio de amparo (Mexico: Editorial José Cajica, Jr, 1957), 90.
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amparos where procedural claims were being challenged (in procedendo). 
The Supreme Court would hear amparos that challenged the merits of 
the decision (in iudicando). Further reforms in 1967 redistributed the 
Supreme Court’s docket to federal collegiate circuit courts. As a con-
sequence, circuit courts could also hear amparos that challenged the 
merits of decisions. however, circuit courts could only hear cases that 
involved misdemeanours, agrarian jurisdiction, civil cases depending 
on the amount being litigated, and family cases.59 The 1987 constitu-
tional amendment transferred most of the amparo directo caseload to 
federal courts, which left the Supreme Court with a very narrow share 
of amparos directos.
These legal and constitutional reforms had several consequences. 
The first was a major increase in the number of federal courts.
In 1951 there were five federal circuit courts with three magistrates 
each. It is reported that in 1951, the Supreme Court transferred 27,000 
cases to the new federal collegiate circuit courts. Figure 1 shows how 
the creation of the new courts (in 1967 and 1987) resulted in a signifi-
cant transfer cases to them. The increase in the number of courts in the 
late 1990s is in turn related to the 1994 reform.60 As of November 2014, 
there were 246 courts and 738 magistrates. This expansion radically 
redesigned Mexico’s judicial map. In 1951, the federal judiciary was 
distributed in five circuits.61 Today, thirty-two circuits are operating. 
Given that Mexico has thirty-one states as well as the Federal District, 
the outcome is that every federal entity has its own federal circuit court. 
Considering the role of the amparo directo, every federal entity has some 
sort of federal court that oversees the state superior court and the rest of 
 59 Amendments to section v of Article 107 published in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federación, 25 October 1967.
 60 The 1994 reform redesigned the federal judiciary. The judiciary council became a 
key element for the governance of the federal judiciary. Under this role, the federal 
judiciary became very active in securing resources for the judiciary. Their success 
opened the door for large investments in justice to fund new courts. See José 
Antonio Caballero Juárez, “De la marginalidad a los reflectores: El renacimiento de 
la administración de justicia en México,” in Una historia contemporánea de México,  
vol. 3, Las Instituciones, ed. Ilan bizberg and Lorenzo Meyer (Mexico: Océano-El 
Colegio de México, 2009), 184.
 61 José Antonio Caballero Juárez, “Amparos y abogángsters. La justicia en México 
entre 1940 y 1968,” in Del nacionalismo al neoliberalismo, 1940–1994, ed. Elisa Servín 
(Mexico: CIDE, Conaculta, INEhRM, Fundación Cultural de la Ciudad de México, 
2010), 150.
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the local judiciary.62 This means that every single decision handed out 
by every state court may be reviewed by a federal court that is estab-
lished in the same state. The practical effect is that Federal Courts have 
become the final authoritative determination sources for the interpreta-
tion of state constitutions and state laws.
A second consequence of the reforms concerns the demand for amp-
aros. Constitutional reforms of 1951 and 1967 to relocate amparos and 
reduce the pressure on the Supreme Court’s docket had a very limited 
impact. Each time a constitutional amendment was passed to divert 
amparos to circuit courts, the number of pending amparos was reduced 
immediately, but it did not take long for the numbers to rise again.63 
Despite reforms, the Supreme Court again became unable to process 
its caseload. The only reform that worked for the Court was the 1987 
reform. This reform sent all amparos to the circuit courts except those 
the Supreme Court considers appropriate for its own review.
 62 For a map of the current distribution of the federal judiciary, see Direccíon General 
de Estadística Judicial, http://www.dgepj.cjf.gob.mx/organosjurisdiccionales/
ubicacion/ubicacionoj.asp.
 63 bustillos, El amparo directo.
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however, removing the cases from the Supreme Court and into cir-
cuit courts did not solve the problem. The amparo caseload in circuit 
courts has constantly increased since 1951.64 The federal judiciary’s 
policy to address this phenomenon has been to increase the number 
of circuit courts (see figure 1). however, it seems that the two vari-
ables are linked. This means that increasing the number of circuit 
courts not only raises the cost of the federal justice system but also 
seems to be unable to solve the caseload problem. Cases are growing 
at the same rate as the opening of new federal courts. An additional 
consequence is the large number of precedents (jurisprudencia) pub-
lished monthly.65 Jurisprudencia published by federal circuit courts 
are mandatory for every court in the country except for other circuit 
courts or the Supreme Court.66 This means that state courts have to 
follow federal court decisions closely and take them into account 
when deciding a particular case.67
Thus, in 2011 alone, the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts 
published 206 binding precedents and more than 2,000 authoritative 
precedents. Even though authoritative precedents are not binding, state 
courts tend to take them into consideration. They have little option but 
to do so because the same federal courts that produce the jurisprudencia 
are the ones that will hear, via the amparo, any challenges against state 
court decisions. Indeed, even if a state court follows a federal prece-
dent, this does not mean that the state court decision will be confirmed 
by a federal circuit court. because the circuit courts are not bound by 
other circuit court precedents, if a state court decides to use a precedent 
issued by one circuit court and the case is reviewed by another circuit 
court, the latter may nonetheless apply its own criteria and modify the 
decision subject to review. The question then becomes: to what extent 
does the Supreme Court provide a unifying function?
 64 Ibid.; and annual reports from the Supreme Court of Justice. For electronic versions 
since 2003, see Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, http://www.scjn.gob.mx/
Transparencia/Paginas/informe.aspx.
 65 See note 33.
 66 After the constitutional amendments of 2011, jurisprudencia published by a circuit 
court will be binding only inside the circuit. Only the jurisprudencia published by the 
Supreme Court bind all courts in the country.
 67 Although not every precedent that is published is binding, federal circuit courts 
may consider published precedents when reviewing state court decisions. Therefore, 
if state courts want to ensure a confirmation, they should consider published 
precedents.
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In 2011 the Supreme Court published more than three hundred 
opinions resolving divergent precedents,68 some of which involved 
divergent precedents published by federal courts even within the 
same circuit. The problem of divergent precedents affects not only 
state courts but also the construction of legal certainty.69 An additional 
consequence is that state courts have almost no incentive to publish 
their own precedents because they might be modified or overturned 
by federal circuit courts. Given that every Mexican state has a federal 
circuit, state courts have de facto lost their status as high courts in their 
respective states.
The subordination of state courts to federal circuit courts also has an 
impact on the institutional development of the former.70 For example, 
a common way of assessing the performance of state superior court 
judges is to review their record in amparo directos against the cases they 
have heard.71 Such an approach assumes that the opinions handed 
down by federal circuit courts are necessarily better than the decisions 
delivered by state judges. Federal court judges are all perceived to 
hold more prestigious positions because their salaries are substantially 
higher than those of state judges.72
 68 Section XIII of Article 107 regulates how divergent precedents will be solved by the 
Supreme Court.
 69 The constitutional amendment published on 6 June 2011 provides a new way to 
solve divergent opinions. Magistrates from every court of the circuit sit en banc and 
solve diverging opinions. See section XIII, Article 107.
 70 baruch Delgado, “Discurso del magistrado baruch Delgado Carbajal, presidente del 
Tribunal Superior de Justicia y del Consejo de la Judicatura del Estado de México,” 
Cuestiones Constitucionales 24 (2010): 367–71.
 71 Sonia Serrano Íñiguez, “Congreso remueve a magistrado por dar información falsa,” 
Milenio, Jalisco edition, sec. Cd y Región, 4 May 2012. http://www.milenio.com/
cdb/doc/noticias2011/1472005d2d93788edef2f9d906d4e1f5.
 72 For a description of the impact of the amparo directo over state courts, see hugo 
Concha Cantú and José Antonio Caballero, Diagnóstico de sobre la administración de 
justicia en las entidades federativas. Un estudio sobre la justicia local en México (Mexico: 
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, 2001), 159–66. There is also a 
perception that litigators abuse in the use of the amparo directo: see Silvestre Moreno 
Cora, Tratado del Juicio de Amparo conforme a las sentencias de los tribunales federales 
(Mexico: Tip y Lit La Europea, de J. Aguilar vera y Compañía, 1902, reprint Mexico: 
Supreme Court of Justice, 2008), 639–40; and José Manuel de Alba de Alba, Isidro 
Pedro Alcántara valdés, and Mario Alberto Flores García, Amparo contra resoluciones 
judiciales: Laberinto procesal (Mexico: Porrúa, 2006), 93.
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IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
1. Controversias Constitucionales and the Role of the Supreme Court
In 1995 the Supreme Court of Justice was refounded and new justices 
were appointed.73 The eleven new justices were appointed with the 
nearly unanimous support of all political forces.74 Most of the appointees 
were career judges, but some practising lawyers and experienced pub-
lic servants were appointed as well.75 Of the eleven justices appointed 
in 1995, the last two finished their tenure in November 2015. New jus-
tices have a profile very similar to that of those they are replacing. They 
are either career federal judges or lawyers with prestige as litigators, 
university professors, or public servants. Although a few of the justices 
have been affiliated with a political party, the appointment process is 
far from being a quota system in the hands of political parties. Thus, 
justices are not considered to represent any particular political party. 
The Court’s reform was considered a key part of the agenda of the 
new political system that arose with the end of the PRI’s domination of 
Mexican politics. Courts before had hardly ever enforced federal clauses 
because the PRI regime was able to negotiate conflicts through party 
politics. The new Supreme Court is now recognized as an independent 
arbitrator and has become a central institution in Mexico’s new politi-
cal system.76 Citizens as well as political actors have begun employing 
constitutional litigation as a means of advancing various causes. Some 
of the most contested cases have involved disputes between branches 
 73 Published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 31 December 1994. The statute that 
regulates the controversias was published a few months later (Diario Oficial de la 
Federación, 11 May 1995).
 74 Senators from the PRI, the PAN, and most senators from the Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática-Left (PRD) voted in favour of the new justices. See Diario de los Debates, 
Senado de la República, Primer Periodo Extraordinario. LvI Legislatura, 26 January 
1995, http://www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=3&sm=3&lg=56&ano=1
&id=4474.
 75 Seven justices had ample experience as federal judges. For a biographical note on 
the new justices, see Lucio Cabrera Acevedo, La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el 
gobierno del presidente Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1995–2000) (Mexico: Suprema 
Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2005), 53–77.
 76 María Amparo hernández Chong Cuy, Suprema Corte y Controversias Constitucionales: 
Análisis de comportamiento judicial (Mexico: Porrúa-Instituto Mexicano de Derecho 
Procesal Constitucional, 2012).
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of the federal government or between federal, state, and municipal 
authorities. These cases have given rise to many significant changes 
in constitutional law generally, particularly in its federalism-related 
aspects.
The 1994 constitutional amendment that provided the basis for the 
Supreme Court’s re-establishment also included several new consti-
tutional procedures. The most important one for federalism has been 
the controversia constitucional. The controversia is a means to resolve 
disputes between federal, state, and municipal officials. Since 1995, 
the Supreme Court has heard an average of ninety such cases each 
year. Some also involve conflicts between government branches. The 
1994 amendment thus gave the Supreme Court a key role in defining 
the limits of federalism. The controversia constitucional in particular 
became the most common way of making federalism-related claims. 
In some cases, conflicts of competence also arise in acciones de incon-
stitucionalidad.77 Some of these actions will receive comment; how-
ever, most of the cases included in this section will be controversias 
constitucionales.
The controversia constitucional is regulated by Article 105, section I of 
the Constitution. Additional regulations are included in the Ley regla-
mentaria de las fracciones I y II del artículo 105 constitucional (Law that 
regulates sections I and II of Article 105). Controversias focus on conflicts 
between branches of government (e.g., Congress against the president) 
and between orders (e.g., federation against a state or a municipality). A 
key element in every controversia is that plaintiffs need to argue how the 
application of the act that is being challenged affects them.78 A controver-
sia is essentially a written procedure, with a plaintiff and one or several 
defendants. both parties have the opportunity to submit evidence and 
 77 See Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007, Pleno, 
27 May 2010. This case discusses abortion in the Federal District. One of the most 
important constitutional questions answered in this case was the degree to which 
the Federal District was bound to follow federal regulations on health. The Supreme 
Court decided that the Federal District was not bound by such regulation.
 78 Unlike Acciones de inconstitucionalidad, controversias are not designed to test 
legislation from an abstract perspective. See controversias constitucionales 
y acciones de inconstitucionalidad. diferencias entre ambos medios de 
control constitucional. Controversia Constitucional 15/98. Ayuntamiento del 
Municipio de Río bravo, Tamaulipas, 11 May 2000. Novena Época; Pleno; SJF y su 
Gaceta, XII, August 2000; page 965; thesis P./J. 71/2000. Also see hernández Chong 
Cuy, Suprema Corte y controversias, 181–3.
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produce allegations.79 Once allegations are filed, justices will decide on 
the merits of the case, after debating a draft judgment prepared by one 
of them. The Supreme Court’s debates are public.80 Article 105, section 
I includes a list of the entities that may present controversias and entities 
that may be considered defendants. The Supreme Court has adopted a 
narrow view of legal standing for plaintiffs in controversias. Thus, it is 
not common for the Court to accept a challenge presented by an entity 
that is not authorized expressly by Article 105, section I.81 however, 
the Court is more flexible in the case of defendants, where it tends to 
accept defendants even if they are not considered expressly by Article 
105, section I.82
The Supreme Court has resolved 1,283 constitutional controversies 
since 1995.83 Most of the caseload comes from municipalities suing a 
state governor, a state congress, or both.84 Conflicts between state or 
federal government branches as well as conflicts between the federal 
and state or municipal authorities make a up a smaller proportion of 
the cases. The statistics of controversias presented in 2014 provide a good 
 79 Evidence in controversias is usually written. Parties almost never need to present 
expert witnesses or other sources of evidence that are not based on a document. 
Allegations are also presented on written documents.
 80 Contrary to many other traditions, Mexico’s Supreme Court will usually hear oral 
arguments in chambers, and justices will debate in a public session. These sessions 
are televised. Transcriptions and videos of these sessions may be accessed in 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, www.scjn.gob.mx.
 81 Such is the case that involved the Federal Electoral Institute. In this case the Supreme 
Court has relied on a literal reading of Article 105, section I to deny standing to the 
institute as a plaintiff in a controversia. See hernández Chong Cuy, Suprema Corte y 
controversias, 101.
 82 controversia constitucional. legitimación activa y legitimación pasiva. 
Solicitud de revocación por hecho superveniente en el incidente de suspensión 
relativo a la controversia constitucional 51/96. 16 June 1998. Novena Época; Pleno; 
SJF y su Gaceta, vIII, December 1998; page 790; thesis P. LXXIII/98.
 83 These include only cases resolved by the Supreme Court. There are pending cases 
from these years as well as from 2010 and 2011. Data come from @lex, the statistics 
website of the Supreme Court of Justice, http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/alex/. See also 
hernández Chong Cuy, Suprema Corte y controversias, 107.
 84 In 2001, more than three hundred municipalities from Oaxaca challenged a 
constitutional amendment that introduced several rights for indigenous peoples. 
They claimed that the amendment did not address all the concerns of indigenous 
peoples in Mexico. however, the Supreme Court declared that municipalities do 
not have standing to challenge a constitutional amendment. See Controversia 
constitucional 82/2001. 6 June 2002.
276 Courts in Federal Countries
idea of litigation in this area. That year the Court received 121 contro-
versias. Eighty-seven were presented by municipalities, twenty-three by 
states, and eleven by the federation.85 The most common challenges are 
against administrative acts, such as inspections, state executive orders, 
or the distribution of public funds. There are also numerous challenges 
to laws or regulations.
Despite the number of challenges heard by the Supreme Court 
between 1995 and 2009, only 12 per cent were successful. Notwith-
standing the low rate of success, the 159 cases that obtained a favour-
able ruling, as well as several other cases where the ruling was against 
the plaintiff, have made significant contributions to the definition and 
meaning of Mexican federalism.
2. Evolving Federalism Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s approach to federalism, via the controversias 
constitucionales, has evolved through time. Three key concepts help 
orient the analysis of federalism: concurrence, coordination, and col-
laboration. The case law provides several examples of how these con-
cepts are defined and used. It also shows how the controversia itself has 
evolved as a constitutional process used to define the limits of powers 
and competences.
In a case known as “Temixco” (controversia constitucional 31/1997) a 
municipality challenged a decree passed by a state congress affecting 
the former’s territorial limits.86 In upholding the municipality’s claim, 
the Supreme Court held that the controversia was an appropriate instru-
ment for constitutional control and could be used to review any sort 
of constitutional violation.87 The Court reasoned that this interpreta-
tion favoured federalism because it provided a remedy for any kind 
of constitutional grievance concerning an act or a law that might be 
 85 See Informe Anual de Labores 2014, ministro presidente Juan N. Silva Meza, https://
www.scjn.gob.mx/Transparencia/Docs%20info%20Labores/Informe2014.pdf.
 86 Controversia Constitucional 31/97. Pleno. Ayuntamiento de Temixco, Morelos.  
9 August 1999.
 87 controversia constitucional. el control de la regularidad constitucional 
a cargo de la suprema corte de justicia de la nación, autoriza el examen 
de todo tipo de violanciones a la constitución federal. Controversia 
Constitucional 31/97. Ayuntamiento de Temixco, Morelos, 9 August 1999; Novena 
Época, SJF y su Gaceta, X, September 1999, page 703; thesis P./J. 98/99
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challenged.88 This wide and open-ended view of the controversia process 
was challenged, however, in a later case that involved the municipal-
ity of Ciudad Juarez against the federal attorney-general (controversia 
constitucional 21/2006). In that case, the Supreme Court limited the use 
of the controversia to cases involving the limits of the powers vested 
in authorities in light of the five orders recognized by the Mexican 
Constitution.89 The federal attorney-general claimed that municipal 
authorities of Ciudad Juárez had overreached their powers by stipulat-
ing the minimum distance between gas stations in their municipality. 
because the federal Congress is authorized by the Constitution to regu-
late energy, the attorney-general argued that municipalities could not 
regulate where gas stations should be placed. The attorney-general also 
claimed that such municipal regulation improperly affected landown-
ers’ rights to decide the best use of their land. The Supreme Court held, 
however, that Article 115 expressly grants municipalities the power to 
regulate public safety and that under that clause municipalities may 
decide gas station locations. Consequently, the attorney-general’s claim 
that the municipality was invading federal powers to regulate energy 
did not have any basis. The decision thus provided a strong framework 
to sustain municipal regulation on public safety grounds notwithstand-
ing federalism-based challenges. The Court did not rule on the merits 
of the claim regarding the effect on landowners, however, because it 
was considered that controversias constitucionales could be used only to 
challenge the limits of powers vested in the different orders and could 
not be used to protect individual rights. This decision narrowed the 
scope of the controversia. Although the decision does not express a clear 
reason to leave behind the Temixco precedent, it is very likely that jus-
tices opted for this new interpretation in an effort to reduce litigation 
via the controversia.
In a later case (controversia constitucional 59/2006), the Court con-
firmed that controversias cannot be used to challenge alleged rights vio-
lations and extended the principle in relation also to collective rights. 
Specifically, the Court considered that a municipality cannot use the 
controversias procedure to allege that government acts violate the rights 
of indigenous peoples, even if they live within the municipality’s 
 88 A brief comment in English to that case with other references can be found in García 
Sarubbi, Federalism, 44.
 89 See Controversia Constitucional 21/2006. 24 March 2008, pages 74–80.
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boundaries.90 The amparo procedure is considered to be the proper rem-
edy for such challenges.
The Supreme Court’s opinions in controversias constitucionales offer 
different solutions to conflicts of competence, depending on the spe-
cific issue that is in question. In many cases, the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretations determine the boundaries between the five legal orders. For 
example, in one case (controversia constitucional 72/2008), the federal 
executive branch complained that a municipality was invading federal 
powers by passing zoning and urban development regulations that 
extended into a national park. The federal executive branch’s claim 
prevailed and the municipal regulation was declared void.91 The case 
involved a national park and an archaeological zone that were created 
within the territory of a municipality. Some parts of the national park 
were used for housing and commercial activities. yet most of them 
were informal. The municipality decided to enact zoning regulations 
for an area that included the national park in order to control the expan-
sion of housing and commercial activities. The Supreme Court decided 
that such regulations could not be enforced on lands considered to be 
under federal jurisdiction, even if such zones included urban develop-
ments. In this case the majority opinion chose to apply a strict reading 
of the Constitution in order to exclude any municipal intervention in 
areas considered to be under federal control such as national parks and 
archaeological zones. Although it was quite clear that the municipality 
had no competence to unilaterally enact zoning regulations affecting 
such federal areas, it was also possible to recognize that such regu-
lations could be crafted as a result of collaboration between federal, 
state, and municipal authorities. Federal laws regulating environment 
and archaeological sites may be read under this latter interpretation.92 
 90 controversia constitucional. los municipios carecen de interés legítimo 
para promoverla contra disposiciones generales que consideren 
violatorias de derechos de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas que 
habiten en su territorio, si no guardan relación con las esfera de 
atribuciones que la constitución política de los estados unidos mexicanos 
les confiere. Controversia constitucional 59/2006. Municipio de Coxcatlán, Estado 
de San Luis Potosí. 15 October 2007. Décima Época, Pleno, SJF y su Gaceta, book III, 
December 2011, volume 1, page 429. Thesis P./J. 83/2011 (9a).
 91 Controversia Constitucional 72/2008. Poder Ejecutivo Federal. 12 May 2011.
 92 Justice Salvador Aguirre proposed this interpretation in his dissenting opinion. 
however, a very similar opinion did obtain a majority a few months earlier. See 
below on controversia 91/2007.
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Instead, the majority opted to exclude any sort of municipal participa-
tion on a narrow reading of the Constitution and of federal law. Under 
these terms, justices decided that collaboration may happen only if fed-
eral authorities considered it necessary. Justices in the majority probably 
used this narrow reading to discourage other municipalities from pass-
ing zoning regulations that could affect federal zones, thus reducing 
incentives for the establishment of irregular housing and commercial 
areas in such zones.
however, other questions are more complex, because the Consti-
tution contains clauses that give the federal Congress power to pass 
general statutes to regulate a certain topic or entitle authorities from 
different levels to act on the same subject matter.93 The first case to 
review this question was the amparo en revisión 120/2002. here, the 
Supreme Court decided that general statutes could distribute powers 
between the federation, states, the Federal District, and municipalities. 
by acknowledging this, the Court recognized that this was an excep-
tion to Article 124 of the Constitution (the residual clause). The only 
requirement for a general statute to be valid was that it was stated in 
the Constitution that the federal Congress had the power to pass it.94 In 
this case, the majority opinion delivered a new reading of Article 133 of 
the Constitution (supremacy clause) that recognized a “national order” 
below the constitutional order but above state and federal legislation.95 
Thus, a general statute became the source for the distribution of powers 
between federal, state, and municipal authorities on a particular subject 
area; it also regulated the powers of federal authorities in such a sub-
ject area. The drafters of constitutional amendments reacted quickly to 
this new interpretation. After this decision, Article 73 of the Constitu-
tion (which regulates the powers of the federal Congress) was amended 
several times in order to extend federal powers over states and munic-
ipalities, by granting the power to enact general statutes to regulate 
 93 Article 73 of the Constitution states that education, health, and tourism, among 
several other areas, may be regulated by general statutes. See the discussion on 
concurrence ahead.
 94 leyes generales. interpretación del artículo 133 constitucional. Amparo 
en revisión 120/2002. McCain Mexico, SA de Cv. 13 February 2007. Novena Época, 
Pleno, SJF y su Gaceta, XXv, April 2007, page 5; thesis P. vII/2007.
 95 Justice José Ramón Cossío, in his dissenting opinion, held that general statutes were 
not part of a new “national order.” Instead they were statutes that established rules 
only to help coordinate the intervention of federal, state, and municipal authorities 
in a particular area where the constitution gave competence to the three orders.
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and distribute powers in many areas.96 Consequently general statutes 
became the preferred tool for granting federal government control over 
state and municipal matters.
Still, according to the Supreme Court (acción de inconstitucionalidad 
119/2008), general statutes are not the last word concerning the reg-
ulation of a particular topic. States may also produce regulations on 
the same subject matter as long as these new rules do not oppose the 
standards provided by the general statute.97 The Court decided (contro-
versia constitucional 91/2007) that state rules can even regulate matters 
that the general statute attributes to federal authorities, provided that 
enforcement of the federal regulation is given priority over enforcement 
of the state regulation. This decision was made in the context of a chal-
lenge by the federal executive branch against several articles of a for-
est preservation law enacted by a state. The law contained regulations 
that were similar to the ones that the forest preservation general statute 
attributed to federal authorities.98 The justices held that state legisla-
tors are entitled to enact statutes on forest preservation, as long as such 
statutes do not oppose regulations and competences established in the 
federal general statute on forest preservation. The decision widens the 
material authority of states over forest preservation, because it recog-
nizes that states may enact legislation they consider useful to establish 
 96 See, for example, section XXIX-P on the rights of children and adolescents 
(amendment published on the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 12 October 2011), section 
XXIX-J physical education and sports (amendment published on the Diario Oficial 
de la Federación, 12 October 2011), section XXI General Statute against kidnapping 
(amendment published on the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 4 May 2009), and again 
section XXI General Statute against human trafficking (amendment published on the 
Diario Oficial de la Federación, 14 July 2011).
 97 leyes en materias concurrentes. en ellas se pueden aumentar las 
prohibiciones o los deberes impuestos por las leyes generales. Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 119/2008. Diputados integrantes de la Cuarta Legislatura de la 
Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal. 3 September 2009. Novena Época, Pleno, 
SJF y su Gaceta, XXXI, February 2010, page 2322, thesis P./J. 5/2010.
 98 conservación y restauración de tierras. los artículos 85, fracciones i, ii, 
iii y v, y 86 de la ley relativa del estado michoacán de ocampo, al definir 
las conductas que serán consideradas infracciones en materia forestal 
y otorgar a la secretaría de desarrollo rural de la entidad la facultad 
de imponer sanciones por su comisión, no invaden la competencia de la 
federación. Controversia constitucional 91/2007. Presidente de la República.  
28 February 2011. 10a. Época; Pleno; SJF y su Gaceta; Libro IX, June 2012, Tomo 1, 
page 119. Thesis P. Iv/2012 (9a).
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forest preservation actions and programs. The Supreme Court’s deci-
sion also recognizes that states may identify and protect lands that are 
not part of the federal protection programs. Thus, in forest preservation 
matters there may be two types of protected areas: federal areas and 
state areas. Lastly the Supreme Court recognized that state and fed-
eral authorities may coordinate themselves through formal agreements 
where they decide who will be responsible to enforce regulations. Jus-
tice Aguirre delivered the majority opinion. his approach recognized 
that the Constitution and the forest preservation general statute grant 
concurrent powers to the federal, state, and municipal authorities and 
that coordination of the regulations of all three authorities is therefore 
needed. Under such an arrangement, if the federal and state authorities 
agree that the latter would be responsible for enforcing forest preser-
vation regulations, it would be possible for state legislators to enact 
regulations to complete federal regulations on such matters. Such an 
approach is more flexible than the one adopted in the controversia case 
72/2008 mentioned above. While the ruling in controversia 72/2008 was 
based on a strict reading of the Constitution that excludes any sort of 
municipal participation, controversia 91/2007 had accepted the possi-
bility of state intervention in certain circumstances. Neither decision 
provides an explanation of how the Court’s criteria can be regarded 
as consistent. however, the particular circumstances that arose in 
each case may help explain why the Supreme Court adopted different 
approaches. As mentioned above, in controversia 72/2008 the justices 
decided a case that involved the irregular occupation of a national park. 
In such a case it may have seemed necessary to establish a clear prec-
edent that signalled that irregular occupation of federal land could not 
be the source of any legitimate claim. In controversia 91/2007, however, 
the justices had to decide if a state regulation concerning authoriza-
tions for lumber exploitation invaded an area of federal competence. 
The case therefore involved only the possibility of granting states the 
power to regulate areas left behind by the federation, or areas where the 
federation expressly accepted state intervention.
A similar situation has developed between municipalities and states. 
In controversia constitucional 19/2008, a municipality claimed that a state 
transportation law violated Article 115 of the Constitution. The Court 
recognized that regulating public transportation is a power vested 
in the states. Nevertheless, Article 115 also grants municipalities the 
power to “participate” in the design of the transportation policy that 
will be executed in their territories. The Supreme Court stated that the 
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state transportation law did not offer municipalities a true opportu-
nity to exercise their power to participate in drafting the transportation 
policy.99 In this case the judges limited the state legislator’s power to 
enact statutes that affected municipalities by requiring consultation as 
part of the process of enacting a statute. The judges reasoned that the 
word participate in Article 115 means that the municipalities must be 
enabled to participate in the drafting of public transport programs.
3. Concurrence, Coordination, and Collaboration
This last example also provides a good introduction to cases dealing 
with concurrent competences.100 Mexico’s Constitution identifies more 
than fifteen areas where active collaboration between government 
orders is meant to occur, including regional development for indige-
nous peoples (Art. 2); education (Art. 3 and Art. 73); health (Art. 4 and 
Art. 73); environment (Art. 4 and Art. 73); public security and polic-
ing (Art. 21 and Art. 73); planning for development (Art. 26); urban 
development (Art. 27, Art. 73, and Art. 115); coordination against 
kidnapping and human trafficking (Art. 73); public safety (Art. 73); 
physical education and sports (Art. 73); tourism (Art. 73); fishing (Art. 
73); promotion and development of cooperative associations (Art. 73); 
culture (Art. 73); children and adolescents (Art. 73); and intercity coor-
dination (Art. 115).101 Many of these areas were formerly reserved to 
the states, but recent changes have expanded federal competence to 
encompass them. This wide array of areas in which concurrent legisla-
tion is possible has made it necessary for the Supreme Court to pro-
vide interpretations to help establish the boundaries of concurrence 
and collaboration.
In a case decided in 2002 (controversia constitucional 29/2000), the 
Supreme Court adopted a relatively broad view of the concurrent 
 99 transporte público de pasajeros. aunque el titular de la competencia 
sobre la materia es el estado, el municipio debe gozar de una participación 
efectiva en la formulación y aplicación de los programas relativos en 
lo concerniente a su ámbito territorial. Controversia constitucional 19/2008. 
Municipio de Zacatepec, Estado de Morelos. 11 January 2011. 10a. Época; Pleno; SJF y 
su Gaceta; book I, October 2011, volume 1, page 308, thesis: P./J. 39/2011 (9a).
 100 For a definition of concurrence for Mexico and its differences with other countries, 
see Serna de la Garza, El sistema federal, 105–6.
 101 For a study of the Mexican federal models of collaboration, see ibid., 107–70.
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powers.102 Under this approach the Court understood that concurrent 
powers constituted limits to the residual clause in Article 124 and that 
the federal Congress can regulate the way in which the federation, states, 
and municipalities should interact in each concurring competence. In 
more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has also laid down more spe-
cific criteria to determine the scope of concurrent powers, as will be seen. 
Also important distinctions in doctrine have developed.103
In controversia 132/2006 on public security and policing, the Supreme 
Court defined concurrence in terms of the coordination that is between 
the different orders of government to make policing more effective. The 
Supreme Court considered that coordination between orders of gov-
ernment can occur not only administratively104 but also legislatively. 
With this interpretation the Court created a new source for coordina-
tion between federal, state, and municipal authorities. Instead of sign-
ing coordination agreements, the federal Congress may enact general 
statutes that establish jurisdictional boundaries.105 The justices also 
considered that the Mexican federal model is to be understood as a 
cooperative system, and one in which federal competences are to be 
interpreted widely, thus narrowing the powers of the states (and the 
municipalities). In the case, Mexico City, in accordance to the current 
name in the Constitution, had challenged Article 52 of the statute that 
 102 facultades concurrentes en el sistema jurídico mexicano. sus 
características generales. Controversia constitucional 29/2000. Poder Ejecutivo 
Federal. 15 November 2001. Novena Época, Pleno, SJF y su Gaceta, Xv, January 2002, 
page 1042; thesis: P./J. 142/2001.
 103 For example, concurrence in education is broader than in other fields, since the 
Constitution contains in Article 3 specific clauses that give Federal Congress a 
broad power to regulate education. In other fields such as health, the constitutional 
language is not that specific. Consequently federal and state regulations coexist. 
See Felipe Tena Ramírez, Derecho constitucional mexicano (Mexico: Porrúa, 2000), 
119–124; and Serna de la Garza, El sistema federal, 116.
 104 by administrative coordination the Supreme Court understands that federal, 
state, and municipal authorities may sign agreements where they decide how to 
distribute the responsibility to enforce regulation on a particular field. See the 
comments on the controversia constitucional 91/2007.
 105 seguridad pública. es una materia concurrente en la que todas las 
instancias de gobierno deben coordinar esfuerzos para la consecución 
del fin común de combate a la delincuencia, bajo una ley general 
expedida por el congreso de la unión. Controversia constitucional 132/2006. 
Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal. 10 March 2008. 9a. Época; Pleno; SJF y su 
Gaceta; XXIX, April 2009, page 1296; thesis: P. IX/2009.
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established the country’s national security system, as well as the Pri-
vate Security Services federal statute, claiming that they invaded the 
competences of the Federal District provided for in Article 122, which 
gave the Federal District assembly competence to regulate public secu-
rity services. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the assembly had 
such competence, but it decided that there was federal competence in 
those cases where private security services were offered in more than 
one state. The Court also recognized that the federal Congress has the 
power to pass a private security services act. The Court’s reasoning 
began from the premise that Article 21 and Article 73, section XXIII give 
the federal Congress power to distribute competences among different 
government orders through a general statute. The general statute that 
established the national police system stated that when private security 
services are offered in more than one federal entity, federal authori-
ties will regulate them. The Court considered that the federal Congress 
does not have an explicit competence to legislate on private security 
services. however, Article 73, section XXX states that Congress is com-
petent to legislate on all matters where the Constitution implicitly gives 
it that power. Since the general statute stated that federal authorities 
have the power to regulate private security services, it must be under-
stood that the federal Congress’s power to legislate on that subject mat-
ter is included in the implicit cases described in section XXX of Article 
73.106 The decision thus gave effect to a relatively broad interpretation 
of the concept of concurrence, since its interpretation overruled a com-
petence that was given expressly to the Federal District’s assembly.107 
Unlike other cases where the Supreme Court tends to have a very lit-
eral approach to the Constitution, in this case the justices decided to 
open the way for broader federal powers. A possible explanation for 
this approach is that the justices are recognizing the growing influence 
 106 servicios de seguridad prestados por empresas privadas. el artículo 52 
de la ley general que establece las bases de coordinación del sistema 
nacional de seguridad pública dispone una distribución implícita de 
competencias. Controversia constitucional 132/2006. Asamblea Legislativa del 
Distrito Federal. 10  March 2008. 9a. Época; Pleno; SJF y su Gaceta; XXIX, April 2009; 
page 1297; thesis: P. XII/2009
 107 This is noted by Justice José Ramón Cossío in his dissenting vote. See Controversia 
constitucional 132/2006. Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal. 10 March 2008. 
Dissenting vote by Justice José Ramón Cossío, also signed by Justices Margarita 
Luna Ramos and Olga Sánchez Cordero, pages 9–12. The vote is published together 
with the majority’s decision.
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of federal authorities in drafting and executing public security policies 
nationwide.
In controversia constitucional 31/2010, the Supreme Court held that the 
regulation of environmental protection as well as of urban development 
are concurrent competences of the three orders of government. Accord-
ing to the Court, the division of competence was to be determined by 
the environmental protection general statute as well as by the urban 
development general statute, and the federal, state, and municipal 
authorities were expected to enforce those general statutes. The ques-
tion before the Court was how far a state could go in enforcing urban 
development regulations against a municipality. The case arose when 
a municipality challenged a state decision to reject an urban develop-
ment plan drafted by the municipality. The Supreme Court’s decision 
provides guidance about how decisions on urban development have 
to be analysed under the environmental protection regulations. It also 
establishes a benchmark for the development of collaboration among 
federal, state, and municipal authorities. because in this particular case 
state regulators proved that the municipality’s urban development 
plan violated environmental protection regulations, the Court decided 
that the municipality’s challenge had no merit.108 The Supreme Court 
defined how collaboration is expected to happen, as well as the ways 
in which each order of government is expected to act. The Court stated 
that municipalities do have competence to regulate urban develop-
ment, but such regulations have to be exercised within the boundaries 
set by state and federal legislation, including environmental protection 
laws. Still, under these circumstances, the Supreme Court recognizes 
that municipalities can exercise way their competence autonomously in 
urban development. Municipalities are entitled to do more than express 
their opinions on the matter.109
The approach in this case illustrates the “collaborative” aspect of 
Mexican federalism. The decision in this case distinguishes the role 
that the federal Congress has in distributing competences, but also 
 108 Controversia constitucional 31/2010. Pleno. Municipio de benito Juárez, Estado de 
Quintana Roo. 5 April 2011.
 109 asentamientos humanos. los municipios gozan de una intervención 
real y efectiva dentro del contexto de la naturaleza constitucional 
concurrente de la materia. Controversia constitucional 94/2009. Municipio de 
San Pedro Garza García, Estado de Nuevo León. 31 March 2011. 9a. Época; Pleno; 
SJF y su Gaceta; XXXIv, August 2011, page 887; thesis: P./J. 17/2011.
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provides rules to determine how some constitutional provisions that 
give attribution to other orders of government, such as municipalities, 
may be exercised effectively. On one side, the Supreme Court defined 
the conditions required to distribute competences through a general 
statute. On the other, it provided safeguards to ensure collaboration 
among federal, state, and municipal authorities in the formulation and 
implementation of policies, when the Constitution requires it.
The regulation of health has also been a contested topic. In controver-
sia constitucional 55/2009 a state governor challenged a federal admin-
istrative regulation that required hospitals and health centres to offer 
victims of rape a particular medication that interrupts conception. The 
state governor claimed that the federal regulation invaded state powers 
as described in the general health statute.110 The Court’s decision was 
that even when hospitals and health centres are funded and operated 
by state governments, they still belong to the national health system, 
as provided by the general health statute. It was therefore held that the 
same general health statute empowered the federal administration to 
pass regulations governing the technical standards and procedures that 
rule the operation of such state hospitals and health centres.111
These cases help us understand the current debate concerning the 
Supreme Court’s federalism decisions. The Supreme Court consistently 
reasons in terms of two fundamental but distinguishable principles: 
coordination and concurrence. On the first principle, the Court empha-
sizes the need to regulate the way in which different government orders 
collaborate to achieve particular goals where all of them have relevant 
competences. The solution includes the possibility of signing agree-
ments that will help determine the limits of each party in a specific 
area. On the second principle, the Court seeks a definition of compe-
tences between government orders that can be derived from either the 
Constitution or a general statute enacted by the federal legislature. The 
problem here is that, by definition, concurrent competences overlap. To 
resolve these issues the Supreme Court seeks to identify some topics 
where collaboration between the orders of government is emphasized, 
and other areas where constitutional interpretation is used to limit the 
 110 State powers are usually understood under the residual clause contained in  
Article 124. Article 13 of the health general statute distributes competence between 
federal and state authorities.
 111 Controversia constitucional 55/2009. Pleno. Gobierno Constitucional del Estado 
Libre y Soberano de Jalisco.
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competence of each government order, usually favouring the federal 
order. This type of approach is increasing as a consequence of consti-
tutional amendments. The main problem with the approach is that the 
rules that construct federalism are different for each subject area.
A further important source of litigation is the collaboration clauses 
that appear expressly in the constitutional text.112 In these cases the 
Supreme Court has to determine the meaning of the collaboration 
clauses and how they should be enforced. It is difficult to enforce con-
stitutional rules that require only the hearing of opinions or that refer to 
“participation” in broad terms. The Supreme Court usually solves these 
cases by drafting guidelines that will govern the collaboration that is 
required by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court also distinguishes between competence and 
hierarchy as a way to analyse constitutional rules on federalism. In the 
first case, it is understood that when one order of government has the 
power to enact a regulation on a subject, the limits of such regulation 
have to be scrutinized in light of the power of other government orders 
also to regulate that subject. In the second case, the limits of a specific 
regulation will be tested in accordance to the limits expressed in the law 
on which the said regulation is based.
V. Conclusion
Federalism in Mexico, viewed from the court system’s perspective, 
shows a contrasting image. On one hand, the Supreme Court has been 
very active in producing case law that develops federalism. These opin-
ions have favoured local governments, provided that their competences 
are clearly stated in the constitutional text. In cases where there is no 
explicit competence, the Court has enforced, via collaboration clauses, 
the establishment of formal consultation between federal, state, and 
municipal authorities for drafting regulations in particular subject 
areas. In some other cases, the Court has enabled states to exercise their 
powers in such a way that their development plans are autonomous 
from the federal plan. Only if a state decides to coordinate with fed-
eral authorities on such plans will it do so through a formal agreement. 
Otherwise, there is no obligation to follow federal guidelines. however, 
where the rules are less clear, the Court seems to favour federal powers 
 112 See the public transportation case above: Controversia constitucional 19/2008.
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over those of the states and municipalities. A clear example of this trend 
is the doctrine of the general statute as a law produced by the federal 
Congress that may distribute competences among federal, state, and 
municipal governments.
In many cases, the Supreme Court tends to adopt a rather literal 
interpretation of the Constitution. In those cases where the Supreme 
Court adopts an interpretation that is less literal, the outcome seems 
to favour the interests of the federal government. however, thus far it 
is not possible to establish a clear pattern in the Court’s interpretation. 
Most of its decisions seem to be crafted in response to the particular 
circumstances of each case. Consequently, there is not one federalism 
jurisprudence in Mexico but several. Justices tend to balance their deci-
sion between constitutional and statutory rules governing the issue at 
stake on the one hand and the specific problem involved in the case on 
the other hand. Although the literal approach prevails in many cases, 
when in doubt regarding the merits or the possible outcome of the case, 
justices tend to defer to federal order. however, justices do not include 
arguments in their decisions that justify their preference for the federal 
order.
A very interesting consequence of the Court’s literal approach to the 
Constitution is its influence over constitutional amendments. The lit-
eral approach began by favouring states and municipalities, because 
the Constitution’s structure had in most cases a strict distribution of 
powers. Under this arrangement the only available way to extend 
federal powers was through constitutional amendments. When the 
Supreme Court showed flexibility in its constitutional interpretation 
and accepted that a general statute was a legitimate source to dis-
tribute powers, the drafters of constitutional amendments took note. 
Accordingly, new constitutional amendments included clauses giv-
ing the federal Congress power to enact a general statute to govern 
the distribution of powers in a particular area. Justices and drafters of 
constitutional amendments thus seem to be engaged in a constitutional 
dialogue over federalism.
From a broad perspective, the political transition that Mexico began 
experiencing in the mid-1990s has had a significant impact on feder-
alism. The new political configuration that arose from the end of the 
PRI’s regime is characterized by a federalism that is continuously rede-
fined through adjudication and constitutional amendments. During 
the PRI regime, federalism was less visible. Most arrangements took 
place as a result of internal party negotiations. The weakening of the 
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PRI’s hegemonic position forced actors from every political party to 
review federal rules and demand their enforcement. The Supreme 
Court began enforcing articles of the Constitution that had hardly ever 
been contested before, and new doctrines are being tested. As a whole, 
this process may be seen as new reconfiguration of Mexican federalism. 
It is still too early to identify many specific trends in this new process. 
however, it seems very clear that federalism in Mexico has changed. A 
few years ago, federalism was discussed mostly in textbooks. Today it 
is impossible to approach Mexican federalism without taking into con-
sideration the Supreme Court’s decisions.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary con-
stitute the focal points of the judicial centralism that characterizes Mex-
ico’s court system. Every day new examples emerge that illustrate the 
federal judiciary’s intervention to review state court decisions with the 
argument that their intervention helps correct unfair or poorly crafted 
judgments. however, this also means that state courts find it very diffi-
cult to establish themselves as sources of legal norms that have author-
ity within their respective states. State courts are very substantially 
subordinated to an overextended federal judiciary. Under these circum-
stances, the space for the development of independent and accountable 
state judiciaries remains quite limited.
10  The Supreme Court of Nigeria:  




Assessments of Nigeria’s judiciary often oscillate between exaggerated 
criticisms of its fecklessness, dysfunction, and corruption and extrava-
gant celebrations of its principled constitutional activism and bold and 
balanced interventionism. Such contradictory appraisals are sympto-
matic of the judiciary’s conflicted role in Nigeria’s political develop-
ment and federal evolution. On one hand, the courts have functioned 
as a vanguard of constitutionalism in a neo-patrimonial post-military 
authoritarian environment, helping “to roll back abuses of government 
power more frequently and effectively than any other institution.”1 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has played an important role in mediating 
and moderating Nigeria’s overly centralized federal system, helping 
to arbitrate potentially disruptive conflicts and securing a modicum 
of sub-national and other constitutional rights, particularly in foster-
ing better sharing of centrally collected oil revenues, scrutinizing the 
administration of local governance, and resolving partisan and fac-
tional contests for political power in the federation. On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court’s arbitrative functions have had to address several 
difficulties, including an entrenched hyper-centralized constitutional 
framework, a fraudulent and violent neo-patrimonial political process, 
and the judiciary’s own institutional dysfunction and capacity limi-
tations. Overall, the Court has been more centralist than federalist; it 
 1 human Rights Watch, Corruption on Trial: The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (New york: human Rights Watch, 2011), 36.
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has not had a transformational impact on Nigeria’s centralized federal 
system, which remains constitutionally skewed, politically corrupt, 
ethnically contentious, and, therefore, chronically fragile.
II. Federal System
1. General Characteristics
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and one of the world’s most 
complex multi-ethnic federations.2 Its estimated population of 170 mil-
lion people is divided into three major territorially concentrated eth-
nic groups (the northern hausa-Fulani, western yoruba, and eastern 
Ibo), hundreds of smaller minority ethnic communities, and roughly 
equal numbers of Muslims and Christians, making Nigeria the world’s 
largest religiously bi-communal country. The country is also Africa’s 
leading oil producer, and its GDP purchasing power parity (PPP) of 
$1.053 trillion is the largest on the continent.3 Despite earning hundreds 
of billions of dollars in oil revenues since the 1970s, however, Nigeria 
is ranked low on human development by the United Nations Devel-
opment Program, with 64.4 per cent of its population living below 
an estimated poverty line of PPP of US$1.25 per day in 2011. human 
 2 For analyses of Nigerian federalism, see Ignatius Ayua and Dakas C.J. Dakas, “Federal 
Republic of Nigeria,” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, 
ed. John Kincaid and Alan Tarr, 239–75 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005); Isawa Elaigwu, “Federal Republic of Nigeria,” in Distribution 
of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald Watts, 
and Douglas brown, 207–37 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2006); Ebere Osieke, “Federal Republic of Nigeria,” in Legislative, Executive and 
Judicial Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, 198–223 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); Akpan h. Ekpo, 
“Federal Republic of Nigeria,” in The Practice of Fiscal Federalism, ed. Anwar Shah, 204–
34 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007); habu Galadima, 
“Federal Republic of Nigeria,” in Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal 
Systems, ed. Nico Steytler, 234–66 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2009); Rotimi Suberu, “Nigeria,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries, 
ed. Luis Moreno and César Colino, 227–57 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2010); and Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Nigeria,” in Intergovernmental 
Relations in Federal Systems, ed. Johanne Poirier, Cheryl Saunders, and John Kincaid, 
272–304 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada, 2016).
 3 See Central Intelligence Agency, “World Fact book,” https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.htm.
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development indicators are particularly abysmal in the mainly Mus-
lim north, where “the poverty level is between two and three times the 
rate” in the oil-rich, predominantly Christian, south.4
Instituted under british colonial auspices primarily as an ethnic-
conflict management device, the federal system is devolutionary in its 
origins (having evolved from the unitary but decentralized colonial 
Nigerian state) and symmetrical and highly centralized in its consti-
tutional design. From a relatively decentralized structure of three con-
stituent regions under the quasi-federal Richards Constitution of 1946 
and the fully federalist Lyttelton Constitution in 1954, Nigeria’s federa-
tion now consists of a dominant central government headquartered in 
the federal capital territory of Abuja, thirty-six states that are distrib-
uted into six more or less informal geo-political zones (three each in the 
north and south), and 774 constitutionally designated local-government 
areas. This sweeping federal transformation reflects Nigeria’s volatile 
political dynamics, including three failed democratic republics and 
extended periods of centrist military rule, all of which have affected the 
evolution of the country’s judicial governance.
The First Republic, spanning the period from independence from 
britain in 1960 to the first military coup of 1966, juxtaposed Westmin-
ster parliamentary institutions with a regionalized federal structure. As 
underscored by cases such as Balewa v. Doherty (1961)5 and Adegbenro 
v. AG Federation (1962)6, Nigeria’s Supreme Court invariably became 
embroiled in the polarized ethno-regional conflicts of the First Republic. 
Its curtailment of federal powers of inquiry over regional institutions 
in Balewa v. Doherty, in particular, provoked strident denunciations of 
“government by the judiciary” from the federal parliamentary execu-
tive.7 Ultimately, the judiciary was stripped of some of its authority 
under the revised republican constitution of 1963, which terminated 
appeals to the british Privy Council and scrapped the judicial service 
commission in order to enhance direct political control of the courts. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court began to shy away from “any desire 
 4 Peter Pham, “boko haram’s Evolving Threat,” Africa Security Brief no. 20 
(Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2012), 7.
 5 Balewa v. Doherty [1961] 1 All NLR 604.
 6 Adegbenro v. AG Federation [1962] 1 All NLR 431.
 7 John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1966), 42.
The Supreme Court of Nigeria 293
to become involved in political issues or to stress federalism in the 
sense of a division of powers.”8
Judicial federalism was eviscerated during the two phases of military 
rule (1966–79 and 1984–99) that followed the collapse of the First Repub-
lic (1960–6) and Second Republic (1979–83). The attempted assertion of 
judicial oversight of the military in Lakanmi v. AG Western State (1971)9 
immediately provoked a backlash in the form of a military decree-law, 
the Constitution (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree no. 28 
of 1970, which ousted the courts’ jurisdiction over the rule and conduct 
of the soldiers. Meanwhile, the federal division of powers was effectively 
terminated by the empowerment of the “Federal Military Government” 
to “make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or 
any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.”10 Aided by the 
rise in the production and international prices of oil, and by its decisive 
victory in the civil war (1967–70), the military refashioned the country in 
accord with its own unitary organization and vision. Its political legacies 
included fragmentation of the regions into smaller and weaker states, 
centralization of oil revenues, abrogation of separate regional state con-
stitutions, unification of the police and local government structure, and 
the shift from parliamentary to presidential rule.
Given the subordination of judicial review to parliamentary sover-
eignty under the First Republic, the abrogation of constitutionalism 
under military rule, the short duration of the American-styled Second 
Republic, and the abortion of the Third Nigerian Republic even before 
its inauguration by the military in 1993, the Fourth Republic (1999 to 
date) has provided the sole moment of sustained judicial federalism 
in Nigeria’s post-independence history. The republic has witnessed 
the intensification and amplification of a tradition of federalist judicial 
review that began in the short-lived Second Republic with cases like 
Awolowo v. Shagari & Ors (1979),11 AG Bendel v. AG Federation (1981),12 
AG Ogun v. AG Federation (1982),13 and AG Ondo v. AG Federation (1983),14 
 8 Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, 86.
 9 Lakanmi v. AG Western State [971] 1 University of Ife Law Reports-UILR 201.
 10 Federal Military Government, “Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 
(1966, no. 1), in Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1966 (Lagos: Government 
Printer, 1966), A3–A11.
 11 Awolowo v. Shagari & Ors [1979] All NLR 120.
 12 AG Bendel v. AG Federation [1981] 10 Supreme Court Cases-SC 1.
 13 AG Ogun v. AG Federation [1982] 3 Nigeria Constitutional Law Reports-NCLR 166.
 14 AG Ondo v. AG Federation [1983] 2 Supreme Court of Nigeria Law Reports-SCNLR 269.
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which involved constitutional conflicts over electoral governance, rev-
enue allocation, and the centre’s policing powers.
2. Structural Features
A major source of inter-governmental conflict and litigation in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic is the unitary federalism of the current Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), which concentrates enor-
mous legislative, fiscal, executive, and judicial powers in the central gov-
ernment.15 Reflecting the legacy of three decades of hyper-centralization 
under military rule, the Constitution creates an expansive exclusive list of 
sixty-eight federal legislative powers. Items on the list include arms, avia-
tion, banking, foreign borrowing, currency, customs and excise duties, trade 
and commerce, taxation of incomes and profits, external affairs, labour and 
minimum wage, mines and minerals, police and prisons and security ser-
vices, railways, formation and regulation of political parties, federal and 
state elections as well as the procedural regulations of local elections, mar-
riages other than customary or Islamic matrimonial causes, and the pro-
motion and enforcement of an omnibus set of fundamental objectives and 
directive principles of state policy.
Twelve additional items are included within the purview of the fed-
eral government by a “concurrent legislative list” that specifies the 
“extent of federal and state legislative powers” in policy domains like 
allocation of public revenue, electric power, industrial, commercial, and 
agricultural development, scientific and technological research, and 
post-primary education.16 Under section 4 (5) of the Constitution, if any 
state law is “inconsistent with any law validly made by the National 
Assembly,” the national law “shall prevail.”
These enormous federal legislative powers are vested in a bicameral 
National Assembly. This consists of a 109-member Senate, including 
1 member popularly elected from Abuja and three senators elected 
from single-member constituencies in each of the thirty-six states, and 
a 360-member house of Representatives elected from single-member 
“constituencies of nearly equal population as far as possible, provided 
that no constituency shall fall within more than one state.”17
 15 See The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Lagos: Federal 
Government, 1999).
 16 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Second Schedule, Part II.
 17 Ibid., section 49.
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The fiscal ramifications of the legislative division of powers are par-
ticularly significant. The National Assembly is constitutionally empow-
ered to enact a law for the vertical (federal-state-local) and horizontal 
(inter-state and inter-local) allocation of centrally collected revenues 
paid into the Federation Account, on which the three orders of gov-
ernment are dependent for more than 80 per cent of their finances. 
Currently, the account is distributed vertically in the proportions of 
48.50 per cent, 26.72 per cent, 20.60 per cent, and 4.18 per cent to the 
federal government, states, localities, and centrally controlled special 
funds, respectively.18
Executive powers of the federation are vested in a popularly elected 
president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president’s 
powers include the appointment (subject to confirmation by the Senate) 
of the chairman and members of key constitutional or statutory agencies, 
many of which are designed to operate as independent federal bodies, 
but almost all of which function as agents of the federal executive. These 
bodies include the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 
the Police Service Commission, the National Security Council, the Rev-
enue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC – a body 
that determines the salaries of all major public functionaries, including 
judges), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, and the National bounda-
ries Commission (NbC).
Nigeria’s political over-centralization is reinforced by a constitution-
ally mandated national political party system. This system prohibits 
sectional parties, vests the conduct of all national and state elections in 
the INEC, requires the winning candidate for president to obtain broad 
electoral support from across the federation, and prescribes a uniform 
electoral cycle for federal and state executives and legislators, with the 
president and the bicameral National Assembly having the same four-
year terms as the state governors and unicameral state assemblies. The 
presidents and governors are limited constitutionally to a maximum of 
two terms, while legislative terms are indefinitely renewable.
These electoral regulations have encouraged the development of 
a dominant national party system, as evident in the rise of the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) and, subsequently, the All Progressives 
 18 See Kalu Idika Kalu, Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Practices and Issues (Abuja: Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, 2011), 14–15.
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Congress (APC). before it succumbed to severe fractionalization and 
the defection of many of its leaders to the opposition APC in 2013, the 
PDP controlled the federal presidency, approximately two-thirds of 
National Assembly seats, and twenty-three (twenty-eight in 2007) of 
the thirty-six state governorships. yet such dominance has also often 
reflected the pathologies of a fraud-riddled authoritarian neo-patrimo-
nial system in which elections have “been stolen more often than won,” 
with the ruling party using the enormous institutional and coercive 
resources of the central government to tilt the electoral playing field.19
Reflecting the hegemony of the central government, the states are 
relatively weak orders of government, lacking separate constitutions, 
independent police organizations, significant internal revenue sources, 
or truly exclusive policy competences. For instance, although some 
specific concurrent powers (e.g., antiquities, monuments, rural electri-
fication, regulation of cinematography, post-primary education, and 
industrial, commercial, and agricultural development) and all residual 
powers are assigned to the states, there are hardly any policy areas that 
can be described as truly exclusive to the states, given the Constitu-
tion’s generous construction of federal legislative powers. As the result 
of the constitutionally mandated redistribution of Federation Account 
revenues among the three orders of government, however, the states 
and local governments now account for approximately half of public 
expenditures and personnel in the federation.
Even more than the states, the local governments constitute a vulner-
able component of Nigeria’s intergovernmental architecture. The 1999 
Constitution incorporates two conflicting visions of the appropriate 
status of local government in the federal system. The first vision, pro-
moted by the federal government under both military and post- military 
rule, is that of local government as the third order of the federal system, 
with an entrenched status under the Constitution, considerable auton-
omy from state administrations, and direct relations with the federal 
government, which has a putative responsibility to protect localities 
from arbitrary interventions or exploitations by the states. Reflecting 
this vision, the Constitution formally guarantees a “system of local 
government by democratically elected councils,” entrenches the cur-
rent 774 local government areas, provides for the allocation of Federa-
tion Account revenues to the localities, and devotes a whole schedule 
 19 human Rights Watch, Corruption on Trial, 26.
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to the “functions of local government council” (e.g., collection of rates, 
issuance of licences, provision and maintenance of basic public con-
veniences and infrastructures, and collaboration with the states in the 
provision of primary education).20
A second vision of the constitutional status of localities, favoured by the 
states and more or less confirmed by the judiciary since 1999, dismisses the 
notion of three-tier federalism as anomalous. It conceptualizes the local 
government system as an inherently sub-national subject, which should 
be left entirely to the discretion of the states in a proper federal system. 
This vision is most succinctly captured in section 7 (1) of the Constitution, 
which gives the states broad powers to legislate for “the establishment, 
structure, composition, finance and functions” of local councils.
Nigeria’s lopsided intergovernmental architecture has engendered 
intense but mostly southern-based and unfulfilled agitation for the decen-
tralization of the federal system, including proposals for a return to the 
pre-military regional federalism of the First Republic. A major reason for 
the abortion of decentralist reform is the absence of the national consen-
sus required to amend the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution. 
The amendment formula, as enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution, 
requires that a proposal to change the Constitution be approved by not 
less than two-thirds of all the members of each house of the bicameral 
National Assembly or by a four-fifths majority of these members if the 
change concerns the amendment formula itself or the provisions of the 
Constitution on fundamental human rights, boundary adjustments, and 
the creation of new states and localities. In both cases, the amendment 
must be approved by resolutions of the houses of assembly of two-thirds 
of the states. Although several constitutional provisions were successfully 
amended in 2011, the changes involved relatively minor institutional 
adjustments and did not alter the fundamental features of Nigeria’s cen-
tralized federalism, including the unified judicature.
III. Court System
1. Judicial Structure
The Constitution enshrines a tripartite legal tradition consisting of an 
overarching English common law system complemented by customary 
 20 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, sections 3 (1), 7 (1), 162, First 
Schedule Part I, and Fourth Schedule.
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(tribal) and Islamic legal systems. Chapter 7 of the Constitution estab-
lishes and prescribes the composition and jurisdictions of seven fed-
eral courts: the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Federal high Court, 
National Industrial Court, high Court of the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT, Abuja), Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT, and Customary Court 
of Appeal of the FCT. It also provides for three state courts: the high 
Court of a State, the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, and the Custom-
ary Court of Appeal of a State. The federal and state legislatures are 
constitutionally empowered to establish additional federal and state 
courts, respectively, or to confer additional jurisdictions on existing 
courts, subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The states, in par-
ticular, have established several courts (including magistrate, district, 
area, and/or customary courts) with subordinate jurisdiction to the 
three constitutionally established state courts.
Despite its formal division into federal and state courts, the judi-
cature functions as a unified structure with common oversight and 
appointments structures, a pattern of career mobility from state to fed-
eral courts (and from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court), and a 
single integrated appellate system atop which sits the Supreme Court, 
whose decisions are binding on all other courts (federal and state) in 
accordance with the rules of precedent and hierarchy of courts. The 
Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in federal-state, fed-
eral executive-legislative, and inter-state conflicts and appellate juris-
diction in decisions emanating from the Court of Appeal. The Court, 
as stipulated under section 230 of the 1999 Constitution, consists of 
the “Chief Justice … and such number of Justices … not exceeding 
twenty-one as may be prescribed by … the National Assembly.” Dis-
putes before the Court are determined by a bench of not fewer than five 
justices or, in constitutional disputes, by seven justices, to be empanelled 
by the chief justice. The attorneys-general of the federation and each of the 
states, whose offices are established under sections 150 and 195 of the 
Constitution respectively, institute intergovernmental disputes before 
the Court on behalf of the affected governments.
below the Supreme Court is the Court of Appeal, which is given 
exclusive original jurisdiction in presidential electoral petitions, 
as well as appellate jurisdiction over all other courts and tribunals 
established under the Constitution, including the Code of Conduct 
Tribunal, and tribunals for gubernatorial and federal and state leg-
islative elections. The Court of Appeal consists of a president of the 
court and not fewer than forty-nine justices, including at least three 
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justices with learning in Islamic personal law and another three com-
petent in customary law. A panel of not fewer than three justices of 
the court hears election petition and Islamic and customary cases. 
The court is administratively divided into judicial divisions that sit 
in various parts of the country.
The Federal high Court was established in 1973 as a Federal Revenue 
Court with jurisdiction over causes involving the economic interests 
of the federal government. Under the 1999 Constitution, the plenary 
jurisdiction of the federal high Court has been expanded to embrace 
effectively all federal civil and criminal causes and matters. The court 
consists of a chief judge and such numbers of judges as the National 
Assembly may prescribe. The court is duly constituted to exercise its 
powers if it consists of at least one judge of the court. Like the Court 
of Appeal, the Federal high Court sits in judicial divisions across the 
country.
This expansion of the jurisdiction of the Federal high Court has 
emasculated the state high courts (including the high court of the FCT), 
which traditionally was the court with the widest original jurisdiction, 
in both federal and state causes, in Nigeria. Under the current dispen-
sation, the state high courts retain general jurisdiction over civil and 
criminal causes except causes in respect of which other courts have 
been vested with exclusive jurisdiction. The high courts are made up 
of a chief judge and such other number of judges as the state assembly 
(or the National Assembly in the case of the FCT’s high court) may 
prescribe.
The final tier of superior court of records directly established under 
the Constitution consists of the customary and sharia courts of appeal 
in the states and in the FCT. These courts are constitutionally given 
appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving 
questions of customary and Islamic personal law, respectively. begin-
ning with Zamfara State in 1999, however, twelve northern Muslim 
states have controversially and perhaps unconstitutionally conferred 
general civil and criminal jurisdiction on their sharia courts of appeal. 
The Sharia Court of Appeal consists of a grand kadi (Islamic judge) and 
such numbers of kadis as a state assembly, or the National Assembly in 
the case of the Sharia Court of Appeal in the FCT, may prescribe. Simi-
larly, the Customary Court of Appeal consists of the president of the 
court and such numbers of judges as the relevant governmental legisla-
tive authority may prescribe. Panels of at least three judges exercise the 
jurisdiction of these courts.
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2. Judicial Appointments, Tenure, and Functioning
The Constitution prescribes uniform regulations for appointing or 
removing the various judicial officers in the federal and state courts. 
Appointments to the federal courts are made by Nigeria’s president on 
the recommendations of the National Judicial Council (NJC), subject 
to confirmation by the Senate. Appointments to state courts are made 
by the state governor on the recommendations of the NJC, subject 
to confirmation by the state house of assembly. In making its recom-
mendations, the NJC receives advice from the Federal Judicial Service 
Commission in respect of appointments to the four main federal courts 
(Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Federal high Court, and National 
Industrial Court), from the Judicial Service Committee of the FCT in 
respect of the courts in Abuja, and from state judicial service commis-
sions in respect of the state courts.
In addition to serving as the clearinghouse for judicial appoint-
ments, the NJC is charged with disbursing monies appropriated by the 
National Assembly for the courts established under the Constitution. 
These monies include the capital and recurrent budgets of the federal 
courts, as well as the salaries and allowances (recurrent costs) of the 
judges of the high courts and sharia and customary courts of appeal of 
the states.
headed and appointed largely by the chief justice, the twenty-three-
member NJC includes some of the most senior jurists in the federation 
and the states. Although they are smaller in size and less politically 
insulated than the NJC, the judicial service commissions at federal and 
state levels also are headed by the chief justice and chief judges, respec-
tively, and comprise mostly senior members of the bench and bar.
The relative non-politicization of judicial appointments through the 
creation of the NJC and judicial service commissions has not detracted 
from a long-standing policy to reflect the country’s “federal character” 
or diversity on the courts, especially the Supreme Court. however, 
whereas it is generally interpreted to require equal representation of the 
states, the federal character principle has been implemented more judi-
ciously in relation to the Supreme Court, that is, as a rule for the rep-
resentation of broader geographical identities (e.g., the old regions and 
current six geopolitical zones). Furthermore, following a succession of 
southern chief justices during the initial decades of the Supreme Court, 
the chief justices of the Court since 1987 have been northern Muslims, 
including Aloma Mukhtar, who was appointed the first female member 
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of the court in June 2005 and served as Nigeria’s first female chief jus-
tice from July 2012 to November 2014.
Some decisions of the Court, notably AG Federation v. AG Abia State 
& Ors (2001)21 and Abacha v. the State (2002),22 have highlighted sec-
tional fissures on the bench. however, making the Court substantially 
politically autonomous and professionally recruited and organized, 
yet regionally inclusive, has significantly insulated the institution from 
debilitating sectional bias, fragmentation, or conflict. In addition, the 
Court has reduced its vulnerability to ethno-politicization through a 
long-standing aversion to advisory opinions, which is based on a strict 
reading of section 232 (1) of the Constitution that gives the Court origi-
nal jurisdiction in any federal-state or inter-state dispute “if and in so 
far as that dispute involves any question … on which the existence or 
extent of a legal right depends.” The Court has also explicitly evaded 
some politically sensitive or contentious issues, especially the constitu-
tionality of Islamic sharia law implementation and discrimination on 
the basis of state of origin. In Adeyinka A. Badejo v. Federal Minister of 
Education & Ors (1996),23 for instance, the Court ruled that an applica-
tion filed on behalf of a prospective entrant to a prestigious national 
unity secondary school scheme to enforce her constitutional right to 
freedom from discrimination on the basis of state of origin had been 
overtaken by events (having taken eight years to reach the Supreme 
Court from the high court) and would amount to a futile academic exer-
cise. Similarly, in AG Kano v. AG Federation (2006),24 the Court argued 
that Kano’s challenge of a federal police ban on the state’s sharia-based 
hisbah vigilance corps involved a dispute with the inspector general 
of police (rather than with the federal government), as well as a crime-
related cause, both of which are outside the original (as distinct from 
appellate) jurisdiction of the Court.
Reflecting the Constitution’s emphasis on a professionally rather than 
ethno-politically organized justice sector, judges of the superior courts of 
record are generally required to have at least ten to fifteen years of expe-
rience after qualifying to practise as a legal practitioner. The constitution-
ally mandated retirement age for judges is seventy years at the Supreme 
Court, and sixty-five years in all other courts. The heads of federal or 
 21 AG Federation v. AG Abia & Ors [2001] 9 Supreme Court Monthly-SCM 45–110.
 22 Abacha v. the State [2002] 5 Nigeria Weekly Law Reports-NWLR (Part 761) 638.
 23 Badejo v. Federal Minister of Education & Ors [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 464).
 24 AG Kano v. AG Federation [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1029).
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state courts (chief justice, president of the Court of Appeal and Custom-
ary Court of Appeal, chief judge, or grand kadi) can be removed only 
by the president or state governor acting on an address supported by a 
two-thirds majority of the Senate or the house of Assembly. however, 
on the basis of a holistic reading of the constitutional functions of the 
NJC, the Supreme Court has affirmed, in Hon. Justice Raliat Elelu-Habeeb 
& Anor v. AG Federation & Ors (2012),25 that the removal of the head of 
a court by the political executive and legislature must be predicated 
on a recommendation to that effect by the NJC. Other judicial officers 
can be removed directly by the president or the state governor on the 
recommendation of the NJC that the officer be dismissed on grounds of 
infirmity, incompetence, or misconduct.
Despite the remarkable provisions written into the Nigerian Con-
stitution to guarantee its political insulation, the judiciary suffers 
from considerable institutional dysfunction and limitations of human 
and material capacities. While section 84 (3) of the Constitution pro-
vides that “remuneration and salaries” (as proposed by the RMAFC, 
approved by the National Assembly and administered by the NJC) of 
judicial officers “shall not be altered to their disadvantage after their 
appointment,” this guarantee explicitly excludes “allowances” (for, 
among other things, housing, transportation, utilities, and domestic 
and official aides), which account for approximately 80 per cent of the 
total pay of judges.26 More important, because they are only partially 
funded via the NJC, the state judiciaries are not effectively insulated 
from financial neglect or manipulation by the state governments, which 
have mostly ignored constitutional guarantees of budgetary autonomy 
for courts.
More generally, the NJC has attracted criticisms and even resistance 
over its centrist influence on judicial appointments at the subnational 
level, over the overwhelming power of the chief justice on the com-
position and conduct of the council, and over the failure of the coun-
cil to eliminate executive interference in budgetary and appropriation 
processes of the courts. In addition, most Nigerian courts, like courts 
in many developing African countries, suffer multiple institutional 
deficiencies, including a deteriorating quality of legal education, poor 
 25 See Hon. Justice Raliat Elelu-Habeeb & Anor v. AG Federation & Ors [2012] Law Pavilion 
Electronic Law Report-LPELR-SC 281/2010.
 26 Nurudeen Abdallah and Adelanwa bamgboye, “Nigeria: Senior Judges Soak Up 
N14 billion Annually,” Daily Trust (Abuja), 9 December 2013.
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physical facilities (e.g., dilapidated courtrooms and absence of stand-
ard libraries), outdated legal infrastructure (including procedural and 
evidentiary rules that have not been reformed since colonial rule), 
excessive caseload and backlog of appeal cases deriving partly from 
the abysmal quality of the lower courts, poor assistance for judges, 
gross abuse (by judges and defence lawyers) of interlocutory appeals 
or injunctions, and “delays so extreme that they are almost a form of 
impunity.”27
Corruption is a particularly pernicious challenge for the judiciary. 
As claimed by a former president of the Court of Appeal, “There are 
many lazy, ignorant and dishonest judges in the system.”28 Not sur-
prisingly, successive Afrobarometer surveys suggest that Nigerians 
do not see effective rule of law in the country and express increasing 
distrust in law courts, although the courts still evoke relatively greater 
trust than the notoriously corrupt police.29 These multiple deficiencies 
in the justice system are generally more pronounced in the state and 
local arenas than in the federal arena, although the judiciary in Lagos 
(the federation’s most economically developed and independent state) 
is considerably better resourced and modernized than in the rest of the 
federation.30
3. Overview of Judicial Culture
The aforementioned institutional deficiencies, coupled with the repres-
sion of an independent judicial culture during military rule, have 
undermined the development, professionalism, and sophistication 
 27 human Rights Watch, Corruption on Trial, 34; see also Ameze Guobadia, “Judicial-
Executive Relations in Nigeria’s Constitutional Development: Clear Patterns or 
Confusing Signals?,” in Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism, ed. Charles 
Fombad, 239–64 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) .
 28 Ayo Salami, “Eradicating Corruption in the Nigerian Judiciary,” Sahara Reporters,  
4 December 2015, http://saharareporters.com/2015/12/04/eradicating-corruption-
nigerian-judiciary-justice-isa-ayo-salami. 
 29 Peter Lewis and Michael bratton, Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria, 
Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 3 (2000), 20–1, http://afrobarometer.org/
publications/wp3-attitudes-democracy-and-markets-nigeria; Peter Lewis and 
Etannibi Alemika, Seeking the Democratic Dividend: Public Attitudes and Attempted Reform 
in Nigeria, Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 52 (2005), 39, http://afrobarometer.org/
publications/wp52-seeking-democratic-dividend-public-attitudes-and-attempted-
reform-nigeria.
 30 human Rights Watch, Corruption on Trial, 32, 60.
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of the judiciary, including the quality of legal reasoning, which some 
experts have described as overtly literal, demonstrating “very little 
intellectual energy,” and lacking the sort of investigative depth and 
rigorous opinion-writing associated with good judicial practice in the 
common law tradition.31 Nonetheless, it is possible to discern two broad 
jurisprudential tendencies: (1) a conservative, passive, and politically 
restrained approach to judicial reasoning as highlighted, for instance in 
Badejo v. Federal Minister of Education & Ors (1996), and (2) a more pro-
gressive, activist, radical, or liberal orientation, as evident in Lakanmi v. 
AG Western State (1971) and AG Bendel v. AG Federation (1981). The con-
servative tendency extols the principle of judicial precedent, upholds 
very rigid or strict standing rules regarding the right or standing to sue, 
frowns on attempts to nudge the courts into giving advisory opinions 
or abstract academic rulings that are not rooted in concrete or “live” 
contestations, is quite pragmatic in accommodating the exigencies and 
legacies of military rule, and therefore is generally more centralist in its 
federalism jurisprudence.
The more progressive orientation interprets the rule of locus standi 
generously in order to expand access to judicial redress, gives the 
broadest and most liberal construction possible to the jurisdiction of 
the courts and the provisions of the law, frowns on stultifying narrow 
legalisms, is intellectually critical of the country’s centralizing authori-
tarian traditions, and consequently is broadly more decentralist in its 
federalism opinions.32
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
Three specific areas of federalism-related judicial review have featured 
prominently in the Fourth Republic: revenue allocations, the status of 
local governments, and the regulation of factional and partisan strug-
gles for national and sub-national power.
 31 See Tunde Ogowewo, “Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in 
Nigeria,” Journal of African Law 49, no. 1 (2005): 50; ben Nwabueze, The Judiciary 
as the Third Estate of the Realm (Ibadan: Gold, 2007), 165–8; Solomon Ukhuegbe, 
“Jurisdictional Reform and the Role of the Supreme Court of Nigeria: The Path to a 
Policy Court,” 12 April 2012, 80, http://papers.ssrn.com.
 32 For a discussion of the two jurisprudential traditions, see Obinna Okere, “Judicial 
Activism or Passivity in Interpreting the Nigerian Constitution,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 36, no. 4 (1987): 788.
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1. Revenue Allocation and Distributive Conflicts
Reflecting the domination of Nigerian federalism by the redistribution 
of centrally collected oil revenues lodged in the Federation Account, 
the Supreme Court has been summoned regularly to arbitrate conflicts 
over account disbursements. Perhaps the most momentous of these 
revenue cases was AG Federation v. AG Abia State & Ors (2001, 2002),33 
which involved a conflict over the determination of the boundaries of 
Nigeria’s littoral states for the purpose of implementing section 162 (2) 
of the 1999 Constitution, according to which “the principle of deriva-
tion shall be reflected in any approved [revenue allocation] formula 
as being not less than thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the 
Federation Account directly from any natural resources.” Designed by 
the drafters to assuage complaints of economic deprivation in the oil-
rich ethnic minority Niger Delta, the so-called 13 per cent derivation 
principle has been rendered contentious by the chequered political and 
legislative history of the derivation rule in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism, 
the centrality of oil revenues to the finances of all governments in the 
federation, and the Constitution’s silence on the exact beneficiary of 
the derivation revenues and its explicit vesting, under section 44 (3), of 
the proprietorship, control, and management of all “minerals, mineral 
oils and natural gas … in the Government of the Federation.”
The federal government, supported by the non-oil-producing states, 
conceded the allocation of 13 per cent of onshore oil revenues to the 
oil-rich states on a derivation basis, but claimed that offshore resources 
(accounting for about 40 per cent of oil revenues) were exempt from the 
derivation rule because they belong to the federation as a whole. but 
the Niger Delta and other southern littoral states (Akwa Ibom, bayelsa, 
Cross River, Delta, Rivers, Ondo, and Lagos) insisted on the attribution 
of offshore resources to the adjoining states and condemned the fed-
eral government’s initiation of AG Federation v. AG Abia State & Ors as 
politically vexatious, pre-emptive of the National Assembly’s revenue 
allocation powers, and an abuse of judicial process.
In July 2001, a seven-member panel of the Supreme Court, with its 
sole panellist from the Niger Delta dissenting, decided to exercise juris-
diction in AG Federation v. AG Abia State & Ors. In its substantive ruling 
 33 AG Federation v. AG Abia State & Ors [2001] 9 SCM 45–110; AG Federation v. AG Abia 
State & Ors [2002] 6 Supreme Court Monthly-SCM 1–234.
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on the suit in April 2002, the Court upheld the federal government’s 
position that the natural resources on Nigeria’s continental shelf belong 
to the federation as a whole and, therefore, cannot be said to be deriv-
able from the adjoining littoral states for revenue-allocation purposes. 
The southern boundary of the littoral states, the Court argued, is the 
low-water mark of their land surface or the seaward limit of their internal 
waters; it does not extend to the country’s continental shelf or territorial 
waters.
According to the Court, Nigeria’s southernmost regions (the pre-
cursors to the littoral states) were legally defined since british colonial 
rule as sharing a boundary with the sea, thereby implying that “the 
sea cannot be a part of the territory of any of the old regions” or their 
successors. Furthermore, the 1999 Constitution did not include any 
provision similar to a clause in the 1960 or 1963 constitutions in the First 
Republic, according to which the “continental shelf of a region shall 
be deemed to be part of that region” for the purpose of applying the 
revenue-derivation rule. Finally, the Court held the view that Nigeria’s 
continental shelf is ascribed to the country by virtue of international 
conventions and concessions that “do not directly apply” to sub-federal 
units, but are given domestic effect by the exercise of federal legislative 
competence.34
The Supreme Court’s blunt affirmation of the fiscal interests of the 
federal government and the non-oil producing states provoked strident 
objections from prominent Niger Delta politicians and legal scholars, 
who disparaged the Court’s decision as a “supreme injustice” against 
the Niger Delta. They faulted the Court for its strained invocations 
of colonial-era proclamations, disregard of more contemporaneous 
national and international practices that effaced the dichotomy between 
onshore and offshore oil resources, conflation of federal jurisdiction 
over external affairs with the domestic allocation of offshore oil rev-
enues, and contradictory position in pre-empting the allocation of off-
shore oil revenues while recognizing the broad constitutional mandate 
of the National Assembly to determine the terms of such allocation.35
In response to these resentments, the federal executive brokered 
a political compromise that culminated in the National Assembly’s 
 34 AG Federation v. AG Abia State & Ors [2002] 6 SCM 91.
 35 See Rotimi T. Suberu, “The Supreme Court and Federalism in Nigeria,” Journal of 
Modern African Studies 46, no. 3 (2008): 464.
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enactment of the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the 
Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act of 2004. Under the act, 
an area of “two hundred meter water depth Isobaths contiguous” to 
the littoral states is deemed to belong to those states for the purpose of 
the derivation principle. Although the act failed to satisfy the demands 
of the Niger Delta states for the complete abrogation of the onshore-
offshore oil dichotomy, the act was nonetheless challenged as uncon-
stitutional and contemptuous of the Supreme Court by twenty-two 
non-littoral/non-oil-producing states, including all nineteen states in 
the North and Ekiti, Osun, and Oyo in the southwest.
however, the Supreme Court, in AG Adamawa State & Ors v. AG Fed-
eration & Ors (2005),36 upheld the counterclaim of the federal govern-
ment and the littoral states that the Abolition Act was a legitimate law 
of the National Assembly (including representatives of the non-litto-
ral states) and impugned the plaintiff non-littoral states for failing to 
“demonstrate sufficiently and effectively how their civil rights … have 
been affected by the Act.” This finding underscored the Court’s will-
ingness to abandon its earlier holding regarding the non-applicability 
of the derivation rule to offshore oil resources for a more politically 
judicious approach. This gave recognition to the constitutional pow-
ers of the National Assembly to define the parameters of the revenue 
allocation system or develop the rather incomplete constitutional pro-
visions on derivation in order to accomplish the larger political goals 
of inter-regional accommodation and the alleviation of ethnic minority 
grievances in the Niger Delta.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the federal government’s revenue-
sharing prerogatives in a series of decisions following AG Federation v. 
AG Abia State & Ors (2001, 2002). In AG Ogun State & Ors v. AG Federation 
(2002),37 the Supreme Court determined that the federal government 
cannot be required, as demanded by the five plaintiff southwestern 
states, to pay all federally collected revenues, net of its own independ-
ent revenues, into the general distributable intergovernmental pool or 
Federation Account, since the government is constitutionally obliged 
to transfer some portions of federally collected revenues directly to the 
states on a derivation basis. An inadvertent effect of this ruling was 
to encourage the federal government to continue to short-change the 
 36 AG Adamawa State & Ors v. AG Federation & Ors [2005] 12 SCM 1–74.
 37 AG Ogun State & Ors v. AG Federation [2002] 14 SCM 1–32.
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sub-national orders by pre-empting considerable amounts of centrally 
collected revenues from the general distributable pool.
In AG Abia State & Ors v. AG Federation (2003),38 the Court ruled 
that President Olusẹgun Obasanjo was legally competent to modify 
the existing revenue-allocation decree-law inherited from the military 
in order to bring it into conformity with the constitutional provision 
mandating the allocation of Federation Account revenues among the 
three orders of government only. This ruling legitimated the president’s 
transfer to the federal government of 7.5 per cent of Federation Account 
revenues that the decree-law had designated as special funds for pur-
poses like financial stabilization and the development of the FCT. The 
transfer was unpopular among the state governors who had argued 
that the president should have prorated the funds to the three orders 
of government rather than assigning them exclusively to the cen-
tre. Although a subsequent political solution reduced the proportion 
of special funds assigned to the centre to 4.18 per cent, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling underscored the expansive distributive powers of the 
federal government.
In AG Abia State v. AG Federation & Ors (2005),39 the Supreme Court 
confirmed the powers of the federal government to make deductions 
from Abia State’s share of the Federation Account in order to service 
debts incurred by the state, including its obligations for loans incurred 
by the old Imo State, which was subdivided into Abia and Ebonyi in 
1996. The Court ruled that the federal government’s role as the guaran-
tor of all external loans incurred by the states entailed a “responsibility 
to see that repayments for the loans are paid as and when due,” which 
“can only be done by deductions from the states’ monies available 
through the Federal Government, namely, the Federation Account.”
In another major decision that ultimately preserved the centre’s fis-
cal hegemony, the Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction in 
AG Lagos State v. AG Federation (2014),40 involving a challenge to the 
authority of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) to administer 
the Nigerian value Added Tax. The Lagos state government contended 
that activities of the FIRS had impeded the government’s efforts to levy 
and collect taxes within the state on the supply of goods and services, 
 38 AG Abia State & Ors v AG Federation [2003] 1 SCM 1–61.
 39 AG Abia State v. AG Federation & Ors [2005] 7 SCM 1–70.
 40 AG Lagos State v. AG Federation [2014] LPELR-SC 20/2008.
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which being on neither the concurrent nor exclusive legislative lists, 
was a residual matter within sub-national jurisdiction. The Court ruled 
that its original jurisdiction to arbitrate constitutional disputes between 
the federation and its component units could not properly be invoked 
in conflicts involving purely administrative or political agents of the 
federal and/or state governments; moreover, federal government reve-
nue matters were constitutionally within the original jurisdiction of the 
Federal high Court, from where they would gradually have to ascend 
the judicial ladder via the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.
In AG Ondo State v. AG Federation & Ors (2002),41 the Supreme Court 
upheld the federal government’s authority to enact and administer a 
federation-wide anti-corruption law designed to ensure transparency 
in the use of public funds (including Federation Account transfers) by 
all orders of government. The Court determined that while it contained 
some irregularities, the national anti-corruption law was consistent 
with the constitutional powers of the federal government to pursue 
broad national objectives and directive principles, including the aboli-
tion of “all corrupt practices and abuse of power.” As a power to legis-
late generally on corruption was not explicitly on the list of the federal 
government’s exclusive or concurrent legislative powers, the Court’s 
validation of the anti-corruption law relied largely on decisions from 
common law federal jurisdictions like the United States, Australia, and 
Canada, including McCulloch v. Maryland (1819),42 R v. Kidman (1915),43 
and Reference re Anti-Inflation Act (1976),44 that have given a liberal con-
struction to the centre’s authority to promote “peace, order and good 
government” or to legislate on matters that are “incidental and sup-
plementary” to, or “necessary and proper” for, the furtherance of its 
express powers.45
yet the Supreme Court has not been simply an instrument for the 
advancement of the centre’s fiscal hegemony. At least three of its rev-
enue-sharing decisions protected the interests of the states under the 
national revenue-sharing system. First, the Supreme Court invalidated 
not only the direct allocations of the Federation Account to entities 
or funds other than the three orders of government, but also upfront 
 41 AG Ondo State v. AG Federation & Ors [2002] 9 SCM 1–70.
 42 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 US 316 (1819).
 43 R v. Kidman [1915] 20 CLR 425.
 44 Reference re Anti-inflation Act [1976] 2 SCR 373.
 45 See AG Ondo State v. AG Federation & Ors [2002] 9 SCM 61, 70–2.
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deductions from centrally collected revenues in the form of first-line 
charges for such items as external debt payments of the federal gov-
ernment, the NJC, and national priority projects.46 This potentially 
expanded the amount of centrally collected revenues available for gen-
eral intergovernmental redistribution via the Federation Account. This 
decision, however, weakened the federal government’s efforts to save, 
rather than simply share, windfall oil revenues beyond a federal budg-
etary benchmark through instruments like the Excess Crude Account, 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
Second, the Court, in AG Cross River v. AG Federation & Anor (2005),47 
held that the federal government, as the “trustee in respect of all mon-
ies paid into the Federation Account,” is obliged to render accurate and 
regular statements of the account if and when it is clearly requested to 
do so by the sub-national beneficiaries of the account. The Court also 
awarded about US$17.1 million verified shortfalls in federal revenue 
transfers to the Cross River state government.
Finally, the Court has ruled that all monies standing to the credit 
of the localities in the Federation Account must constitutionally be 
channelled to the local governments through their respective states 
rather than transferred directly by the federal government to the local 
councils.48
An important subset of federalism cases arbitrated by the Supreme 
Court during the Fourth Republic focused on interstate, as distinct from 
federal-state, conflicts. Many of these conflicts involved disagreements 
over the location of oil wells in the Niger Delta for revenue-attribution 
purposes as well as disputes over the boundaries and the sharing of 
the assets and liabilities of states that were subdivided during the mili-
tary’s state-creation exercises.
In AG Cross River v. AG Federation & Anor (2005),49 for instance, the 
Supreme Court upheld the legality of the state governor’s variation of 
the internal boundaries of the old Cross River State under the “Local 
Governments Clans, villages (variation) Order No. 1 of 1983.” The 
Court rejected the request by Akwa Ibom State (which was excised 
from Cross River in 1987) to have the affected clans and villages trans-
ferred from Cross River to Akwa Ibom. In a subsequent suit between 
 46 AG Federation v. AG Abia & Ors [2002] 6 SCM 66.
 47 AG Cross River State v. AG Federation & Anor [2005] 7 SCM 98.
 48 AG Ogun State & Ors v. AG Federation [2002] 14 SCM 19.
 49 AG Cross River State v. AG Federation & Anor [2005] 7 SCM 93.
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the same parties, AG Cross River State v. AG Federation & Anor (2012),50 
the Supreme Court held that Cross River had ceased to be a littoral state 
following the final implementation of an International Court of Justice 
decision that handed over bakassi Peninsula in southern Cross River 
to the Republic of Cameroon. The Court ruled that the federal govern-
ment had acted factually, correctly, and legally in transferring deriva-
tion revenues in respect of seventy-six offshore oil wells, previously 
attributed to Cross River, to neighbouring Akwa Ibom.
In AG Rivers State v. AG Akwa Ibom State & Anor (2011),51 the Court 
ruled that Akwa Ibom could not connive with the NbC and RMAFC 
to opt out of a “political solution” brokered by the federal president 
and endorsed by the governors of the two states in October 2006, 
which shared derivation revenues from 172 disputed oil wells equally 
between the two states. The Court also ordered the payment to Rivers 
State by the appropriate federal agencies of all monies, plus interest at 
the prevailing commercial rate, that had been credited to Akwa Ibom 
since April 2009 in breach of the political solution.
In AG Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State & Anor (2012),52 the Supreme 
Court held that a decision on the appropriate attribution of revenues 
from the disputed Soku/Oluasiri oilwells would have to await the final 
demarcation of the boundaries between the two states by the NbC. 
berating the NbC for shirking its constitutional responsibilities and 
for its “lamentable,” “reproachable,” “technically questionable,” and 
“highly controversial” operations, the Court urged the commission to 
“give priority” to concluding the boundary demarcation between the 
two states.
In AG Plateau State v. AG Nasarawa State (2005),53 the Court held 
Nasarawa liable for debts outstanding on road and water projects 
executed by the old Plateau state government but located in Nasarawa 
State, which was excised from Plateau in 1996. In AG Nasarawa State 
v. AG Plateau State (2012),54 the Court ruled that the Plateau govern-
ment could not unilaterally rescind the terms of a statutory assets and 
liabilities sharing process, which had assigned several government 
buildings, offices, and staff quarters located in Jos (the capital of the old 
 50 AG Cross River State v. AG Federation & Anor [2012] LPELR-SC 250/2009.
 51 AG Rivers State v. AG Akwa Ibom State & Anor [2011] SC 27/2010.
 52 AG Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State & Anor [2012 ] SC 106/2009.
 53 AG Plateau State v. AG Nasarawa State [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 930).
 54 AG Nasarawa State v. AG Plateau State [2012] LPELR-SC 214/2007.
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and current Plateau State) to Nasarawa. The ruling echoed a previous 
decision of the Court, in AG Ondo State v. AG Ekiti State (2001),55 that it 
was not open to any state to seek unilaterally to reject or reinterpret the 
terms of the assets and liabilities sharing committees established dur-
ing the military’s state-creation exercises.
A theme common to most of the Supreme Court’s holdings in inter-
state distributive disputes is that, in the absence of evidence of fraud 
or misrepresentation, a state government must, in accordance with the 
common law principle of estoppel, observe and honour past agreements 
or contracts no matter how erroneous, contradictory, or undemocratic 
those pacts may now appear to it to be. As the courts cannot rewrite 
those contracts, any unilateral attempts to repudiate them would, in the 
opinion of the Supreme Court, be “reckless with capacity to encourage 
lawlessness and disobedience to constituted authority and the rule of 
law, which outcome would not rule out chaos.”56
2. Status of Local Government
The conflicting constitutional visions and provisions regarding the 
status of local government in the federation have invariably triggered 
intergovernmental litigation in the Supreme Court. Thus, in the afore-
mentioned case of AG Ogun & Ors v. AG Federation (2002),57 the Supreme 
Court determined that it is the responsibility of each state government 
to establish and manage the constitutionally mandated “State Joint 
Local Government Account” (SJLGA), which is a repository for all allo-
cations to the LGAs of a state from the Federation Account and from the 
government of the state. The Court accordingly invalidated the estab-
lishment of an SJLGA Committee for each state under the subsisting 
federal revenue decree-law.
Similarly, in its decision in AG Abia & Ors v. AG Federation (2002),58 
the Court ruled in favour of a petition by the thirty-six states challeng-
ing a 2001 federal Electoral Act that had extended the tenure of local 
councils from three years, under a 1998 federal military decree-law, 
to four years. Specifically, the Court confined the applicability of the 
extension to the six LGAs in the federal capital city of Abuja, restricted 
 55 AG Ondo State v. AG Ekiti State [2001] 17 NWLR (Pt. 743).
 56 AG Nasarawa State v. AG Plateau State [2012] LPELR-SC 214/2007.
 57 AG Ogun State & Ors v. AG Federation [2002] 14 SCM 17, 23.
 58 AG Abia & Ors v. AG Federation [2002] 5 SCM 27–8.
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the electoral powers of the National Assembly over local governments 
nationally to making laws for the registration of voters and the proce-
dural (rather than substantive) regulation of local elections, declared 
the tenure of local governments to be a residual subject belonging to 
the states under the practice of the Constitution, and impugned the 
National Assembly for encroaching on the general powers of the states 
over their localities.
yet, while it unanimously held that the National Assembly could 
not regulate the tenure of local councils, the Court left somewhat unre-
solved the precise scope of the Assembly’s power under item 11 of the 
concurrent legislative list to make laws “on procedure regulating elec-
tions to a local government council.” In AG Abia & Ors v. AG Federation 
(2002), the seven-member panel of the Court issued conflicting opin-
ions on the validity of a provision of the 2001 Electoral Act mandating 
a ninety-day public notice for holding any elections (including local 
government polls), with four justices (Muhammadu Uwais, Michael 
Ogundare, Emmanuel Ogwuegbu, and Akintola Ejiwunmi) upholding 
the validity of this provision, and three justices (Uthman Mohammed, 
Umaru Kalgo, and Idris Kutigi) invalidating the provision.
In the instructive case of Osun State Independent Electoral Commission 
(OSIEC) & Anor v. Action Congress & Ors (2010),59 however, the Supreme 
Court unanimously affirmed the powers of the National Assembly to 
regulate the length of notifications by the states for local elections. The 
background to this case was that in November 2007 the opposition 
Action Congress (AC) party had asked the Osun State high Court to 
invalidate the Osun State Electoral Law of 2002 on the ground that the 
21-day notice provided for holding local government elections under 
the law was inconsistent with the 2006 federal Electoral Act, which 
mandated a 150-day notice for holding any elections in Nigeria. Imme-
diately following the rejection of the AC’s claim by the high court in 
December 2007, OSIEC conducted elections in thirty-one local coun-
cils, which poll the AC and other opposition parties boycotted. The 
AC subsequently approached the Court of Appeal, which set aside the 
2007 Osun local government elections as illegal and unconstitutional 
on account of the failure of the OSIEC to provide the federally required 
150-day notice of polling. On further appeal to the Supreme Court by 
 59 Osun State Independent Electoral Commission (OSIEC) & Anor v. Action Congress & Ors 
[2010] LPELR-SC 265/2009.
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OSIEC and the Osun government, the apex Court upheld the decision 
of the Court of Appeal. Invoking the doctrine of covering the field, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the supremacy of the federal Electoral Act 
over the Osun law with respect to any provisions “on the procedure 
regulating elections to a local government council, the issue of notice 
inclusive.” The Court referenced its previous expositions on this doc-
trine, including AG Ogun v. AG Federation (1982) and AG Abia & Ors v. 
AG Federation (2002), which have invoked the position of Justice Owen 
Dixon of Australia’s high Court in Ex Parte McLean (1930)60 that a state 
law on a concurrent subject is rendered inconsistent and thus invalid 
or inoperative by a federal statutory scheme intended to “completely, 
exhaustively or exclusively” cover the same subject.61
Essentially, the Supreme Court’s decisions, in AG Abia & Ors v. AG Fed-
eration (2002) and Osun State Independent Electoral Commission (OSIEC) 
& Anor v. Action Congress & Ors (2010), highlighted the conflicted con-
stitutional status of localities by voiding a federal law prescribing the 
tenure of local councils while upholding another federal act regulating 
the length of notification for local elections. A further dramatization of 
this ambivalence was the legal imbroglio between the federal govern-
ment and Lagos State that followed President Obasanjo’s April 2004 
directive withholding the payment of local government allocations in 
the Federation Account to states where elections had been conducted in 
LGAs created after the 1999 civilian transition. According to Obasanjo, 
“As the National Assembly is yet to make the necessary consequential 
provisions in respect of any of the newly created Local Government 
Areas in the country, conducting any election into them, or funding any 
of them from the Federation Account, would clearly be a violation of 
the Constitution.”62
Unlike the PDP-controlled states of Ebonyi, Katsina, Nasarawa, and 
Niger, all of which abrogated their new LGAs in order to continue to 
receive federal transfers to the localities, the opposition-controlled 
administration of Lagos insisted on its authority to establish local gov-
ernment areas, which the state government had increased from twenty 
in 1999 to fifty-seven in 2002. Consequently, Lagos approached the 
Supreme Court for a declaration that it is unlawful and unconstitutional 
 60 Ex Parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472.
 61 AG Abia & Ors v. AG Federation [2002] 5 SCM 74.
 62 See AG Lagos State v. AG Federation [2004] 9–12 SCM 23.
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for the federal executive “to suspend or withhold for any period what-
soever the statutory allocation due and payable to the Lagos state gov-
ernment” for the benefit of its localities.63
The Supreme Court ruled, in AG Lagos State v. AG Federation (2004),64 
that the president had no power to hold back federal transfers meant 
for the localities in Lagos insofar as the money “applies to the 20 Local 
Government Councils for the time being recognized by the Constitution 
and not the new Local Government Areas which are not yet operative.” 
At the same time, the Court did not annul the new Lagos LGAs, which 
it described as legal but inchoate until their ratification by the National 
Assembly. The Supreme Court also rejected the federal government’s 
request for the invalidation of the elections into these areas because, 
according to the Court, the polls involved individuals and groups that 
were not parties to the suit.
Although celebrated by Lagos State as a judicial vindication of its 
federalist struggle against an imperial federal presidency, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in AG Lagos State v. AG Federation did not resolve the 
conflict between the state and the federal executive. The federal govern-
ment continued to withhold the funds for Lagos LGAs on the ground 
that the creation of new areas had effectively obliterated the legitimate 
beneficiaries of the funds. As claimed by ben Nwabueze, “In fairness to 
the Federal Government … the contradictory positions of the Supreme 
Court … in this case are a contributory factor in [the Government’s] 
refusal to obey the Court’s order” regarding the release of the withheld 
funds.65
The Supreme Court, however, issued a more definitive opinion on the 
constitutional status of localities in AG Abia & Ors v. AG Federation and 
Ors (2006).66 This suit involved an action by Abia, Delta, and Lagos States 
challenging the constitutionality of the federal government’s Monitor-
ing of Revenue Allocation to Local Government’s Act 2005. Drawing 
on the extensive revenue-sharing powers of the National Assembly, the 
act required each of the thirty-six states to establish an SJLGA Commit-
tee under the chairmanship of the commissioner responsible for local 
government in the state. The committee’s primary function would be 
 63 AG Lagos State v. AG Federation [2004] 9–12 SCM 48.
 64 Ibid.
 65 ben Nwabueze, How President Obasanjo Subverted the Rule of Law and Democracy 
(Ibadan: Gold, 2008), 150–1.
 66 AG Abia State & Ors v. AG Federation & Ors [2006] 10–11 SCM 1–146.
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to ensure that all statutory federal and state grants to the localities are 
“promptly paid into” the SJLGA and distributed among the councils in 
accordance with the relevant laws of the state legislature. The commit-
tee also would render monthly statements of the SJLGA, on the basis 
of which quarterly reports would be made to the National Assembly 
through the accountant-general of the federation. Finally, under the act, 
a state government encroaching on funds due to its localities would 
have its Federation Account allocations appropriately deducted and 
credited to the affected local council(s), while a functionary involved in 
such violation would be “liable on conviction to a fine twice the amount 
[involved] or imprisonment for a term of five years or to both such fine 
and imprisonment.”67
The Supreme Court, by a 5–2 majority, ruled that the Monitoring 
Act transgressed the states’ constitutional autonomy. Specifically, the 
Court’s majority upheld the claims of the plaintiff state governments 
that the act had usurped the powers of the state legislature to provide 
for the establishment, composition, and functions of the SJLGA Com-
mittee, unlawfully directed the states to include federal appointees 
(including a commissioner of the RMAFC and a representative of the 
accountant-general of the federation) on the SJLGA and render reports 
to the federal government, unconstitutionally conferred on the federal 
government oversight functions over local administrations within a 
state, and generally exceeded federal powers to allocate revenues to the 
localities by encroaching on the responsibilities of the states to regulate 
the distribution of such funds to local councils. however, disparaging 
the majority’s attempt to differentiate the federal powers of allocation 
from the state powers of distribution as a distinction without a differ-
ence, the dissenting Justices Idris Legbo Kutigi and Dahiru Musdapher 
upheld the act as consistent with the integrative orientation of Nigeria’s 
Constitution.
In a comparable decision on the relative powers of the centre and the 
states over local governance, the Supreme Court, in AG Lagos State v. 
AG Federation & Ors (2003),68 by a narrow 4–3 majority, invalidated most 
sections of the Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Law, enacted 
under military auspices in 1992. In the opinion of the Court’s majority, 
urban and regional planning is “a residual matter within the exclusive 
 67 See AG Abia State & Ors v. AG Federation & Ors [2006] 10–11 SCM 63.
 68 AG Lagos State v. AG Federation & Ors [2003] 9 SCM 1–148.
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legislative and executive competence” of the states, is conceptually 
distinct from national environmental policymaking, and is, therefore, 
beyond the purview of any exclusive, concurrent, or incidental pow-
ers assigned to the federal government under the 1999 Constitution. 
Similarly, in AG Federation v. AG Lagos State (2013),69 the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the exclusive legislative powers of the federal 
government to regulate “tourist traffic,” including the movement of 
foreigners, did not extend to the “regulation, registration, classification 
and grading of hotels” and other tourism or hospitality establishments, 
which were “clearly residual matters for the states.”
Determined to preserve some measure of local autonomy for state 
governments in Nigeria’s otherwise centralized federation, Justice 
Uwaifor, speaking for the Court’s majority in AG Lagos State v. AG Fed-
eration & Ors (2003), “completely” and with “great faith” embraced the 
opinion of Chief Justice William Taft in the American case of Bailey v. 
Drexel Furniture Co. (1922),70 which rejected the potential use of con-
gressional authority to “breakdown all constitutional limitation of the 
powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the 
states.”71 Similarly, Justice Ayoola, while dissenting from the majority’s 
position that urban planning is a residual subject over which the states 
have exclusive legislative responsibility, argued, citing American case 
law like National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)72 and Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc. (1981),73 that any federal 
government legislation on urban planning must be reasonably related 
or adapted to national environmental policymaking and exercised in a 
manner that does not offend or impair the autonomy or sovereignty of 
the states.74
An adverse effect of the Court’s holdings on local governance issues, 
however, was to facilitate the degradations of the putative third order 
of Nigerian federalism by the state governments, which systemati-
cally hijacked and raided local government funds, replaced elected 
local councils with caretaker committees appointed by the governors, 
rigged local government elections, or failed to conduct local elections 
 69 AG Federation v. AG Lagos State [2013] LPELR-SC 340/2010.
 70 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. 259 US 20 (1922).
 71 AG Lagos State v. AG Federation & Ors [2003] 9 SCM 39.
 72 National League of Cities v. Usery 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
 73 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc 442 U.S. 264 (1981).
 74 AG Lagos State v. AG Federation & Ors [2003] 9 SCM 128–31.
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altogether. These abuses persist despite the Court’s opinion in Honor-
able Chigozie Eze & Ors v. Governor of Abia State & Ors (2014),75 and a 
series of decisions of the Court of Appeal, including AG Plateau State & 
3 Ors v. Goyol & 15 Ors (2007)76 and Adamawa State House of Assembly & 2 
Ors v. Chubado Batti Tijjani and Ors (2011),77 which invalidated attempts 
by state governments arbitrarily to truncate or terminate the tenures of 
elected local councils. by August 2012, only thirteen states and the FCT 
had elected local government chairmen.78 This crisis of local democracy 
is emblematic of a broader national debacle of electoral authoritarian-
ism, which poses the most chronic challenge to judicial governance in 
Nigeria.
3. Restraining Federal Executive and Ruling Party Authoritarianism
A major challenge for constitutionalism in neo-patrimonial African 
countries is the tendency towards authoritarian “big man,” personal, 
“presidential,” and/or single-party rule and the attendant degradation 
of liberal democratic processes, including the suppression of autono-
mous pluralistic spheres of political authority outside of the central 
executive and/or ruling party.79 In Nigeria, such authoritarianism has 
included federally backed arbitrary attempts to uproot or overwhelm 
sub-national governments through stage-managed impeachments or 
dismissals of governors considered to be partisan or factional “oppo-
nents and non-loyalists” of the president, impositions of states of 
emergency, and manipulations of sub-national and national electoral 
contests.80 While states also engage in this kind of unconstitutional 
behaviour, the abuses by the federal government have been enormously 
aided and aggravated by presidential control and manipulation of key 
 75 Honourable Chigozie Eze & Ors v. Governor of Abia State & Ors [2014] LPELR-SC 
209/2010.
 76 AG Plateau State & 3 Ors v. Goyol & 15 Ors [2007] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1059).
 77 Adamawa State House of Assembly & 2 Ors v. Chubado Batti Tijjani and Ors [2011] 
CA/J/304/2009.
 78 See Chuks Okocha, “INEC Directs States with Caretaker Committees to Conduct 
Council Elections,” This Day (Lagos), 3 August 2012.
 79 See Nicolas van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging 
Party Systems,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 2 (2003): 297–321.
 80 Mamman Lawan, “Abuse of Powers of Impeachment in Nigeria,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 48, no. 2 (2010): 333.
The Supreme Court of Nigeria 319
agencies like the anti-corruption bodies, the single national police force, 
and the national electoral commission.
The Constitution provides guidelines for the impeachment of politi-
cal executives and presidential proclamations of a state of emergency. 
The impeachment process for state officials essentially involves four 
stages: (1) the presentation to the speaker of the state assembly of a 
written notice signed by at least one-third of the members of the leg-
islature alleging official “gross misconduct” by the executive; (2) a 
motion, within fourteen days of the presentation (and circulation) of 
the notice, by at least two-thirds of the legislators supporting the inves-
tigation of the alleged misconduct; (3) within seven days of the motion, 
the appointment by the chief judge on the request of the speaker of 
an independent seven-member panel to investigate the allegation and 
submit a report within three months of its appointment; and (4) if the 
report confirms the allegation, and two-thirds of the legislators adopt 
the report, the political executive stands removed.81
A presidential proclamation of a state of emergency in the federation 
or any part thereof, which must be approved by a two-thirds majority of 
all the members of each house of the bicameral National Assembly for a 
period of only six months at a time, must be predicated on (1) the actual 
or imminent existence of a dangerous exigency (e.g., war, invasion, 
breakdown of public order, natural disaster, or threat to the existence 
of the federation), or (2) a request by the governor of an endangered 
state, supported by a two-thirds majority of the state assembly, asking 
the president to proclaim an emergency in the state. During the period 
of emergency, the federal government may undertake “extraordinary 
measures” to avert danger or restore peace.82
Despite these formal constitutional safeguards, egregious abuses, 
implicating the federal executive, characterized the invocations of these 
impeachment or emergency provisions during the Fourth Republic in 
Anambra, Oyo, and Plateau, among other states. The impeachment 
processes, in particular, were degraded by numerous interrelated vio-
lations of the letter or spirit of the law, including the external initia-
tion or instigation of impeachment processes by the federal executive 
rather than by the state legislatures; the use of the EFCC, an agency 
under the president’s control and notorious for its politically selective 
 81 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s. 188.
 82 Ibid., s. 305.
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anti-corruption program, as the main author or source of the charges 
of gubernatorial misconduct; the resort to impeachment as a strategy 
for removing the constitutional immunity of the governors in order to 
enable their prosecution for corruption by the EFCC; the use of federal 
security agencies (i.e., the police, state security services, and even the 
military) to coerce state legislators into endorsing the impeachments; 
suspensions of recalcitrant legislators in bids to achieve the numbers 
required for impeachment; the appointment of openly partisan mem-
bers into, and the unduly hasty conduct of the work of, a panel of inves-
tigation; and “tampering with the offices of the speaker of the house of 
Assembly and of the chief judge, sittings at odd times of the day, acting 
on an interim report of a panel of investigation, or even acting without 
a report at all.”83
The presidential proclamations of emergency, although politically 
less contentious and procedurally less abusive than the impeachment 
exercises, were characterized by such questionable processes as “non-
compliance with the requirement of an objective factual situation” of a 
dangerous exigency; “non-compliance with the request requirement”; 
and use of a constitutionally dubious and arguably moribund law, the 
Emergency Powers Act of 1961, to suspend the entire executive and 
legislature of a state during the period of emergency.84
The courts were partly reluctant to intervene in these politically 
fraught impeachment and emergency sagas, especially as the Constitu-
tion explicitly prohibits judicial review of impeachment proceedings. 
Thus, in AG Anambra State v. AG Federation & Ors (2005),85 which was 
instituted following an attempt by the Nigeria Police Force to force 
the ouster of Anambra’s governor on the basis of a forged or illicitly 
obtained resignation letter purportedly accepted by the state assem-
bly, the Supreme Court acknowledged the “siege” on the governor, 
but declined to issue any advisory, “hypothetical,” “speculative,” or 
pre-emptive declarations regarding the scope of federal police or emer-
gency powers in the state.
Similarly, in Plateau State & Anor v. AG Federation & Anor (2006),86 the 
Court struck out a legal challenge to President Obasanjo’s suspension of 
 83 Lawan, “Abuse of Powers of Impeachment in Nigeria,” 317–18.
 84 ben Nwabueze, How President Obasanjo Subverted Nigeria’s Federal System (Ibadan: 
Gold, 2007), 196–230.
 85 AG Anambra State v. AG Federation & Ors [2005] 5 SCM 39.
 86 Plateau State & Anor v. AG Federation & Anor [2006] 1 SCM 163.
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the elected executive and legislature of Plateau for six months (18 May–
17 November 2004), following an outbreak of ethno-religious violence 
in the state. The Supreme Court ruled the suit procedurally incompe-
tent because it was instituted during the six-month emergency period 
by the suspended legislators in the name of Plateau State without the 
authorization of the centrally imposed administration of the state. That 
the emergency administration could not possibly have authorized a 
legal action against its own validity did not stop the Supreme Court 
from rejecting the action as falling outside its constitutional jurisdiction. 
The Court also held that the suit involved claims for personal reliefs (or 
payments of financial compensation for loss of emoluments during the 
emergency not only to the plaintiff legislators but also to their executive 
counterparts) that were outside the original, as distinct from appellate, 
jurisdiction of the Court. It acknowledged that the suit raised “very 
salient questions” but “founder[ed] on an important procedural point,” 
leading the legal scholar and counsel for the plaintiff, ben Nwabueze, 
to conclude that this was “a lamentable instance of the (Court’s) policy 
of avoiding sensitive constitutional or policy issues.”87
however, in Hon. Michael Dapianlong & Ors v. Chief (Dr) Joshua Chibi 
Dariye & Ors (2007),88 the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the 
Court of Appeal that “held that the jurisdiction of courts is ousted [in 
impeachment proceedings] only if the procedure outlined in … the 
constitution is complied with” and therefore voided the removal of 
the Plateau State governor by only eight members of the twenty-four-
member state legislature.89 Although the eight legislators claimed that 
fourteen of the state’s legislators had effectively vacated the house by 
decamping from the ruling PDP to the opposition Action Congress, 
the Supreme Court affirmed that “until the vacancies created by the 
carpet crossing members are filled by the process of by-election, the 
Plateau State house of Assembly can only transact such legislative 
duties that require the participation of less than 2/3 majority of ALL 
the members of that house, which duties definitely exclude impeach-
ment proceedings.”90
 87 Plateau State & Anor v. AG Federation & Anor [2006] 1 SCM 183, 202; Nwabueze, 
Judiciary as the Third Estate of the Realm, 237.
 88 Hon. Michael Dapianlong & Ors v. Chief (Dr) Joshua Chibi Dariye & Ors [2007] 8 NWLR 
(Pt. 1036).
 89 Lawan, “Abuse of Powers of Impeachment in Nigeria,” 317.
 90 Ibid., 322 (capitalization in the original).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s invalida-
tion of the impeachment of the PDP governor of Oyo State by eighteen 
of the thirty-two state legislators. backed openly by the federal attorney 
general and security agencies, the eighteen members claimed to have 
suspended seven of their counterparts, thereby reducing the member-
ship of the house to twenty-five and fulfilling the constitutionally man-
dated two-thirds requirement for the removal of the governor. but in Hon. 
Muyiwa Inakoju & Ors v. Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke & Ors (2007),91 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of the impeachment 
proceedings in Oyo and restored the governor to his position as the 
state’s constitutionally elected chief political executive.
Electoral manipulation, along with impeachments and declarations 
of states of emergency, are key strategies by which the federal execu-
tive and its political allies have sought to undermine their sub-national 
rivals. In Anambra, where the federal executive had sought to employ 
all three strategies simultaneously, the judiciary made multiple crucial 
interventions that protected constitutionalism and the state’s political 
autonomy. These included the voiding of the PDP’s 2003 gubernatorial 
victory in March 2006 on account of massive electoral fraud, the invali-
dation in February 2007 of the procedurally irregular impeachment of 
the newly installed All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) governor 
by PDP legislators, and the setting aside of the PDP’s purported guber-
natorial victory in the April 2007 election illegally conducted by INEC 
when the opposition APGA governor of the state was barely a year into 
his four-year tenure.
In Anambra, as well as in Edo, Ekiti, Osun, and Ondo, opposition 
parties were ultimately installed in place of the PDP as state govern-
ing parties following active judicial review and annulment of several 
of the PDP’s dubious gubernatorial victories in the massively rigged 
and heavily litigated 2007 elections. however, the most phenomenal 
instance of Supreme Court intervention in the elections involved, yet 
again, a PDP intra-party conflict.
In Rt Hon. Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi v. INEC & Ors (2008),92 the Supreme 
Court invalidated the electoral victory of Celestine Omehia, the official 
PDP candidate in the 2007 Rivers gubernatorial election, and instead 
 91 Hon. Muyiwa Inakoju & Ors v. Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke & Ors [2007] 4 NWLR  
(Pt. 1025).
 92 Rt. Hon. Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi v. INEC & Ors [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080).
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declared Rotimi Amaechi, who had been prevented by the party from 
contesting the election, the governor-elect. Amaechi had overwhelm-
ingly won the PDP’s Rivers governorship primaries, but his candidacy 
was surreptitiously substituted by the national-level PDP with Omehia’s, 
who was not even a contestant in the primaries. When Amaechi legally 
challenged the substitution, the PDP referred to his purported indictment 
by the EFCC and subsequently expelled him from the party.
Unable to obtain redress in the Federal high Court and the Court of 
Appeal, Amaechi finally approached the Supreme Court, which held, 
in an unprecedented but unanimous ruling, that Amaechi, and not 
Omehia, must be deemed to be the only lawful PDP candidate in, and 
winner of, the April 2007 Rivers gubernatorial election. The Supreme 
Court upbraided the Court of Appeal for not following a judicial prec-
edent regarding the unconstitutionality of candidate substitutions that 
were not based on “cogent and verifiable reasons.” It also impugned 
the attempt to punish Amaechi for an alleged indictment without pros-
ecution in an impartial court of law, and disparaged the federal execu-
tive’s use of the EFCC and INEC to “politicize the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offences.” The apex court, however, reserved its 
harshest words for the PDP for doing “everything possible to subvert 
the rule of law, frustrate Amaechi and hold the court before the general 
public as supine and irrelevant.”93
As underscored by the cases of Alhaji Atiku Abubakar & Ors v. Alhaji 
Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua & Ors (2008)94 and General Muhammadu Buhari v. 
INEC & Ors (2008),95 however, the Supreme Court was less activist in 
addressing PDP shenanigans in presidential, as distinct from guberna-
torial, elections. In Alhaji Atiku Abubakar & Ors v. Alhaji Umaru Musa 
Yar’ Adua & Ors, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal 
rejecting vice-President Atiku Abubakar’s petition that he had been 
unlawfully excluded from participating in the April 2007 presidential 
elections. Determined to prevent the allegedly disloyal Abubakar from 
succeeding to the presidency, the federal executive and the PDP had 
suspended Abubakar from the party, all but secured his disqualifica-
tion by INEC from the presidential contest for alleged indictment for 
corruption, and sought unsuccessfully to remove him as vice-president. 
 93 Ibid., 321.
 94 Alhaji Atiku Abubakar & Ors v. Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua & Ors [2008] 19 NWLR 
(Pt. 1120).
 95 General Muhammadu Buhari v. INEC & Ors [2008] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120).
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Forced into protracted legal battles for his political survival, Abubakar 
got officially on the presidential ballot only on the ticket of the opposi-
tion Action Congress just three days before the massively rigged pres-
idential election, coming in a distant third in the election with 7 per 
cent of the vote. however, the Supreme Court affirmed by a 6–1 major-
ity that, as an official candidate in the presidential election, Abubakar 
could not claim unlawful exclusion from the election; furthermore, 
having pleaded unlawful exclusion, Abubakar could not question the 
election on any other grounds available to a participant in the election.96
A similar narrow legalism was evident in General Muhammadu Buhari v. 
INEC & Ors. In this instance, the Court conceded that the conduct of 
the 2007 elections had been characterized by substantial non-compli-
ance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, including a failure to use 
serialized ballot papers. but it upheld the results of the elections, by a 
narrow 4–3 majority, on the ground that Muhammadu buhari, the run-
ner-up in the elections, had failed to prove that such non-compliance 
had substantially affected the election’s outcome. yet, as argued by Jus-
tice George Oguntade in his dissent, INEC’s failure to use serialized 
ballot papers had made it “impossible to establish [an audit] trail of 
ballot papers,” thereby fundamentally compromising the transparency 
and validity of the presidential elections. Furthermore, to saddle “a 
petitioner with the burden of showing non-compliance with the provi-
sions of the Electoral Act and at the same time showing the effect of the 
alleged non-compliance on the result of election would appear unduly 
favorable and lenient to the respondent [INEC] who is the perpetrator 
of disobedience to the law of the land.”97
The Supreme Court’s validation of the universally condemned 2007 
presidential election preserved the political hegemony of the PDP and 
the electoral authoritarianism of the Nigerian federation, while rais-
ing serious questions about the Court’s credibility and viability as an 
arbiter. Indeed, the judiciary’s interventions in electoral processes have 
posed the stiffest challenges to the institution’s efficacy, authority, and 
legitimacy.
First, the sheer volume of electoral petitions (1,250 in 2007) strained 
the judiciary’s already overstretched resources, leading to long delays 
 96 Alhaji Atiku Abubakar & Ors v. Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua & Ors [2008] 19 NWLR 
(Pt. 1120) 215.
 97 General Muhammadu Buhari v. INEC & Ors [2008] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 452.
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in resolving many of the electoral disputes and virtual impunity for 
election riggers. Second, in inserting the judiciary into high-level politi-
cal and electoral disputes, Nigeria’s system of “democracy by court 
order” left the institution at the receiving end of politicians’ desper-
ate antics, including abuses of court processes and orders, and illicit 
attempts to influence judges.98 Third, electoral adjudications have been 
mired in massive legal contradictions and financial corruption, includ-
ing credible allegations of huge bribes paid by politicians to judges of 
election tribunals, the Court of Appeal, and even the Supreme Court. 
Fourth, the judiciary’s immersion in electoral disputes has under-
mined the institution’s internal cohesion. This was evident in 2011–12 
when the federation’s two highest judicial officers, the chief justice of 
the Supreme Court and the president of the Court of Appeal, publicly 
clashed and traded accusations of corruption over electoral adjudica-
tion matters.99 Finally, despite the reining in of some of the worst politi-
cal excesses of the federal executive and PDP at the sub-national level, 
judicial interventions in elections failed to end the party’s stranglehold 
on the federal government until the 2015 presidential elections, when 
the PDP was decisively defeated by the APC. This is partly because 
the onerous evidentiary burden for electoral petitions is significantly 
easier to muster in statewide gubernatorial races than in nationwide 
presidential contests.
V. Conclusion
The judiciary’s performance in the development of Nigeria’s con-
stitutional federalism has been ambivalent. On the positive side, the 
Supreme Court has played an important arbitrative role in Nigerian 
federalism. The Court has been a key mediator of the distributive con-
flicts that dominate Nigeria’s oil-centric federal system, judiciously 
arbitrating revenue-sharing disputes between the federal government 
and the states, between the oil-producing and non-oil-producing states, 
and among the oil-rich states themselves. The Court has adjudicated 
the conflicted constitutional status of local governments, affirming the 
broad rights of the states over localities, while seeking to uphold the 
national framework rules designed to guarantee the integrity of local 
 98 See “Nigeria: Democracy by Court Order,” Economist (London), 24 January 2008.
 99 human Rights Watch, Corruption on Trial, 36.
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government as the putative third order of the federal system. The Court 
also has helped to strengthen the weak democratic foundations of the 
federation, restraining political executives’ authoritarian attempts to 
destabilize or remove state and local governments, while curtailing the 
centre’s manipulations of gubernatorial elections.
Less positively, the Supreme Court has played at best a secondary or 
limited role in the development of Nigerian federalism. Essentially, the 
Court has seen itself as an interpreter and enforcer of Nigeria’s centrist 
Constitution rather than as a transformational agent for the country’s 
democratic decentralization after years of hyper-centralizing, extra-
judicial military rule. As claimed by Justice Niki Tobi in AG Lagos State 
v. AG Federation & Ors (2003), “We may have our own aversions and 
prejudices on the unitary context of some provisions of our Federal 
Constitution but there is nothing we can do as judges.”100 Not surpris-
ingly, most of the Court’s decisions since 1999 have buttressed federal 
supremacy by, for instance, affirming federal ownership of oil resources, 
upholding the federal government’s broad revenue-sharing powers, 
confirming the centre’s authority to regulate local government elections 
and boundaries, and legitimizing the authoritarian electoral control of 
the PDP at the national level. Furthermore, reflecting the narrow con-
finement of much of its federalism jurisprudence to concrete intergov-
ernmental disputes, the Supreme Court has remained disengaged from 
some of the country’s major federalist debates and conflicts, including 
the constitutionality of extensions of sharia law in Muslim states or the 
legality of discrimination on the basis of state of origin.
The quest for better judicial governance, including a more robust 
judicial federalism, has produced multiple, often conflicting, propos-
als for reform.101 These include the creation of a specialized constitu-
tional court devoted exclusively to the timely arbitration of major 
political conflicts; the redefinition of the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to enable it offer advisory constitutional opinions; the evolution 
of more sensible docket-management doctrines and practices as a way 
of removing purely practical and procedural causes from the Supreme 
Court’s overloaded docket and, thus, enhancing the quality of the 
 100 AG Lagos State v. AG Federation & Ors [2003] 9 SCM 137.
 101 See, for instance, National Political Reform Conference (NPRC), Report of the 
Committee on Judiciary and Legal Forms (Abuja: NPRC, 2005); Adebisi Onanuga, Eric 
Ikhiale, Joseph Jibueze, and Precious Igbonwelundu, “Will Musdapher’s bill Sail 
Through?” Nation (Lagos), 26 June 2012.
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Court’s jurisprudence; changes to the composition and qualifications 
of the Court in order to enhance the professionalism and experience of 
its justices; the implementation of clean-elections reforms as a means 
of alleviating the pressures on the courts from electoral petitions; the 
reconstitution of the NJC in order to enhance its independence from, 
and oversight of, serving judicial officers, while making it more federal 
(rather than unitary) in character; the de-politicization of the office of 
the attorney-general; and strengthening the dignity, quality, and effi-
ciency of lower courts as a way of restoring confidence in these courts 
and reducing the size of the docket in the appellate courts.
yet, in the absence of broader changes in the structural founda-
tions and constitutional architecture of Nigeria’s semi-democratic and 
pseudo-federal polity, it is unlikely that the judiciary will be a catalyst 
for a radically reformed or enhanced democratic federalism.
11  The Constitutional Court of South 
Africa: Reinforcing an hourglass  
System of Multi-Level Government1
nico steytler
I. Introduction
“The supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law” are two founda-
tional values of South Africa’s 1996 Constitution (s. 1(c)). An independent 
judiciary is thus set to play a major role in interpreting and enforcing the 
Constitution. With some significant federal elements in the Constitution, 
such as establishing provincial and local orders of government, the courts, 
with the Constitutional Court at the apex, are bound to give shape and 
texture to this system of government. Since 1995, the Constitutional Court 
as well as the Supreme Court of Appeal and high Court have asserted the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the separation of powers, establishing 
a jurisprudence that gives effect to the principle of limited government. 
however, in interpreting the federal arrangements, the Constitutional 
Court has not given full effect to the self-rule elements of provincial gov-
ernment. Instead, it has more often enforced local government’s constitu-
tional “right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of 
its community” (s. 151(3)). Furthermore, while soft on the substantive con-
tent of provincial self-rule, it has scrupulously policed compliance with the 
procedural rules of intergovernmental relations. The Court’s jurisprudence 
has given further credence to the hourglass model of multi-level govern-
ment; provinces are squeezed thin from the top by a dominant national 
government and from below by powerful metropolitan governments.
 1 helpful suggestions by my colleagues Jaap de visser, Derek Powell, and the 
anonymous reviewers are much appreciated. This work is also based is upon research 
supported by the South African Research Chairs Initiative of the Department of 
Science and Technology and National Research Foundation.
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II. Federal System
1. The Broad Characteristics
South Africa’s 54 million people are diverse. Africans, comprising 
nine linguistic communities, constitute 80.2 per cent of the population, 
followed by Coloureds (a mixed-race category at 8.8 per cent), whites 
(8.4 per cent), and Indian or Asian (2.5 per cent).2 A few million undocu-
mented inhabitants (the precise number unknown), originating from 
neighbouring countries, notably Zimbabwe, should be added to the 
total. Eleven official languages are constitutionally recognized, and the 
percentage breakdown of the major language groups is IsiZulu (22.7); 
IsiXhosa (16); Afrikaans (13.5); English (9.6), Sepedi (9.1); Setswana (8); 
and Sesotho (7.6).3 Although the explicit intention was not to create 
ethnically based provinces, seven of the nine provinces have a linguis-
tic majority. South Africa is regarded as a middle-income country at 
US$12,900 GDP per capita in 2014; yet it shows one of the highest levels 
of income disparity (income Gini coefficient 0.69),4 with nearly half of 
the population living in poverty spread across urban and rural areas.
Following the demise of apartheid, the interim Constitution of 1993 
established two orders of government – the national government and 
nine provinces. Although local government was recognized in the 1993 
Constitution (mainly as a provincial competence), the 1996 Constitu-
tion elevated it to a “sphere” of government alongside the national and 
provincial governments (s. 40(1)).5
 2 Statistics South Africa, Stats in Brief 2014 (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 2014),  
table 2.3.
 3 Statistics South Africa, Census 2011: Census in Brief (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 
2012), 24, figure 2.3.
 4 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa 2015, 7, http://www.treasury.gov.za/
publications/other/OECD%20Economic%20Surveys%20South%20Africa%202015.pdf.
 5 For further background, see Nico Steytler, “Republic of South Africa,” in Constitutional 
Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, 
311–46 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005); Christina 
Murray, “Republic of South Africa,” in Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Governance 
in Federal Countries, ed. Katy le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, 258–88 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); and Jaap de visser, “Republic of 
South Africa,” in Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems, ed. Nico 
Steytler, 267–97 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); Chris 
Tapscott, “Republic of South Africa: An Uncertain Path to Federal Democracy,” 
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The 1993 Constitution was a peace treaty between the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the white minority regime. The low-intensity civil 
war that commenced in 1960 was also taken to the black homeland 
governments, which were regarded as collaborators of the apartheid 
government. The formation of the nine provinces was a key compro-
mise between the incumbent white regime and some homeland leaders, 
notably Chief Mangosuthu buthelezi from KwaZulu, who championed 
a strong federal system for ethnic accommodation as well as limiting the 
power of the centre. however, the ANC demanded a strong centre in 
order to transform the society after three centuries of racial oppression. 
The outcome of the “negotiated revolution” was a weak form of federal-
ism, showing strong unitary elements.6 Although there were four “inde-
pendent” homelands (recognized as such only by South Africa) and six 
self-governing territories (giving effect to the grand apartheid design 
based on ethnicity), the formation of provinces in 1994 was a process of 
devolution; a largely centralized system, ultimately under the control of 
the white minority regime, devolved into nine provinces.
The peace negotiations were essentially the business of political 
parties, most notably the (white) National Party (NP) and the ANC. 
because the result was a negotiated constitution, the ANC’s demand for 
a democratically based constitution was met with the undertaking that 
within two years a final constitution would be drafted by a democrati-
cally elected Constitutional Assembly. The NP’s fears that the gains it 
made at the negotiating table would be swept aside by an elected ANC 
majority were met by the condition that the new constitution had to 
comply with a number of negotiated constitutional principles, which 
included protection of the provincial system.
The 1996 Constitution’s hybrid federal system, eventually certified 
by the Constitutional Court as complying with the Constitutional Prin-
ciples,7 has been in operation ever since, with no significant changes. 
 in Political Parties and Civil Society in Federal Countries, ed. Klaus Detterbeck, Wolfgang 
Renzsch, and John Kincaid, 199–226 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 
2015); Derek Powell, “Constructing a Developmental State in South Africa: The 
Corporatization of Intergovernmental Relations,” in Intergovernmental Relations in 
Federal Systems: Comparative Structures and Dynamics, ed. Johanne Poirier, Cheryl 
Saunders, and John Kincaid, 305–49 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015).
 6 Ronald L. Watts, “Is the New South African Constitution Federal or Unitary?,” in 
Birth of a Constitution, ed. bertus de villiers (Cape Town: Juta, 1994), 75, 86.
 7 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) 
bCLR 1253 (CC) (“First Certification judgment”).
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Giving effect to the self-rule elements of the hybrid federal system has 
entailed the subnational governments being responsible for 62 per cent 
of the total state expenditure; in the 2013/14 financial year, provinces 
(responsible for the wage bill of teachers and medical staff) expended 
36 per cent and municipalities 26 per cent.8
because the ANC never fully embraced the negotiated solution, 
the system has been under review since 2007.9 The other two mem-
bers of the ruling ANC alliance – the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – 
are outspoken in criticizing the provinces and advocating their aboli-
tion. In contrast, the major opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, 
which captured the Western Cape province in 2009, and again, with 
an increased majority, in 2014, is a strong proponent of the provincial 
system. It not only seeks to exploit the opportunities provided by the 
current system, but also uses good governance in the Western Cape as 
the platform for its political campaign to capture other provinces.
Although the high level of maladministration and corruption preva-
lent in a number of provinces has not endeared them to the public or 
the national government, strong elites coagulated around such govern-
ments, thus making major constitutional reform unlikely.10 This was 
reflected in the ANC’s 53rd National Conference resolution in Decem-
ber 2012 that effectively retained the provincial system by requiring 
that “provinces [should] be reformed, reduced and strengthened.”11 
What is also on the cards is the continual growth of metropolitan gov-
ernment.12 The formation in 2000 of six major metropolitan municipali-
ties (increased to eight in 2011) has resulted in ever-increasing demands 
 8 National Treasury, Budget Review 2014 (Pretoria: National Treasury, 2014), 93, and 
table 7.1.
 9 ANC, “Legislature and Governance for a National Democratic Society,” Policy 
Discussion Documents, ANC 52nd National Conference 2007, Umrabula Publication 
(Marshalltown: African National Congress, 2007). See further Nico Steytler “The 
Politics of Provinces and the Provincialisation of Politics,” in Law, Politics and Rights: 
Essays in Memory of Kader Asmal, ed. Tiyanjana Maluwa, 191–214 (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2014).
 10 Steytler, “Politics of Provinces and the Provincialisation of Politics.”
 11 ANC, Resolutions of 53rd National Conference: Legislatures and Governance, 
Resolution 4.2.1 (2012).
 12 National Planning Commission, National Development Plan: Our Future – Make It Work 
(Pretoria: National Planning Commission, 2012), 435. See also De visser “Republic of 
South Africa,” 292.
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for more functions at the expense of provinces. Over the last few years, 
the important provincial functions of transport and housing have been 
slowly assigned to the metropolitan councils.
With constitutional supremacy a core principle of the Constitution,13 
the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction covers all aspects of the federal 
arrangement. As such, the Court has the power to invalidate legisla-
tion and executive action compelling the fulfilment of constitutional 
obligations (s. 2). Even though the system of multi-level government 
has operated for two decades, the Constitutional Court has not had a 
dominant hand in shaping the system; at best, its role can be described 
as middling.
2. Structural Features
The Constitution provides that “government is constituted as national, 
provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, inter-
dependent and interrelated” (s. 40(1)). The “distinctive” characteristic 
reflects the measure of “self-rule” of provinces and local government; 
they have entrenched powers and functions and access to revenue 
sources. The Constitution provides detailed provisions for the function-
ing of provincial legislative and executive structures and procedures. 
It also envisages national legislation on provincial administration and 
financial management.14 As the constitutional provisions with regard 
to local government are more schematic, national legislation structures 
the establishment of municipalities and their internal organizations, 
functioning, and financial management.15
Following an integrative federal approach, the allocation of powers 
and functions to provinces and municipalities allows for an interwo-
ven and complementary system. First, most provincial functions are 
 13 The establishment of constitutionalism in South Africa in 1994 finds resonance in 
the argument of Ran hirschl (Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the 
New Constitutionalism [Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 2004], 99); judicial 
empowerment through the constitutionalization of judicial review and a bill of rights is 
often a “conscious strategy undertaken by threatened political elites seeking to preserve 
or enhance their hegemony by insulating policy-making from popular political 
pressures and supported by economic and judicial elites with compatible interests.”
 14 Inter alia, the Public Service Act, 1994, and the Public Finance Management Act, 1999.
 15 See Municipal Structures Act, 1998; Municipal Systems Act, 2000; Municipal Finance 
Management Act, 2003; Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004; and Municipal Fiscal 
Powers and Functions Act, 2007.
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concurrent with the national government, the principal functions being 
education, health, social welfare, housing, agriculture, and transport 
(sch. 4). Much more limited are exclusive provincial powers, which 
include ambulance services, liquor licences, provincial planning, pro-
vincial roads, and traffic control (sch. 5). The adoption of a provin-
cial constitution, although within narrow parameters, is perhaps the 
only “true” exclusive power. Local government’s constitutionally 
entrenched, but not exclusive, powers include electricity reticulation, 
water and sanitation, municipal public transport, municipal health 
services, municipal planning, and municipal roads and traffic (schs. 
4b and 5b). The national legislative powers are almost supreme; not 
only does Parliament have all residual powers, but it may also trump 
competing concurrent provincial legislation through a qualified over-
ride clause (s. 146), as well as exclusive provincial legislation on more 
limited grounds (s. 44(2)). both the national and provincial legislatures 
may regulate the entrenched local government powers (s. 155(7) and 
schs. 4b and 5b).
In the constitutional scheme, the national Parliament may assign 
any of its legislative powers (save very specific ones) to provinces and 
municipalities. Provinces may likewise assign any of their powers to 
municipalities. Municipalities, on the other hand, may claim the assign-
ment of both national and provincial matters if such matters would 
most effectively be administered locally (s. 156(4)).
Although the definitions of the various functional areas are often 
opaque (e.g., the precise differences between national, provincial, and 
local health services), there is, in the main, agreement on the allocated 
functions. however, contestation occurs on the cut-off points between 
functional areas, appropriate allocation of some functions (e.g., housing 
and transport), and unfunded mandates.
Within the paradigm of constitutional supremacy, the Constitutional 
Court has the final word on the definition of functional areas. The 
national Parliament has also on occasion circumscribed the content of 
broad functional areas by, for example, defining provincial and local 
health responsibilities in the National health Act, 2003.
Differing from the German constitutional model on which the South 
African system of “cooperative government” is based, the Constitution 
does not prescribe national framework legislation that must be comple-
mented by provincial laws. It does, however, envisage national laws in 
the terrain of provincial and local governance, as indicated above. In 
the case of local government, however, both the national and provincial 
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governments may legislate regulatory frameworks for the exercise of 
local competences (ss. 155(6)(a) and 155(7)).
The Constitution contains specific provisions to deal with conflict-
ing concurrent national and provincial laws by allowing a national 
law to trump a provincial law if certain broad conditions are met 
(s. 146). The override sets, however, a low hurdle for national legisla-
tion. First, for example, national legislation prevails if a matter “can-
not be regulated effectively” by provinces individually (s. 146(2)(a)). 
Moreover, the interpretational guidance in the Constitution is equally 
broad. First, courts are guided by the principle that they must always 
prefer a reasonable interpretation of the conflicting legislation that 
would avoid the conflict above an interpretation that results in conflict 
(s. 150). Second, in considering a further override test, namely, whether 
national legislation is “necessary” to maintain national security, eco-
nomic unity, and a common economic market, etc., courts must have 
“due regard to the approval or the rejection of the National Council 
of Provinces” (s. 146(4)), but there is no indication how such decision 
is to be used. Third, there is a built-in default position in favour of 
the national government; if a court cannot resolve the conflict, the 
national legislation prevails over the provincial legislation (s. 148). 
In case of a conflict, the law that does not prevail is not invalid but 
merely becomes inoperative.
Constitutional supremacy is also reflected in the amendment proce-
dures. The Constitution may be amended only by a two-thirds majority 
of the National Assembly following a special procedure. In the case of 
the founding values in section 1, a three-quarters majority is required. 
Depending on the nature of the amendment, the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) (and thus the provinces) has an important veto 
(s. 74). Any amendment of section 1 and the bill of Rights requires 
the consent of at least six of the nine provinces. Also, in respect of any 
amendment that affects the NCOP, or alters provincial boundaries, 
powers, functions, or institutions, at least six of the nine provinces must 
consent. Moreover, if the amendment affects only a specific province or 
provinces (such as a boundary change), the consent of the legislature(s) 
of those provinces is required. The two-thirds majority rule also applies 
to the amendment of provincial constitutions (s. 144).
Although there is no requirement of subjecting amendments to a 
popular referendum, the Constitutional Court has interpreted the leg-
islative process as requiring adequate public participation. Indeed, 
the Court has invalidated legislation on the basis of insufficient public 
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participation,16 including a constitutional amendment that changed the 
boundaries of the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape.17
As the upper guardian of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
plays a pivotal role in interpreting the Constitution’s federal elements 
when matters are brought to it. Provincial constitutions do not see the 
light of day unless the Constitutional Court has certified that they com-
ply with the required constitutional prescripts (s. 144). Given the rela-
tive newness of the system and the limited litigation due to the near 
dominance of the ANC in the provinces, it is premature to map how the 
Court has altered the operation of the federal system; yet the trend has 
been favourable to local government but not to the provinces.
The NCOP is one of the pivotal institutions intended to effect an inte-
grative federalism. As the name suggests, it is a council of provinces 
that participates in the national legislative process. The NCOP is thus 
described in the Constitution as representing “the provinces to ensure 
that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of 
government. It does this mainly by participating in the national legisla-
tive process and by providing a national forum for public consideration 
of issues affecting provinces” (s 42(4)). Owing some dues to its bundesrat 
progenitor, each province is represented by a ten-member delegation: 
four are members of the provincial legislature (with the premier being 
the leader of the delegation) and six are indirectly elected by the provin-
cial legislatures to serve at the legislatures’ pleasure a term of five years. 
Coming almost as an afterthought, but a logical consequence of the rec-
ognition of local government as a sphere of government, organized local 
government has ten representatives in the NCOP, who may participate 
in proceedings when the interests of local government are at issue, but 
may not vote (s. 67).
III. Court System
1. Introduction
Coming from a long tradition of parliamentary supremacy, the 
advent of democratic rule in 1994 also meant a shift to constitutional 
 16 Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, 2006 
(12) bCLR 1399 (CC).
 17 Matatiele Municipality and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, 2007 (1) bCLR 47 (CC).
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supremacy and the rule of law. Given that the “revolution” was nego-
tiated, there was no breach of legal continuity; the laws in operation 
in 1994 continued to apply to the extent that they were compliant with 
the new constitutional dispensation. This, too, applied to the common 
law; it had to comply and be developed in conformity with the bill of 
Rights.
The 1993 and 1996 Constitutions preserved the distinction between 
the high Court of general jurisdiction and the lower courts with lim-
ited jurisdiction. The Appellate Division, the highest court before 1994, 
now called the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), continued as the high-
est court in all matters other than constitutional. Final constitutional 
adjudication was reserved for the newly created Constitutional Court. 
The separate roles of the SCA and the Constitutional Court were neces-
sitated by the apartheid past. With all judges from the apartheid era 
continuing in their positions, final interpretation of the new supreme 
Constitution could not be left in the hands of the SCA. The Constitu-
tional Court was thus established, with only four of the eleven justices 
drawn from sitting judges. As court of final jurisdiction on constitu-
tional matters, this Court has also the final word on the constitutional 
framework for multi-level government in South Africa. The Consti-
tution thus makes specific provision that the Constitutional Court is 
the only court that can “decide disputes between organs of state in 
the national or provincial sphere concerning the constitutional status, 
powers and functions of any of those organs of state” (s. 168(4)). The 
Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 has now unified the 
appellate structure by making the Constitutional Court the final arbiter 
also in non-constitutional matters.
The new constitutional order entrenched the judiciary as a national 
competence. No constitutional provision was made for provincial or 
local courts. A high Court division has been established for every prov-
ince, with their jurisdictions coinciding with provincial boundaries. All 
the courts function in an integrated appellate system. There are appeals 
from the lower courts to the high Court, from the high Court to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, and from there to the Constitutional Court. 
On constitutional matters, an appeal lies either directly to the Constitu-
tional Court (with leave given in few cases) or via the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. Where the high Court invalidates a national or provincial law, 
or presidential conduct, as being unconstitutional, there is an “auto-
matic” review by the Constitutional Court; unless the Court confirms 
the invalidity, the law or conduct stands (s. 167(5)).
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As a trial court, the high Court proceedings are presided over by a 
single judge. In criminal cases, the judge is joined by two lay assessors. 
Lower court appeals to the high Court are heard by two or three judges. 
In the latter case, minority judgments can be delivered. In appeals to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, criminal cases are heard by a three-judge bench, 
while other appeals require a five-judge bench. In the Constitutional Court, 
a minimum of eight of the eleven justices forms a quorum. All decisions 
appear under the name of the judges. Only the Constitutional Court has 
on rare occasions delivered its judgments en banc, without reference to the 
justice who wrote them. Those occasions were of high political significance 
such as the certifications of the 1996 Constitution18 and the provincial con-
stitutions of KwaZulu-Natal19 and the Western Cape.20 Dissenting judg-
ments are possible and not infrequent. In the Constitutional Court’s 2007 
term, no fewer than in a third of the twenty-seven judgments contained 
dissenting opinions,21 with the percentage in the 2008 term being thirty-
nine,22 remaining the same for the 2012 term.23 This is a decrease from the 
48 per cent of 2006 judgments with dissenting opinions, while the average 
for the previous decade was only 23 per cent. Judgments of the high Court 
and appellate courts are published as well as the dissenting opinions.
Rooted in the common-law system, the doctrine of precedent is 
applied firmly by the courts. The Constitutional Court has asserted this 
doctrine of stare decisis even with regard to judgments originating from 
the apartheid era, subject, of course, to not being in conflict with the 
Constitution. The high Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. Even the two appellate 
courts are bound by their own decisions unless they are satisfied that 
the previous decision was “clearly wrong.”24
 18 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) 
SA 744 (CC) para. 287 (“First Certification” judgment).
 19 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996, 1996 
(11) bCLR 1419 (CC) (“KwaZulu-Natal Constitution”).
 20 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 (9) bCLR 1167 (CC).
 21 Liza Chamberlain and Sha’ista Kazee, “Constitutional Court Statistics for the 2007 
Term,” South African Journal on Human Rights 26 (2010): 571, table 3.
 22 Samantha brener, Michael Eastman, and Jennifer Macleod, “Constitutional Court 
Statistics for the 2008 Term,” South African Journal on Human Rights 27 (2011): 566, 
table 3.
 23 Saflii.org.za (analysis of the 34 judgment in the 2012 term).
 24 Camps bay Ratepayers and Residents Association v. harrison, 2011 (2) bCLR 121 
(CC) para. 28. See further, see Jason brickhill, “Precedent and the Constitutional 
Court,” Constitutional Court Review 3 (2010): 79–110.
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2. Constitutional Status of Courts and Judicial Officers
An entire chapter of the Constitution is devoted to the courts and the 
administration of justice. having complied with the Constitutional Princi-
ples that there should be “a separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness,”25 the relationship between 
the courts and the other branches of government is clearly set.26 The judi-
cial authority is vested in the courts (s. 165(1)), comprising the courts men-
tioned above. The Constitution, though, provides for national legislation 
to further regulate the judicial system. As the judiciary is a national com-
petency, provinces and municipalities play no role in their functioning, 
bar two exceptions. First, the provinces via the NCOP nominate four of 
its permanent delegates as members to the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC). In addition, the premier of the province is a member of the JSC when 
it considers a matter relating to the high Court in that province. The sec-
ond exception is the establishment of a “municipal” court. A municipality 
may pay for the salary of a nationally appointed magistrate, whose task is 
then to adjudicate the enforcement of municipal by-laws.
Central to the appointment of judges to the higher courts stands the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC). It was created in 1994 as a clear 
break with the long-standing practice of executive appointments, 
under which the first black judge was appointed only in 1991.27 In the 
new constitutional state, not only is the independence of the judici-
ary entrenched, but the process of appointment also is more transpar-
ent and less controlled by the executive. The JSC’s members comprise 
representatives from the judiciary (three, including the chief justice as 
chairperson), the minister of justice, the legal profession (four), law 
schools (one), the National Assembly (six, three of whom must be 
opposition MPs), NCOP delegates (four), presidential nominees (four), 
 25 Constitutional Principle vI Schedule 4 1993 Constitution.
 26 In National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries and Others (Licensed Animal Trainers Association and two 
amici curiae intervening) 2013 (1) bCLR 1159 (CC), the Constitutional Court affirmed 
the importance of the principle of the separation of powers when it invalidated 
provisions in a 1935 law that gave magistrates the task of issuing licences for 
exhibiting and training performing animals, because it was an administrative function 
totally unrelated to the judicial function.
 27 yvonne Mokgoro, “Judicial Appointments,” Advocate (December 2010): 44.
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and the judge-president and premier of a province where a matter con-
cerns the high Court in that province.
Despite the overhaul of the appointment process, there is still a strong 
executive hand in appointments to the top curial positions. The president 
appoints the chief justice and his or her deputy after consultation with 
the JSC and the leaders of the political parties in the National Assembly. 
The president needs to consult the JSC with regard to the appointment of 
the president and deputy president of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
When it comes to the nine justices of the Constitutional Court, the presi-
dent appoints them from a list provided by the JSC (there must be three 
names more than the vacant positions). For the appointment of all other 
judges, the president must follow the JSC’s advice. Giving effect to the con-
stitutional imprimatur that “the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the 
racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered when 
judicial officers are appointed” (s. 174(2)), by July 2014 of the 243 judges, 
63.4 per cent (147) were black and 32.5 per cent were women.28 Further-
more, the tradition of appointing judges from the ranks of senior advocates 
only has been tempered; a number of attorneys (solicitors), magistrates, 
and a few law professors have been elevated to the bench.
The JSC’s conduct has also come under criticism. Given the ANC’s 
strong hand in the JSC’s composition (at least twelve of twenty-three 
would be directly linked to the ruling party through the executive and 
the legislature), claims of political and biased appointments have been 
levelled. In 2011, the Cape bar Council successfully challenged the JSC 
for not appointing an outstanding white candidate to the Western Cape 
high Court as being arbitrary and irrational.29
The bedrock of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law is 
the independence of the judiciary. The Constitution thus proclaims, “The 
courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice” 
(s. 165(2)). The independence of the judiciary is entrenched through the 
usual techniques. First, judges have tenure until reaching a specified age. 
 28 Nomthandazo Ntlama, “The Transformation of the South African Judiciary: A 
Measure to Weaken Its Capacity?,” 9 table 3, New york Law School, http://www.
nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/10/Ntlama.pdf.
 29 Cape bar Council v. Judicial Service Commission and Another (Centre for 
Constitutional Rights and Another as Amici Curiae), 2012 (4) bCLR 406 (WC), 
upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Judicial Service Commission and 
Another v. Cape bar Council and Another 2012 (11) bCLR 1239 (SCA).
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before then, their removal requires a finding by the JSC that a judge suffers 
from incapacity, is grossly incompetent, or is guilty of gross misconduct. 
This finding must then be supported by a two-thirds vote in the National 
Assembly. Second, their salaries, allowances, and benefits may not be 
reduced. Third, after a long wrangle with the executive, the budget of the 
courts was placed under the control of the chief justice.30
The judiciary’s independent functioning has not gone uncontested. 
The first serious volley fired over the bow of the courts was the state-
ment of the secretary-general of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, that some 
courts were “counter revolutionaries,” stymieing the national demo-
cratic revolution.31 These sentiments were echoed by senior ministers in 
the national executive. Even President Jacob Zuma weighed in against 
the Constitutional Court when he ordered a review of the judgments of 
that Court, stating that the courts cannot be regarded as always right 
when they produce dissenting opinions. Furthermore, the president’s 
choice of the current chief justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng, was widely criti-
cized because he was the least experienced judge on the Constitutional 
Court. In each case where the Constitutional Court imposed positive 
obligations on the state to fulfil socio-economic rights, the complaint by 
government has been that the judiciary was not respecting the separa-
tion of powers. These volleys were, no doubt, instigated by government 
being on the losing side most often32 and thus perceiving the Court as an 
obstacle to its governing.
 30 Superior Courts Act, 2013.
 31 See Sapa, “ANC Defends Mantashe’s Remarks on Judges,” Polityorg.za, 11 July 
2008, http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-defends-mantashes-remarks-on-
judges-2008-07-11.
 32 In the Constitutional Court’s 2007 term, the Court found in favour of the 
government only in eight of eighteen cases (47 per cent) (Chamberlain and Kazee, 
“Constitutional Court Statistics 2007,” table 7). The percentage of state success in 
2008 was lower at 44 per cent (brener, Eastman, and Macleod, “Constitutional Court 
Statistics 2008,” 567). In 2011 alone the national executive lost a number of crucial 
decisions: invalidating the placement a special investigative unit (formerly known 
as the Directorate of Special Operation, called “the Scorpions,” now renamed the 
Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations, called “the hawks”), which fell under 
the jurisdiction of the largely autonomous National Prosecuting Authority, under 
the South African Police Service (and executive control) (Glenister v. President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others, 2011 (7) bCLR 651 (CC)); the unconstitutional 
extension of Chief Justice Ngcobo’s term of office (Justice Alliance of SA v. 
President of the RSA and Two Similar Applications, 2011 (10) bCLR 1017 (CC)); the 
invalidation by the SCA of the presidential appointment of the national director of 
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Matters came to a head when the North Gauteng high Court issued 
an interim order that the government could not allow the sitting presi-
dent of Sudan, Omar al-bashir, who was attending an African Union 
Summit in Johannesburg in June 2015, to leave South Africa, pending 
a determination whether South Africa should arrest him and hand 
him over to the International Criminal Court to face charges of geno-
cide and war crimes. Not only did the government deliberately diso-
bey the court order (see further below), but Cabinet ministers and the 
ANC unleashed a barrage of criticism against the judiciary.33 Mantashe 
proclaimed that the courts were biased against the ruling party and 
that certain courts had “a negative attitude towards government.”34 At 
the centre of the complaint was the accusation that the courts did not 
respect the separation of powers. Instead, they “overreached” into the 
domain of the executive.
The ANC’s attacks on the judiciary have raised grave concerns over 
the past few years. The first chief justice in the democratic South Africa, 
Arthur Chaskalson, warned that the attacks against the judiciary com-
ing from senior politicians “undermine the constitutional order and 
pose a threat to our democracy.”35 he admonished politicians who 
want to rein in the courts rather to direct their fury to the Constitution, 
which the courts interpret. Public outcry against political interference 
has been severe from some legal quarters. For example, a civil-society 
organization, Freedom under Law, under the leadership of former 
 public prosecutions (Democratic Alliance v. President of the RSA and Others, 2012 
(3) bCLR 291 (SCA)). In 2014 some provisions of the South African Police Services 
Amendment Act, 2012, which sought to align the Act with the Court’s judgment 
in Glenister (see above), were also invalidated for failing to secure adequate 
independence for the hawks (helen Suzman Foundation v. President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others; Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 
2015 (1) bCLR 1 (CC)).
 33 Editorial, “This Is a Country of Laws,” City Press, 21 June 2015.
 34 “Gwede Mantashe Criticises Judiciary as being Problematic,” ENCA, 23 June 2015, 
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/gwede-mantashe-criticises-judiciary-being-
problematic.
 35 Address on 29 January 2012, University of Cape Town. Arthur Chaskalson, 
“When Law Irks Power,” Times Live, 29 January 2012, http://www.timeslive.
co.za/2012/01/29/when-law-irks-power. See also the concerns of former chief 
justice Sandile Ngcobo, “Sustaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary: An 
eEssential Condition for Realising the Judicial Role,” South African Law Journal  
128 (2011): 5.
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Constitutional Court judge, Johan Kriegler, has sought through legal 
challenges to overturn the JSC’s overtly political decisions.36
After the attacks on the judiciary following the al-bashir debacle, the 
judiciary responded; under the leadership of the chief justice, senior 
judges convened in July 2015 and expressed their dismay at what they 
termed “general gratuitous criticism” by Cabinet ministers and the ANC. 
Chief Justice Mogoeng and a few senior judges then met in August with 
President Zuma and a coterie of Cabinet ministers to discuss judicial 
“overreach” and the separation of powers. From all accounts, the judici-
ary was not cowed; both sides agreed to respect the separation of powers, 
exercise caution when criticizing each other, and respect and comply with 
court orders.37 This meeting was followed by another in November, this 
time between Zuma, Mogoeng, and the chairpersons of the two houses 
of Parliament, in order for the three arms of government to discuss mat-
ters of mutual concern. Whether the planned twice-yearly meetings will 
strengthen the separation of powers or undermine it is too early to tell.
3. Institutional Role of the Courts
The organization of the court system shows some specialization. Start-
ing from the top, the Constitutional Court has the final say on consti-
tutional matters and exclusive jurisdiction concerning, among other 
things, the validity of national legislation and certain intergovernmen-
tal disputes. The Supreme Court of Appeal had final appellate jurisdic-
tion on all matters other than constitutional matters. This space was 
increasingly narrowed as the Constitutional Court decided what is 
and what is not constitutional. As noted above, the split in jurisdic-
tion has ended; in terms of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment 
Act of 2012, the Constitutional Court is also the final appellate court in 
any non-constitutional matter that “raises an arguable point of law of 
general importance.”38 The high Court in each province has general 
 36 hlope v. Premier of the Western Cape; hlope v. Freedom under Law and Others 
(Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Others as Amicus Curiae), 2012 (1) bCLR 
1 (CC). A number of civil society organizations successfully challenged the 
unconstitutional extension of Chief Justice Ngcobo’s tenure (Justice Alliance of SA v. 
President of the RSA and Two Similar Applications, 2011 (10 bCLR 1017 (CC)).
 37 “‘historic’ Meeting Falters on Separation of Powers,” Legalbrief, 31 August 2015, 
http://legalbrief.co.za/story/historic-meeting-falters-on-separation-of-powers-3/.
 38 See Mbata v. University of Zululand 2014 (2) bCLR 123 (CC).
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original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction from its own ranks as 
well as from the magistrates’ courts. The high Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited by the specific jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Labour 
Appeal Court (on labour matters), the Competition Appeal Court (on 
competition law), the Electoral Court, and the Land Claims Court (on 
land reform).
In line with common-law jurisdictions, such as the United States 
and Australia, South African courts, as a rule, entertain live disputes 
only. The establishment of the Constitutional Court has, however, 
introduced abstract review. Setting the tone, one of the Court’s first 
tasks was assessing whether the 1996 Constitution complied with the 
Constitutional Principles set forth in the 1993 Constitution. The 1996 
Constitution further embedded abstract review in three instances. 
First, the president may refuse to sign a bill into law if he or she has 
doubts about its constitutionality and then refer the matter to the 
Constitutional Court for an opinion.39 A similar power is bestowed on 
premiers of provinces with regard to provincial bills.40 Second, a third 
of the members of the National Assembly may place an act assented 
to by the president before the Constitutional Court to decide on its 
constitutionality (s. 89). A similar procedure applies to provincial 
legislatures where the support of only 20 per cent of the members is 
required (s. 120). The third instance is the duty of the Constitutional 
Court to certify whether a provincial constitution or amendment 
thereto complies with the national Constitution (s. 144).
The generous standing rules should also be mentioned. In human 
rights litigation (as well as other constitutional matters), public inter-
est litigation is encouraged by the Constitution, permitting any person 
“acting in the public interest” to approach a court (s. 38(d)). Also, as can 
be gleaned from the case citations in this chapter, civil-society organi-
zations often participate in litigation before the Constitutional Court as 
friends of the court (amici curiae).
Reflecting on the practice of the Constitutional Court (for the years in 
which tallies were kept), conflicts relating to governance issues, includ-
ing disputes between organs of states, constitute a tiny minority of 
 39 See Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa: in re: Constitutionality of the 
Liquor bill, 2000 (1) bCLR 1 (CC) (“Liquor bill”).
 40 See Premier: Limpopo Province v. Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature and 
Others, 2011 (11) bCLR 1181 (“Limpopo I”).
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cases. In 2007, only one case dealt with a non–bill of Rights provision 
of the Constitution. This pattern is also evident in the preceding years.41
4. Curial Procedures
The low number of federalism-related cases can be attributed to two fac-
tors. First, with eight of the nine provinces and all but one of the major 
cities under ANC control, intergovernmental disputes between ANC-
controlled organs of state are usually resolved through intra-party direc-
tions or mediation. however, a divergent practice has emerged of late; 
the ANC-controlled Johannesburg Metropolitan Council challenged the 
ANC-governed Gauteng provincial government over the proper defini-
tion of “municipal planning” and won.42 The second factor is the principle 
of cooperative government that eschews the solution of intergovernmen-
tal disputes through litigation (s. 41(1)(h)(vi)). This obligation has teeth; 
a court may refer a dispute back to the litigants when it is satisfied that 
the parties did not make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by 
means other than litigation (s. 42(2)).43 Such other means, including medi-
ation, are provided for, among others, in the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act, 2005. In a dispute between district municipalities and 
the National Treasury about the entitlement of the former to an equita-
ble share of the revenue raised nationally, the Court refused to hear the 
case, because the municipalities had failed to utilize an intergovernmen-
tal forum, the budget Council, to settle the matter.44 Consequently, federal 
issues are raised more often than not by private parties when they advance 
their cause. For example, a community concerned with the substantive 
issues regulated by the Communal Land Rights Act, 2009, challenged the 
validity of the law on a procedural ground that reflects a federal element; 
the correct legislative procedure was not followed in the NCOP, thereby 
depriving the provinces of their say in the legislative process.45
 41 Chamberlain and Kazee, “Constitutional Court Statistics for the 2007 Term,” 571.
 42 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Gauteng Development Tribunal, 
2010 (9) bCLR 859 (CC) (“Gauteng Development Tribunal”).
 43 See, for example, National Gambling board v. Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, 2002 
(2) bCLR 156 (CC) (“National Gambling board”); Minister of Police and Others v. 
Premier of the Western Cape and Others, 2013 (12) bCLR 1405 (CC).
 44 Uthekela District Municipality and Others v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others, 2002 (11) bCLR 1220 (CC).
 45 Tongoane and Others v. Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2010 (8) bCLR 741 
(CC).
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The superior courts are equipped with wide discretion over reme-
dies to enforce the Constitution. A court must declare invalid any law 
or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution. To mitigate the 
impact of such a declaration, a court has the discretion to “make any 
order that is just and equitable” (s. 172(1)). Such an order may include 
limiting the retrospective effect of a declaration of invalidity, or sus-
pending such a declaration for a period of time on conditions it may 
stipulate. In practice, the Constitutional Court has invalidated a num-
ber of laws and in some instances suspended their invalidity for up to 
eighteen months so as to allow Parliament to remedy the constitutional 
defect. The courts may also issue a mandamus for the fulfilment of a 
constitutional obligation.
The courts operate very transparently. Court proceedings are open to 
the public, and courts are increasingly allowing television cameras into 
the courtroom, as glaringly illustrated by the 2014 murder trial of para-
Olympian Oscar Pistorius, who was convicted of culpable homicide 
(similar to involuntary manslaughter in the United States). Judgments 
are delivered in public (and most often within a reasonable time), and 
those of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal are 
readily available on these courts’ websites.46 The Constitutional Court 
also provides media releases on all its judgments. but litigation is, in 
general, prohibitively expensive. Despite a legal-aid system, which 
focuses mainly on criminal defence, access to justice is not readily avail-
able to the poor or even the middle class.
Former chief justice Ismael Mohamed wrote that in the absence of any 
physical force at their disposal, the courts’ “ultimate power must there-
fore rest on the esteem in which the judiciary is held within the psyche 
and soul of the nation.”47 Such esteem has been widespread, as Chief 
Justice Sandile Ngcobo confirmed: “Enforcement of court decisions and 
orders has not been an issue in this country.”48 The problem has arisen 
in some divisions of the high Court where, for example, court orders 
that pensions should be paid out regularly were not executed, leading 
 46 For judgments of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, see 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, www.constitutionalcourt.org.za, and Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa, http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/judgments/
judgem_sca_2012.html.
 47 Ismael Mohamed, “The Role of the Judiciary in a Constitutional State,” South African 
Law Journal 115 (1999): 111, 112.
 48 Ngcobo, “Sustaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary,” 5.
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to successful class actions.49 The first open defiance of a court order came, 
as noted above, when the national government let President al-bashir 
leave the country, despite an interim order prohibiting that. In question 
was whether South Africa was obliged to execute a warrant for his arrest 
issued by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide and 
war crimes. South Africa not only ratified the Rome Statute establishing 
the court, but it also domesticated the statute in legislation, in terms of 
which it was bound to execute the court’s arrest warrants. A civil society 
organization obtained an interim order to prevent al-bashir from leaving 
the country, but the national government facilitated his escape. The interim 
order was confirmed by the high Court, finding that the government was 
indeed obliged to execute the arrest, rejecting the government’s argument 
that it acted in accordance with its diplomatic obligations towards the 
AU.50 The circumstances of the case may be unique, but it came on the 
back of a long-running attack on the alleged “overreach” of the judici-
ary. The commitment by the president at his August meeting with Chief 
Justice Mogoeng to respect court orders may be a turning point, but the 
likely government response will be the appointment of more compliant 
judges so as to reduce possible conflicts with the executive.
5. Judicial Culture
Functioning on a common-law foundation, the judiciary played a major 
role in developing the legal system within the constraints of the apartheid 
legal order. In the 1980s, some social critics called for “moral” judges to 
resign their offices in an act of protest against an abhorrent system, but 
the dominant liberal view was that judges, given their relative but lim-
ited autonomy, could do more to blunt the hard edge of apartheid and 
repression through the ethical performance of their judicial duties than by 
resigning. Arguments based on the rule of law and human rights could, 
unlike in the Nazi courts, be validly raised and were occasionally success-
ful. Former chief justice Ngcobo commented that the tradition of judicial 
integrity predates 1994.51 Despite many executive-minded judges, the 
 49 See Jayiya v. MEC Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another, 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA); MEC, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v. Kate, 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA).
 50 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
2015 (9) bLCR 108 (GP).
 51 Ngcobo, “Sustaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary,” 7. A fellow constitutional 
court judge, yvonne Mokgoro, is less charitable and refers to the “few maverick” judges 
who used the law to restrain the apartheid state (Mokgoro, “Appointment of Judges,” 44).
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integrity of the bench as a whole made legal continuity with respect to the 
judiciary not a bridge too far in the post-apartheid South Africa. Legal con-
tinuity also pertained to pre-1994 laws; they continued to apply, provided 
they were compatible with the Constitution. In the common-law tradition, 
most judgments were carefully reasoned. The Constitutional Court has 
continued to excel in providing path-breaking judgments on the bill of 
Rights that have been celebrated across the legal world, albeit not without 
criticism.
The role of the judiciary increased substantially under the Consti-
tution. With the supremacy of a broadly worded constitution firmly 
entrenched, the post-1994 courts have become a significant check and 
balance on the executive and the legislature. Moreover, it has become 
the institution of last resort when politics fail. For example, when the 
opposition parties failed to get a motion of no confidence in the presi-
dent tabled in the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, by a 
vote of five to four, held that the rules of the National Assembly were 
inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that they did not allow a 
political party or a member to enforce the right to table such a motion.52 
While this leads to the judicialization of politics, it has also resulted in 
the politicization of the judiciary.53 Within this environment, as heinz 
Klug argues, the Constitutional Court has managed reasonably well the 
tension between “principled” reasoning on one hand and “institutional 
pragmatism” on the other.54
The Constitutional Court as final interpreter of the Constitution has 
followed a purposive approach to interpretation. The purpose of a pro-
vision is gleaned from a number of sources, mainly from the language 
used and the context or scheme of the Constitution, with historical 
 52 Masibuko v. Sisulu and Another, 2013 (11) bCLR 1297 (CC). See also Oriani-Ambrosini, 
MP v. Sisulu, MP, Speaker of the National Assembly, 2013 (1) bCLR 14 (CC).
 53 herschl, Towards Juristocracy, 203. See C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn vallinder, eds., The 
Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New york: New york University Press, 1995).
 54 heinz Klug, “Finding the Constitutional Court’s Place in South Africa’s Democracy: 
The Interaction of Principle and Institutional Pragmatism in the Court’s Decision 
Making,” Constitutional Court Review 3 (2010): 1–33. For a critique of the Court’s 
approach to one party dominance with respect to democracy, which has had a 
negative impact on “real” federalism emerging, see Sujit Choudhry, “‘he had a 
mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress 
in a Dominant Party Democracy,” Constitutional Court Review 2 (2009): 1–86. For a 
challenge on the premises of Choudhry’s argument, see Jonathan Klaaren, “Dominant 
Democracy in South Africa? A Response to Choudhry,” Constitutional Court Review 2 
(2009): 87–96.
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context being of subsidiary value. Consistent with this hermeneutical 
approach, the Constitutional Court viewed its task of interpreting the 
federal elements in a purposive manner; there were no different or addi-
tional, subject-specific principles of interpretation. In a decision dealing 
with the appropriate assignment of functions to provinces in terms of 
the interim Constitution, the Court said, in response to an argument 
that provincial powers should be construed restrictively, “In the inter-
pretation of those schedules [listing provincial powers] there is no pre-
sumption in favour of either the national legislature or the provincial 
legislatures. The functional areas must be purposively interpreted in 
a manner which will enable the national parliament and the provin-
cial legislatures to exercise their respective legislative powers fully and 
effectively.”55
The Court’s view that by such a purposeful reading (without any 
underlying presumption) the constitutional text will reveal itself, has 
resulted in a series of decisions that did not facilitate the ability of prov-
inces to exercise a measure of self-governance.
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
1. Introduction
In an assessment in 2005 of judicial behaviour in the context of the fed-
eral elements of the Constitution, I argued elsewhere that the Constitu-
tional Court exhibited a pro-centre stance in the majority of cases that 
came before it, emphasizing the unitary language in the Constitution.56 
The explanation offered was that the Court’s stance was driven primar-
ily by two factors. First, the Court was concerned about national unity. 
After decades of the pernicious divide-and-rule of ethnic and racial 
groups, the first task was to forge a new nation through its state institu-
tions. The second factor was the need for order. Where the provinces in 
particular proved to be singularly inept to provide services effectively 
and efficiently, the Court stepped in as the bulwark of order. In the sea 
of provincial ineptitude, favouring the centre was inevitable.
 55 Dvb behuising (Pty) Limited v. North West Provincial Government and Another, 
2000 (4) bCLR 347 (CC), para. 17.
 56 Nico Steytler, “Judicial Neutrality in the Face of Ineptitude: The Constitutional Court 
and Multi-Level Government in South Africa,” in Judge Made Federalism, ed. h.-P. 
Schneider, J. Kramer, and b. Caravito (baden: Nomos verlag, 2009), 27.
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Since 2005, the Constitutional Court has not changed its tune appreci-
ably, although the record is not always centre-prone. What has changed 
is that local government has come off the better in its scraps with prov-
inces and the national government. Whether there is a decidedly pro-
local and anti-provincial attitude is too early to say, but the complexity 
of overseeing a multi-level system is now coming to the fore, and the 
balancing of the powers of the three spheres of government is that 
much more challenging.
Regarding these centre-prone decisions, the Court’s justification 
could be traced to a fundamental conception of the nature of the South 
African state. First, the proclamation in section 1 that South Africa is 
“one sovereign, democratic state” gives the Constitution a “unitary 
emphasis,” the Court has said.57 yet the Constitution contains very defi-
nite federal elements of local and provincial self-rule, which the Court 
has sought to harmonize with the unitary emphasis through the notion 
of “cooperative government.” In the words of the Constitutional Court, 
the Constitution embodies not “competitive federalism” but rather a 
“new philosophy” of “co-operative government.”58
In interpreting the Constitution’s federal features, the Court’s 
departure point is that provinces derive their powers and functions 
exclusively from the Constitution. In the first case on the exercise of 
concurrent powers (education) under the interim Constitution, minor-
ity political parties and the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government 
challenged the constitutionality of the National Education Policy bill, 
1995, on the ground that it would oblige provinces to adhere to national 
education policy.59 The applicants placed much reliance on the U.S. 
Supreme Court majority opinion in New York v. United States,60 which 
held that the U.S. Constitution did not confer on Congress the power 
to compel states to take particular actions. The Constitutional Court 
found this decision not relevant because of the differences in history 
and language of the two constitutions. In the United States, several sov-
ereign states where brought together in a federation, surrendering only 
a part of their sovereignty to the federal government and retaining the 
remainder. In South Africa, on the other hand, the provinces were not 
sovereign states: “They were created by the Constitution and have only 
 57 First Certification, para. 287. See also Liquor bill, para. 41.
 58 Ibid., para. 469.
 59 In re: The National Educational Policy bill, No. 83 of 1995, 1996 (4) bCLR 518 (CC).
 60 New york v. United States 505 US 144 (1992).
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those powers that are specifically conferred on them under the Con-
stitution.”61 Furthermore, the powers conferred on provinces were not 
exclusive but held concurrently with the national Parliament. The pro-
cess of state formation through devolution of powers to provinces thus 
produced a result that was significantly different from what prevails in 
the United States.
Within the limited parameters set by the Constitution, a measure 
of self-rule is permissible. Although the bill of Rights may impose 
uniform standards, total uniformity is not required. The Court thus 
rejected a claim that differing provincial legislation could give rise to 
an anti-discrimination challenge.62 A bookie taking bets at horse rac-
ing complained that he was discriminated against in KwaZulu-Natal 
because, in that province’s gambling law, only a person in his or her 
personal capacity could obtain a betting licence, contrary to the posi-
tion in all other provinces, where both a natural and a juridical per-
son could ply the bookmaking trade. The Court found that because the 
gambling law was within the province’s competence, it did not offend 
the right against unfair discrimination. Provincial differences were 
legitimate differentiation.
Provincial experimentation and innovation have not, however, been 
articulated expressly as a value worth pursuing. No reference has yet 
been made to the celebrated dictum of Justice Louis brandeis in New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann: “It is one of the happy incidents of the fed-
eral system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”63 One exception has been, but 
only so by implication, the Treatment Action Campaign case,64 where 
provincial differences were used in legal reasoning without highlight-
ing the value added of such experimentation. The Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC), a civil-society organization, challenged the decision 
of the national government and eight provinces to limit access to an 
anti-hIv drug to prevent mother-to-baby infection to two pilot sites 
per province. TAC argued that this measure was inconsistent with the 
socio-economic right of access to health services (s. 26), because it was 
 61 National Educational Policy bill, para. 23.
 62 Weare and Another v. Ndebele and Others, 2009 (4) bCLR 370 (CC), para. 70.
 63 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
 64 Minister of health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1), 2002 
(10) bCLR 1033 (CC), para. 93 (“Treatment Action Campaign”).
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unreasonable and the roll-out of the treatment to all clinics in provinces 
was within the provinces’ available resources – the conditions on which 
the fulfilment of this right are predicated. Their argument was based 
principally on the conduct of one province (the Western Cape), which, 
within the same budget as the other provinces, provided the medicine 
in all its clinics. The Constitutional Court (and the high Court more 
explicitly65) accepted the argument and found that the national govern-
ment’s efforts fell short of a reasonable standard and the province could 
afford to fulfil the positive obligation imposed by the right.66
In shaping the Constitutional Court’s federalism jurisprudence, 
supranational bodies have played no part. The Court has, more often 
in the earlier years, referred to American,67 Canadian,68 Indian,69  
German,70 and Australian71 cases, but has emphasized the unique his-
tory and language of South Africa’s constitutions. For example, in The 
National Education Policy Bill decision, referred to above, the Court thus 
cautioned, “Decisions of the courts of the United States dealing with 
state rights are not a safe guide as to how our courts should address 
problems that may arise in relation to the rights of provinces under our 
Constitution.”72
2. Specific Issues
Since the creation of South Africa’s hybrid federal system, the Consti-
tutional Court’s point of departure is that the provinces’ only source 
of authority is the Constitution. In the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
 65 Minister of health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 2002 (4) 
bCLR 356 (T).
 66 Nico Steytler, “Federal homogeneity from the bottom Up: Provincial Shaping of 
National hIv/AIDS Policy in South Africa,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33,  
no. 1 (2003): 59–74.
 67 KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, para. 24; Constitution of the Western Cape, para. 
28; Treatment Action Campaign, para. 107; Matatiele Municipality and Others v. 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2007 (1) bCLR 47 (CC) para. 79 
(“Matatiele Municipality”) .
 68 Liquor bill, para. 62; Dvb behuising, para. 36; Treatment Action Campaign, para. 
110; Matatiele Municipality, para. 66.
 69 Dvb behuising, para. 36; Treatment Action Campaign, para. 108.
 70 Treatment Action Campaign, para. 109; Matatiele Municipality, para. 36.
 71 KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, para. 24; Dvb behuising, para. 36;
 72 National Educational Policy bill, para. 23.
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Constitution Certification case, that constitution was rejected because 
it gave the province powers not found in the Constitution. The Court 
described it as a case where the province sought to pull itself up by its 
own federal bootstraps. Any power or function has thus to be located 
within the four corners of the Constitution, which, of course, requires 
an interpretation of the broad constitutional language.
Arguably the most important exclusive provincial power is the adop-
tion and amendment of a provincial constitution, the scope of which was 
forged in the last months before the first democratic election of 1994.73 
To bring the Inkatha Freedom Party into the negotiating process, a pro-
vision was inserted in the interim Constitution that a provincial con-
stitution could be different from the national Constitution with regard 
to “legislative and executive structures and procedures.”74 While the 
first provincial constitution drafted by the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature 
never attempted to comply with the provisions of the interim Consti-
tution, and was easily rejected by the Constitutional Court, the West-
ern Cape sought to remain within the parameters of the Constitution, 
even though it, too, pushed the constitutional envelope. The Western 
Cape’s draft constitution floundered principally on the interpretation 
of the elusive terms legislative structures and procedures. It not only set 
the number of seats of the provincial legislature but also established 
an electoral system that incorporated both a party list system and con-
stituency-based presentation to produce proportional representation 
(the national Constitution, although it stipulates that the system should 
“result, in general in proportional representation” [s. 105(1)(d)], pre-
scribes a pure party list electoral system). Averse to the idea that a prov-
ince could establish its own form of PR, the Constitutional Court gave 
a restricted interpretation of “legislative structures and procedures” by 
confining them to “no more than a difference regarding the nature and 
the number of the elements constituting the legislative structure.”75 The 
Court thus accepted the setting of the number of seats in the provincial 
legislature (as opposed to the constitutional requirement that the num-
ber must be set in terms of a formula prescribed by national legisla-
tion), but rejected the different electoral system. The latter conclusion, 
 73 See Nico Steytler and Johann Mettler, “Federalism and Peacemaking: A South 
African Case Study,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 31 (2001): 93–106.
 74 Section 143(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution is a similar provision.
 75 Western Cape Constitution, para. 48.
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commentators argued, was not the only credible one the Court could 
have reached.76
The interpretation of provinces’ other “exclusive” competences 
(those listed in Schedule 5A) received equally parsimonious treatment. 
At issue was the functional area of “liquor licences” and a national Liq-
uor bill that sought to control the liquor industry, including providing 
for the national issuing of licences for manufacturing, distribution, and 
local retail. The national Parliament may intrude on “exclusive” pro-
vincial powers, provided that certain qualifications are met, such as if it 
is “necessary,” inter alia, “to maintain national security, economic unity 
and essential national standards” (s. 44(2)). The question that the Court 
had to confront was whether all or any of the licences listed above fell 
in the provincial exclusive zone. The Court adopted a restrictive inter-
pretation; any aspect of the liquor trade that had an extra-provincial 
dimension fell outside the ambit of provincial competences. Provin-
cial exclusive powers apply “primarily to matters which may appro-
priately be regulated intra-provincially.”77 Intra-provincial matters are 
concerned with “activities that take place within or can be regulated 
in a manner that has a direct effect upon the inhabitants of the prov-
ince alone.”78 Excluded thus are matters with “a national dimension,”79 
which included all licences for manufacturing liquor (including all 
wine estates in the Western Cape), because such liquor may be destined 
to cross a provincial boundary. Only licences dealing with consumption 
within a province can be an exclusively provincial. The Court’s reason-
ing was based on the need for “economic unity,”80 which disallowed 
any regulatory spillage over a provincial boundary.
Other constitutional sources of provincial competences, apart from 
concurrent and exclusive powers, have also been met with a tight-fisted 
 76 Rassie Malherbe, “The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Development of 
Provincial Autonomy,” SA Public Law 16, no. 2 (2001): 255; Christina Murray, 
“Provincial Constitution-Making in South Africa: The (Non)example of the Western 
Cape,” Jahrbuch des Őffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 49 (2001): 481–512; Robert F. 
Williams, “Comparative Subnational Constitutional Law: South Africa’s Provincial 
Constitutional Experiments,” South Texas Law Review 40 (1999): 625; Stu Woolman, 
“Provincial Constitutions,” in Constitutional Law of South Africa, ed. Stuart Woolman 
and Michael bishop, 21-1–21-25 (Cape Town: Juta).
 77 Liquor bill, para. 53.
 78 Ibid., para. 72.
 79 Ibid., para. 75.
 80 Ibid., para. 76.
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Court, but dissenting voices are beginning to emerge.81 In Premier: 
Limpopo Province v. Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature and Others 
I,82 the issue was the constitutionality of a provincial bill to regulate 
the provincial legislature’s financial management. The bill would pass 
constitutional muster if the subject matter was “expressly assigned to 
the province by national legislation” or if it was a “matter for which a 
provision of the Constitution envisages the enactment of provincial leg-
islation” (s. 104(1)(b)(iii) & (iv)). The provincial legislature maintained 
that the power was “expressly assigned” to provinces by the national 
Financial Management of Parliament Act, 2009, although the reference 
to provincial legislation was only in a schedule.83 Focusing on the word 
expressly, the Court held that it “intended to remove any doubt about 
the nature and the extent of the powers of the provinces.”84 The Court 
maintained that “the constitutional scheme shows that the legislative 
authority of the provinces must be conveyed in clear terms.”85 In the 
Court’s opinion, the provincial bill did not have a firm constitutional 
footing because the national act did not expressly assign the power to 
 81 In the early decision of Executive Council of the Western Cape v. Minister for 
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development of the Republic of South Africa; 
Executive Council of KwaZulu-Natal v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, 1999 (12) bCLR 1360 (CC) the Constitutional Court did not support a generous 
interpretation of provincial powers over local government. The Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal, both in opposition hands, contested the constitutionality of a national 
law, the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, which gave to the national government the 
power to establish metropolitan areas and district management areas, a power the two 
provinces claimed belonged to them in terms of section 155. The Court agreed that 
this power did not fall in the domain of the national government, but neither did it 
resort under provinces. The power should be exercised by the Municipal Demarcation 
board, an independent constitutional institution. The Court found in favour of 
a provincial power only on a minor point. In terms of section 155(5), provinces 
determine the types of municipalities and not the national government, as the Act 
provided. See Jaap de visser, “Provinces v Structures Act: Demarcation board Walks 
Off with Spoils,” Local Government Law Bulletin 1, no. 4 (1999): 1–3.
 82 2011 (11) bCLR 1181 (CC) (“Limpopo I”).
 83 Six provinces drafted and adopted such legislation with the guidance of the National 
Treasury. That it was the intention of Parliament to assign such a power was also 
evident from the submission of the Speaker of Parliament to the Court (Premier: 
Limpopo Province v. Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature and Others, 2012 (6) 
bCLR 583 (CC) (“Limpopo II”).
 84 Limpopo I, para. 23.
 85 Ibid., para. 35.
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the provinces (despite the fact that there was a direct reference to pro-
vincial legislation in the act).86
The same quest for clarity was applied to the second source of pro-
vincial powers, namely where legislation was “envisaged” by the Con-
stitution. Although the Constitution does not use the word expressly, the 
majority, nevertheless, imposed such a requirement. Speaking for the 
Court, Chief Justice Ngcobo held, “Our constitutional scheme does not 
permit legislative powers of the provincial legislatures to be implied. 
Were it to be otherwise, the constitutional scheme for the allocation of 
legislative power would be undermined. The careful delineation between 
the legislative competence of Parliament and that of provincial legisla-
tures would be blurred. This may very well result in uncertainty about 
the limits of the legislative powers of the provinces … This is not what the 
drafters of our Constitution had in mind.”87 This “clear line” scheme of 
the Constitution was contested in two dissenting opinions. Justice Edwin 
Cameron remarked that by the very nature of the Constitution’s drafting, 
clarity will remain “a chimera.”88 Moreover, he continued, “as a matter 
of fundamental outlook, it would seem to me surprising if the Constitu-
tion did not envisage that provinces may legislate for the financial man-
agement of their own legislatures.”89 The difference in judicial opinion 
was one of “fundamental outlook”; the majority adopted a parsimonious 
view of provincial space, while the dissents sought to breathe some life 
into “legitimate provincial autonomy.”
The Court’s parsimonious approach to provincial powers is perhaps 
explained by its experience of provincial dysfunctionality. In 2002, it took 
Mr Mashavha, who was entitled to a disability grant from the provincial 
government of Limpopo, more than two years to receive some but not all 
that was owed to him. his wife’s disability grant as well as his daughter’s 
child-support grant also were outstanding. he and his family, the Consti-
tutional Court noted, were reliant on “the proper administration of the dis-
ability grant for their daily sustenance and wellbeing.”90 Although “social 
 86 See Robert Williams and Nico Steytler, “Squeezing Out Provinces’ Legislative 
Competence in Premier: Limpopo Province v Speaker: Limpopo Provincial 
Legislature and Others I and II,” South African Law Journal 129, no. 4 (2012): 621–37.
 87 Limpopo I, para. 52.
 88 Ibid., para. 121.
 89 Ibid., para. 124.
 90 Mashavha v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2004 (12) bCLR 
1243 (CC) para. 9.
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welfare” is a national and provincial concurrent competency, Mashavha 
argued that the administration of the Social Security Act, 1992, in terms of 
which disability grants were dispensed, should never have been assigned 
to provinces when they were established in 1994 because such assign-
ment could be done only if the provinces had the capacity to administer 
it. The argument was thus that if the administration of the Social Security 
Act was not assigned to the provinces, Mashavha would have received 
his grant from a more competent national department. The Constitutional 
Court agreed and invalidated the assignment of the Social Assistance 
Act to provinces ten years after the assignment. before the fifteen-month 
period of suspension of invalidity lapsed, the South African Social Security 
Agency was established with the mandate to distribute all social grants. 
As the administration of grants was, along with education and health, the 
major expenditure item of provinces, the impact of the shift in responsibil-
ity on provinces was a massive loss in national transfers.
In 2013, a charge of incompetence was levelled against the national 
government. Civil society organizations requested the premier of the 
Western Cape to appoint a commission of inquiry into the abject failure 
of the national police (SAPS) to provide safety and security in Khayalit-
sha, a large black township of Cape Town. The Constitution provides for 
the appointment of such a provincial commission of inquiry into “any 
complaints of police inefficiency or a breakdown in relations between 
the police and any community” (s. 206(5)). When Premier helen Zille, 
who is also the leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance, appointed 
a commission, the national minister of police contested her constitu-
tional power to do so in a rare occurrence that the national government 
questioned a provincial competence largely because of provincial inac-
tivity. before the Constitutional Court, the national minister conceded 
the existence of such a power, but nevertheless contended that such 
a commission could not subpoena police officers because that would 
constitute controlling the national police force, a power that falls out-
side provincial competence. The Court first asserted a province’s right 
to oversee the SAPS’s activities in a province and then made short shrift 
of the minister’s contention, finding that without subpoenaing pow-
ers, a commission of inquiry would not be able to fulfil its mandate.91 
because the case was driven largely by a political agenda against an 
 91 Minister of Police and Others v. Premier of the Western Cape and Others, 2013 (12) 
bCLR 1405 (CC) (“Minister of Police”) para. 50.
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opposition-held province rather than by a contested legal principle, the 
judgment does not signal a fundamental shift in the Court’s approach 
to provincial powers. however, its significance lies in the fact that it 
was the province that sought to do something to ameliorate national 
government failure. The Court thus found that it was the duty of the 
premier to take reasonable steps “to shield the residents of Khayalitsha 
from an unrelenting invasion of their fundamental rights because of 
police inefficiency in combatting crime and the breakdown of relations 
between the police and the community.”92 As “there is much to worry 
about when the [national] institutions that are meant to protect vulner-
able residents fail, or are perceived to be failing,” it was appropriate 
for the province to exact accountability in terms of its constitutional 
powers.93 As will be argued below, the Court’s positive approach to 
the province’s efforts to assist in providing safety and security came in 
the face of national failure, a reversal of roles from the Mashavha case 
where the focus was on provincial failure.
When it came to interpreting local government’s powers, the Consti-
tutional Court showed a generosity of spirit at the expense of provincial 
powers. Contrary to the view of the majority in the Limpopo judgment, 
the Constitution is not a model of clarity when cut-off points between 
provincial and local government powers are in issue.94 The local gov-
ernment’s functional areas of health, roads, traffic, tourism, airports, 
and abattoirs are distinguished from similar provincial functional areas 
by the addition of the qualifier local to the former (e.g., local tourism 
vis-à-vis provincial tourism). Furthermore, many provincial functional 
areas are inclusive of a local government functional area. For example, 
included in the provincial power of “pollution control” is the local func-
tional area of “air pollution.” how are cut-off points to be determined?
The City of Johannesburg argued that the Gauteng provincial govern-
ment had no final decision-making powers on matters related to land-
use planning because this functional area fell in the local competence of 
“municipal planning.” Gauteng replied that its Development Tribunal 
could decide matters of land use because it fell within the provincial 
functional areas of “regional planning” and “urban and rural develop-
ment.” The Constitutional Court sided firmly with the city, reiterating 
 92 Ibid., para 51.
 93 Ibid., para 52.
 94 See Nico Steytler and yonatan Fessha, “Defining Local Government Powers and 
Functions,” South African Law Journal 124 (2007): 320–38.
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its view that competences must enable local government to exercise its 
functions “fully and effectively.”95 As most local government functions 
could be included in the broader powers of national and provincial 
government, the Constitutional Court implicitly adopted the view that 
local government functions should be defined first, with the residue 
falling in the provincial or national domain.96 Consequently, “munici-
pal planning,” which includes all questions relating to the zoning of 
land and the establishment of townships, are to be decided by the 
municipality.97
With “municipal planning” entrenched against provincial incursion, 
it could not be trumped by national legislation either. The fact that 
mining is an exclusive national competence does not mean, the Con-
stitutional Court held, that a national mining licence trumps municipal 
land-use permission. Rather, dual approvals are required; without such 
land-use permission from a municipality, the mining licence cannot be 
exercised.98
The Constitutional Court has also not hesitated to expand local gov-
ernment’s remit beyond what the Constitution prescribes. In a number 
of judgments on the state’s obligation to positively fulfil the implemen-
tation of socio-economic rights, the Court imposed duties on munici-
palities in areas falling outside their constitutional competences. In 
the area of housing (a concurrent national and provincial function), 
municipalities were ordered to assist national and provincial govern-
ments with the provision of emergency housing for the homeless99 and 
 95 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Gauteng Development Tribunal, 
2010 (9) bCLR 859 (CC) para. 49. See further Nico Steytler and Jaap de visser, Local 
Government Law of South Africa, 4th update (Durban: LexisNexis butterworth, 2011), 
5–19.
 96 This view was clearly expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Gauteng Development Tribunal,  
2010 (2) bCLR 157 (SCA) paras 35–6.
 97 See also Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning of the Western Cape v. Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others, 
2014 (2) bCLR 182 (CC); Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs 
and Development Planning, Western Cape v. habitat Council and Others (City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality as Amicus Curiae), 2014 (5) bCLR 591 (CC).
 98 Maccsands (Pty) Ltd v. City of Cape Town and Others (Chamber of Mines of South 
Africa and Another as Amici Curiae), 2012 (7) bCLR 690 (CC); Minister of Mineral 
Resources v. Swartland Municipality and Others, 2012 (7) bCLR 690 (CC).
 99 Government of the RSA and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11)  
bCLR 1169 (CC).
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the vulnerable after eviction from state or private property.100 These 
decisions were based on the constitutional obligation that rests on all 
spheres of government to realize the right of access to adequate hous-
ing (s. 26) and not on the listed municipal competences.
The other side of the parsimonious attitude toward provincial treat-
ment is the generous approach to national competences in respect to 
national legislation that covers both the national and provincial govern-
ments. One such law is on the single public service for the national and 
provincial administrations (s. 197(1)). The Western Cape objected when 
the national Public Service Act, 1994, was amended in 1998 because it 
removed provincial discretion on creating new departments. While the 
province could not challenge the national competence to make a law 
on the provincial public service, it argued that such a power should 
be exercised in the light of the principles of cooperative government, 
including the principle that “all spheres of government must exercise 
their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of the 
government of another sphere” (s. 41(1)(g)). The Constitutional Court 
accepted this principle as judicially enforceable but found that the very 
intrusive provisions complained of did not offend this principle.101
In contrast to the Court’s stinginess with respect to the substance of 
provincial powers, it has given full effect to the provinces’ procedural 
rights to shared rule institutions. As noted above, the provinces through 
their representation in the NCOP form part of the national Parliament 
and have, although not an absolute veto, a significant voice in the pas-
sage of national legislation affecting provinces (s. 76). Further, a con-
stitutional amendment that effects boundary changes must be passed 
by six of the nine provinces in the NCOP as well as with the consent of 
the affected provincial legislatures. The first notable case dealt with the 
latter issue. In order to eliminate municipalities that crossed provincial 
boundaries (because the latter followed apartheid-drawn magisterial 
districts), boundaries of seven provinces were amended by the Consti-
tution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005. Although the KwaZulu-Natal 
and Eastern Cape provincial legislatures voted for the amendment, the 
 100 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd and Another (Lawyers for human Rights as Amicus Curiae), 2012 (2) 
bCLR 150 (CC).
 101 Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v. President of the RSA, 1999 (4) bCLR 
382 (CC).
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community of Matatiele (which was to be moved from KwaZulu-Natal to 
the Eastern Cape without its consent) contested the legitimacy of the vote 
because Matatiele was not properly consulted by the provincial legisla-
ture. The Constitutional Court agreed by asserting, first, the need for pro-
vincial consent for a boundary change and, second, the need for proper 
consultation on the basis of the constitutional principle of participatory 
democracy.102 The provisions of the constitutional amendment affecting 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape were thus declared invalid, because 
a procedural requirement for passing a valid law (proper public participa-
tion) was not complied with. however, Parliament and the two provinces 
were given eighteen months to rectify the legislative process. After due 
consultation with Matatiele, the KwaZulu-Natal legislature again voted 
for the boundary change, and the Constitution Thirteenth Amendment 
Act was validly passed in 2007 effecting the change.
The Court has also protected the provinces’ procedural rights when 
Parliament considers legislation affecting provinces, by insisting that 
the correct legislative procedure be followed in the NCOP. Parlia-
ment regarded the Communal Land Rights bill as a bill that did not 
affect provincial interests, a “tagging” decision made by the Speaker 
of the National Assembly and the chairperson of the NCOP.103 Parlia-
ment argued that the bill dealt with “land,” which is a national resid-
ual power, despite the fact that communal land rights by their every 
essence affect the provinces’ concurrent function of “traditional leader-
ship.” As a result, the bill was passed following the so-called section 
75 procedure. The NCOP delegates voted as individual members (not 
as provincial blocs), with a vote rejecting the bill having only delaying 
effect. If the bill was regarded as affecting provincial interests, then the 
provinces had to vote as provincial blocs, and a negative vote could 
be overcome only by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. 
The community of Tongoana, disapproving of the substance of the act, 
attacked the bill’s procedural route, contending it affected the prov-
inces. The Constitutional Court agreed with a generous interpretation 
of “provincial interests.” It rejected the argument that provincial inter-
ests were synonymous with provincial competences and held that the 
test is more broadly drawn: “Any bill whose provisions substantially 
 102 Matatiele Municipality and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, 2007 (1) bCLR 47 (CC).
 103 Christina Murray and Richard Simeon, “‘Tagging’ bills in Parliament: Section 75 or 
Section 76?,” South African Law Journal 123 (2006): 232.
The Constitutional Court of South Africa 361
affect the interests of provinces must be enacted in accordance with 
the procedure stipulated in section 76.”104 Following the wrong route 
that undermined provincial participation in the law-making process 
rendered the law invalid.
Outside the legislative arena, the courts also safeguarded a province’s 
right to participate in the Judicial Service Commission’s proceedings 
where it affected a judge of the high Court in that province (s. 178(1)(k)). 
The premier of the Western Cape objected for not having been invited to 
participate in the proceedings of the JSC when it had to consider impeach-
ment proceedings against the judge-president of the Western Cape high 
Court for allegedly trying improperly to influence two Constitutional 
Court justices. The Supreme Court sustained a high Court decision that 
set aside the relevant JSC proceedings, because a premier’s right to par-
ticipate was not confined to judicial appointments but extended to the 
conduct of judges of the high Court in that province.105
The procedural requirement of cooperative government that all 
organs of state should “avoid legal proceedings against one another” 
(s. 41(1)(h)(iv)) was enforced against the national government when 
it sought to interdict the KwaZulu-Natal government from establish-
ing a gambling monitoring regime in competition with a national sys-
tem (gambling being a concurrent function). The Constitutional Court 
refused to entertain the application, because the parties displayed no 
effort to settle the matter amicably.106
In summary, the Constitutional Court has confined provincial powers, 
to the clearest expressions in the Constitution. Provincial competences 
also are squeezed from below by an expansive view of municipalities’ 
functions. Consequently, the Court has given further impetus to the 
construction of an hourglass federation, where provinces are squeezed 
thin between the national and local governments. At the same time, 
procedural rights have received full protection from the Court. It may 
well be that the courts are more comfortable enforcing procedural rules 
 104 Tongoane v. Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2010 (8) bCLR 741 (CC)  
para. 72.
 105 hlophe v. Premier of the Western Cape Province; hlophe v. Freedom Under Law 
and Other 2012 (6) bCLR 567 (CC), read with Democratic Alliance v. President of 
the RSA and Others, 2012 (3) bCLR 291 (SCA). because a number of Constitutional 
Court judges were involved in the complaint against the judge-president and could 
therefore not hear the case, the decision of the SCA was the final word on the matter.
 106 National Gambling board.
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than dealing with substantive matters, particularly the complex issue 
of carving out a space for provincial self-government.
These developments have hardly raised a public eyebrow. With most 
provinces not fulfilling their constitutional mandate of service delivery 
of education, health, and housing, more public trust is placed in the 
national government to remedy the ills of the provinces. In most prov-
inces, the public may well support the ANC’s call for an overhaul of the 
provincial system and a reduction in the number of provinces.
3. Significance of the Courts
In assessing the courts’ role in securing federally relevant goals and 
objectives, it should be borne in mind that the federal elements in 
South Africa’s Constitution are not confined to the provincial institu-
tions of self-rule and the shared rule in the National Council of Prov-
inces. The Constitution establishes a system of multi-level government 
where local governments, and the large metropolitan governments in 
particular, play a major role in governance. The courts’ performance 
should thus be assessed on how they have dealt with the entire sys-
tem of multi-level government. On the positive side, the Constitutional 
Court has strengthened the hand of municipalities by interpreting their 
powers generously, not only vis-à-vis the provincial sphere of govern-
ment, but also in competition with the national government. The latter 
government in exercising its broad residual powers cannot automati-
cally override local autonomy. The supportive approach towards local 
government has not been apparent with respect to provincial self-rule. 
Although the Constitutional Court professed to be neither for nor 
against provinces, it did not assert provincial constitutional space when 
it could reasonably have done so. The niggardly approach to provinces 
has of late, however, prompted some dissenting voices seeking to give 
some flesh to the original Constitutional Principle of “legitimate pro-
vincial autonomy.” Overall, the Court has supported the hourglass 
model of multi-level government: a strong supervisory national gov-
ernment, a development-oriented local government at the bottom, and, 
in the middle, a provincial order of government providing ever fewer 
services. but the hourglass is kept functioning by allowing the inter-
governmental sands of procedural compliance to flow freely.
The Court’s concern in the early years was, no doubt, with build-
ing a nation from the fractured past. It emphasized the unitary vision 
of the country when it rejected in 1996 the wayward attempt in the 
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KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution to clamour for more federal-
ism. It may also have been less than charitable to the Western Cape con-
stitution with the province then under the hand of the New National 
Party exhibiting much of the old National Party in attitude. These iso-
lationist forces no longer threaten the united vision of the South African 
nation, and the main opposition party has national ambitions. The sec-
ond reason for a pro-centre stance was the perilous state of provincial 
governance. Little improvement on this score has been witnessed; some 
provinces have retrogressed, as indicated by the national interventions 
in Limpopo and other provinces in 2012.
Why then the support of local municipalities? First, local government 
as a necessity of government poses no centrifugal threat to the nation; to 
the contrary, the cities have been the melting pot where the new South 
African nation is taking shape. Second, despite the failure of many 
municipalities, particularly in rural areas, the large metros and cities 
are reasonably well governed; Johannesburg, Cape Town, Ethekwini 
(Durban), and Tshwane (Pretoria) are functioning adequately and hold 
the key to economic growth and poverty reduction. As to the question 
of why the judiciary supports procedural compliance, the answer may 
lie in the pragmatics of the judicial function, as suggested above.
The judicial contribution to multi-level government has to some 
degree supported federal objectives and goals. As the original purpose 
of ethnic/nationalist accommodation is no longer an overt concern, the 
focus shifts to development goals and limiting the centre’s monopoly 
on power. Support for local government, particularly for the major 
metros having budgets in excess of the smaller provinces, contributes 
to development goals. Collectively provinces and local government 
(again with metros in the forefront) pose a counterweight to central 
dominance.
The Court’s hourglass approach fits snuggly with the national govern-
ment and ANC policy. The ANC never embraced provinces, although 
it may now find it very difficult to unmake the provinces. Over the 
past five years, the debate has moved from the premise that provinces 
have served their initial purpose107 and are therefore now expendable, 
to a more focused concern for greater functionality of perhaps fewer 
provinces. In the ANC’s Policy Document of March 2012, there is a 
call “to reform, rationalize and strengthen provinces” by, among other 
 107 ANC, “Legislature and Governance for a National Democratic Society,” 2007.
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things, having “fewer provinces which are functional, effective, eco-
nomically sustainable, integrate communities on a non-racial basis and 
do away with ethnic boundaries.”108 As noted above, the outcome of 
the ANC National Conference in December 2012 was a cryptic state-
ment: “Provinces [should] be reformed, reduced and strengthened.”109 
The conference further recommended the devolution of certain provin-
cial functions to stronger municipalities (which include the metros). 
This reflects much of the national government’s view, articulated in 
the National Planning Commission’s National Development Plan: Our 
Future – Make It Work.110 Provinces are there to stay, but they must 
become part of the “capable state” that can tackle poverty and inequal-
ity, while an enhanced role is to be accorded to metros. This would 
include the devolution of more provincial powers to metros in the areas 
of housing, transport, and planning.
Although the Constitutional Court may be ad idem with the govern-
ment on multi-level government, its independent stance and exercise 
of judicial powers in other areas of the Constitution do not always sit 
comfortably with the government. Although there are no moves afoot 
to clip the wings of the Constitutional Court (its powers have been 
enhanced when it assumed the function of the court of final appeal in 
all matters), changes to the bench may see judges being more deferen-
tial to Parliament and the executive. however, the Court’s value as an 
independent and fearless guardian of the Constitution is widely appre-
ciated both inside and outside of government. Changes will not come 
easily.
To return to the initial question – does South Africa have a unitarist 
court in a hybrid federal system? – the answer is nuanced. In terms 
of a narrow conception of federalism, focusing alone on the provin-
cial order of government, the Constitutional Court has certainly been 
unitarist. Using a broader definition of federalism that encompasses 
multi-level government, the answer is different, even though it may 
result in an hourglass federation. The Court’s strengthening of local 
government and procedural intergovernmental relations counter-
balances its narrow “fundamental outlook” on the role of provinces. 
however, the consequence of this approach is that the Constitutional 
 108 ANC, Policy Discussion Document, March 2012, Legislature and Governance, 12.
 109 ANC, Resolutions of 53rd National Conference: Legislatures and Governance, 
Resolution 4.2.1 (2012).
 110 National Planning Commission, Development Plan: Our Future, 434–5.
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Court has not breathed life into the constitutional space for provincial 
self-governance.
Given the looming reform of provinces and local government, the 
Court is bound in the short term to play at the side lines of the main 
game. The main actors shaping the system are the ANC (determining 
policy on provinces and local government), the government imple-
menting the structure and the National Treasury giving budget effect to 
policy (and at times determining policy through budget choices). The 
Constitutional Court will, however, play a decisive role in changing the 
number and boundaries of provinces, demanding scrupulous compli-
ance with procedures.
What would strengthen the courts’ role in supporting or improving the 
functioning of multi-level government? Ironically, the provinces them-
selves could be the most important actors in contributing to a more sym-
pathetic court. Although nation building is stumbling along, territorially 
based centrifugal and isolationist tendencies have evaporated. The cap-
turing of the Western Cape by the DA in 2009 was not an attempt at isola-
tion, but a platform for expansion to other provinces.111 Nation building 
per se may thus no longer be a burning concern for the Court. The other 
ostensible reason for the Court’s apathy towards provinces could be the 
continued poor performance of seven out of the nine provinces. yet, 
in many instances, national departments fare no better than provincial 
ones. The South African Social Security Agency, which took over the dis-
tribution of social grants from provinces, has not been a shining example 
of efficiency and financial rectitude.112 yet the assumption remains that 
the national government does better. Although poor administration is a 
legitimate concern, it could also hide a deeper, underlying ideological 
view that sees centralization and uniformity as values in themselves and 
preferable to regional experimentation and innovation.
 111 In the May 2014 national and provincial elections, the DA increased its percentage 
of the vote from 17 to 23 per cent nationally. More importantly, the ANC retained 
the most populous and wealthiest province, Gauteng, with a slender margin 
of 53 per cent. In the 2016 local government elections it may lose its majority in 
Gauteng’s three metropolitan municipalities.
 112 For example, in AllPay Consolidated Investment holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others 
v. Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others 
(Corruption Watch and Another as Amici Curiae), 2014 (1) bCLR 1 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court set aside a massive tender award for the distribution of grants 
because of the defective management of the tender process.
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The answer to both impediments lies with provinces themselves. If 
provinces show themselves not as dens of patronage and maladmin-
istration but as capable and effective instruments of governance and 
development, and if they add value through diversity, the courts might 
see the advantage of expanding the provinces’ constitutional space. 
This is best illustrated in the contested appointment of the provincial 
commission of inquiry in the Western Cape to investigate the failure of 
the South African Police Service (SAPS) to provide safety and security 
in Khayalitsha,113 Given this failure, the Court asserted and protected 
the province’s right (and duty) to call the SAPS to account in order to 
better protect its residents. The same argument applies to municipali-
ties. A virtuous circle may then emerge: better subnational governance 
makes for better judgments.
 113 Minister of Police and Others v. Premier of the Western Cape.
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Spain’s Constitutional Court has played an important role in estab-
lishing the Spanish “state of the autonomies,” a concept largely unde-
fined by the Constitution.1 In the extensive litigation that has occurred 
between the Spanish state (i.e., the central government) and the autono-
mous communities (ACs) since the inauguration of the 1978 democratic 
Constitution, the Court’s case law is generally perceived as having been 
fairly balanced between the state and the ACs. Although the Court has 
validated expansive interpretations of the central state’s competences, 
it has made some important decisions defending the ACs. however, 
the recent wave of reforms of the ACs’ statutes of autonomy, and par-
ticularly the constitutional challenge to the Statute of Catalonia, have 
put the Court at the forefront of the political conflict over the territorial 
organization of the state. The Court’s 2010 decision in the Catalonia 
case strongly divided scholars, institutions, and public opinion, leaving 
the future of the system at a crossroads and undermining the Court’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of some people in Spain. Since then, the Spanish 
government’s insistent use of the Court to block attempts to hold an 
independence referendum in Catalonia threatens to further compro-
mise the Court’s position.
 1 State of the autonomies (or autonomic state) is the term generally used to refer the 
Spanish federal or quasi-federal model of territorial organization of the state.
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II. The State of the Autonomies
1. Broad Characteristics
Spain has 46,449,565 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom are indige-
nous.2 Spain is not ethnically or racially diverse. In recent years, though, 
Spain has become home to a growing number of immigrants who are 
changing the population’s profile. The country’s gross domestic prod-
uct is US$1.38 trillion.3 The sovereign Spanish state was constructed 
through the union of independent crowns, dating back to the fifteenth 
century, and the territorial organization of the state has been the source 
of ongoing conflict in Spanish constitutional history. Today, it is gener-
ally acknowledged that Spain is a pluri-national state. The current ter-
ritorial model was established to accommodate the nationalist claims of 
Catalonia, the basque Country, and, to a lesser degree, Galicia. The 1978 
Constitution is “based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation,” 
but it also “recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of 
the nationalities and regions of which it is composed” (Art. 2). The term 
nationality was a compromise term used to give some recognition to the 
minority nations in the Constitution. The common official language, 
Spanish, coexists with other languages such as Catalan, Euskera, and 
Galician, which have a co-official status in the territories where they 
are spoken, when so provided. The Constitution also recognizes other 
asymmetrical particularities for certain ACs, known as “differential 
elements” (e.g., a special historical private law or tax and financing 
system). The Spanish state is organized into seventeen autonomous 
communities, two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla), and a strong 
level of local government organized in provinces and municipalities.
A specific feature of the Spanish model is that the Constitution does 
not define the system of territorial organization or contain a list of 
ACs. The Constitution was the result of a consensus between different 
political forces in a peaceful transition to democracy after forty years 
of dictatorship. At the same time, the regulation of some of the more 
controversial elements was left largely open and undefined. As regards 
political decentralization, the constitutional provisions established 
 2 Data for 1 January 2015. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, http://www.ine.es/
inebaseDyN/cp30321/cp_inicio.htm.
 3 Data for 2014. World Development Indicators, World bank, http://data.worldbank.
org/country/spain.
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a wide framework within which the nationalities and regions could 
constitute themselves as autonomous communities.4 This framework 
included the identification of those territories that could access self-
government; the necessary procedure for doing so, namely, the elabo-
ration of a statute of autonomy of each AC; and the minimum content 
required for these statutes, including a list of competences the AC could 
assume. The initiative was left to the territories to proceed towards 
autonomy and complete the model’s design. It was therefore initially 
unclear exactly how the state of the autonomies would develop.
The terminology of “nationalities” and “regions” used in the Constitu-
tion was meant to establish a distinction between those ACs constituted 
by national minorities that had a previous experience of autonomy (i.e., 
Catalonia, the basque Country, and Galicia) and those that could be con-
stituted in the rest of Spain’s territory. The Constitution also included 
two different procedures for elaborating the statutes of autonomy. First, 
a more complex yet faster procedure enabled ACs to secure a higher 
level of self-government. This was included specifically for the historic 
nationalities where support for self-government was very strong. Sec-
ond, a less complex and slower procedure resulted in an initially infe-
rior level of autonomy for some ACs, at least for the first five years. This 
was meant for the rest of the Spanish territories, where it was unclear if 
such a process would take place. After 1978, all the territories progres-
sively initiated a procedure towards self-government, culminating in 
the establishment of a fully decentralized state consisting of seventeen 
ACs by 1983. Andalusia followed Catalonia, the basque Country, and 
Galicia in adopting the faster process and assuming also the maximum 
level of competences; the slower procedure was used by all the rest.
The trend has been to move towards an equalization and symmetry 
between the different ACs; hence, the initial distinction between two 
types or levels has been blurred. Part of this is the result of intentional 
action of the two main statewide political parties – the Union of the 
Democratic Centre/People’s Party (UCD/PP) and Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE) – manifested in two sets of agreements. The first 
“autonomic agreements,” signed in 1981, established a fully decentral-
ized state, extending autonomy to those territories where there was ini-
tially no strong desire for self-government. The second, signed in 1992, 
 4 See generally, Eliseo Aja, El Estado Autonómico: Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales 
(Madrid: Alianza, 2003).
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levelled the scope of competences of all the ACs. however, an attempt 
by the two statewide parties to recentralize the system in 1982 was 
challenged and invalidated by the Constitutional Court, which had 
been established in 1978 as, among other things, an arbiter between the 
two orders of government. Another important feature of the develop-
ment of the state of the autonomies has been the high levels of conflict 
between the ACs and the state, which has resulted in substantial inter-
ventions by the Court.
Spain’s accession to the European Union (then European Commu-
nity – EC) in 1986 posed a new set of challenges to the newly cre-
ated state of the autonomies. As the Constitution was silent on the 
issue of implementation and application of EC law, which extended 
to both areas of Spanish state and AC competence, there was an initial 
debate over the level at which these functions should be carried out. 
Despite claims by the state institutions that these were now encom-
passed within their more general competence over “international 
relations” (Art. 149.1.3) or “external commerce” (Art. 149.1.10), the 
Constitutional Court ruled that European integration did not alter the 
distribution of competences between the Spanish state and the ACs. 
Any related functions must be distributed in accordance with pre-
existing criteria.5 The ACs were also the most affected by the transfer 
to, and progressive expansion of, competences at the European level, 
as the state could still continue to participate in European law-making 
through their representation in the Council of the EC/EU. Following 
the model of the German Länder, the ACs progressively secured dif-
ferent modes of participation in European law-making in areas of AC 
competence, initially in the development of the Spanish state’s posi-
tion in the Council, then in the Council’s working groups, and finally 
in the Spanish representation in the Council itself.6
Overall, the development of the state of the autonomies so far 
has largely been considered a success, as it has allowed for trans-
formation of a unitary system into a fully functioning territorially 
decentralized state. As for the system’s future, there is a diversity 
of opinions across the academic, political, and wider public spheres. 
Some favour a degree of recentralization, particularly as a result of 
 5 Constitutional Court Decision 252/1988.
 6 See Agustin Ruiz, “Spanish Autonomous Communities and EU Policies,” Perspectives 
on Federalism 5, no. 2 (2013), 29–50.
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the post-2007 economic recession. Others favour the status quo, con-
sidering that the overall model has now been completed. And some 
favour increasing the self-government of some or all the ACs, in cer-
tain cases, to reach full independence from the state (mainly in the 
basque Country and Catalonia). The party in government at the state 
level from 2011 to 2015, the PP, is notably more centralist than its 
predecessor, the PSOE, which was in government from 2004 to 2011. 
Indeed, the election of the PSOE’s Jose Luis Zapatero in 2004 spurred 
a generalized wave of reform of the statutes of autonomy, attempt-
ing a bottom-up reform that was described as a “refounding of the 
state of the autonomies.”7 however, as these reforms proceeded, 
they became more controversial and ended up being challenged and 
largely deactivated by the Constitutional Court in 2010. As will be 
seen below, this resulted in the most significant crisis for the system 
since its establishment.
The PP won the 2015 general elections again but by a much smaller 
margin (123 seats). The irruption of two new parties onto the Span-
ish political landscape, Podemos and Ciudadanos, with 69 and 40 seats 
respectively, has for the first time overthrown the traditional two-
party system (the PSOE gained 90 seats). The tensions within the state 
of autonomies are central to the positions of these two new parties. 
Ciudadanos was born as a regional party to counter Catalan national-
ism and is strongly centralist. Podemos is an anti-austerity party that 
defends the need for asymmetry between the different ACs and a much 
more robust articulation of Spain as a pluri-national state, including the 
right of Catalonia and the other minority nations to hold an independ-
ence referendum. how the significant presence of these two new par-
ties in the Spanish parliament will affect the development of the state of 
autonomies remains to be seen.
2. Structural Features
The Constitution safeguards the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish 
nation” and “guarantees the right to self-government of the nationali-
ties and regions” (Art. 2). The autonomy of the ACs is also protected 
by their statutes of autonomy, which the Constitution provides are 
 7 Pedro Cruz, “La Reforma del Estado de las Autonomías,” Revista d’Estudis Federals i 
Autonòmics 2 (2006): 84. 
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the “basic institutional rule of each autonomous community,” and 
which the state is obliged to “recognize and protect … as an integral 
part of its legal system” (Art. 147, Sec. 1). because the constitutional 
provisions are so open, the most distinctive aspect of Spain’s system 
is the importance of the statutes of autonomy in completing the con-
tent of the Constitution and rendering more complete the general 
aspects of the territorial power structure.8 The margin conferred on 
the regional assemblies (and now the self-governing parliaments) to 
design their corresponding AC in their statute is known as the “dis-
positive principle.” It is also a fundamental feature of the system.9 As 
a result, the territorial organization of the state cannot be understood 
without considering both the constitutional provisions and the dif-
ferent statutes of autonomy that constitute part of what is known as 
the “block of constitutionality.” From a legal perspective, the statutes 
of autonomy are negotiated norms that are, at the same time, state 
laws and the basic institutional laws of the ACs, and are finally for-
mally enacted by the state. but once in force, they cannot be amended 
unilaterally or abolished by the state parliament, and any initiative 
for their reform must come from the autonomous community itself. 
The autonomy of local municipalities is also guaranteed in the Con-
stitution (Art. 140), and all three orders of government are provided 
with a direct appeal to the Constitutional Court if they believe their 
autonomy is infringed.
The distribution of competences is not specifically established by the 
Constitution but is based on a system of double lists, one with the com-
petences that may be assumed by the ACs in their statutes of autonomy 
(Art. 148) and one setting out the competences that are reserved to the 
state (Art. 149). In these lists, the Constitution establishes a clear pre-
eminence of the state, which is responsible for the competences typical 
of the central government of a federal state (e.g., defence, international 
relations, immigration, and currency), the main branches of the law 
(i.e., criminal, procedural, commercial, and labour), and the main eco-
nomic and social sectors (e.g., social security, health, the environment, 
 8 Carles viver, “Spain’s Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy: Explaining the 
Evolution and Political Decentralisation,” in Constitutional Dynamics in Federal 
Systems: Sub-national Perspectives, ed. Michael burgess and G. Alan Tarr, 218–37 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).
 9 Enric Fossas, El principio dispositivo en el Estado Autonómico (barcelona: IvAP / Marcial 
Pons, 2007).
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education, and public safety).10 yet in many of these areas, the state is 
not invested with all the functions in relation to a specific field, and 
the ACs can intervene also. Thus, for example, in some areas, the basic 
legislation and their coordination are the responsibility of the state, 
and the ACs can legislate within this framework. In others, the ACs are 
granted executive power to implement legislation enacted by the state. 
These areas, then, require the cooperation of both orders of government 
in the exercise of their powers. Within this framework, the ACs have 
significant competences in areas such as internal transport and tourism, 
urbanism, and agriculture; they also provide many public services, such 
as education, health, and social assistance. All matters not conferred 
explicitly by the Constitution on the central institutions can be assumed 
by the ACs by virtue of their statutes of autonomy. From among those 
open to them, matters not assumed by statutes of autonomy belong to 
the state, whose norms prevail in case of conflict over those of the ACs 
in everything that is not attributed to their exclusive competence (Art. 
149(3)). Finally, two additional mechanisms allow for some flexibility 
of the system. The state may pass harmonization laws in matters of AC 
competence (Art. 150, Secs. 1 and 2). It can also delegate or transfer the 
exercise of its competences to the ACs (Art. 149(3)).11
The Constitution provides for a central bicameral parliament (Con-
gress and Senate), where the Senate is the house of territorial represen-
tation. The Senate currently represents the fifty provinces (the historical 
model of territorial subdivision of the unitary Spanish state, which was 
retained with the establishment of the ACs), however, rather than the 
seventeen ACs, whose parliaments appoint only a small number of sen-
ators (1 each, and another for every million inhabitants, out of a total of 
266). It is generally accepted that with its current composition, the Sen-
ate is of little utility because it is largely a duplicate of the Congress. On 
many occasions, it simply validates its decisions. The Senate’s functions 
 10 Carles viver, “Centralization and Decentralization in Trends in Spain: An 
Assessment of the Present Allocation of Competences between the State and the 
Autonomous Communities,” in Decentralizing and Re-Centralizing Trends in the 
Distribution of Powers within Federal Countries, ed. Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 
155–79 (barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2010); and Enric Argullol and Xavier 
bernadi, “Spain,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, 
ed. Akthar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and Douglas M. brown, 238–65 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
 11 Article 155 of the Constitution also confers extraordinary or emergency powers on 
the state, which have never been used.
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are also largely similar to those of the Congress; it can present bills, and 
it considers and votes on any proposed bills after the Congress has con-
sidered them. however, any amendments voted by the Senate can be 
overruled by a simple majority in the Congress, and if the Senate votes 
to veto a bill, this can also be overruled by an absolute majority in the 
Congress, or a simple majority after a period of two months. In practice, 
this makes the Senate’s veto power ineffective. There have been failed 
attempts to convert this chamber into an institution that would effec-
tively represent the ACs at the state level. Apart from their very mini-
mal representation in the Senate, there is no representation of the ACs 
in the other institutions and bodies of the state. This also is considered 
by many to be an important deficiency of the system.
The Constitution provides two different procedures for its amend-
ment, which depend on the object and scope of the proposed reform. 
The more rigid procedure, which applies to a total revision (the draft-
ing of a new Constitution) and to revisions of the preliminary title 
(this contains the fundamental principles of the constitutional system), 
the charter of fundamental rights, and the provisions on the monar-
chy, requires the approval by two-thirds of both chambers of the state 
parliament in two successive parliaments (the first must be dissolved 
after the vote and new elections held) and ratification by referendum 
(Art. 168). Amendment of the rest of the Constitution’s provisions, 
including those relating to the state of the autonomies, requires a major-
ity of three-fifths of each chamber and, if one-tenth of the members of 
one chamber requests it, ratification by referendum (Art. 167). The ACs’ 
participation in the process is limited to being able to propose a reform 
of the Constitution, either by filing a bill directly to the central parlia-
ment or by requesting the central government to do so (Arts. 167 and 
87). While there is again a common agreement that certain reforms of 
the fundamental norm would be advisable, it is also generally acknowl-
edged that, at least until very recently, it was impossible for lack of the 
minimum consensus between the two main statewide parties required 
to reach the necessary majority. The only two reforms since the Con-
stitution’s enactment have been due to requirements imposed by the 
European Union.12 As noted above, the irruption of two new parties 
 12 Article 13.2 was amended in 1992 in order to allow EU nationals to vote in local 
elections. Article 135 was amended in 2011 to introduce the principle of “budgetary 
stability.”
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with a significant number of seats in the 2015 general elections may 
open new possibilities for change. Two aspects where a reform is con-
sidered particularly advisable are the composition and functions of 
the Senate and an update and systemization of the provisions on the 
state of the autonomies, which in its development has become largely 
“de-constitutionalized.”13 The impossibility of reforming the Constitu-
tion in this final aspect was one factor that initiated the 2004 wave of 
reforms of the statutes of autonomy.
The procedures for amending the statutes of autonomy are included 
in the statutes themselves. These are initiated and drafted by the par-
liament of the autonomous community and require a strong majority 
to pass this initial stage (e.g., two-thirds in Catalonia or three-fifths in 
Murcia). by specific mandate of the Constitution, they then require 
the approval of the Spanish parliament through a special strength-
ened procedure known as an “organic law” (in practice, this requires 
an absolute majority in the Congress). The ACs that attained their 
autonomy through the faster process prescribed more complex proce-
dures for the reform of their statutes, which include a binding refer-
endum in the AC. As the majority for approving a reformed statute of 
autonomy in the Spanish parliament is less strict than for a reform of 
the Constitution, an important difference is that they can be reformed 
with the consent of only one of the two main statewide parties. Since 
their initial enactment, different statutes have been subject to various 
reforms to update or amend specific aspects. These reforms, with the 
exception of the more recent ones, have been driven by the state or by 
statewide parties.
The generalized wave of reform of the statutes of autonomy of the 
ACs initiated in 2004 was broad and encompassing. It was directed 
to updating these norms and maximizing their scope of competences 
and self-government within the framework of the Constitution, while 
resolving some of the main deficiencies of the system. between 2004 
and early 2013, eight ACs reformed their statutes, although the scope 
and intensity of the reforms varied. The first was valencia in April 
2006. The drafting and enactment of its new statute of autonomy was 
largely unproblematic. however, two other ACs challenged one of 
its provisions, which included a right to water resources and to the 
 13 Eliseo Aja and Carles viver, “valoración de 25 Años de Autonomía,” Revista Española 
de Derecho Constitucional 69 (2003): 69–113.
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transfer of surplus water from other basins. (This was seen as threat 
to resources on which the other ACs depended.) The challenge was 
unsuccessful, but the case prepared the ground for the Court’s later 
decision on the challenge to the controversial new Statute of Catalo-
nia. The Catalan statute, enacted in August 2006, was highly innova-
tive and was seen as the leading model for the reforms, including, 
among other aspects, a full charter of rights and an extensive chapter 
on the judicial branch. In addition, it included a series of largely sym-
bolic provisions to strengthen recognition of the history and identity 
of Catalonia as a minority nation within the constitutional framework. 
These provisions included references, for example, to the symbols and 
historical rights of Catalonia, and, most controversially, a reference 
to Catalonia as a “nation” in the preamble. because of all the above, 
the statute was very strongly opposed from the drafting of the initial 
proposal by the centralist PP, which considered it to be a violation 
of the Constitution and a threat to the unity of Spain. however, as a 
minority in the Catalan parliament, the PP could not stop it.14 The PP 
also strongly opposed and campaigned against the new statute dur-
ing the debates and amendments in the Spanish parliament, but the 
support of the PSOE and the nationalist parties again secured the nec-
essary majority for it to be enacted. Once in force, the PP then chal-
lenged a substantive part of the outcome in the Constitutional Court. 
The extent and nature of the challenge was received with outrage by 
supporters of the statute and by the Catalan people more generally, 
as it had been negotiated and agreed to by both the Catalan and state 
parliament and ratified by referendum in Catalonia. The political 
conflict was therefore laid before the Court, and the intense pressure 
from both sides continued throughout the proceedings. Finally, after 
a drawn-out consideration, in 2010 the Court deactivated many of the 
new reforms and the process was brought to an abrupt end, resulting 
in significant difference between ACs that had reformed their statutes 
and those that had not.
 14 The Catalan group of the PP in the Catalan parliament voted against the approval 
of the proposal in response to the content and extent of the proposed reforms, and 
the representatives of the party again voted against its enactment in the Congress. 
Their challenge then included 136 provisions of the total of 223 articles, as well as 
additional and final provisions. They were then joined by the ombudsman and five 
autonomous communities.
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III. Court System
1. Ordinary Court System
The court system, which is based on civil law, is organized along four 
main jurisdictions: civil (for civil and commercial matters), crimi-
nal, administrative, and labour (for employment and social security 
matters).15 The Constitutional Court is considered separate from the 
courts of ordinary jurisdiction and is invested with final jurisdiction 
concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Within each ordinary 
jurisdiction, the different courts are located at municipal, district, pro-
vincial, autonomous-community, and state levels and are organized 
hierarchically so that appeals can be made against the judgments of 
the lower courts. A distinction is made between the juzgados, composed 
of a single judge, and the tribunales, which are collegiate bodies com-
posed of a panel of judges. At the municipal level, the peace courts 
(Juzgados de Paz) operate in municipalities that have no district-level 
courts. At the district level, there are courts of first instance (Juzgados 
de Primera Instancia) and criminal investigation courts (Juzgados de 
Instrucción); some major cities also have specific courts to fight violence 
against women (Juzgados de Violencia sobre la Mujer). At the provincial 
level, there are different Juzgados for criminal, administrative, social, 
juvenile, prison vigilance, and commercial matters, as well as collegiate 
provincial courts (Audiencias Provinciales) that hear civil and criminal 
cases. At the AC level, the higher courts of justice (Tribunales Superiores 
de Justicia) hear civil, criminal, administrative, and social cases. At the 
central level, the National Court (Audiencia Nacional) hears cases that 
affect the whole state, and the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) is the 
final court of appeal in all jurisdictions.
The Constitution states that “the principle of jurisdictional unity is 
the basis for the organization and functioning of the courts” and that 
“the highest judicial body in all jurisdictions” shall be the Supreme 
Court (Art. 117(5)). For lack of further definition in the constitutional 
text, this principle has been given several meanings, among which is a 
principle of territorial jurisdictional unity that precludes the ACs from 
 15 The organization of the Spanish court system is regulated in the “Organic Law 
6/1985, of 1 July, of the Judicial Power,” which has been reformed on numerous 
occasions. This is then complemented by the specific procedural norms enacted for 
each of the jurisdictions.
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having their own court systems.16 In this respect, Spain’s Constitutional 
Court has stated that “the judicial power established by our funda-
mental norm requires that the different courts in which the exercise of 
the jurisdictional powers is vested be integrated in one single jurisdic-
tional organisation.”17 At the same time, in its provisions regarding the 
state of the autonomies, the Constitution establishes the higher courts 
of justice as bodies that “culminate the jurisdictional organization in 
the territory of the Autonomous Communities” (Art. 153(1)). There is 
a higher court of justice in each of the seventeen ACs, constituting a 
distinct level within the unitary judicial system. It is generally accepted 
that these courts are the instrument through which the judicial branch 
adapts its organization and functioning to reflect the existence of the 
ACs as an autonomous order of government with the capacity to create 
their own laws.
The above duality is not, however, present in the distribution of com-
petences; the Constitution confers exclusive competence on the Span-
ish state over the “administration of justice” (Art. 149.1.5). The specific 
content of this provision has been determined by the Constitutional 
Court in various decisions as extending only to “the essential nucleus 
of the administration of justice.”18 In practice, this has allowed the ACs 
to participate in what the Court has also defined as “the administration 
of the administration of justice,” consisting of the provision of personal 
and material resources to the judicial offices and some other limited 
functions. The Constitution also confers exclusive competence on the 
Spanish parliament to enact procedural legislation, although “taking 
into account the necessary specialities derived from particularities of 
the substantive law of the autonomous communities” (Art. 149.1.6). 
This final provision, however, has been construed in such a way as to 
deprive it of content, as the Court has adopted an extremely restrictive 
interpretation of when such particularities would arise, giving a clear 
pre-eminence to safeguarding the uniformity of procedural rules and 
instruments across the state.19
 16 Miguel Ángel Cabellos, “La adecuación del Poder Judicial al modelo de Estado,” 
Revista Vasca de Administración Publica 68 (2004): 77–95.
 17 Constitutional Court Decision 254/1994.
 18 Constitutional Court Decisions 56/1990 and 106/2000.
 19 Miguel Ángel Cabellos, “En torno a la práctica desaparición de una competencia. 
El art. 149.1.6 CE y las especialidades procesales autonómicas,” Revista Vasca de 
Administración Publica 93 (2012): 103–23.
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The Supreme Court in Spain is the Tribunal Supremo, based in 
Madrid. The origin of this Court can be traced to 1812. With the estab-
lishment of the state of autonomies in 1978, its functions have been 
progressively adapted to the state’s composite nature.20 It is a Con-
tinental-style cour de cassation, structured in five divisions (i.e., civil, 
criminal, administrative, labour, and military) and hears a substantial 
number of cases each year. As the highest court in the single judicial 
system, with jurisdiction over the territory of the whole state, the posi-
tion and functions of the Supreme Court are strongly linked to the 
principle of unity of the judicial branch established by the Constitu-
tion. On the basis of the different procedural instruments, either in 
original or appellate jurisdiction, it renders the final decision of the 
ordinary judicial branch on all ordinary questions of law. The only 
exceptions are constitutional issues, where the Constitutional Court 
takes the final decision, and issues involving exclusive law of the ACs, 
where the final decision is taken by their respective higher courts of 
justice. Although these latter courts are fully integrated into the single 
judicial system of Spain as a whole, the higher courts of justice func-
tion as “supreme courts” for their corresponding autonomous com-
munity, and are responsible for the final appeals (cassation) in issues of 
their own civil and administrative law under the general procedural 
legislation.21 In addition, in coordination with the statutes of auton-
omy, this legislation provides that they hear cases of judicial review 
of the decisions of, and civil and criminal liability cases against, their 
highest institutions of government. Their functions therefore largely 
reproduce those of the Supreme Court within their sphere of jurisdic-
tion. In ACs that have a co-official language, proceedings can also be 
held in that language.
The Constitution states that the judicial branch will be “integrated 
by career judges,” establishing a Continental-style judiciary “forming 
a single body” (Art.122(1)). Again, the result of the interpretation of 
this provision has been that the ACs cannot have their own judiciar-
ies. The Constitution also establishes a governing body for the judici-
ary, the General Council of the Judiciary, in order to guarantee the 
 20 Manuel Gerpe, coord., La posición del Tribunal Supremo en el Estado Autonómico 
(barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2008).
 21 Manuel Gerpe Landin, coord., Posición y funciones de los Tribunales Superiores de 
Justicia (barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2008).
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independence of the judicial branch.22 Its functions include judicial 
appointments, promotion, and discipline. Judges are classified into 
three categories, from the lowest to the highest: judge, magistrate, and 
magistrate of the Supreme Court. As a general rule, all candidates 
enter the judicial system as ordinary judges after passing a selec-
tion exam. They can then move up to the higher categories through 
a ranking system based on a combination of years of experience in 
the post and activities related to the judicial function or competi-
tive specialization exams when a vacancy appears. In the case of the 
judges of the Supreme Court, the General Council of the Judiciary 
has greater discretion in selecting among the candidates who fulfil 
the requirements for the post and, as an exception to the general rule 
above, one of every five judges appointed is selected from outside the 
pool of judicial candidates among lawyers and other jurists of recog-
nized competence. The appointment of judges of the higher courts of 
justice of the ACs follows the general system, although the ranking 
method provides that for the appointment of judges in ACs with a co- 
official language or a special historical civil law, knowledge of these 
is considered a merit (but not a requirement) and therefore results in 
additional points. Moreover, in the civil and criminal sections of these 
courts, one in every three vacancies is filled by a legal professional of 
recognized standing with more than ten years of experience within 
the respective AC, appointed from a list presented by the parliament 
of the relevant AC.
In order to guarantee their independence, all judges enjoy security of 
tenure and cannot be removed, suspended, transferred, or retired from 
their position without their consent. While in office, they cannot hold 
or run for public office, belong to political parties or trade unions, or 
carry out any remunerated work except teaching, legal research, and 
creative work. The judges have therefore established their separate 
judicial associations to defend their interests. These associations play 
an important role in the appointment of the judicial representatives on 
the General Council of the Judiciary and are also strongly politicized. 
The age of compulsory retirement is seventy-five; until then, judges can 
 22 Article 122, Section 3, of the Constitution provides it will be composed of the 
president of the Supreme Court, who presides, and twenty members, twelve 
of whom must be judges and magistrates. The other eight are appointed by the 
Congress and the Senate, elected by three-fifths, among lawyers and other jurists of 
recognized competence with more than fifteen years of professional practice.
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be dismissed only according to the rules provided by law and in com-
pliance with the necessary guarantees.
The lack of real participation of the ACs in the organization and func-
tioning of the judicial branch has been a matter of ongoing of debate 
and one of the main areas where further autonomy is claimed by the 
ACs.23 Recent discussions have centred on strengthening the role of 
the higher courts of justice to unburden the Supreme Court, and on the 
decentralization of the some of the functions of the General Council 
of the Judiciary to new judicial councils of the ACs, over which their 
institutions would have certain competences. As a result, the recently 
reformed statutes of autonomy contained more extensive provisions 
concerning the courts in their territory, in particular their correspond-
ing higher courts of justice, and provided for the creation of new 
judicial councils in coordination with the required legislation by the 
Spanish parliament.24 These were challenged in the case of the Catalan 
statute, and the Constitutional Court, emphasizing again its restrictive 
interpretation of the principle of unity, declared that “the territorial 
organization of the state is of no relevance, as a matter of principle, to 
the judicial branch as a power of the state.”25
2. The Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court was established by the 1978 Constitution 
and started functioning in 1980.26 It has a precedent in Spanish con-
stitutional history, which is the Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales of 
1931.27 The basic regulation of the Court can be found in the constitu-
tional provisions that define it as a court of extraordinary jurisdiction 
and separate from the ordinary court system. Further regulation is con-
ferred in an Organic Law on the Constitutional Court, enacted by the 
 23 Manuel Gerpe and Miguel Ángel Cabellos, coords., Poder Judicial y Modelo de Estado 
(barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2013).
 24 Miguel Ángel Cabellos, “Los Consejos de Justicia en el actual proceso de reformas 
estatutarias y sus perspectivas de futuro,” Revista de Derecho Publico 80 (2011):  
89–116.
 25 Constitutional Court Decision 31/2010.
 26 José A. Marín, Naturaleza Jurídica del Tribunal Constitucional (barcelona: Ariel, 1998).
 27 This was established in the Constitution of 1931 and existed during the Second 
Spanish Republic. See Francisco Rubio, “Del Tribunal de Garantías al Tribunal 
Constitucional,” Revista de Derecho Político 16 (1982–3): 27–37.
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state parliament.28 The Court is composed of twelve judges appointed 
by the king, four at the proposal of the Congress (by three-fifths of its 
members), four proposed by the Senate (by the same majority), two 
proposed by the government, and two proposed by the General Coun-
cil of the Judiciary. Possible candidates include ordinary judges, pros-
ecutors, university lecturers, public officials, and lawyers, all of whom 
must have a recognized standing with at least fifteen years of profes-
sional practice. The composition of the Court has generally presented 
a balance between members of judicial origin and of non-judicial ori-
gin, with a strong presence of academics; therefore, the Court has a 
profile that is different from that of the courts in the ordinary judicial 
branch.29 Constitutional Court judges are appointed for nine years and 
are renewed by thirds (four judges) every three years in order to ensure 
some continuity for the Court’s composition and work. The president 
of the Court is appointed by the king from among its members on the 
proposal of the Court itself, for a period of three years, and has a casting 
vote. One major problem has been delays in selecting new candidates 
by the political institutions, particularly the Congress and the Senate, 
when political parties try to ensure appointments in accordance with 
their ideological viewpoints.30
Members of the Court must be independent and enjoy security of 
tenure during their term in office. by specific constitutional mandate, 
membership of the Constitutional Court is incompatible with any posi-
tion of a representative nature, any political or administrative office, 
employment in a political party or trade union, active service as an 
ordinary judge or prosecutor, or any professional or business activ-
ity. Incompatibilities for the members of the ordinary judicial branch 
also apply to the members of the Constitutional Court. here again, the 
practice established by political parties in the appointment process has 
led to a perception of the Court being politicized, with judges being 
linked to a specific party, accused of voting accordingly, and divided 
into a “conservative” and a “progressive” group. The large majorities 
 28 “Organic Law 2/1979, of 3 October, of the Constitutional Court,” which has been 
reformed on various occasions.
 29 Javier García, “La experiencia de veinticinco años de jurisdicción constitucional en 
España,” in La Reforma del Tribunal Constitucional: actas del V Congreso de la Asociación de 
Constitucionalistas de España, coord. Pablo Pérez 17–120 (valencia: Tirant blanch, 2007).
 30 Francisco Rubio, “El Tribunal Constitucional,” Revista Española de Derecho 
Constitucional 71 (2004): 11–33.
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required to select a judge, aimed at securing a strong cross-party sup-
port for the appointments, have led to the practice of political parties 
distributing the vacancies arising among themselves (sometimes this 
includes the appointments conferred on more than one institution, pro-
ducing the long delays referred to above), and where then each party 
agrees to vote for the others’ candidates. This leads to the appointments 
being divided largely between the two main statewide parties and 
clearly violates the intention behind the constitutional provisions on 
the appointment system. This view of the Court being politicized also 
affects the disputes regarding the territorial organization of the state, 
where the “conservative” judges are perceived as favouring a stronger 
central state, while the “progressive” judges are perceived as being 
more sensitive to the claims of the ACs.
The conferral of the appointment of two of judges of the Constitu-
tional Court on the Senate highlights the fact that the territorial per-
spective was taken into account in designing the Court. however, as 
seen above, the Senate does not represent the interests of the ACs, and 
their participation in the appointment of the jurisdictional body con-
ferred with the task of resolving disputes between both orders of gov-
ernment has also been one of their ongoing claims. A recent reform 
strengthened their participation in these appointments by establishing 
that those judges appointed by the Senate be selected among candi-
dates presented by the parliaments of the ACs.31 This controversial 
reform was rejected by the opposition in the Spanish parliament (PP) 
and had to be validated by the Constitutional Court itself, which ruled 
that it is constitutional insofar as the Senate is still free to select candi-
dates in addition to those nominated by the ACs.32 In practice, this ren-
dered the reform meaningless. Moreover, the first Senate appointment 
after the reform highlighted again the pre-eminence of party interests, 
as all the AC parliaments governed by one of the two main parties 
(again, PP) proposed the same two candidates, which were, in effect, 
the party’s chosen candidates for the posts.33
The Constitutional Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution. 
As such, it is independent of the other constitutional bodies of the state 
 31 This was introduced in the “Organic Law 6/2007, of 24 May, for the Reform of the 
Organic Law of the Constitutional Court.”
 32 Constitutional Court Decisions 49/2008 and 101/2008.
 33 “El Senado sortea la estrategia del PP contra la renovación del Constitucional,” 
 El País, 1 July 2010.
384 Courts in Federal Countries
and subject only to the Constitution and its own governing statute.34 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court have the force of res judicata 
from the day following their publication and are fully binding on all 
institutions and bodies of both the central state and ACs. The Constitu-
tional Court hears cases concerning conflicts of jurisdiction between the 
Spanish state and the ACs or between particular ACs themselves, con-
flicts between different constitutional bodies of the state (including the 
central government, the Congress, the Senate, and the General Council 
of the Judiciary), challenges against statutes for violating the Constitu-
tion, appeals in defence of local autonomy, declarations of the constitu-
tionality of international treaties, and extraordinary appeals to protect 
fundamental rights. Cases concerning conflicts of jurisdiction (conflictos 
de competencia) may be lodged by the government of the central state or 
by the executives of the ACs against regulations (secondary legislation) 
of the other order of government (positive conflicts), or a failure to act 
in a specific area (negative conflicts). Many conflicts between the state 
and the ACs are also lodged via the “appeal of unconstitutionality” 
(recurso de inconstitucionalidad), which allows the Court to carry out an 
abstract review of statutes at the request of the president of the govern-
ment, fifty members of the Congress, fifty members of the Senate, the 
AC executives and parliaments, or the ombudsman, during the three 
months after their publication. Once the three-month post-publication 
period is over, all statutes can be referred to the Constitutional Court 
by the ordinary courts in relation to a specific controversy through the 
procedure of “question of unconstitutionality” (questión de inconstitu-
cionalidad), for which there is no time limit. An essential function of 
the Court and the largest number of cases it hears are the “extraordi-
nary appeals for protection against violations of fundamental rights” 
(recurso de amparo), which can be lodged by the directly affected party, 
the ombudsman, or the prosecution, when all other judicial remedies 
have been exhausted. Finally, and as a result of the controversial case 
of the reformed Catalan statute, as of 2015 the Court can also hear chal-
lenges against proposals for the enactment or amendment of statutes of 
autonomy.35
 34 “Organic Law of the Constitutional Court,” Art. 1.
 35 “Organic Law 12/2015, of 22 September, for the amendment of the Organic Law 
of the Constitutional Court, for the establishment of the pre-enactment appeal of 
unconstitutionality for proposals for the enactment or amendment of statutes of 
autonomy.”
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As noted above, as a general rule, only privileged applicants can 
lodge appeals against either the Spanish state or an AC for violating the 
constitutional provisions on the state of the autonomies. Individuals 
may not, therefore, do so, with the exception of a negative conflict of 
jurisdiction when their interests are affected. The most common case is 
that the state challenges statutes or regulations of the ACs or that ACs 
challenge statutes or regulations of the state. When there is a conflict of 
jurisdiction, before the appeal can be lodged, the relevant provisions 
provide that there must be an initial attempt to negotiate a solution 
(this is not binding for the state).36 Similarly, in order to try to reduce 
the number of “appeals of unconstitutionality” lodged against statutes 
by both orders of government, a reform introduced in 2000 allows for 
the extension of the period to appeal from three to nine months when 
there is an agreement to negotiate to try to resolve the discrepancies, 
and this is notified to the Court.37 If the challenges go ahead, various 
scholars have highlighted that the state and the ACs are in an asymmet-
rical position with regard to their initial effects.38 If the state challenges 
an AC regulation directly before the Court, on competence grounds or 
not, it will result in the automatic suspension of the norm for a period 
of five months, after which the Court must decide if it will maintain the 
suspension until the final decision on the case.39 The ACs can obtain the 
suspension of a regulation of the state only when the challenge is on 
competence grounds and if they can prove it could cause irreparable 
damage.40 In addition, as a general norm, an “appeal of unconstitution-
ality” does not result in the suspension of the validity of the statute, but 
in the cases where the Spanish government challenges the constitution-
ality of a statute enacted by an AC, this will be suspended automati-
cally up to a period of five months, and if ratified by the Court, until 
there is a final decision. The significant differences in the effects of these 
challenges highlight a presumption in favour of the state.
 36 “Organic Law of the Constitutional Court,” Arts. 62–3.
 37 Ibid., Art. 33, as amended by the “Organic Law 1/2000, of 7 January.”
 38 Enoch Alberti, “La intervención del Tribunal Constitucional en la construcción del 
Estado Autonómico español,” in 50 años de Corte Constitucional Italiana, 25 años de 
Tribunal Constitucional español, coords. Miguel Revenga, Emilio Pajares, and Juan 
Ramón Rodríguez, 193–212 (Madrid: Ministerio de Justicia, 2007).
 39 Spanish Constitution, Art. 161, Sec. 2.
 40 “Organic Law of the Constitutional Court,” Art. 64, Sec. 3.
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In exercising its functions, the Court is described as carrying out the 
role of a “negative legislator,” analysing the initiatives of both the state 
and AC legislators, when challenged, and invalidating those that do not 
comply with the Constitution. because the constitutional provisions are 
open to interpretation in many aspects, scholars have highlighted the 
importance of the Court’s self-restraint and of a strong presumption of 
the constitutionality of legislation. In the area of the territorial organi-
zation of the state, its governing statute provides specifically that when 
analysing conformity with the Constitution of a state or AC statute, the 
Court will take into consideration not only the constitutional provisions 
but also other statutes enacted within the framework of the Constitu-
tion to delimit or harmonize the competences of the state and the dif-
ferent autonomous communities.41 As a result, the Court has engaged 
in an ongoing and evolving dialogue with both the central state and AC 
legislatures. Some scholars highlight the fact that the Court has extended 
its role further than a simple veto (“negative legislator”). The Court has 
contributed, for example, its own doctrines and principles to the inter-
pretation and development of the Constitution. It also makes use of the 
technique of “interpretative opinions,” reconstruing challenged provi-
sions to make them compatible with the Constitution, which are more 
activist than simply invalidating them.42 The style of its opinions has been 
characterized as “professorial,” because they tend to be long and discur-
sive, with arguments constructed on the basis of previous decisions and 
showing an engagement with specialized legal scholarship, even if not 
referring to it specifically. Dissenting opinions are common and are pub-
lished together with the majority opinion. In cases where the Court is 
divided, dissenting opinions are considered very important, because in 
many cases they can signal a future change in the Court’s position.
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
1. General Tendencies
Within the largely open model outlined in the Constitution, the Consti-
tutional Court has a fundamental role in contributing to the construc-
tion of the state of the autonomies. Many of the different constitutional 
 41 Ibid., Art. 28.
 42 See García, “La experiencia de veinticinco años de jurisdicción constitucional en España.”
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provisions concerning the territorial organization of the Spanish state, 
especially the competence provisions, have been developed and fleshed 
out by hundreds of decisions. It is impossible, therefore, to under-
stand the functioning of the state of the autonomies without taking the 
Court’s case law into consideration.43 Litigation during the first years of 
the state of the autonomies was especially intense, with a large number 
of challenges brought by both the ACs and the state (an average of 100 
challenges per year in 1984–8). Since then, the number of challenges has 
decreased, and the role of the Court has become more one of fine-tuning 
in specific cases, although the number of competence challenges is still 
notably high. The reasons proffered for this include the openness of the 
constitutional provisions as well as the use of constitutional challenges 
by government institutions and political parties to obtain short-term 
political goals, knowing that the over-burdened Court and the long 
delay in resolving challenges (in some cases, currently, up to ten years), 
may not produce a final decision until two parliamentary sessions later. 
Also a significant number of challenges are subsequently withdrawn as 
a result of political negotiations or changes in the governing majorities 
at the state and AC levels. On the other hand, the number of challenges 
between ACs has been very limited and has not had a significant effect 
on the development of the system, although they have recently gained 
prominence in the challenges against the newly reformed statutes of 
autonomy.
Development of the state of the autonomies within the possibilities 
provided by the Constitution has been notably centralizing through an 
extensive interpretation of the functional and substantive competences 
of the state, thus limiting the ACs’ scope of self-government. The Con-
stitutional Court has contributed to this process by validating many of 
the expansive statutes and decisions adopted by the central-state leg-
islature, which has defined the model largely through the coordinated 
action of the two dominant statewide parties. Therefore the Court has 
helped consolidate a notably centralized interpretation of the constitu-
tional provisions on the territorial organization of the state, foreclos-
ing other possible interpretations that would have been much more 
favourable to the ACs. At the same time, however, in certain crucial 
 43 For a detailed commentary, see Gerard Martin, “La jurisprudència constitucional 
sobre l’organització territorial de l’Estat Autonòmic i bibliografia sobre la incidència 
d’aquesta jurisprudència,” Revista Catalana de Dret Públic 43 (2011): 221–76.
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cases, the Court has made important decisions defending the ACs. It 
is precisely because on these occasions the Court limited the central-
izing tendencies of the state institutions that – until recent decisions 
on the reformed Statute of Autonomy of valencia and, in particular, on 
the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia – it was generally accepted that 
its intervention had been fairly balanced overall.44 These two decisions 
of 2007 and 2010 were notably controversial and for the first time very 
strongly split academic and more general political, institutional, and 
public opinion on the Court.45 As will be seen, for the supporters of the 
new statutes, in making these decisions, the Constitutional Court had 
bowed to the pressure of those opposing the reforms, and in order to 
do so had reversed much of its previous case law on the state of the 
autonomies, adopting a much more restrictive interpretation of the role 
of the ACs and their statutes of autonomy within the system. The Court 
was also accused of reinforcing its own position, to the extent that it 
conferred on itself the role of “prorogued constituent power” with the 
authority to further define or limit what the Constitution purposely left 
open.46 For those opposing the reforms, however, the Court was simply 
safeguarding the model established by the Constitution, a model that 
was violated by a pact between the state and self-governing legislatures 
aimed at an “undercover” reform of the Constitution through the stat-
utes of autonomy.47
These two controversial decisions also highlighted the division of 
the Court into two blocks with radically opposite understandings of 
the Constitution’s provisions on the territorial organization of the state. 
 44 Among others, German Fernández, La Contribución del Tribunal Constitucional al 
Estado Autonómico (Madrid: Iustel, 2005).
 45 The valencian decision was seen largely as setting the groundwork for the Catalan 
case, in which many of the provisions challenged had been reproduced in other 
statutes and approved by the members of the challenging party. by the time the 
Catalan decision was finally adopted (four years after the challenge), one judge 
had died and three of the judges’ mandates had expired, with the filling of the four 
vacancies being postponed in order to avoid altering the majorities on the Court, 
and leading to allegations of it being adopted by an “illegal court.”
 46 Paloma Requejo Rodriguez, “La posición del Tribunal Constitucional Español tras su 
Sentencia 31/2010,” Revista Catalana de Dret Públic 43 (2011): 317–41.
 47 As an example, see the following monographic issues: “Justícia constitucional i 
estats compostos: reflexions a partir de la sentència del Tribunal Constitucional 
sobre l’Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya,” Revista Catalana de Dret Públic 43 (2011); 
“Monográfico: STC 31/2010,” Teoría y Realidad Constitucional 27 (2011); and “El Tribunal 
Constitucional y el Estatut,” El Cronista del Estado Democrático de Derecho 15 (2010).
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The valencian decision was adopted by a very tight majority (7–5), 
and part of the reason for the long delay in the Catalan decision was 
the lack of a minimum consensus among the Court’s members, a fact 
that was continuously leaked to the press. An example of the depth 
of this division was that in order to obtain the final Catalan opinion, 
the ten judges (one was ruled to have a disqualifying interest and one 
had died without being replaced) had to vote on different blocks of 
challenged provisions separately, with different judges voting in favour 
and against each block. A first block included the preamble and the 
reference to Catalonia as a nation (6–4); a second block concerned the 
challenged provisions declared unconstitutional (8–2); a third block 
dealt with the challenged provisions declared constitutional (6–4); and 
a fourth block concerned the provisions that had to be reconstrued in 
order to be constitutional. The decision was also accompanied by four 
dissenting opinions, three from “conservative” judges and one from a 
“progressive” judge.
2. Specific Issues
The Constitutional Court’s explicit understanding of the Constitution’s 
provisions on the state of the autonomies is that they are very open and 
allow for the inclusion of very different political options pertaining to 
the design of the territorial organization of the state.48 In this sense, the 
Court has always been careful to refer to the Spanish polity as a “com-
posite state” (Estado compuesto), safeguarding the autonomy of the ACs, 
but at the same time avoiding commitment to a more specific charac-
terization. In the 2007 decision on the Statute of Autonomy of valencia, 
the Court summarized its conception of the territorial organization of 
the state as resting on five fundamental principles.49 First, the Court 
stated that the system rests on the adequate integration of the principle 
of unity, translated into the existence of one organization – the state – for 
the whole of the Spanish territory, with the principle of autonomy of 
the nationalities and regions. According to the Court, the principle of 
autonomy, which ensures a sphere of self-government for the ACs, is 
not opposed to the principle of unity, but encompassed by and attains 
its true meaning within the latter. These are then complemented by the 
 48 Constitutional Court Decisions 76/1983 and 247/2007.
 49 Constitutional Court Decision 247/2007.
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principle of solidarity, which applies to the state and the ACs and also 
to the different ACs among themselves, the principle of the equality of 
citizens, which ensures the common basic conditions in the exercise of 
their rights, and the more general principle of loyalty to the Constitu-
tion. This final principle, which is not expressly included in the Con-
stitution, requires that all decisions adopted by the different orders of 
government are in the general public interest.
As regards the locus of constitutive authority upon which the system 
is legally founded, the Court has declared that national sovereignty, 
which the Constitution says belongs to the Spanish people, is not the 
result of a pact between historical territorial entities that retain rights 
going back to before the Constitution, but is a provision emanating from 
the constituent power with general binding force.50 The Court reiterated 
this idea in its decision on the Statute of Catalonia, declaring that the 
references to Catalonia as “nation” or a “national reality” in the pream-
ble do not have any interpretative legal effect and that the references to 
“the historical rights of the Catalan people” had to be interpreted as the 
rights the Constitution itself provides with regard to, for example, their 
distinct private law or minority languages, and not as a separate founda-
tion of the self-government of Catalonia.51 Similarly, it has declared that 
statutes of autonomy are not the expression of a sovereign power, but 
of autonomy founded in the Constitution. however, while thus distin-
guishing autonomy from sovereignty, the Court has stated that the polit-
ical nature of the autonomy of the ACs means that they should have the 
capacity to establish their own public policies in the areas of their com-
petence.52 Further, a necessary consequence of the political autonomy of 
the ACs is that citizens living in different parts of the state can be subject 
to different legal rules and thus have different rights without violating 
the general principle of equality of rights across the state.53
A large part of the constitutional litigation on the territorial organiza-
tion of the state has centred on the distribution of competences between 
both orders of government. Using a diversity of techniques, the Court 
has defined in detail the functional and substantive content of the differ-
ent competences reserved as “exclusive” to the Spanish state.54 This has 
 50 Constitutional Court Decisions 4/1981 and 247/2007.
 51 Constitutional Court Decision 31/2010.
 52 Constitutional Court Decisions 4/1981 and 25/1981.
 53 Constitutional Court Decisions 37/1981 and 247/2007.
 54 Fernández, La Contribución del Tribunal Constitucional al Estado Autonómico.
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also required it to define the different concepts used in the Constitu-
tion when doing this in each specific area, which in turn also delimited 
the scope of intervention of the ACs: where the competence over the 
“bases” or “basic legislation” is conferred on the central state, the ACs 
can enact more detailed legislation within the basic state legislative 
framework; where the competence to enact “legislation” is conferred on 
the central state, the ACs are granted executive powers to implement it; 
and the more general conferral of competence over “coordination” on 
the central state means it is granted powers to coordinate a specific field, 
notwithstanding the related competences of the ACs. As part of this pro-
cess, the Court has allowed for an expansive interpretation of the cen-
tral state’s competences, with two headings that have become known as 
“horizontal clauses.” These as well as “basic legislation” have been par-
ticularly invasive. The Court has adopted a more restrictive approach to 
those headings assumed as exclusive AC competences in their statutes 
of autonomy, stating that in these cases, exclusivity does not mean that 
ACs are granted all functions pertaining to a particular field.55 In some 
of its first decisions, the Court already established that the term “exclu-
sive” was not absolute when used in a statute of autonomy to refer to 
competences assumed by an AC because the statutes cannot impede 
the central state from exercising its exclusive competences, which may 
result in an intervention in those fields.56 As the statutes of autonomy 
have tended to occupy all the areas left open by the Constitution, the 
Court has hardly ever applied the residual clause, and it has not con-
ferred additional competences on the central state.
The two central competence headings that have become known as 
“horizontal clauses” are the provision of the “basic rules and coordina-
tion of the general planning of economic activity” (Art. 14, Sec 1.13) and 
the regulation of “the basic conditions that guarantee the equality of all 
Spanish citizens in the exercise of their rights and in the fulfilment of 
their constitutional duties” (Art. 149(1.1)). In both cases, the Court has 
established a more limiting initial definition, but has then allowed for 
a wide variety of exceptions that have largely expanded their applica-
tion. In the first, which has been the object of notable conflicts and a 
high number of decisions, the Court has established that this provision 
cannot be interpreted to annul the competences of the ACs that happen 
 55 Constitutional Court Decision 56/1986.
 56 Constitutional Court Decision 3/1981.
392 Courts in Federal Countries
to have certain economic aspects, and that it can authorize only those 
measures that concern matters having a direct and significant impact 
on general economic activity.57 yet the Court has validated numerous 
exceptions to these rules to cover individual measures, which the state 
argued were necessary to attain particular important objectives.58 Simi-
larly, regarding the equality of all Spanish citizens in the exercise of 
their rights and fulfilment of their duties, the Court has again held that 
the provision covers only the conditions that have a direct and imme-
diate relation to basic constitutional rights in a strict sense, and that a 
regulation must still leave scope for the ACs to exercise their compe-
tences in the relevant field, but has then permitted much more detailed 
and expansive central regulations to stand.59
The Court’s definition of “basic laws” (framework laws) has followed 
a pattern similar to the cases above. In its initial decisions, it established 
that the “basic” content must be included in a statute and that it must 
provide the minimum normative common denominator on the basis 
of which each AC can build and establish its own particular legislative 
policies.60 however, since then, the Court has allowed for exceptions to 
the above rules, including the use of secondary legislation and even an 
administrative act, along with detailed regulations in particular fields 
and variations in their general application across all ACs.61 The Court 
has also established that the specific content of the “basis” of a basic law 
is mutable. It can be amended over time; consequently, changes by the 
central legislator can result in previously valid AC statutes becoming 
unconstitutional.62 The Court has been similarly flexible about the pow-
ers of coordination conferred on the central state, allowing their use to 
be extended farther than the specific competence headings that provide 
for them, with the objective of the integration of the global system.63
In some cases, the Court has defended the autonomy of the ACs and 
adopted an open and flexible interpretation of their competences in 
areas that are included in the central state’s exclusive competences. A 
fundamental decision from the viewpoint of the ACs was invalidation 
 57 Constitutional Court Decisions 125/1984 and 76/1991.
 58 As an example, Constitutional Court Decision 95/1986.
 59 Constitutional Court Decisions 61/1997 and 164/2001.
 60 Constitutional Court Decisions 32/1981 and 1/1882.
 61 Constitutional Court Decisions 49/1988, 50/1999, and 109/1988.
 62 Constitutional Court Decisions 1/1982 and 2/1989.
 63 Constitutional Court Decisions 32/1983 and 104/1988.
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of the state “Organic Law for the harmonization of the Process of 
Self-Government” (known as LOAPA), enacted in 1982 as an attempt 
to re-centralize powers and stall the “autonomic process.” The Court 
declared that the state’s harmonization power was restricted to the spe-
cial circumstances provided for in the Constitution, and that the public 
interest did not allow it to infringe or take over competences that had 
been assumed by the ACs.64 Some examples of the Court carrying out an 
extensive interpretation of the competences of the ACs include the field 
of “administration of justice,” discussed above, and the development by 
the ACs of their special historical civil law, where the Court has allowed 
them to regulate institutions connected to those in their compilations, 
without strictly binding them to their original content.65 Other decisions 
favouring the ACs include accepting their international activity, validat-
ing the Catalan language policy, impeding the central state from using 
funding to invade areas of AC competence, and allowing ACs to open 
offices in brussels to facilitate their contacts with EU institutions and 
bodies.66 As seen above, the Court also has stated that integration and 
implementation of EU law does not alter the distribution of competences 
between the Spanish state and the ACs, and that any related functions 
must be distributed in accordance with pre-existing criteria.
As part of the above decisions, the Court has developed interpreta-
tive principles and criteria for resolving inconsistencies or contradictions 
between state and AC laws. Notably, the Court has not made significant 
use of the “prevalence clause,” which favours the law of the state in these 
cases, and has usually resolved conflicts on the basis of the principle of 
competence.67 Additional principles include the “irrenounceability” and 
“unavailability” of AC competences, meaning that once assumed by an 
AC in its statute of autonomy, they cannot be returned to or taken back 
by the central state; and the principle of “specificity,” where the most 
generic competence must give way to the more specific.68 The Court also 
has stated that implicit in the system is a general principle of collabora-
tion between the Spanish state and the ACs.69
 64 Constitutional Court Decision 76/1983.
 65 Constitutional Court Decision 88/1993.
 66 Constitutional Court Decisions 153/1989, 165/1994, 82, 83, 84/1986, 337/1994, and 
179/1985.
 67 Constitutional Court Decision 163/1995.
 68 Constitutional Court Decisions 87/1993 and 71/1982.
 69 Constitutional Court Decision 18/1982.
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In its valencian and Catalan decisions, the Court issued a series 
of general propositions about the role and functions of the statutes 
of autonomy. These propositions have been objects of much contro-
versy. The reformed AC statutes contained several novelties, including 
detailed delimitation of the competence categories and fields to safe-
guard the ACs against the expansiveness of central-state competences, 
and the representation of the ACs in certain state and EU bodies and 
institutions, following and building on the court’s own case-law. As 
seen above, until then, it was generally accepted that the statutes of 
autonomy had a fundamental role in completing the constitutional 
design of the state of the autonomies and were a central part of the 
“block of constitutionality.” however, while in the initial valencian 
decision the Court seemed to accept this role of the statutes, in the Cata-
lan decision it declared that any understanding of these norms as being 
“constitutional in substance” was merely academic and gave them no 
added legal value or force.70 Disregarding their negotiated nature, and 
the fact that the Constitution itself provides that they are “the basic 
institutional norm of each AC” (Art. 147.1), the Court went on to state 
that the statutes of autonomy are simply “organic laws,” the formal cat-
egory under which they are finally enacted in the Spanish parliament.71 
On this basis, the court then declared that the statutes of autonomy 
could describe the functional and substantive content of competences, 
but that only the Court itself could carry out a “genuine and unchal-
lengeable interpretation of the principles and categories in the Constitu-
tion.”72 In a similar sense, the Court ruled that the provisions regarding 
AC participation in state and EU institutions and bodies were void of 
any normative content and depended on being provided for in state 
legislation, which the state has absolute freedom to enact or not. In a 
final decision of nearly 900 pages, it deactivated most of the reforms 
included in the statute, in many cases by re-construing them in a way 
that went against their original meaning and left them with no legal 
effect. The Court, however, did not openly acknowledge or explain this 
change in its case law, and the reasons for it therefore are not fully clear. 
As noted above, this challenge was the result of a political rather than 
 70 Constitutional Court Decision 31/2010.
 71 The court equated the statutes with the rest of organic laws that regulate specific 
areas when so provided by the Constitution, and which can be freely enacted and 
amended at the state level (Art. 81.1).
 72 Constitutional Court Decision 31/2010.
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a strictly legal conflict, and the Court was under substantial pressure 
from both sides. In this context, and after an extensive and complex 
deliberation, a majority of the judges decided to block the new reforms. 
Possible reasons for this decision are that some judges considered the 
reforms to be a threat to the unity of Spain; some believed that reforms 
of this nature should be carried out through the constitutional amend-
ment process; and others thought that they could not be enacted in such 
a controversial climate or without wider consensus at the central level.
As noted above, the Constitutional Court’s decisions are fully bind-
ing on all ordinary courts, legislatures, and executives. These insti-
tutions cannot deviate from, opt out of, or refuse to comply with the 
Court’s doctrines and rulings. The Court’s decisions have, however, 
been contested by nationalist politicians and governments. The Court 
was even the object of a boycott by the basque Country, which for years 
refused to present any challenges to the Court after a decision on justice 
matters in 1990. These criticisms reached their highest point in the bar-
celona Declaration, signed in 1998 by Convergència i Unió (a federation 
of two Catalan nationalist parties), Partido Nacionalista Vasco (basque 
Nationalist Party), and Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist 
Coalition). The declaration described the Court as an instrument for 
centralism and accused it of formulating a unitary reading of the Con-
stitution.73 A notable precedent to the Catalan statute conflict was the 
basque proposal for a “freely associated state” (also known as the “Ibar-
retxe plan”), approved by the basque parliament in 2004 as a reform of 
its statute of autonomy, which was later declared invalid by the central 
state parliament. both sides of the conflict required the intervention of 
the Constitutional Court, which finally validated the state parliament’s 
decision, resulting in strong criticism from the nationalist parties and 
institutions.74 The reaction against its decision on Catalonia’s statute of 
autonomy was unprecedented and included a joint editorial by twelve 
Catalan newspapers (entitled “The dignity of Catalonia”) some months 
before and a massive protest march headed by civil-society organiza-
tions and all political parties except the PP, which had presented the 
 73 Signed on 16 July 1988, it requested a redefinition of the state as a multinational and 
multilingual nation.
 74 Constitutional Court Decrees 135/2004, 44 and 45/2005. The Court declared invalid 
a challenge by the state government to the basque government’s initial agreement, 
as well as two individual challenges to the state Congress’s refusal to consider the 
proposal.
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challenge.75 Immediate academic criticisms also were published within 
and outside Catalonia, directed at both the content and form of the 
decision.76 Criticisms were centred, first, on the fact that the Court went 
back on a substantial part of its previous case law on the state of the 
autonomies, and it did so without putting forward clear reasons for 
such a change. Second, the decision was criticized for its harshness and 
apodictic tone, particularly as the Court was considering a statute that 
had been negotiated by both orders of government and ratified by ref-
erendum. Finally, the decision was strongly criticized for its extensive 
use of the technique of stating the “constitutionally compatible inter-
pretation” of the challenged provisions, and for re-construing them in 
such a way that it converted them into a set of general programmatic 
provisions. At the same time, however, strong voices were raised in 
defence of the Court and its decision.77
V. Conclusion
The role of the Constitutional Court in enabling the ACs to exercise sig-
nificant levels of political autonomy and self-determination has been 
important, particularly during the first years of the Constitution and the 
initial construction of the state of the autonomies. In the development of 
the system, the expansive interpretation of the competences of the Span-
ish state and the resulting restriction of the sphere of self-government of 
the ACs cannot be attributed directly to the Court, as it has simply vali-
dated the initiatives of the state legislator within the open provisions of 
the Constitution. Its recent intervention in the new wave of reform of 
the statutes of autonomy has proved much more problematic. The prin-
cipal objectives of this bottom-up constitutional initiative to develop 
the state of the autonomies were to expand the self-government of the 
ACs to the maximum within the Constitution and to resolve some of the 
system’s ongoing problems. In order to do so, the required procedures 
were followed and the required majorities in both the self-governing 
AC parliaments and the state parliament were obtained, constituting 
 75 26 November 2009. For example, “La dignidad de Catalunya,” La vanguardia, 
http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20091126/53831123016/la-dignidad-de-
catalunya.html.
 76 See Revista Catalana de Dret Public 43 (2011): 44.
 77 For example, Francesc de Carreras, Catalunya tras la Sentencia del Estatuto, Letras 
Libres (September 2010): 32–7.
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an exercise of “self-rule” combined with “shared-rule.”78 As part of this 
process, the statutes were subject to scrutiny by constitutional experts 
and amended, following deliberation, by both orders of government; 
so it is arguable that they were in accordance with at least one possible 
and plausible interpretation of the Constitution. however, the Court 
deactivated most of these reforms, devalued the legal status of the stat-
utes of autonomy, and left them with a large number of programmatic 
provisions having no normative content. by expunging the statutes of 
autonomy from the “block of constitutionality,” the Court also left key 
elements of the autonomy of the ACs to the discretion of the state parlia-
ment. As a result, the state of the autonomies is at a crossroads, with the 
only option for the ACs to improve their self-government and resolve 
some of the deficiencies of the system being reform of the Constitution 
itself, which, at least until very recently, has been highly unlikely.
Further, the Court has played a fundamental role in securing indi-
vidual rights and liberties as part of a transition to a fully constitutional 
system, in particular by incorporating the case-law of the European 
Court of human Rights as well as other international human-rights 
treaties and decisions. The Court has, at the same time, been more 
restrictive in allowing the development of a multi-level system of rights 
protection in accordance with the principles of unity and autonomy on 
which the system is based. Another of the new aspects in the reformed 
statutes was the inclusion of a charter of rights; yet it was also part 
of the provisions challenged in both cases.79 In the valencian decision, 
the Court stated that there are no constitutional impediments for the 
statutes of autonomy to include “statutory rights,” but in the Catalan 
case, the Court declared that these are in reality not individual rights 
but simply mandates to the AC legislator, binding within their sphere 
of competences. Of particular significance, the Court also invalidated 
the conferral on the Council of Statutory Guarantees of Catalonia – an 
expert advisory body on constitutional and statutory matters – of the 
power to give a binding opinion on the compatibility of bills presented 
in the Catalan parliament with the rights included in the statute. In 
practice, this would have allowed the council to block those bills con-
sidered in violation of the statutory rights, and part of the grounds for 
 78 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 5.
 79 Enriqueta Expósito, “La regulación de los derechos en los nuevos estatutos de 
autonomía,” Revista d’Estudis Federals i Autonòmics 5 (2007): 147–202.
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the Court’s decision were that it would confer on the council a role too 
similar to its own.
Within the above framework, one still largely unresolved issue in 
the state of the autonomies is the “national question,” particularly 
with respect to the basque Country and Catalonia. After the conflict 
surrounding the basque proposal for a “freely associated state,” which 
was blocked because it was considered too much of a fundamental 
challenge to the constitutional framework, the Catalan proposal was 
clearly and carefully drafted to fit within the constitutional provisions. 
Together with maximizing self-government, parts of the provisions of 
the new statute were directed at introducing elements that recognized 
the identity of Catalonia as a minority nation within the state, including 
references to its history and cultural heritage. As seen above, in many 
cases these provisions had no direct legal effect on the organization and 
functioning of the system, and, again, their scrutiny by constitutional 
experts meant that they were arguably also compatible with at least 
one possible interpretation of the Constitution. When considering these 
provisions, however, the Court was particularly harsh in its tone and 
wording, showing a lack of sensitivity to the situation of national plu-
ralism, which is clearly recognized in the Constitution, thereby increas-
ing the feeling of alienation and support for independence in Catalonia. 
For example, the Court stated that “the Constitution doesn’t recognize 
any other nation than the Spanish nation.”80 With such an approach, 
the Court missed an opportunity to set out an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the constitutional use of the terms nationalities and nation, which 
could have allowed for an inclusive understanding of the constitutional 
framework in a way that could accommodate both the minority and 
majority nations in recognition of Spain’s pluri-national reality.
Until the 2010 decision on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, the 
Constitutional Court was generally regarded as an institution that sup-
ported the state of the autonomies and contributed to its development in 
a generally balanced fashion. The decision on the Statute of Autonomy 
of Catalonia put the Court at the forefront of the political conflict on the 
territorial organization of the state and for the first time very strongly 
divided specialized scholars, political parties, institutions, and public 
opinion more generally on its role in the system. Of particular gravity, 
the division not only concerned the specific content of the decision, but 
 80 Constitutional Court Decision 31/2010.
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also how the Court exercised its jurisdiction, with it being accused of 
establishing itself as an extension of the constituent power and breach-
ing its constitutional limits. Moreover, while the criticism was strongest 
in Catalonia and among the defenders of the Catalan statute, some of 
those who supported the general outcome of the Court’s decision were 
also critical of its quality and of its impact on the Court’s previous case 
law on the state of the autonomies. Most critics and defenders of the 
Court agree that this decision has come at a high cost for the Court in 
its prestige and perceived legitimacy, and polls show that the public’s 
trust in the Court has dropped significantly since.81 Proposals to reform 
the system, especially to reduce the delays and backlogs of cases, and 
also to avoid political malpractice in appointing the judges, have been 
ongoing and have increased since the decision. As noted above, a pre-
enactment review for reforms of statutes of autonomy was introduced 
in 2015 in order to prevent situations like the Catalan case from arising 
again.
More generally, the Court’s decision on the Statute of Autonomy of 
Catalonia has increased support for independence in the region, and 
with it, the uncertainty regarding the future of the overall model. The 
decision was followed by a victory of the PP, responsible for the chal-
lenge, in the elections at the state level in November 2011, fuelling ten-
sions in Catalonia further. On the celebration of the Diada (the national 
holiday of Catalonia, which commemorates the fight for barcelona in 
1714) on 11 September 2012, 1.5 million Catalan citizens participated in 
a march in favour of independence from Spain. This led to the holding of 
elections in Catalonia two months later and to a parliamentary majority 
in favour of holding a referendum on independence. Despite the central 
government stating that such a referendum is not possible within the 
constitutional framework, the Catalan government began a process of 
national transition to the Catalans’ “own state,” the first step of which 
was adoption of a “Declaration of Sovereignty and Right to Decide of 
 81 The decline in the perception of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court can be 
seen in the CIS statewide polls on the public’s trust in institutions for 1998, 2011, 
2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively, where the results for high and low trust in the 
Court have been as follows: 1998 – high (23 per cent) and low (11 per cent) of 
responses; 2011 – high (18 per cent) and low (20 per cent; and 2013 – high (10 per 
cent) and low (38 per cent). The average overall rating of the court from 1 to 10 has 
also decreased across the three years considered: 5.53 (1998), 4.71 (2011) 3.51 (2013), 
3.35 (2014), and 3.40 (2015). Sources: CIS barometers 2039, 2861 2984, 3021, and 3080.
400 Courts in Federal Countries
the People of Catalonia” by the Catalan parliament.82 The preamble of 
the declaration refers to “impediments and refusals by the institutions 
of the Spanish state” in relation to measures to transform the political and 
legal framework, “among which Sentence 31/2010 passed by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court deserves particular emphasis.”83 The Court’s deci-
sion is still at the centre of the conflict; as a result, in Catalonia, it is not 
perceived as an impartial arbiter able to mediate between both orders of 
government to help resolve it. This was put clearly into words before the 
Catalan parliament by Miquel Roca, a leading Catalan advocate and one 
of the drafters of the 1978 Constitution, who stated that “the opinion of 
Constitutional Court does not deserve any respect.”84
To end this chapter on a more positive note regarding the Court’s 
case law, a recent carefully drafted unanimous decision cast a ray of 
hope on the current situation and can be interpreted as a first step in the 
Court reconsidering its fundamental constitutional position and role as 
a mediator in a complex pluri-national state. This decision resolved a 
constitutional challenge by the Spanish government to the “Declaration 
of Sovereignty and of the Right to Decide of the People of Catalonia” 
adopted by the Catalan parliament.85 When considering the different 
grounds of the challenge, the Court ruled, first, that the “declaration 
of sovereignty” of the people of Catalonia was incompatible with the 
constitutional provision, stating that sovereignty belongs to the “Span-
ish people” (Art. 1.1.). however, the Court then argued that the refer-
ences to the initiation of a process to exercise “the right to decide of 
the Catalan people” could be interpreted as the expression of a politi-
cal aspiration susceptible to being defended within the constitutional 
framework. More importantly, it stressed problems such as those deriv-
ing from one part of the state wanting to alter its legal status could 
 82 Available at http://www.catdem.org/cat/downloads2/declaration-of-sovereignty.pdf.
 83 Ibid.
 84 As reported in “Miquel Roca: ‘El TC no me merece ningún respeto desde la sentencia 
del Estatut,’” La vanguardia, 30 July 2013, http://www.lavanguardia.com/
politica/20130730/54378991824/miquel-roca-el-tc-no-me-merece-ningun-respeto-
desde-la-sentencia-del-estatut.html.
 85 Constitutional Court Decision 42/2014. Interestingly, a first issue the Court had to 
consider was if it could actually review the political declaration, which the Catalan 
parliament argued had no real and concrete legal effects. The Court decided that, 
despite its prominently political nature, the resolution was also susceptible to 
producing legal effects, as it conferred attributes of sovereignty on the Catalan people, 
and initiated a process directed at enabling their exercise of the right to decide.
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not be resolved by the Court, whose function is to safeguard the strict 
observance of the Constitution, and must be resolved through dialogue 
and cooperation between the different political institutions within the 
state of the autonomies. The Court seemed to point to the option of 
constitutional reform as a solution to the current conflict, stating that 
if an AC parliament initiated such a process, the Spanish parliament 
would be bound to consider its proposals under the general principle 
of loyalty to the Constitution. The decision was largely well received in 
Catalonia and interpreted as recognizing the legitimacy of Catalonia’s 
claims and the process of constitutional reform currently underway.86
however, since the Constitutional Court’s call for dialogue and for 
a political resolution of the conflict, Spain’s government has refused to 
engage with the Catalan process, which has continued regardless. Of 
particular concern for the issues considered in this chapter, the Span-
ish government’s response has been to use the Constitutional Court to 
block the different legal avenues the Catalan authorities have sought 
to pursue to allow their citizens to vote on the constitutional future 
of Catalonia, thus placing the responsibility for stopping the Catalan 
process on the Court. Following the “Declaration of Sovereignty,” they 
challenged the “Catalan Statute on Popular Consultations” (enacted to 
provide an alternative to a referendum, which requires authorization 
of the Spanish government under the Constitution), the Catalan decree 
providing for holding such a consultation on independence (both were 
invalidated by the Court for providing for what it considered to be an 
undercover referendum), and even the Catalan government’s involve-
ment in what ultimately became a citizens’ participation event on the 
set date.87 Finally, in response to the Catalan government’s announce-
ment that it would then hold plebiscitary elections on independence, 
the Spanish government enacted emergency legislation giving the Con-
stitutional Court new powers to impose sanctions and suspend public 
authorities that do not comply with its judgments.88 The reason for this 




 87 Constitutional Court Decisions 31/2015, 32/2015, and 138/2015.
 88 “Organic Law 15/2015, of 16 October, for the reform of the Organic Law of the 
Constitutional Court, for the enforcement of the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court as a safeguard for the rule of law.”
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reform is to enable the Constitutional Court to suspend the Catalan 
authorities if they take any actions seen as leading to a process of uni-
lateral independence, despite the Spanish government having its own 
powers to take “all measures necessary” to make an AC comply with its 
obligations under the Constitution (Art 155). This has not only placed 
further responsibility on the Court, but has effectively converted it into 
the Spanish government’s enforcer.
In the “plebiscitary” elections to the Catalan parliament, held on 
27 September 2015, the pro-independence parties gained a majority of 
seats (72 out of 135), with 48 per cent of votes, and announced the start 
of a “process of the creation of an independent Catalan state in the form 
of a republic.”89 Catalonia’s parliament voted in favour of starting this 
process on 9 November 2015 in a resolution that includes refusal to con-
tinue compliance with decisions of Spanish state institutions, among 
them, the Constitutional Court.90 The resolution was again challenged 
by the Spanish government before the Court, which declared its pro-
visional suspension. For the first time, and at the request of the state 
government, the Court’s order included a personal notification with a 
specific warning to leaders of the Catalan parliament and provisional 
Catalan government of the consequences of non-compliance. Less than 
a month after, the Court ruled unanimously that the resolution was in 
violation of the Constitution.91
Whatever the final outcome of this conflict, the Court’s call for nego-
tiation and for a political solution has so far been ignored, and the 
Court has been forced to remain a central player in blocking the Cata-
lan process. The extensive use of the Court and the establishment of its 
new powers of enforcement have therefore so far thwarted its attempt 
to regain some of its lost legitimacy and reinstate itself as an effective 
mediator between both orders of government; they have simply rein-
forced the perception in Catalonia that the Court is the enforcing arm of 
the Spanish government. Overall, this ongoing conflict between Cata-
lonia and the state authorities is a consequence of the long-standing 
 89 See, for example, M. Colomer, O. Maarch, and R. Tugas, “Principi d’acord per a la 
declaració rupturista del Parlament,” Política, 23 October 2015, http://www.ara.cat/
politica/Principi-dacord-declaracio-rupturista-Parlament_0_1454254647.html.
 90 “El Parlament declara l'inici del procés de creació de l'estat català independent en 
forma de república,” Parlament de Catalunya, 9 November 2015, http://www.
parlament.cat/web/actualitat/noticies/index.html?p_format=D&p_id=176474300.
 91 Constitutional Court Decision 259/2015.
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problems and tensions within the state of the autonomies that have 
been highlighted in this chapter. These problems need to be urgently 
and comprehensively addressed by the relevant political institutions; 
hopefully recent changes in the composition of the state parliament 
will help facilitate this. however, until this happens, the Constitutional 
Court cannot resolve them alone. Continuously placing the Court at 
the forefront of the political conflicts that arise within the state of the 
autonomies only further compromises its position and legitimacy.
13  The Federal Supreme Court of 
Switzerland: Judicial balancing of 
Federalism without Judicial Review
andreas lienhard, daniel kettiger,  
jacques bühler, loranne mérillat,  
and daniela winkler
I. Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the structure of Switzerland as a fed-
eral state and the organization of its judicial system and judicial pro-
ceedings. It also analyses the rulings of the highest judicial body, the 
Federal Supreme Court, in terms of its influence in the federal sphere.
The Swiss state is highly federalist. The state is structured on three 
levels: the confederation, the twenty-six cantons, and around 2,3241 
municipalities. Subsidiarity is the defining principle in the division of 
powers among these orders of government. The confederation may 
assume a function only if that function exceeds cantonal powers or uni-
form regulation is required. Although a certain centralization trend may 
be observed, responsibility for executing federal law essentially remains 
with the cantons (commonly known as executive or administrative fed-
eralism). Within this structure, the cantons are largely autonomous both 
organizationally and financially. Moreover, the Federal Constitution 
(FC) expressly guarantees municipal autonomy under cantonal law. 
Despite this underlying federal structure, the functions of government 
and administration are increasingly being fulfilled through vertical and 
horizontal alliances (cooperative federalism) and the use of (financial) 
balancing mechanisms.
The judicial system also follows a federal pattern. The cantons 
have their own higher and lower courts with both criminal and civil 
 1 1 January 2015 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office). The number of municipalities is 
decreasing every year.
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jurisdiction. Cases involving administrative decisions are often deter-
mined by cantonal administrative judicial authorities as courts of first 
instance below the upper courts, but the constitutional guarantee of 
legal recourse generally means that these decisions can be appealed to 
the Federal Supreme Court. There are also lower federal courts, whose 
decisions can generally also be appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. 
While codes of procedure for civil and criminal action were harmo-
nized across all cantons in 2011, administrative proceedings are still 
subject to twenty-six separate cantonal ordinances, although these are 
becoming increasingly aligned. Each federal court has its own code of 
procedure. In contrast to most other European countries, the Federal 
Supreme Court does not exercise judicial review over federal legisla-
tion. Judges are generally appointed by the parliaments for a defined 
period of office, with party membership taken into account alongside 
professional capabilities. Switzerland attaches great importance to the 
independence of judges and the institutions they serve, even though 
the judiciary and the courts are also subject to democratic systems of 
checks and balances.
Complementing the regular legislative processes of the parliaments 
and the electorate, the Federal Supreme Court is the only court whose 
rulings shape the general development of Swiss law. This is illustrated 
clearly by the charter of fundamental rights that gradually came into 
being over several decades before being incorporated into the Federal 
Constitution when the latter underwent comprehensive revision in 1999. 
The Federal Supreme Court nonetheless respects the discretionary 
powers of the cantons as far as is possible. For example, it will declare 
cantonal norms to be unconstitutional only if it appears genuinely 
impossible to apply them in conformity with the Federal Constitution. 
Another illustration of the limited influence of the Federal Supreme 
Court on the application of law by the cantons is that the highest court 
in the land is essentially bound by facts established by the lower courts. 
Furthermore, where the interpretation and application of cantonal 
statute law are concerned, the Federal Supreme Court has the power 
only to sanction the arbitrary application of law by a canton. how-
ever, where federal or international law sets out clear (harmonization) 
requirements for the cantons, the Court unequivocally imposes these 
requirements. In the separation of powers that exists under the Swiss 
system, (federal) jurisdiction therefore also has an important function 
in the modern evolution of the balance between federalism and cen-
tralism. yet a generalization of the impact is not possible. There is a 
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slight unitarist tendency in the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court. 




Some 8.24 million people live in Switzerland.2 At 24.3 per cent, the 
country is home to one of the highest proportions of foreign nationals 
anywhere in Europe. Switzerland has four official national languages: 
63.5 per cent of the population speaks German, 22.5 per cent French, 
8.1 per cent Italian, and 0.5 per cent Romansh. The remaining 5.4 per 
cent of the Swiss population speaks a language other than these four. 
The four national languages are not distributed evenly across Switzer-
land, but instead form four distinct language regions, each with its own 
dominant language. Where religion is concerned, 38.2 per cent of the 
population is Roman Catholic and 26.9 per cent Protestant. The remain-
der of the population belongs to another religion (12.2 per cent) or to 
no religion (21.4 per cent). These religious differences were once closely 
linked to particular territories within Switzerland but are no longer 
especially significant.
GDP per capita was estimated at US$88,746 for 2015; based on pur-
chasing power parity, the figure was put at US$49,497.3 Among Western 
industrialized countries, Switzerland has one of the most uneven distri-
butions of income and wealth, with tax on the assets held by the richest 
3 per cent of the population equalling that paid on the assets belonging 
to the other 97 per cent.4 In 2011, the wealthiest 20 per cent of society 
enjoyed incomes that were an average of 4.3 times higher than those of 
the lowest-income 20 per cent.5 The Gini coefficient is 28.5.6
 2 These statistics on population, language, and religion, as well as those given below, 
can be accessed at “Population,” Swiss Federal Statistical Office, http://www.bfs.
admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01.html.
 3 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database,” http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx.
 4 See Ueli Mäder, Ganga Jay Aratnam, and Sarah Schilliger, Wie Reiche denken und lenken. 
Reichtum in der Schweiz: Geschichte, Fakten, Gespräche (Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 2010).
 5 For further information, see “Wirtschaftliche und soziale Situation der bevölkerung,” 
Panorama, http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/20/01/pan.html.
 6 based on 2013 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office).
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The federal system7 consists of three orders of government, each 
with its own institutions. These are the confederation, the twenty-six 
cantons,8 and 2,324 municipalities.9 At each level, powers are generally 
divided among executive, legislative, and judicial bodies.10 All cantons 
enjoy the same constitutional status, even though there are major dif-
ferences in number of inhabitants, size of territory, and economic sig-
nificance.11 Each canton has its own constitution. The structure of the 
municipalities, which also vary significantly in size and population, 
differs from canton to canton and is governed by cantonal law.
The modern Swiss Confederation12 was founded with the first federal 
constitution of 1848. It was based on a political compromise between 
the largely Protestant Liberals and the rural and largely Roman Catho-
lic Conservatives. The confederation came about as a union of sover-
eign cantons, although the process of integration took several hundred 
years. Switzerland is not a nation in the conventional sense, but rather 
a nation forged by the Federal Constitution as an expression of political 
 7 For a summary of the federal system in Switzerland, see Adrian vatter, “Föderalismus,” 
in Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, ed. Peter Knoepfel, yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal 
Sciarini, Adrian vatter, and Silja häusermann, 5th ed., 119–44 (Zürich: Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 2014); see also Adrian vatter, Das politische System der Schweiz (baden-baden: 
Nomos, 2014), 427–75.
 8 The confederation consists of twenty-three full cantons and six “half” cantons (basel-
Stadt, basel-Land, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Obwalden, and 
Nidwalden). For historical reasons, the half-cantons’ votes are only counted for half, 
and they have only one representative in the Council of States.
 9 1 January 2015 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office); the number of municipalities is 
decreasing every year.
 10 For a detailed description of Switzerland’s federal institutions, see Wolf Linder 
and Isabelle Steffen, “Swiss Confederation,” in Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, 298–315 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
 11 For example, the population of Canton Zurich is 100 times that of Appenzell-
Innerrhoden. In land area, the largest canton is Graubünden (Grisons), while the 
smallest is basel-Stadt. Where economic differences are concerned, the urban 
cantons of Geneva and basel, combined with the Zurich region, wield more financial 
power than the rest of Switzerland put together. Some rural and mountain regions 
are relatively poor by comparison.
 12 Despite its official name, Switzerland is not a confederation but a classical federal 
state; see Thomas Fleiner, Alexander Misic, and Nicole Toepperwien, Constitutional 
Law in Switzerland (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2012), 27. The 
old name “Confederation” has been preserved by the founders in 1848 in order not 
to destabilize voters who had to adopt the new constitution in a popular vote.
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will (Willensnation) – albeit one that still insists that cultural, linguistic, 
and religious diversity be upheld.13 Within a highly decentralized federal 
system, the cantons – as the constituent units of the confederation – have 
been able to maintain their original autonomy and their own constitu-
tions, as well as to a large extent also their identities and differences. 
Furthermore, the constitutional power-sharing concept reflects a “bot-
tom-up” approach to the structure of the confederation, which rests on 
the residual powers of the cantons and, in some cases, even those of the 
municipalities.14
Since modern Switzerland was founded, the Federal Constitution has 
undergone comprehensive revision only twice, in 1874 and 1999. The 
comprehensive revision of 1874, which did not fundamentally alter the 
Swiss system, was followed by more than 100 partial revisions, most 
of which were intended to strengthen the powers of the confederation. 
The latest Federal Constitution was approved by the Swiss people on 
18 April 1999 and entered into force on 1 January 2000.15 This version 
is essentially an update,16 which contains no underlying changes. One 
significant amendment, however, was the inclusion in the new Fed-
eral Constitution of the comprehensive charter of fundamental rights 
(Arts. 7 to 34). This charter was shaped to a considerable extent by the 
practices of the Federal Supreme Court. Furthermore, the new Federal 
Constitution marked a shift from “self-rule” towards the principle of 
“shared rule.”17 It centralized a variety of originally cantonal powers 
and strengthened those of the confederation, yet offered the cantons 
greater opportunities to participate in confederation decision-making 
 13 Nicolas Schmitt, “Swiss Confederation,” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and 
Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 376. For further information on 
diversity in Switzerland, see Thomas Fleiner, The Current Situation of Federalism in 
Switzerland, REAF, no. 9 (2009), 51–90 and Thomas Fleiner and Maya hertig, “Swiss 
Confederation,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries, ed. Luis Moreno and Cesar 
Colino, 320–48 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).
 14 Thomas Fleiner, “Swiss Confederation,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities 
in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and Douglas M. brown 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 267.
 15 The Swiss Federal Constitution can be accessed at https://www.admin.ch/opc/
en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html. Unless stated otherwise, “Art.” 
references in this chapter refer to articles in the Federal Constitution of 1999.
 16 See Fleiner, Misic, and Toepperwien, Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 31.
 17 Fleiner, Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland, 82–3.
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processes (such as those concerning foreign policy matters).18 The Swiss 
political system has thus remained largely unaltered since 1848. how-
ever, there has been one important territorial change since then: 1979 
saw the foundation of Canton Jura when the French-speaking Catho-
lic part of Canton bern broke away from the largely German-speaking 
Protestant part.19 Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the partial revi-
sion concerning the restructuring of the financial equalization system 
between the cantons, and the distribution of functions between the con-
federation and the cantons. This revision, which entered into force on 
1 January 2008, represents real reform in the federal system.20 One of 
its central elements is fiscal equivalence, in which the purposes, costs, 
and benefits of policies must be aligned in the way in which the tasks 
of government are financed.21 It is also worth mentioning the trend in 
recent years towards municipalities merging into larger units to enable 
them to perform their functions more effectively.
Federalism is an important element of consensus (or concordance) 
democracy in Switzerland, which is characterized by political power-
sharing.22 Direct democracy is another central feature. In addition to 
appointing their representatives in regular elections, the people play a 
direct part in political decision-making through referenda and popular 
initiatives. As such, the people are part of the legislative process in the 
federal system. It is the people – and not parliament or the courts – who 
make the most important decisions.23
The Swiss people are proud of their political institutions. Federalism 
is seen as one of Switzerland’s strongest symbolic values. The federal 
system has made it possible peacefully to bridge the country’s cultural, 
religious, and linguistic divides. There is criticism from some quarters 
 18 Ibid., 83.
 19 For more detail, see Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in 
Multicultural Societies, 3rd ed. (New york: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 72; Andreas 
Kley, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts der Schweiz (Zurich: Dike, 2011).
 20 In detail, “Grundlagen,” https://www.efv.admin.ch/efv/de/home/themen/
finanzausgleich/uebersicht.html.
 21 Andreas Lienhard and Agata Zielniewicz, “Finanzverfassung,” in Schweizerisches 
Bundesverwaltungsrecht (SBVR) (basel: helbling Lichtenhahn, 2011), 10:1, 30–1.
 22 See Linder, Swiss Democracy, 128.
 23 Linder and Steffen, “Swiss Confederation,” 291. See also, in general, Arnold Koller, 
Daniel Thürer, bernard Dafflon, bernhard Ehrenzeller, Thomas Pfisterer, and 
bernhard Waldmann, Principles of Federalism, Guidelines for Good Federal Practices: A 
Swiss Contribution, Swiss Law in a Nutshell (Zurich: Dike, 2012).
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that the cantons are too small to be efficient service-providers, but the 
proposal to reduce the number of cantons is unlikely to succeed. Can-
tonal autonomy and self-determination are much-vaunted principles 
and would prove a significant obstacle to any such institutional reforms.
2. Structural Features
The Federal Constitution guarantees the existence of the cantons in 
Article 1 of the Federal Constitution, which lists the cantons, and Arti-
cle 53, according to which the confederation must protect both the exist-
ence and the territory of the cantons.24 In addition, Article 3 guarantees 
cantonal sovereignty to the extent that it is not limited by the Federal 
Constitution. Legislation and administration are the responsibility of 
the confederation only where it is granted such powers by the Federal 
Constitution; otherwise they fall within the competence of the cantons 
(Art. 3 and Arts. 42–43a). The division of powers between the confed-
eration and the cantons is laid down by area under the third title of the 
Federal Constitution (Arts. 54–124). Furthermore, the Federal Constitu-
tion contains general rules on cooperation between the confederation 
and the cantons (Arts. 42–53, 126–35) and guarantees to the cantons, 
among other things, a high degree of organizational autonomy (Art. 46, 
para. 2, and Art. 47, para. 2). The cantons enjoy considerable legislative, 
organizational, and financial autonomy and have the right to their own 
systems of democracy, government, and justice. Their constitutions 
must nonetheless be guaranteed by the confederation (i.e., they must 
be approved by the United Federal Assembly25 if the cantonal consti-
tution is not contrary to federal law26) and must thus uphold federal 
law and democracy (Art. 51). The confederation must also protect the 
constitutional order of the cantons (Art. 52).
because the cantons have the authority to organize themselves, there 
are significant differences in the scope of municipal powers from can-
ton to canton. Article 50, paragraph 1 guarantees the autonomy of the 
municipalities, but this guarantee is contingent upon the autonomy 
that those municipalities are granted by their individual cantonal 
 24 See Walter haller, The Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context (Zurich: Dike, 
2009), 50.
 25 The joint meetings of the National Council and the Council of State are named the 
United Federal Assembly.
 26 See Fleiner, Misic, and Toepperwien, Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 166; see also n95.
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constitutions.27 Article 50 also states that the confederation must take 
account of the possible consequences of its policies for municipalities, 
as well as for cities, conurbations, and mountain regions. An infringe-
ment of municipal autonomy may ultimately be taken before the Federal 
Supreme Court as the court of last instance (Art. 198, para. 1).
The high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the cantons and localities 
places a practical and effective limit on the extension of confederation 
powers.28 As mentioned earlier, the principle of subsidiarity dictates 
that the confederation should fulfil only those functions that cannot 
be performed effectively by the cantons or municipalities (Art. 5a, 43a, 
para. 1).
The confederation’s powers are specified by the Federal Constitution. 
All residual powers remain with the cantons. According to Article 3, 
the cantons exercise all rights that are not vested explicitly in the 
Confederation. Depending on the density of regulation, this covers dif-
ferent types of power – exclusive, parallel, and partial.29 There are no 
generally valid criteria for drawing the line between federal and can-
tonal powers. In many areas, power is exercised in a form of alliances 
between the confederation, the cantons, and the local authorities (see in 
particular Art. 48 and Art. 48a).30
Foreign affairs are the responsibility of the confederation (Art. 54). how-
ever, the cantons can participate in foreign policy decisions where these 
affect their own powers or essential interests. The confederation must also 
inform the cantons in good time and consult with them (Art. 55). Indeed, 
according to Article 56, the cantons may conclude treaties with foreign 
states on matters that lie within their powers.
 27 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 48.
 28 Linder, Swiss Democracy, 47.
 29 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 59-60. Exclusive competencies 
of the confederation mean that only the federal parliament may legislate, and 
the execution is with the federal administration. With partial competencies the 
cantons may legislate as far as the federal parliament does not do this. As to parallel 
competencies, there is a complete separation of jurisdiction, and the confederation 
and the cantons are independent in legislation in their jurisdiction (e.g., legislation 
on the organization of the administration).
 30 The following summarizes the allocation of powers in certain areas. For a 
detailed and comprehensive description of the allocation of powers, see haller, 
Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 65; for a table listing how powers are 
distributed, see also Linder, Swiss Democracy, 46; Fleiner, “Swiss Confederation,” 288; 
Fleiner, Misic, and Toepperwien, Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 131.
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The confederation and the cantons together are responsible for 
national security and for protecting the population (Arts. 57–61). The 
specific responsibilities of the confederation include external security 
(the armed forces), while large parts of the internal security remit (the 
police) fall within the authority of the cantons.
All three orders of government (confederation, cantons, and munici-
palities) may levy taxes, but the confederation’s tax powers are lim-
ited under the Constitution. The authority to levy taxes is an important 
power for the cantons and the municipalities, as they determine more 
than two-thirds of their own income and expenditure. Nonetheless, the 
confederation must promote financial equalization between the can-
tons (Art. 128).31
basic schooling falls within the authority of the cantons, while voca-
tional training is governed by the confederation, and higher education 
is the joint responsibility of the confederation and cantons.32 Culture 
and language are cantonal matters, but the confederation must sup-
port cultural activities that are in the national interest and also help 
to preserve Switzerland’s linguistic diversity. The Federal Constitution 
also guarantees religious freedom, but the cantons may decide inde-
pendently on the relationship between church and state (Art. 72). The 
cantons many also exercise broad discretion in health care.
The examples given above illustrate the close cooperation among 
the three levels of the federal system. This is sometimes referred to as 
“cooperative federalism.”33 Article 44, paragraph 1 requires the confed-
eration and the cantons to support each other in fulfilling their duties 
and generally to cooperate with each other. Disputes between can-
tons, as well as between cantons and the confederation should, where 
possible, be resolved by negotiation and mediation (Art. 44, para. 3). 
The Federal Supreme Court makes any judicial decisions that may be 
required (Art. 189, para. 2). In contrast to other federal states, however, 
disputes between cantons and the confederation are rarely resolved 
through the courts, but rather by negotiation or by amendments to laws 
and constitutions.34 In this sense, the federal government must consult 
the cantonal governments on all important matters and, in particular, 
on proposed legislative decisions (Art. 45).
 31 Lienhard and Zielniewicz, “Finanzverfassung,” 10:38.
 32 Fleiner, “Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland,” 57.
 33 Lienhard and Zielniewicz, “Finanzverfassung,” 10:33.
 34 Fleiner, “Swiss Confederation,” 276.
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Federal law is implemented largely by the cantons (“executive feder-
alism”35) (Art. 46). Within this system, the confederation allows the can-
tons the greatest possible freedom of action, supports them financially, 
and respects their individuality. The implementation of federal law 
by the cantons therefore relies to a considerable extent on the cantons’ 
political will. Furthermore, Article 47 requires the confederation to 
respect the autonomy of the cantons. Article 49 is also important here, 
in that it determines that every type or form of federal law takes prec-
edence over any conflicting provision in cantonal law; even the statu-
tory instruments of the Federal Council take precedence over cantonal 
law. The confederation is also responsible for ensuring that the cantons 
comply with federal law.
The allocation of powers laid down in the Constitution is conclusive.36 
Cantonal powers are guaranteed by the Constitution to the extent that 
they cannot simply be transferred by law to the Confederation. New 
powers for the confederation can be conferred only by means of a for-
mal constitutional amendment. Such an amendment requires both a 
majority in both chambers of the federal parliament (National Council 
and Council of States) and the approval of the majority of the people 
and the cantons (i.e., the majority of the electorate in at least twelve 
cantons). Constitutional amendments may be initiated by members of 
the Federal Assembly (parliament), the Federal Council (executive), 
the cantons (cantonal initiative), or by 100,000 members of the elector-
ate (popular initiative). The processes of direct democracy lend broad 
legitimacy to such changes and ensure widespread acceptance of their 
implementation. In contrast to other federal states, the courts do not 
play a significant role in decisions on the distribution of power based 
on how the Constitution is interpreted.37
The Council of States is an important institution that allows 
the cantons to represent their interests and influence the decisions of the 
confederation.38 Alongside the National Council, which represents the 
people, the Council of States is the second chamber of the United Fed-
eral Assembly. both chambers hold the same status. With the exception 
 35 With regard to executive federalism, see also haller, Swiss Constitution in a 
Comparative Context 57; and Fleiner, “Swiss Confederation,” 278–9.
 36 haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 60.
 37 Fleiner, “Swiss Confederation,” 267–8.
 38 With regard to the organization of confederation authorities, see also Axel Tschentscher 
and Andreas Lienhard, Öffentliches Recht: Ein Grundriss (Zurich: Dike, 2011).
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of the six “half cantons,” each canton is represented equally in the 
Council of States, irrespective of its size and population. The council 
comprises two members from each full canton and one member from 
each half canton (i.e., forty-six members in total). because all parlia-
mentary decisions require a majority in both chambers, the small and 
generally rural cantons have a strong voice. Each canton determines 
its own procedure for elections to the Council of States. Members of 
the council are elected directly by the people in all cantons, usually by 
the majority first-past-the-post system. The Conference of Cantonal 
Governments (KdK)39 and the various conferences of cantonal directors 
also play an important role in the federal system.40
III. Court System
1. General Features
The court system reflects the federal structure of the state and has a dis-
tinct hierarchy.41 The cantonal lower and upper courts (first and second 
instance) usually enforce both cantonal and federal law. In line with this 
structure, a judgment by one of the cantonal courts may generally be 
taken before the Federal Supreme Court, as the highest judicial author-
ity in the land.42 This system is flanked by the Federal Administrative 
Court, the Federal Criminal Court, and the Federal Patent Court. These 
three Courts are generally responsible as courts of first instance in their 
particular fields for hearing legal disputes under federal law, which is 
 39 The Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK) was created only in 1993 and 
plays an important role for the lobbying of cantonal interests. As far as federalism 
is concerned, it is the symbol of a certain “rebirth” of the cantons at the turn of 
the century, because the Council of State does not play its role very well. The KdK 
also plays a certain role in preserving the coherence of the cantonal politics and 
preventing the mighty sectoral politics of the huge number of sectoral cantonal 
conferences.
 40 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 84.
 41 For a summary of the Swiss judicial system, see Christine Rothmayr Allison and 
Frederic varone, “Justiz,” in Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, ed. Peter Knoepfel, 
yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian vatter, and Silja häusermann, 5th ed., 
219–41 (Zürich: verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2014); vatter, Das politische System der 
Schweiz (baden-baden: Nomos, 2014), 477–517.
 42 With regard to the Federal Supreme Court, see Alain Wurzburger, Le Tribunal fédéral: 
Comprendre son fonctionnement, agir devant ses juges (Geneva: Schulthess, 2011).
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applied directly by federal authorities.43 An important element of the 
federal state is the option under the Constitution for disputes between 
the different levels of the state, as well as between the constituent states, 
to be heard before a court. The Swiss Federal Constitution provides 
explicitly that the Federal Supreme Court may rule directly on disputes 
between the confederation and cantons or between cantons (Art. 189, 
para. 2).44 Municipalities are also able to take violations of their consti-
tutionally guaranteed autonomy before the Federal Supreme Court by 
lodging an official, authority-level complaint.45
The system of law is based essentially on the laws enacted by federal, 
cantonal, and municipal legislators. The principal task of the courts 
is therefore to interpret the law as it relates to individual cases. Most 
courts sit as a bench of three or five judges, although certain legal pro-
ceedings are often heard by a single judge. Usually the bench passes 
judgment according to the majority principle. It sets out its decision in 
writing, supported by a legal argument. The formal written judgments 
of the courts usually do not include dissenting opinions,46 what are sub-
ject to an actual debate.47 The central role and sometimes significant 
responsibility of the legally trained clerks of the court are important. 
Clerks of the court support the judges in their judgments. In con-
trast to the majority of other countries, their function extends beyond 
 43 The courts of first instance at the federal level were established with the justice 
reform adopted in 2007. For an evaluation of the new legal system’s effectiveness, 
see Andreas Lienhard, Stefan Rieder, Martin Killias, Christof Schwenkel, 
Sophie Nunweiler, and Andreas Müller, Evaluation der Wirksamkeit der neuen 
Bundesrechtspflege (bern: KPM/Interface/Universität Zürich, 2012).
 44 See also 2.2 above.
 45 This right is laid down in Article 189 paragraph 1e of the Swiss Federal Constitution 
of 18 April 1999 (FC, SR 101); see also Linder, Swiss Democracy, 57–8; haller, Swiss 
Constitution in a Comparative Context, 48.
 46 however, academic opinion in some quarters advocates the introduction of such 
“dissenting opinions,” at least at the highest judicial level. See also Peter Studer, 
“Medien, Gerichte und Kritik an Gerichten,” in Akteure der Gerichtsbarkeit, ed. 
benjamin Schindler and Patrick Sutter (Zurich: Dike, 2007), 361, with reference 
to Rainer J. Schweizer and Patrick Sutter, “Das Institut der abweichenden oder 
zustimmenden Richtermeinung im System der EMRK,” in Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht 
und Menschenrechte, ed. Andreas Donatsch, Marc Forster, and Christian 
Schwarzenegger (Zurich: Schulthess, 2002), 107.
 47 See Arnold Marti, “Offenlegen von Minderheitsmeinungen [dissenting opinion] – 
eine Forderung von Transparenz und Fairness im gerichtlichen verfahren,” Justice – 
Justiz – Giustizia 4 (2012).
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administrative tasks. As a rule, they draft the judgments, are consulted 
in an advisory capacity, and it is often they, not the judges, who pro-
duce or finalize the written judgment.48
In principle, the courts are bound by their own decisions and the 
decisions and legal analysis of superior courts if a case is referred back 
to them for re-evaluation. The findings established in court judgments – 
especially those of the Federal Supreme Court – are usually taken into 
account in subsequent cases. however, the courts are not bound by 
prior judgments, and past judicial practices may be amended by rulings 
made in contradiction of set precedents.49
2. Constitutional Status of Courts and Judicial Officers
The Federal Constitution provides the foundation and legitimation for 
the Federal Supreme Court and the confederation’s judicial authorities 
of first instance. The Constitution obliges the cantons to set up courts 
to determine disputes under civil and public law, as well as in criminal 
cases. As part of their organizational autonomy, the cantons can make 
provision concerning their own cantonal courts.50 however, authority 
to make laws with respect to civil and criminal procedure passed from 
the cantons to the confederation in 2011, and corresponding codes now 
prescribe norms of procedure for all cantons.51
A peculiarity of the Swiss system is the absence of any judicial 
review of the constitutionality of federal laws. As a result, the Federal 
Supreme Court must apply federal laws even if it judges them to be 
 48 See Peter Uebersax, “Stellung der Gerichtsschreiberinnen und Gerichtsschreiber in 
der Gerichtsverfassung,” in Akteure der Gerichtsbarkeit, ed. benjamin Schindler and 
Patrick Sutter, 77–114 (Zurich: Dike, 2007).
 49 In contrast to the common law context, in Switzerland the word precedent does not 
mean a previous decision, which is strictly binding. Precedents are court decisions 
that are considered by the courts as important “landmarks” and are usually 
published in a particular manner (the precedents of the Federal Supreme Court are 
labelled as “bGE”).
 50 See also Andreas Lienhard, Daniel Kettiger, and Daniela Winkler, “Status of Court 
Management in Switzerland,” International Journal for Court Administration, Special 
Issue December 2012, 4. For an overview of the Swiss courts, see Peter bieri, “Die 
Gerichte der Schweiz: Eine Übersicht,” Justice – Justiz – Giustizia 2 (2014).
 51 The Federal Codes of Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure entered into force 
on 1 January 2011. They are based on the judicial reform of 8 October 1999, which 
was adopted by the Swiss people and the cantons on 12 March 2000. by contrast, no 
standardization is planned in the laws on administrative procedure.
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unconstitutional. The same applies to Federal Council ordinances, as 
well as to cantonal decrees issued on the basis of authority granted by 
unconstitutional federal legislation. This limitation on the courts is laid 
down in the Federal Constitution (Art. 190). It is founded on the fear that 
the rescission of parliamentary decrees by the Federal Supreme Court 
might turn the latter into a political body and is therefore legitimized 
by the separation of powers.52 Consistent with this view is the fact that 
Switzerland does not have a federal-level constitutional court either.53 
The Federal Supreme Court is nonetheless permitted to examine the 
constitutionality of cantonal laws and ordinances, both in specific cases 
(i.e., relating to individual elements of law in their application to par-
ticular cases) and in relation to abstract judicial review (i.e., relating 
to procedure).54 however, the Court will declare cantonal norms to be 
unconstitutional only if it appears impossible to apply them in con-
formity with the Federal Constitution.
The way in which judges are appointed is another unique character-
istic of the Swiss court system. At the federal level, and in the cantons 
to some extent, any member of the electorate is eligible in principle to 
be appointed as a judge. This makes possible the appointment to judi-
cial office of lay people without any form of legal training. In practice, 
lay judges are usually appointed only to courts of first instance. Also 
in contrast to other European states, Switzerland has no form of sys-
tematic judicial training. In the cantons, judges are generally elected 
by the people or by the cantonal parliament respecting the principle 
of proportional representation (i.e., all major political parties repre-
sented in the parliament shall be represented in the same way, at least 
in the courts of appeal). The judges of the Federal Supreme Court 
and of the three other confederation courts are appointed by the fed-
eral parliament. This makes it almost impossible to be elected as a 
judge without the support of a political party, and party membership 
is virtually a prerequisite. In view of this electoral system and the 
 52 See Art. 189, para. 4, and Art. 190.
 53 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 245–6. A recent attempt 
to introduce a review of constitutional jurisdiction as part of parliamentary 
consultations has not been supported by the parliament (see Parliamentary 
Initiatives 07.476 and 05.445). This was not the first attempt to introduce 
constitutional jurisdiction; see W.J. Wagner, The Federal State and Their Judiciaries 
(Gravenhage: Mouton, 1959), 105–6.
 54 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 247.
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requirements for election, political criteria play the decisive role in 
the appointment of judges.55 Sex, language, origin, and religion, in 
addition to legal expertise and party allegiance are considered when a 
judge is proposed for election. As long as their personal independence 
remains assured, nothing bars the election of these candidates pro-
gressing up to a higher court. Realistically, however, the career paths 
of lay judges are limited by the fact that upper cantonal and federal 
courts increasingly employ trained lawyers. Furthermore, a move 
to a court in another canton or promotion to the Federal Supreme 
Court may be hampered by the need to secure the party support that 
is essential for appointment.
The guarantee that the courts and the judges who sit in them are 
independent is nonetheless one of the fundamental constitutional 
principles of the rule of law in Switzerland.56 This principle encom-
passes the functional, personal, and organizational independence of 
the courts.57 It also includes the budgetary autonomy that applies to 
federal and cantonal courts – albeit to differing degrees. For example, 
the Federal Supreme Court benefits from a global budget and has the 
competence to prepare and to apply it to parliament directly.58 Judicial 
independence also means the independence of the courts and their 
judges from external influences such as pressure from other authori-
ties or the media. If just and fair proceedings are rendered impossi-
ble by such impairments to judicial independence (e.g., by the media, 
the government, or the parliament), they may be challenged by those 
concerned. The influence that the political parties wield over the elec-
toral system for judges in Switzerland should also be mentioned in 
 55 For more details, see Martin Ziegler, “Laienrichterinnen und -richter,” in Akteure der 
Gerichtsbarkeit, ed. benjamin Schindler and Patrick Sutter (Zurich: Dike, 2007), 65; 
Rainer Klopfer, “Management in der Justiz: Richterbild im Wandel,” Justice – Justiz –  
Giustizia, 2007/2; Walter bosshart, Die Wählbarkeit zum Richter im Bund und in den 
Kantonen (Zurich: Schellenberg, 1961).
 56 On judicial independence, see Regina Kiener, Richterliche Unabhängigkeit, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an Richter und Gerichte (bern: Stämpfli, 2001).
 57 Art. 30, para. 1, and Art. 191c.
 58 With regard to judicial independence, see Andreas Lienhard, “Die 
bernische Gerichtsbarkeit auf dem Weg zur Selbstverwaltung,” in Bernische 
Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 100 Jahre Verwaltungsgericht des 
Kantons Bern, ed. Ruth herzog and Reto Feller (bern: Geiger, 2010), 401; hans Wipfli, 
“Justizielle Selbstverwaltung,” in Akteure der Gerichtsbarkeit, ed. benjamin Schindler 
and Patrick Sutter (Zurich: Dike, 2007), 116.
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relation with the independence of judges. Unlike the United States, 
judges in Switzerland are not, in principle, appointed for life. Most 
of the cantons and the confederation provide for a limited term of 
office, and judges have to be reappointed if their official position is 
to continue. A political party that disagrees with decisions of a judge 
they have supported can threaten the judge with withdrawal of sup-
port.59 Once a judge is elected, however, party politics usually cease to 
be a major issue. Furthermore, the public perception is that judges are 
independent.
In addition to the division of powers, the judiciary has a system of 
checks and balances to prevent the abuse of judicial power. The super-
visory body overseeing the courts of first instance in the cantons is often 
the cantonal court or the upper court, with the court of second instance 
itself supervised by the cantonal parliament. Responsibility for the 
overall supervision of the Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial 
authorities of the confederation lies with the national parliament. In 
view of the institutional autonomy of the justice system, this supervi-
sion is administrative and does not permit the supervisory authorities 
to rescind or amend court judgments.60
3. Institutional Role of the Courts
In the cantons, the district courts (Bezirksgerichte, or Kreisgerichte in the 
case of cities) are competent to rule as the body of first instance on civil 
and criminal matters, while the governments or governmental authori-
ties are responsible as the body of first instance in the administrative 
judicature. In addition to the court of first instance, the cantons are 
obliged by federal law to constitute a court of second instance, or upper 
court, for all civil and criminal matters. In the public law arena, the 
cantonal administrative courts and social insurance courts serve as the 
courts of lower instance before recourse to the Federal Supreme Court 
is sought. however, in most cantons, this structure is supported by a 
number of specialist judicial tribunals such as the commercial courts, 
 59 Martin Kayser, “Richterwahlen: Unabhängigkeit im Spannungsfeld von 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie,” in Akteure der Gerichtsbarkeit, ed. benjamin 
Schindler and Patrick Sutter (Zurich: Dike, 2007), 46.
 60 Andreas Lienhard, “Supervisory Control and Court Management,” International 
Journal for Court Administration 3 (August 2009): 30–45; Kiener, Richterliche 
Unabhängigkeit, 296–7, 299.
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juvenile courts, financial courts, and family courts.61 It is mandatory 
for civil cases to be heard by an arbitration body before action is taken 
before the court of first instance. In recent years, the confederation has 
set up its own specialist judicial authorities with the Federal Adminis-
trative Court (2007), the Federal Criminal Court (2004), and the Federal 
Patent Court (2012).
Unlike the cantonal courts and the federal courts of first instance, 
the Federal Supreme Court, as the highest court, does not usually re-
establish the facts of a given case. As an appellate court, the Federal 
Supreme Court is limited to examining questions of law.62 In addition to 
examining specific cases, the Federal Supreme Court and other relevant 
federal judicial authorities may state their position in hearings and con-
sultations on federal parliament bills that concern proceedings before 
the Federal Supreme Court or other federal judicial authorities, as well 
as the status, organization, and administration of these bodies. As long 
as they do not prejudice an ongoing case, judges are also entitled to 
exercise their right to freedom of speech by offering academic opinions 
on legal or judicial policy issues.
The courts must observe the principles laid down in the Federal 
Constitution, such as democracy, federalism, and fundamental rights. 
The confederation and the cantons also must respect international law 
(Art. 5, para. 4, Art. 190). The Constitution does not explicitly govern 
the relationship between federal and international law in the event 
of conflicting provisions. According to Federal Supreme Court prec-
edent, however, provisions under international law that protect human 
rights, at least, must be given precedence on a case-by-case basis over 
provisions of federal law.63 That said, even if a federal law is found to 
infringe the principle of federalism, it must still be applied by the court, 
despite its unconstitutionality (see 3.2).64 With respect to the federal sys-
tem, mention should be made of the judicial restraint exercised in the 
 61 Further information in Raphaël Arn, Nicole Saurer, and André Kuhn, eds., 
Organisation der kantonalen und eidgenössischen Strafbehörden und strafrechtliche 
Ausführungsbestimmungen (basel: helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011); René A. Rhinow, 
Öffentliches Prozessrecht (basel: helbing Lichtenhahn, 2010); Thomas Sutter-Somm, 
Franz hasenböhler, and Christoph Leuenberger, eds., Kommentar zur Schweizerischen 
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (Zurich: Schulthess, 2010).
 62 See also Tschentscher and Lienhard, Öffentliches Recht, 295–6.
 63 See Alexander R. Ziegler, Einführung in das Völkerrecht, 3rd ed. (bern: Stämpfli, 
2015), 122.
 64 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 245.
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examination by appellate bodies of decisions made by courts of lower 
instance where such decisions concern cantonal autonomy. It is deemed 
appropriate, in the event of doubt, for the appellate body to uphold the 
opinion and conclusions of the highest cantonal court in matters that 
fall within the scope of cantonal autonomy.65
4. Curial Procedures
Procedures and procedural requirements differ across the fields of law. 
In civil law, the parties themselves decide whether they wish to take 
their dispute to court; in public law, the decision on whether to pros-
ecute lies with the public prosecuting authorities.
The Swiss courts act only when the individuals or authorities con-
cerned demand judicial examination of a particular matter. This also 
applies to disputes between the different orders of government, which 
may be heard before the Federal Supreme Court. Such disputes often 
concern conflicts relating specifically to law-making authority and to 
the application of the law, as well as disputes under civil or public law. 
The latter include boundary disputes, breaches of the guarantee of 
existence and territory, conflicts relating to loyalty to the confederation, 
disputes arising from inter-cantonal agreements or treaties between the 
confederation and the cantons (Art. 48, Abs. 2). Action may be brought 
by cantonal or federal authorities. Consequently, private individuals 
and political parties may not institute such proceedings, although their 
participation is not ruled out.66
Depending on the nature of the decision, a number of instruments 
are available to authorities to enforce a final court ruling. Decisions 
relating to payments may be enforced by a compulsory order under 
 65 See also yvo hangartner, “behördenrechtliche Kognitionsbeschränkung in der 
verwaltungsrechtspflege,” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre Moor, Théorie du droit –  
Droit administratif – Organisation du territoire, ed. bovay benoît and Minh Son 
Nguyen (bern: Stämpfli, 2005), 319, 328–9.
 66 hansjörg Seiler, Nicolas von Werdt, and Andreas Güngerich, Bundesgerichtsgesetz 
(BGG), Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht (bern: Stämpfli, 2007), Art. 120; Marcel 
Alexander Niggli, Peter Uebersax, and hans Wiprächtiger, Bundesgerichtsgesetz, 
Basler Kommentar, 2nd ed. (basel: helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2011), Art. 120. See also 
heinz Aemisegger and André Jomini, “Der Föderalismus in der Rechtsprechung des 
bundesgerichts,” in 1. Nationale Föderalismuskonferenz, Der kooperative Föderalismus 
vor neuen Herausforderungen, ed. bernhard Waldmann, Institute of Federalism (basel: 
helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2005), 173.
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debt and insolvency law. The cantons determine the procedures for 
enforcing penalties and measures, as does the confederation within the 
particular scope of its authority.
The Federal Constitution guarantees that court proceedings and writ-
ten judgments are public, although legislators may provide for excep-
tions to this rule (Art. 30, para. 3). The public and the media may be 
excluded from court hearings where necessitated by overriding inter-
ests, such as public order and safety or the protection of an individual’s 
privacy. Judgments must be made public in all cases without exception, 
however. The decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, as well as many 
of those handed down by cantonal courts – at least of second instance – 
are available on the Internet.
5. Judicial Culture
Statute law – which provides the foundation of the Swiss system of 
law – takes precedence, even if the wording of the law is not entirely 
clear and the sense of the norm requires interpretation. If no rule can be 
inferred from the interpretation of the written statutes, then this legal 
loophole must be closed by invoking common (customary) law. The 
courts themselves have only a subsidiary role in the development of 
law. Compared with countries with a common-law system, case law in 
Switzerland is much less significant in the law’s evolution.
When establishing the meaning of a legal norm, the courts pay par-
ticular attention to its grammatical, systematic, historical, and teleologi-
cal interpretation. These four methods of interpretation are not applied 
according to a fixed order of precedence but, in keeping with the plural-
ity approach, will be more or less relevant to the meaning of the norm, 
depending on the situation. The various methods of interpretation must 
therefore be applied in a careful balance. This limits interpretive inven-
tiveness. Moreover, the constitutionality of the resulting interpretation 
must also be taken into account. This interpretive process must be applied 
to all fields of law, even to legal action before the Federal Supreme Court 
in disputes over authority between the confederation and the cantons. 
however, in areas in which the Federal Supreme Court has a consistent, 
published practice, it will no longer interpret the law in individual cases, 
but instead be guided by its prior landmark rulings.67
 67 See hansjörg Seiler, Praktische Rechtsanwendung (bern: Stämpfli, 2009), 4.
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III. Jurisprudence under Federalism
1. General Tendencies
The structure of the federal state is deeply rooted in the Federal Con-
stitution (see II.2). Alongside the parliament, which must respect the 
constitutional framework when enacting new federal legislation, the 
Federal Supreme Court plays in a historical context a central role as 
the guardian of federalism: since 1874 the adjudication of disputes 
between the federation and the cantons has always been a primary 
duty of the court (Art. 189, para. 2).68 The importance of the Federal 
Supreme Court is all the greater because its rulings display a high 
degree of consistency. In the federal context, the rulings of the lower 
Federal Administrative Court, Federal Criminal Court, and Federal 
Patent Court tend to be of lesser importance. Indeed, as relatively 
recent additions to the judicial system, their practices have yet to 
become properly established. The rulings of the cantonal courts have 
also had little impact on federalism.69 That said, the judgments of the 
cantonal courts of highest instance may have had some bearing on 
 68 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 141. This role of the Federal 
Supreme Court has to be seen in a historical context; see Jakob Dubs, Das öffentliche 
Recht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Zweiter Teil (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 1878), 
72. In Article 113 of the old Federal Constitution of 1874 the adjudication of disputes 
between the federation and the cantons ranks number 1, the adjudication of conflicts 
among the cantons number 2, all before the ruling over violation of constitutional 
rights. See also Walter burckhardt, Kommentar der schweizerischen Bundesverfassung 
vom 29. Mai 1874, 3rd ed. (bern: Stämpfli, 1931), Art. 113, 771; Zaccaria Giacometti 
and Fritz Fleiner, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (Zurich: Polygraphischer verlag, 
1949), 834–5: “So erscheint es naheliegend, dass das bundesgericht die mit der 
bundesstaatlichen Struktur des Landes im Zusammenhang stehenden Streitigkeiten, 
d.h. Kompetenzkonflikte zwischen bundesbehörden und kantonalen behörden 
sowie Streitigkeiten zwischen Kantonen zu beurteilen hat” (Therefore it seems 
obvious that the Federal Supreme Court has to adjudicate the disputes related to the 
federal structure of the country, such as conflicts of competence between the federal 
authorities and cantonal authorities or disputes between cantons; translation by 
authors).
 69 See also Arnold Marti, “Die bedeutung der EMRK in der Rechtsprechung der 
kantonalen Gerichte – am beispiel des Kantons Schaffhausen,” in Die Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention und die Kantone, ed. Samantha besson and Eva Maria belser 
(Genf: Schulthess, 2014), 95.
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municipal autonomy, in particular with regard to the delineation of 
responsibilities between the local and cantonal authorities.70
2. Specific Issues
a. fundamental principles of federalism
Article 3 of the Federal Constitution states that the cantons are sovereign 
to the extent that their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitu-
tion.71 They exercise all rights that are not vested in the confederation. The 
cantons decide on the duties that they must fulfil within the scope of their 
powers (Art. 43). The Federal Supreme Court invokes this particular arti-
cle only in rare cases, even though it regularly examines whether the con-
federation or the cantons have authority over a specific area, and whether 
they have exercised the powers incumbent upon them (this does not inter-
fere with the principle that the court does not exercise constitutional judi-
cial review over federal laws). Numerous examples can be given.72
For instance, the Federal Supreme Court has decided that federal legis-
lation on animal welfare does not prevent the cantons from issuing police 
 70 For example, in its judgment b 2010/45 of 14 October 2010, the Administrative Court 
of St Gallen examined whether and to what extent the Cantonal Works Department 
may issue instructions to the municipalities, which are responsible for building 
inspectors, on enforcement of planning permission. In this case, it held that municipal 
autonomy had not been infringed. Meanwhile, in case b 2011/9, the same court held, 
“Municipal autonomy, in the form of the issue of a municipal schedule of criteria, 
is restricted to third-class municipal roads which serve fewer than ten permanently 
inhabited residential units, provided the requirements of the Roads Act and the 
Circular on the Enforcement of the Roads Act of 22 November 1988 are observed.” In 
a judgment related to the law of administrative procedure, which falls within cantonal 
jurisdiction, the Administrative Court of Aarau determined that a referral back to the 
municipality with strict and specific instructions to make revisions was not consistent 
with cantonal buildings legislation because the local authorities’ decision-making 
freedom must be maintained even where an application is rejected (AGvE 72 278).
 71 bGE 2C_76/2015 E. 3.2.2 (foreseen for publication in the official compilation of 
the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court); bGE 140 I 176 E. 7.1; bGE 140 I 218 
E. 5.4; bGE 138 I 435 E. 3.4.1: General reminder of the principle of Art. 3 Federal 
Constitution in recent cases regarding tax law, public health.
 72 These examples are all drawn from the official compilation of the decisions of 
the Federal Supreme Court (bGE). These can be accessed at www.bger.ch, under 
“Rechtsprechung”). For further detail, see also heinz Aemisegger and André Jomini, 
“Le fédéralisme dans la jurisprudence du Tribunal fédéral,” in Waldmann,  
1. Nationale Föderalismuskonferenz, 193–212. The authors are grateful to the documents 
service of the Federal Supreme Court, and to Ms Geneviève Rod in particular, for 
research conducted in the Federal Supreme Court’s database of case law.
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guidelines to prevent dog attacks on humans. Geneva and Zurich have 
instituted measures such as a ban on breeding dangerous dogs, the obli-
gation to obtain a permit to own such dogs, and bans on doing so. Citing 
Article 3 specifically, the Federal Supreme Court deemed these measures 
to be constitutional.73 A similar conclusion was reached even in the case 
of the absolute ban imposed by valais on certain breeds of dog, which in 
effect covered less than 1.7 per cent of all dogs in the canton.74
Article 3 was also cited in a Federal Supreme Court ruling in connec-
tion with the fiscal sovereignty of the cantons, with particular regard 
to patents. In a case from Solothurn, the Federal Supreme Court deter-
mined that the levy of patent fees cannot be ruled out solely by the fact 
that the new Federal Constitution no longer makes explicit provision for 
commercial levies by the cantons, as was the case in Article 31, paragraph 
2 of the previous Constitution.75 The Court reasoned that by virtue of 
Article 3 the fact that the Federal Constitution no longer rules about such 
cantonal patent fees or taxes does not mean that the cantonal legislators 
commit an infraction of the Constitution by fixing such patent fees.
Article 3 was also referred to explicitly in a case relating to land law 
in valais. The Federal Supreme Court ruled that the key factor was 
whether, and to what extent, the federal parliament as legislator had 
made use of its power to enact (framework) legislation, as granted to 
it in the amendment of land law. If the confederation has not exercised 
its legislative powers, ruled the Court, then the cantons are not only 
responsible for issuing regulations guaranteeing property rights in 
greater detail, but are also free under Articles 3, 42, and 43a to grant 
those whose property was expropriated the right to make a claim for 
damages, with such rights extending beyond the guarantee laid down 
in Article 22ter, paragraph 3 of the old Federal Constitution.76
Spatial planning is an area governed by federal legislation. The can-
tons and local authorities are responsible for its application. The Federal 
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to clarify the interpretation of 
the law in this field in many of its judgments. In doing so, the Court, 
on one hand, respects the considerable planning freedom that the can-
tons and the local authorities enjoy within building zones, but on the 
other hand enforces the strict and directly applicable rules of federal 
 73 bGE 133 I 172 E. 2; bGE 136 I 1 E. 3–5.
 74 bGE 133 I 249 E. 3–4.
 75 bGE 128 I 102 E. 5.
 76 bGE 127 I 185 E. 4.
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legislation concerning construction outside building zones77 and with 
respect to environmental conservation.78
According to Article 42 of the Federal Constitution, the confederation 
fulfils the duties that are assigned to it by the Constitution. This prin-
ciple has been applied by the Federal Supreme Court on a number of 
occasions, including a judgment concerning common public procure-
ment (i.e., relating to a joint venture project of the confederation and the 
cantons). The Court determined that in cases of parallel competencies 
of the confederation and the cantons, the confederation must issue a 
conflict of laws rule on the applicable law and responsible authority.79
Article 44 contains the principles of cooperation between the con-
federation and the cantons, including mutual support and cooperation 
in fulfilling tasks and duties of mutual consideration and assistance.80 
Article 46 states that the cantons implement federal law in accord with 
the Federal Constitution and federal legislation, and that the confed-
eration must uphold the independence of the cantons. This has been 
applied, for example, in the following areas:
–  Spatial planning: The Federal Supreme Court has held that, by set-
ting up twenty-six different offices instead of one single competent 
authority, the canton of bern failed to meet the requirements of 
federal legislation (see the more detailed explanation of the spatial 
planning case below).
–  Aliens law: because the Federal Constitution does not address the 
matter in Article 121 (authority of the confederation to legislate 
on the residence and permanent settlement of foreign nationals), 
in view of the principle laid down in Article 46, paragraph 1 it is 
the federal legislators who must determine the extent to which the 
cantons should be entrusted with the enforcement of federal law as 
it relates to foreign nationals (see also Art. 164, para. 1f).81
–  Validity of a cantonal initiative: See the example below of the Geneva 
peace initiative as examined under Article 52.82
 77 bGE 137 II 338, 136 II 359.
 78 bGE 138 II 23.
 79 bGE 130 I 156 E. 2.
 80 See, for example, bGE 139 I 195 E. 4 concerning proportional representation in the 
cantonal law, which does not respect the principle of collaboration between the 
confederation and the concerned canton (here canton Zug).
 81 bGE 127 II 49 E. 3.
 82 bGE 125 I 227.
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The cantons may conclude agreements between each other and may 
also set up joint organizations and institutions (inter-cantonal agree-
ments). The confederation may participate in such agreements within 
the scope of its authority (Art. 48). For example, the Federal Supreme 
Court has determined that confederation gaming and lottery law83 does 
not preclude an inter-cantonal process that transfers licensing decisions 
to a common body.84
Article 49, which provides that federal law will prevail over incon-
sistent cantonal law, is one of the fundamental provisions of the federal 
system, and it has been subject to more Federal Supreme Court rul-
ings than most. The actual rulings on the precedence of and compliance 
with federal law are given here:
–  The Federal Supreme Court confirmed that Zurich’s regulations on 
criminal prosecution powers conformed to federal law. It found that 
the cantonal provision did not contradict the Swiss Code of Criminal 
Procedure.85
–  The Federal Supreme Court declared as part of its judgment that a 
flat-rate fee charged, irrespective of the volume of waste accrued, 
was incompatible with federal law.86
–  The Federal Supreme Court established a breach of the power 
of derogation of federal law. A cantonal law on the construction 
of social housing, which included buildings that did not receive 
any federal aid, could not permit the landlord (on the grounds of 
the corresponding provisions in the Swiss Code of Obligations) 
to invoice expenditure associated with the existence of the rental 
property itself as ancillary costs.87
 83 Federal Lotteries and Commercial betting Act, SR 935.51.
 84 bGE 135 II 338. Opposite decision concerning an inter-cantonal agreement about 
culture of hemp, in bGE 138 I 435.
 85 bGE 137 Iv 269.
 86 bGE 137 I 257.
 87 bGE 137 I 135; see also bGE 5A_948/2015 (foreseen for publication in the official 
compilation of the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court): non-admissibility of 
cantonal civil procedure rules regarding the recent Swiss Civil Procedure Code; 
bGE 142 I 16: admissibility of specific cantonal names for high school institutions 
regarding the Federal regulation; bGE 139 I 195 about proportional representation in 
the cantonal law, which does not respect the principles of the Federal Constitution; 
bGE 139 I 242 about admissibility, regarding the federal rules, of cantonal law 
concerning no smoking areas in restaurants.
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Under Article 51, cantonal constitutions require the guarantee of the 
confederation, which must be given, provided the constitution does 
not contradict federal law. The meaning of this confederation guar-
antee was rendered more precise in a recent judgment by the Federal 
Supreme Court on a provision in the constitution of vaud concern-
ing a mandatory referendum on measures to restructure the cantonal 
budget. The provision in the cantonal constitution was deemed to 
be insufficiently clear to commit the cantonal electorate to a decision 
between a restructuring measure and a corresponding increase in the 
cantonal tax rate. The Court ruled that such a specific referendum 
process must be set out in detail in advance at statute level.88 Other-
wise it will foster infractions of the guarantee of political rights of the 
Constitution (Art. 34).
Article 52 states that the confederation must protect the constitutional 
order of the cantons. The confederation will intervene when public 
order in a canton is disrupted or under threat and the canton is unable 
to maintain order alone or with the aid of other cantons. A cantonal 
initiative to support military measures that promote peace is lawful in 
principle, provided the initiative furthers action such as participation 
of the canton in international institutions, endeavours to reduce the 
military budget, repurposing of military sites for civilian use, shift of 
business activities connected with the military to the civilian sector, or 
protection of victims of violence and promotion of community service in 
the context of an objective information policy and an appropriate infra-
structure. by contrast, it would be unlawful for a canton to decide that 
military personnel may not be used under any circumstances to main-
tain peace and public order on cantonal territory or to ensure the safety 
of international conferences. The Federal Supreme Court therefore 
ruled the Geneva popular peace initiative (based on political rights of 
the cantonal constitution) to be invalid.89
Article 53 states that the confederation must protect the existence 
and the territory of the cantons. A popular initiative (the “Unir” initia-
tive) submitted in Canton Jura, which would have obliged the cantonal 
authorities to work unilaterally and consistently towards the incorpo-
ration of certain districts of Canton bern, was declared invalid by the 
 88 bGE 131 I 126; see also bGE 140 I 394 about election rules on the cantonal level; bGE 
140 I 58 about referendum rules on the local level.
 89 bGE 125 I 227.
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Federal Supreme Court because of the danger of disrupting peaceful 
relations between the two cantons.90
b. distribution of powers between the confederation  
and the cantons
Legislative power is one of the most important components of federal-
ism. The way in which such powers are distributed between the con-
federation and the cantons may vary.
Confederation holds exclusive powers (legislative and executive): If the 
confederation holds exclusive legislative powers in respect of civil law, 
this includes the exclusive competencies of ruling about the personal 
effects of marriage. A canton may therefore not issue regulations about 
the retention or loss of a woman’s cantonal or local citizenship when 
she marries.91
Confederation holds exclusive legislative power – executive power lies 
with the cantons: The confederation is responsible for spatial planning 
legislation (Art. 75) and has enacted a corresponding law.92 This law 
(Art. 25, para. 2 Spatial Planning Act) requires, among other things, 
that all applications for building projects outside building zones be 
examined by a single authority of the canton for reasons of an equal 
treatment all over the territory of the canton. One canton had set up 
twenty-six local administrative offices, because this better accommo-
dated the actual organizational structure of the administration and led 
to shorter procedures. The Federal Supreme Court ruled this arrange-
ment inadmissible.93
Powers shared between confederation and cantons or inter-cantonal bodies: 
Federal lotteries and gaming legislation94 do not preclude an inter- 
cantonal process that transfers licensing decisions to a common body.95
The measures provided for in the inter-cantonal concordat on action 
against violence at sporting events (e.g., travel bans, regular “checking 
in” with the authorities, and police custody) are deemed compatible 
with federal law.96
 90 bGE 118 Ia 195.
 91 bGE 108 Ib 392.
 92 Federal Spatial Planning Act, SR 700.
 93 bGE 128 I 254 E. 4.
 94 Federal Lotteries and Commercial betting Act, SR 935.51.
 95 bGE 128 I 254 E. 4.
 96 bGE 137 I 31 E. 4.
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Cantons hold exclusive powers: According to Article 39, paragraph 1, 
the cantons have exclusive authority over the exercise of political rights 
in cantonal and municipal matters. In cantonal legislation relating to 
elections to the cantonal parliament, the electoral process and the rules 
that apply to proportional representation must respect the principles of 
the Federal Constitution. Specifically, cantonal electoral processes must 
be compatible with principles of proportional representation and with 
the corresponding distribution of seats. This does not rule out recog-
nition by federal authorities of cantonal customary law (i.e., unwrit-
ten cantonal constitutional law historically practised by the cantonal 
authorities), which gives even the smallest municipality the right to a 
minimum of two seats in the cantonal parliament.97 This adjudication 
of the Federal Supreme Court gave rise to something that is very rare (it 
happens two to three times in a century). The Federal Council asked the 
Federal Assembly not to approve section 48 of the new constitution of 
Canton Schwyz because this new cantonal regulation is not compatible 
with principles of proportional representation.98 A canton may also not 
use this exclusive authority to forbid women exercising political rights 
in cantonal and municipal affairs. The constitutional principle of gen-
der equality (Art. 8, para. 3) takes precedence over cantonal autonomy.99
Despite their inherent shortcomings, cantons may hold a cantonal 
referendum in the form of a public meeting, or Landsgemeinde, because 
voting with a show of hands at such a meeting does not constitute a 
breach of electoral freedom.100
c. autonomy of the cantons and municipalities
The municipalities are independent with regard to their public procure-
ment. In public votes, interested citizens select their preferred project 
from a range of studies that have been open to public inspection. In 
one particular case, the project concerned the construction of new local 
authority offices. The Federal Supreme Court held that the “public vot-
ing” (a rather informal instrument of public participation to select the 
 97 bGE 136 I 376 E. 4–5,bGE 136 I 352 E. 2–5; and bGE 139 I 195.
 98 FF 2012 7331; according to Art. 51 par. 2 FC the Federal Assembly has to approve 
the cantonal constitutions and their amendments to guarantee that the cantonal 
constitution is not contrary to federal law; see haller, Swiss Constitution in a 
Comparative Context, 54–5; see also also 2.2.
 99 bGE 116 Ia 359.
 100 bGE 121 I 138 E. 5.
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best among several projects) cannot be equated with a referendum, and 
provides only a rough estimate of the acceptance of a project among 
the population. It would nonetheless be appropriate for an authority to 
take due account of the will of the people even at the preliminary pro-
ject stage. It would be a violation of municipal autonomy if a cantonal 
appeal body were to declare public voting to be fundamentally unlaw-
ful in the award of a public procurement contract.101
Cantonal and federal authorities apply restraint when managing 
disputes about municipal autonomy. In the naturalization process for 
foreign nationals, the grant of citizenship is one area in which local 
authorities can act independently. In this regard, the Federal Supreme 
Court has ruled that the cantonal court that is called upon to rule on 
rejected applications for citizenship is free in its consideration of the 
facts of the case and the application of the law. It must nonetheless 
respect the scope of the local authority’s powers. In effect, this means 
that the cantonal court may examine whether or not the minimum pro-
cedural requirements for determining, such as language skills, have 
been met. It may not conduct its own investigations, however.102
Under certain circumstances, cantonal authorities may order the 
compulsory merger of local authorities. These circumstances include 
the existence of cantonal parliamentary powers to order compulsory 
mergers, a specific legal base, hearings among the populations of the 
local authorities concerned, and the appropriateness of such a move in 
view of the prevailing general and financial situation.103
d. conflicts between constituent states
The Federal Supreme Court is the only body competent to hear disputes 
between cantons (Art. 189, para. 2). Such disputes are very uncommon 
(three in twenty years), but have involved a range of issues.
Inter-cantonal conflicts may concern the precise location of bound-
aries. One case concerned the boundary between bern and valais at 
the Plaine-Morte glacier. Canton bern had recognized the boundary as 
drawn on the map of 1863, making the Plaine-Morte fall within valais. 
however, improved geographical knowledge about the course of the 
water divide between the two cantons meant that later federal maps 
showed a different path for the cantonal boundary. This was adopted 
 101 bGE 138 I 143.
 102 bGE 137 I 235 E. 2–3, bGE 138 I 242; and bGE 139 I 169.
 103 bGE 131 I 91 E 2–3.
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in the overview land survey drawn up by valais. The Court held that 
the tacit recognition of the adjustment to the boundary would be held 
against Canton bern’s claim in favour of the earlier boundary. The 
Plaine-Morte glacier thus now forms part of the territory of bern.104
Disputes between cantons may also concern voting rights. A number 
of referenda were held in bern to determine the precise boundary of 
Canton Jura, which was formed from a part of bern. Jura took the mat-
ter to the Federal Supreme Court, claiming that the boundaries of its 
territory had been drawn too narrowly because of defects in the con-
duct of a referendum. The Federal Supreme Court refused to admit the 
constitutional claim. It found that Jura did not have the authority to 
challenge any errors in the referendum because it was not itself entitled 
to vote in that referendum, neither could it invoke any special norm 
that might have been enacted in its favour.105
Where tax law is concerned, the principle outlawing double taxation 
prevents a canton from taxing commuters from a neighbouring canton. 
With the exception of certain special cases, attempts by Geneva’s tax 
authorities to tax the incomes of commuters from vaud was held to 
infringe vaud’s fiscal sovereignty.106
The Federal Supreme Court is also competent to adjudicate cases 
concerning a conflict of competences between the adult protection 
authorities of two cantons.107
e. development of fundamental rights in  
the swiss federal state
The first Federal Constitution of 1848 and the second Federal Consti-
tution of 1874, which remained in effect until 1999, contained only a 
few specific guarantees of fundamental rights; only those that appeared 
insufficiently assured by cantonal constitutional law were incorporated 
into the Constitution.108 before they were codified in the Federal Consti-
tution of 1999, today’s guarantees of fundamental rights evolved from 
the interplay of fundamental rights in the cantonal constitutions on one 
 104 bGE 120 Ib 512.
 105 bGE 117 Ia 233.
 106 bGE 125 I 458; see also bGE 139 II 373 regarding a conflict between tax authorities 
of the cantons Zürich and Aargau.
 107 bGE 141 III 84 E 1 to 4.
 108 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 149; Regina Kiener and 
Walter Kälin, Grundrechte, 2nd ed. (bern: Stämpfli, 2011), 5–6.
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hand, and the extraordinarily comprehensive body of case law from the 
Federal Supreme Court on the other.109 This was guided to some extent 
by the development of human rights legislation in Europe (see 4.2.6) 
and the precedent set by the Supreme Court in the United States (the 
American Supreme Court has had a very significant influence on the 
development of human rights in Switzerland, but there is no discern-
ible influence concerning federalist matters).
f. the legal question of languages
Switzerland traditionally is a multilingual country. The Constitution 
declares German, French, Italian, and partly Romansh (only concern-
ing relations with the Romansh population) as official languages for 
the use by authorities of the confederation (Art. 70). Each canton can 
define its official languages. Twenty-two of the twenty-six cantons are 
monolingual. The cantons of bern, Fribourg, and valais are bilingual, 
where the official languages are German and French. The only trilin-
gual canton is Graubünden, with German, Romansh, and Italian as its 
official languages.
The Federal Supreme Court played an important role in defining the 
linguistic rights at a time where there were no regulations in the Con-
stitution.110 The Court originally adopted a very strict application of the 
principle of territoriality in a famous case, “Association de l’Ecole fran-
çaise.”111 It prevented a private French-speaking school from teaching 
in Zurich in order to protect the traditional German-speaking linguistic 
zone. Since then, and especially taking into account three important 
decisions, the Court has shifted from strict implementation of territo-
riality towards a certain degree of recognition of freedom of language, 
as granted by the Constitution (Art. 18).112 On closer examination, the 
legal question of languages in Switzerland − reflected by the decisions 
of the Federal Supreme Court − is not a federal question in a strict sense 
 109 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 19–20, 149; Kiener and Kälin, 
Grundrechte, 5–6; Wurzburger, Le Tribunal fédéral, 37–8.
 110 See in extenso Nicolas Schmitt, “Principles and Criteria of the Jurisprudence of 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal concerning Linguistic Questions,” in Jurisprudències 
constitucionals en matèria lingüística: principis i criteri, eds. Institut d’Estudis 
Autonòmics, dir. (barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2011), 11.
 111 bGE 91 I 480.
 112 See Schmitt, “Principles and Criteria,” 24; Fleiner, Misic, and Toepperwien, 
Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 268–9.
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but rather “a struggle between the freedom of language and the princi-
ple of territoriality.”113
g. enforcement of the european convention on  
human rights against federal interests
In the past, the Federal Supreme Court has upheld enforcement of 
the fundamental freedoms of the European Convention on human 
Rights against federal interests. In doing so, it has also intervened in 
the organizational autonomy of the cantons. This is illustrated clearly 
by the example of judicial independence, where the Federal Supreme 
Court – adopting the practices of the Strasbourg authorities − determined 
institutional inconsistences, which resulted in costly reorganizations 
and legislative amendments in the cantons concerned:114 a person may 
be both a public prosecutor and a presiding criminal judge;115 a per-
son may be both an investigating magistrate and a presiding criminal 
judge;116 a person may be both a sentencing judge and a presiding crim-
inal judge if a sentencing order is appealed and court proceedings thus 
instituted;117 and a person may be both a magistrate and a presiding 
criminal judge.118
h. compliance with federal court doctrines or rulings
Although the Federal Supreme Court issues rulings on individual cases 
that are binding on the courts of lower instance only in the case at hand, 
it is rare for the cantonal courts not to respect the case law of the Federal 
Supreme Court, and especially its landmark rulings.119 The reason for 
this probably has less to do with the obedience of the cantonal courts 
than with the fact that the great majority of Federal Supreme Court rul-
ings become the accepted doctrine in the form of textbooks and com-
mentaries, and that the courts of first and second instance also tend to 
follow this doctrine in their own decisions. Another factor may be that 
 113 Schmitt, “Principles and Criteria,” 12.
 114 See also Jörg Paul Müller and Markus Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 
(bern: Stämpfli, 2008), 943.
 115 bGE 117 Ia 159 E. 2, following Piersack c. belgium, EuGRZ 1985, 301.
 116 E.g., bGE 111 Ia 290; bGE 113 Ia 72; bGE 117 Ib 64, following De Cubber c. belgium, 
EuGRZ 1985, 407.
 117 bGE 114 Ia 143.
 118 bGE 115 Ia 180; bGE 121 II 53, following hauschildt c. Denmark, Series A No. 154.
 119 See Wurzburger, Le Tribunal fédéral, 35.
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many court decisions are prepared by the clerks of the court (see 3.1 
above), who are often younger and less experienced lawyers.
Furthermore, in the few cases in which the Federal Supreme Court 
has declared a cantonal norm as unconstitutional in the context of an 
abstract review, the competent authorities have also tended to comply 
with the Federal Supreme Court ruling. In such cases, cantonal legisla-
tors have amended the norm in question at the next opportunity.
Finally, it should be pointed out that cantonal legislators may deviate 
from the Federal Constitution where fundamental rights are concerned 
if the cantonal constitution extends the protection of fundamental 
rights beyond the guarantees that are laid down in the Federal Con-
stitution. For example, the constitution of Canton bern grants an indi-
vidual constitutional right to inspect official records (the principle of 
public access). This is similar to what has been called the “new judicial 
federalism” in the United States.120
i. outlook
The introduction of standard codes of civil and criminal procedure 
for the whole of Switzerland on 1 January 2011 was − together with 
the corresponding amendments of the Constitution (Art. 29a, Art. 121, 
Art. 122) − the greatest intervention in the federal structure of the jus-
tice system since the beginning of the nineteenth century. It remains to 
be seen precisely what the effects on federalism will be. Many cantons 
have used the introduction of the new codes of procedure as an oppor-
tunity to reform their own judicial structures. Exercising the organi-
zational autonomy granted to them in respect of their court systems 
(Art. 122, para. 2, and Art. 123, para. 2), and taking their different sizes 
and structures into account, the cantons have chosen a variety of organ-
izational models.121 Indeed, the diversity in cantonal judicial systems 
would appear to be even greater today than it was before the reforms. 
The criminal prosecution authorities are an exception.122 In view of 
the sequence of steps in criminal proceedings, the new Swiss Code of 
Criminal Procedure prescribes a particular model of public prosecution, 
although the cantons retain a degree of organizational scope even here. 
 120 See, for example, John Kincaid, “State Court Protections of Individual Rights under 
State Constitutions: The New Judicial Federalism,” Journal of State Government 61 
(September/October 1988): 163–9.
 121 See Fleiner, Misic, and Toepperwien, Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 113.
 122 See ibid., 116–17.
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To date, the Federal Supreme Court has rejected individual cantons’ 
challenges to this new public prosecution model.123
As mentioned above, there is no constitutional jurisdiction at the 
national level.124 In 2012, the question of introducing a federal consti-
tutional court was debated by parliament once again.125 It might have 
a positive effect on federalism as a whole in Switzerland, however, if 
the Federal Supreme Court were able to examine the constitutionality 
of federal legislation. The Federal Supreme Court would then also be 
able to examine whether and to what extent federal legislators were at all 
authorized to issue a particular norm that formed the basis for the deci-
sion of the cantonal courts in an individual case. The parliament decided 
against a constitutional jurisdiction. It is difficult to get clear reasons out 
of the debate, yet federalism was not an issue in the discussion.
3. Securing Federally Relevant Goals and Objectives
The Federal Supreme Court plays an important role in promoting the 
universal application of federal legislation in the interests of the federal 
state overall. In this regard, the Federal Supreme Court has had a par-
ticular effect in several areas over the past twenty years. 
Social insurance law: Traditionally, the Federal Supreme Court (from 
1917 onwards, up to just a few years ago, an independent federal court 
in Lucerne) played a very important part in ensuring the standard 
application of federal legislation on social insurance (e.g., old-age and 
survivors’ insurance, disability insurance, and occupational pension 
provision).126 
 123 For example, in implementing the public prosecution model II, some cantons 
have reorganized the public prosecutor’s office as part of the independent justice 
system, subject to the supervision of the upper court. In its judgment 1b_320/2009 
on 5 July 2010, the Federal Supreme Court held that judicial independence was not 
biased or infringed if the upper court or its administrative board appoint public 
prosecutors, on the one hand, and, on the other, the same members of the upper 
court rule in appeal proceedings on a refusal to enter into or suspension of criminal 
prosecutions of those public prosecutors. See Daniel Kettiger, “Zur Unabhängigkeit 
der Staatsanwaltschaft in der Justizorganisation,” Justice – Justiz – Giustizia 4 (2010).
 124 See haller, Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context, 245-246.
 125 See Parliamentary Initiatives 07.476 and 05.445. This is not the first attempt to 
introduce constitutional jurisdiction; see Wagner, Federal State and Their Judiciaries, 
105–6.
 126 See Wurzburger, Le Tribunal fédéral, 14–15.
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Tax harmonization: The cantons enjoy fiscal sovereignty, as well as 
independent legislative authority to enact norms relating specifically 
to income and wealth taxes (direct taxes). Legislative diversity between 
the cantons is thus correspondingly broad. With an amendment of the 
Constitution (Art. 129) and its Tax harmonization Act,127 the confed-
eration brought about a degree of formal standardization in areas such 
as liability to tax, taxable incomes, and capital gains, as well as assets 
and capital, tax assessment periods, the procedures to be followed, and 
criminal tax law, in particular. This harmonization did not, however, 
include tax rates. In this sense, there is no material harmonization of 
the tax system. The Federal Supreme Court has since had a number of 
opportunities to support these harmonization efforts.128 For example, it 
held that new income tax rates imposed by Obwalden were inconsist-
ent with the general tenet of equality before the law and the principle 
of taxation on the basis of ability to pay (Art. 127). The Court further 
ruled that neither tax competition grounds nor other fiscal or non-fiscal 
objectives justified this incompatibility with federal law.129
Unified economic area: A unified economic area forms an integral part 
of Switzerland’s economic constitution (Art. 27, Art. 94). The Domestic 
Market Act130 is intended to give persons who are permanently settled 
or domiciled in Switzerland free and equal access to the market to pur-
sue employment throughout the whole of Swiss territory. The Federal 
Supreme Court has applied this principle in greater detail in a broad 
body of case law.131
Enforcement of guarantees of fundamental rights under international 
law (see 4.2.5) and harmonization of legislation on spatial planning (see 
4.2.2) also illustrate the role of the courts in securing federally relevant 
goals and objectives.
 127 Federal Act of 14 December 1990 on the harmonization of Direct Taxes Levied by 
Cantons and Local Authorities (SthG; SR 642.14).
 128 See also Ulrich Cavelty, “Schranken des Steuerföderalismus,” Rechtliche 
Rahmenbedingungen des Wirtschaftsstandortes Schweiz, ed. Department of Law at the 
University of St Gallen (St Gallen: Dike, 2007), 367.
 129 bGE 133 I 206.
 130 Federal Act of 6 October 1995 on the Domestic Market (Domestic Market Act, 
bGbM, SR943.02).
 131 For an overview of the relevant case law, see Giovanni biaggini, Andreas Lienhard, 
Paul Richli, and Felix Uhlmann, Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht des Bundes, 5th ed. 
(basel: helbling Lichtenhahn, 2009), 40.
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V. Conclusion
As noted above, only the rulings of the Federal Supreme Court have 
any bearing on federalism in Switzerland. The rulings of the cantonal 
courts and other federal courts are of negligible importance. Since its 
foundation in 1848, the Federal Supreme Court has played the very role 
in the federalist structure of the Swiss state that, with regard to feder-
alism, it was designed to play.132 It has struck a balance between the 
necessary degree of legislative harmonization in a federal state, and 
the legal and organizational independence of the cantons, as is their 
due according to the principles of federalism. In more than 150 years, 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court does not show any clear 
tendency towards unitarism or federalism. There has been a slight 
unitarist tendency in the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in the 
last twenty years. but this might as well be the result of a tendency to 
unitarism in federal legislation. Concerning federal matters, no justi-
fiable generalizations can be made about the attitude and outlook of 
the Court. however, there is one exception. When the Federal Supreme 
Court has to decide whether a paragraph of a cantonal law is compat-
ible with the Federal Constitution, the Court clearly follows a federalist 
view. In respect of decisions made by a cantonal parliament or even by 
a canton’s voters, it declares such a paragraph non-constitutional (with 
the effect it is declared null) only if there is no possible way to apply the 
paragraph in a constitutional way.
Jurisdiction is just one of several aspects in the evolution of Swiss 
federalism, however. The principal role is taken by the legislators 
(i.e., the federal parliament and the electorate), which have laid down 
the principles of the federalist division of power between the confed-
eration and the cantons. In comparison to the legislator, the Federal 
Supreme Court is only a middling actor in shaping the Swiss federal 
arrangement. The reshaping of this arrangements take place mostly by 
modifications of federal laws (and seldom by partial revisions of the 
Constitution). These principles continue to be refined, particularly with 
the restructuring of the financial equalization system and the distribu-
tion of functions between the confederation and cantons in 2008. The 
executive government of the confederation plays an important role in 
preparing the implementation of laws and in enforcing them. That said, 
 132 See note 68.
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Swiss federalism rests on the cantons themselves. On the basis of their 
general subsidiary powers and the associated financial autonomy, they 
form the federal state. This remains true despite an emerging shift in 
power from the cantons to the confederation, and the increasing impor-
tance of alliances between the cantons and the confederation. In this 
delicate interplay, the court system – and the Federal Supreme Court 
particularly – is called upon to support an appropriate balance between 
federalism and centralism.
14  The Supreme Court of the United States: 




The relative scope of federal and state power under the U.S. Constitution 
has been a major bone of contention for over two hundred years. Federal 
courts have often intervened both for and against assertions of federal 
authority. Judicial review has sometimes enforced substantial limits on 
federal authority by striking down federal laws deemed to be outside the 
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitu-
tion. At the same time, federal courts have often constrained state power 
by invalidating state laws as violations of constitutional rights.
While judicial review has therefore promoted both centralization 
and state autonomy at different times, on balance it has strengthened 
the former at the expense of the latter. This pattern has been especially 
prevalent since the 1930s, as the U.S. Supreme Court largely abandoned 
earlier efforts to police limits on congressional power, while simultane-
ously enforcing a growing array of individual rights against state and 
local governments.
This chapter does not consider the extent to which the federal courts’ 
decisions on federalism and individual rights questions have been cor-
rect; instead, it examines the impact of judicial review on American fed-
eralism without attempting a normative judgment. I briefly outline the 
structure of American federalism and judicial review, and then describe 
the history of judicial review of structural limits on federal power. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court engaged 
in limited but significant efforts to constrain congressional power. These 
efforts were to a large extent abandoned after the constitutional revolu-
tion of the New Deal period in the 1930s. beginning in the early 1990s, 
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the Supreme Court attempted to revive judicial enforcement of limits 
on federal power. So far, these efforts have had only a limited effect.
The chapter then summarizes the history of judicial review of state 
laws. The range of issues on which federal courts have invalidated state 
laws is so broad that it is impossible to consider it in more than a general 
way here. but that in itself is a strong indication of the extent to which 
state policymaking authority has been curbed by the courts. Overall, 
the impact of these rulings in restricting state autonomy significantly 
exceeds the effects of the courts’ more limited efforts to constrain fed-
eral power. however, they have promoted a kind of decentralization by 
increasing the freedom of individual citizens and private organizations.
The last part of the chapter briefly explains why the centralizing 
effect of judicial review was not accidental. because federal judges are 
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the chance 
that they will resist the political agenda of the dominant political coali-
tion in the federal government is reduced. Even when federal judges 
would like to invalidate federal legislation, they may hesitate to do so 
when the result might create a political confrontation that the courts are 
likely to lose. Federal judges face fewer political risks when they strike 
down state legislation.
I. The American System of Federalism
The United States is one of the world’s largest and most diverse fed-
eral systems, second only to India in population size. The nation also 
boasts enormous ethnic and religious diversity. As of 2010, the U.S. 
population was about 308 million people.1 That includes about 65 per 
cent who describe themselves as “white,” 12 per cent black or African-
American, and almost 16 per cent hispanic (including some black his-
panics).2 There are also many smaller minority groups, most notably 
Asian-Americans and Native American descendants of the aboriginal 
population. The United States has by far the world’s largest economy 
 1 U.S. Census bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2012), 8. The constantly updated Census bureau 
Population Clock estimates it at about 322 million in December 2015. U.S. Census 
bureau, U.S. and World Population Clock, 12 December 2015, available at http://
www.census.gov/popclock/.
 2 Data calculated from figures in U.S. Census bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, 10.
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and is also among the world’s wealthiest nations in terms of per capita 
income.
The U.S. federal system includes fifty state governments, all of which 
have legally equal standing under the Constitution, as well as six asso-
ciated territories such as Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the U.S. 
virgin Islands. The District of Columbia, which includes the capital of 
Washington, DC, is a special territory controlled directly by the federal 
government. Aboriginal Native American tribal governments have a 
complex quasi-autonomous status that has been a focus of much con-
troversy and is difficult to classify precisely.3
There are also over 89,000 local governments of various types, 
including counties, towns, and cities.4 As far as the federal Constitution 
is concerned, local political entities are under the complete control of 
state governments; however, many of them are granted a measure of 
autonomy or home rule under state constitutional or statutory law.
As discussed later, the power of the federal government relative to 
the states has greatly increased over time. The federal government has 
come to play a much larger role in economic and social policy, and in 
protecting a variety of individual rights. Today, as in many previous 
periods in American history, the scope of federal power is a major focus 
of political controversy. Generally speaking, most political liberals 
believe that the role of the federal government should be as great as or 
even greater than it is today, while most conservatives and libertarians 
argue that it should be reduced. At the same time, neither side of the 
political spectrum is consistent in its attitude towards federal power; 
conservatives sometimes favour expansions of federal power that 
seem in tension with their ideology, while liberals sometimes favour 
state autonomy. Overall, there is no consensus on where the bound-
ary between state and federal authority should lie. but few Americans 
want to transform the nation into a completely unitary polity.
 3 For overviews of Indian tribal governments’ relationship with American federalism, 
see, e.g., vine DeLoria Jr and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future 
of American Indian Sovereignty (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998); David E. 
Wilkins and heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, American Indian Politics and the American 
Political System, 3rd ed. (New york: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); harvard Project on 
American Indian Economic Development, The State of the Native Nations: Conditions 
under US Policies of Self-Determination (New york: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
section 1.
 4 U.S. Census bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, table 2, http://www2.census.gov/
govs/cog/2012/formatted_prelim_counts_23jul2012_2.pdf.
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As compared with most other federal systems, the United States is 
unusual in that there are almost no states where an ethnic, religious, lin-
guistic, or racial group that is in the minority nationally is the majority 
within the state. In many other federal nations, the existence of national 
minorities that are regional majorities was one of the main justifications 
for the establishment of a federal system in the first place.5 The one par-
tial exception to the U.S. pattern is the state of Utah, where adherents of 
the Mormon religion – a minority faith that was persecuted by national 
and state governments in the nineteenth century – are in the majority.6 
External possessions such as Puerto Rico and the U.S. virgin Islands 
also have majority populations that differ in ethnicity from that of the 
United States. but they, like Utah, have had only marginal influence on 
the development of American federalism as a whole.
The United States emerged from a rebellion against british rule by 
thirteen previously separate colonies on the east coast of North Amer-
ica. In 1776, the colonies joined together in a Declaration of Independ-
ence, and britain recognized the new nation after an eight-year conflict 
that Americans commonly call the Revolutionary War.
The U.S. Constitution was drafted in 1787 and is the oldest continu-
ously functioning written national constitution in the world. It replaced 
the earlier Articles of Confederation, established in 1781, under which 
the powers of the federal government were significantly weaker.7 
Many political leaders, including George Washington, commander 
of the Continental Army that won the Revolutionary War, Alexander 
hamilton, and James Madison, the eventual “father of the Constitu-
tion,” believed that the federal government created by the Articles was 
too weak, and tolerated far too much abusive behaviour by the states. 
During the 1780s, political support for the establishment of a stronger 
 5 For an overview covering many such cases, see Luis Moreno and César Colino, eds., 
Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2010); see also Dawn brancati, Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate 
Conflict through Decentralization (New york: Oxford University Press, 2009).
 6 For a survey of the issues raised by Utah and the Mormons’ confrontations with the 
federal government, see Sarah barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and 
Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002).
 7 For a helpful summary of the origin and development of the Constitution, see G. Alan 
Tarr, “The United States of America,” in Constitutional Origin, Structure, and Change in 
Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2005), 381–8.
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federal government gradually increased, until a new constitution was 
drafted in 1787 by a convention of state delegates originally called to 
revise the Articles of Confederation.
The new Constitution was approved by specially elected ratifying 
conventions within the states. Article vII of the Constitution stipulated 
that the Constitution would come into force once ratified by nine of 
the thirteen states. Many prominent politicians and Revolutionary 
War leaders supported the Constitution. These included Madison, 
hamilton, and John Jay, who wrote the famous Federalist Papers in an 
attempt to promote ratification. but others, including George Mason 
and Patrick henry, opposed the Constitution because they believed it 
concentrated too much power in the federal government.
The Constitution establishes a system of separation of powers within 
the federal government, with an elected executive (the president, 
Article II), a bicameral legislature (Article I), and an independent judici-
ary (Article III). The upper house of Congress, the Senate, has two sena-
tors for every state; originally they were chosen by state legislatures, but 
they have been popularly elected since enactment of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913. The house of Representatives, the lower house, is 
chosen by plurality voting in single-member districts allocated to the 
states based on population.
Federal judges serve for life and are appointed by the president, 
subject to confirmation by a majority of the Senate. The judicial sys-
tem is hierarchical, with a Supreme Court composed of nine justices 
at the top.8 Unlike in some other nations, there is no separate constitu-
tional court. Most significant cases are decided through publicly avail-
able written opinions signed by the judge who writes them. Since at 
least the early nineteenth century, the federal judiciary – particularly 
the Supreme Court – has been a major player in the political and legal 
system, imposing constraints on the powers of both the states and the 
other two branches of the federal government.
In addition to the Supreme Court, there are two lower levels of gen-
eralist federal judges – district court judges (who hear trials) and court 
of appeals judges (who hear appeals from the district courts). There 
are also a number of specialized courts, such as those that consider tax 
cases, bankruptcy cases, and cases arising in the military justice system.
 8 before 1869, the Supreme Court often had six, seven, or ten justices rather than nine. 
The present number was set by Congress in 1869, and has remained the same ever 
since.
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Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction over all “cases” and “con-
troversies” arising under the Constitution and other federal law. Over 
time, the Supreme Court has interpreted this to forbid the issuing of 
“advisory” opinions and to limit federal litigation to cases involving 
parties that can obtain “standing” by having suffered at least some 
form of tangible harm through violations of the law.
Each state has its own courts, including a state supreme court, which 
are independent of the federal courts and hear cases addressing issues 
of both state and federal law. Each also has its own state constitution, 
many of which contain guarantees of rights that differ from or go 
beyond those protected by the federal Constitution.9 State courts must 
follow federal appellate court precedent on issues involving the federal 
Constitution and federal law. but they exercise considerable independ-
ent authority when they interpret state constitutional law, often in ways 
that restrict the authority of the other branches of their state govern-
ments. Some federal judges are former state judges appointed to the 
federal judiciary, though most are not.
The United States is a common law nation with a legal culture heav-
ily influenced by its british origins.10 In interpreting the Constitution, 
federal judges have resorted to a wide range of methodologies, includ-
ing textualism, originalism, reliance on precedent, and a variety of 
“living constitution” theories that allow for changing interpretation in 
response to economic and social developments. both within and out-
side the judiciary, there is an active debate between supporters of dif-
ferent theories of interpretation – particularly between originalists and 
living constitution advocates – with no definitive resolution in sight.
One issue that has often been the focus of conflict between interpret-
ers of the Constitution over the last two centuries is the question of 
whether the Constitution was established by the people of the United 
States as a whole, or is instead a compact created by state governments.11 
 9 For useful surveys of state constitutional law and its history, see John J. Dinan, The 
American State Constitutional Tradition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); 
and G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000).
 10 The one exception to this generalization is Louisiana, which maintains a civil law 
system inherited from its days as a French and Spanish colony prior to its transfer to 
the United States in 1803.
 11 For helpful statements of the arguments on each side with citations to various 
historical sources and earlier debates on the issue, see the majority and dissenting 
opinions in US Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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Advocates on both sides have usually assumed that the latter theory 
implies a narrower scope for federal authority than the former. This 
is not necessarily true. Even if an undifferentiated people created the 
Constitution, they could still have chosen to put strict limits on fed-
eral power. Conversely, even if the Constitution was established by the 
states, they could have chosen to delegate very broad authority to the 
federal government. Even so, the issue continues to be the subject of 
considerable debate.
Until recently, judicial decisions on federalism issues have not been 
much influenced by international treaties and international law. Over 
the last fifteen years, a few Supreme Court decisions have cited such 
sources, and some scholars advocate greater reliance on them. but the 
practice remains rare and controversial.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress a variety of 
powers, most notably the power to declare war, raise and support 
armies, mint money, impose taxes, and regulate interstate and for-
eign commerce. There is also a Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 18), which gives Congress the power to adopt legisla-
tion that is “necessary and proper” for “carrying into execution” the 
other powers granted to the federal government in the Constitution. 
The Constitution also grants a number of powers to the president, most 
notably the power to command the armed forces, make treaties subject 
to ratification by two-thirds of the Senate, and veto legislation adopted 
by Congress, subject to override by a two-thirds majority in each 
house. The Supremacy Clause of Article vI of the Constitution specifies 
that the Constitution, international treaties signed and ratified by the 
United States, and federal statutory law are all “the supreme Law of 
the Land” and trump state law when they conflict with it. The extent to 
which federal statutes “pre-empt” state laws that do not directly violate 
federal law but may go against it indirectly, has long been a focus of 
extensive debate.12
The Constitution does not contain a specified list of state powers. 
The implicit assumption is that states retain all powers not granted 
to the federal government or explicitly prohibited to the states by the 
Constitution. There are only a few examples of the latter, such as the 
 12 For detailed discussion, see, e.g., Richard Epstein and Michael Greve, eds., Federal 
Preemption: States’ Powers, National Interests (Washington, DC: AEI, 2007); and 
Christopher R. Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 89–126.
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prohibition on states’ issuing their own currency or signing treaties 
with foreign powers (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1). States can also 
legislate on many matters on which the federal government can enact 
laws, so long as state laws do not conflict with federal ones. This has 
meant that states retain broad authority to legislate on a wide range 
of issues, even as the scope of federal power has expanded, especially 
since the 1930s. Still, state policies are increasingly subject to overriding 
or modification by federal legislation.
A wide range of individual rights provisions constrain both federal 
and state power, including amendments protecting freedom of speech 
and religion, property rights, and the rights of criminal defendants. All 
of the former are part of the bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution enacted simultaneously in 1791. The Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, enacted in the late 1860s 
shortly after the Civil War, forbid slavery and restrict racial and ethnic 
discrimination by state governments. various provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment have long been interpreted to protect other indi-
vidual rights as well.
As discussed more fully below, the federal courts have often 
enforced constitutional limits on both federal and state authority. 
Issues related to the proper scope of state and federal power have 
always been among the most important on the federal courts’ agenda. 
At the same time, Congress, the president, public opinion, and a vari-
ety of political and economic factors have had major effects as well. 
Judicial review has influenced the development of American feder-
alism, but it has never been the only influence and rarely the most 
important.
Article v of the Constitution sets out multiple mechanisms for 
enacting constitutional amendments. The only one that has ever been 
used in practice requires the support of a two-thirds majority in both 
houses of Congress, followed by ratification by three-quarters of the 
state legislatures. This amendment process is one of the most difficult 
in the world, and only twenty-seven amendments have been adopted 
in the 230-year history of the Constitution, including just seventeen 
since the adoption of the bill of Rights in 1791. In practice, constitu-
tional change has more often arisen through changing interpretations 
of the constitutional text than through formal amendment. Many state 
constitutions are much easier to amend, and some have been amended 
numerous times.
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II. Judicial Enforcement of Limits on Federal Government Power
1. The Early Republic and Antebellum Eras
Efforts at judicial enforcement of limits on federal power date back 
to the early republic. Their successes and failures have waxed and 
waned at different times. Many of the Founding Fathers envisioned 
the judiciary as an adjudicator of the boundary between federal and 
state power. In the Federalist Papers, Madison wrote that the Supreme 
Court would decide “controversies relating to the boundary between 
the two jurisdictions.”13
In the 1790s, the rival parties debated the constitutionality of federal 
legislation such as the federally chartered bank of the United States, 
a federal government–created corporation that sought to attract pri-
vate depositors and make it easier for the federal government to obtain 
credit. Critics of the bank in the nascent Democratic-Republican Party, 
including future presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 
argued that its creation exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers under 
Article I of the Constitution.14 Federalist Party defenders of the bank, 
led by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander hamilton, contended that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause was broad enough to authorize it.15 
The parties also clashed over the constitutionality of other elements of 
hamilton’s economic policy program, such as the assumption of state 
debts by the federal government.16
The first bank of the United States’ charter was allowed to expire 
after Jefferson won the presidency in 1800 and his party took control 
of Congress. but in 1819 the Supreme Court decided the crucial case 
of McCulloch v. Maryland,17 which involved a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a Maryland tax imposed on the second bank of the United 
 13 James Madison, “Federalist 39,” in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New 
york: Mentor, 1961).
 14 See, e.g., James Madison, “Speech on the bank bill,” house of Representatives,  
2 February 1791, in James Madison, Writings, ed. Jack N. Rakove (New york: 
vintage, 1999), 480.
 15 See, e.g., Alexander hamilton, “Opinion on the Constitutionality of the bank,”  
23 February 1791, in The Founders’ Constitution, ed. Philip b. Kurland and Ralph 
Lerner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 3:247–9.
 16 See David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789–1801 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 76–7.
 17 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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States, which had been created in 1816. In the process of addressing 
the constitutionality of Maryland’s tax, the Court also had to consider 
Maryland’s argument that the bank of the United States itself was 
unconstitutional. In a landmark opinion written by Chief Justice John 
Marshall, himself a Federalist, the Court not only upheld the constitu-
tionality of the bank, but also endorsed hamilton’s argument that the 
word necessary in the Necessary and Proper Clause could be interpreted 
to allow Congress to enact any legislation that was merely “useful” or 
“convenient” as a tool for executing one of Congress’s other enumer-
ated powers.18
McCulloch is traditionally seen as an endorsement of extremely 
broad congressional power, and this conventional wisdom is sup-
ported at least partly by the Court’s broad interpretation of the mean-
ing of necessary. While the Court interpreted necessary very loosely, it 
did not give Congress a blank check to enact virtually any legislation 
it might want. Marshall’s opinion indicated that the clause author-
izes legislation only with a “legitimate” purpose that is “within the 
scope of the constitution,” and uses “means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”19 This passage sug-
gests four constraints on the scope of congressional power authorized 
by the clause: (1) the “end” pursued must be “legitimate” and “within 
the scope of the constitution”; (2) the means must be “appropriate” and 
“plainly adapted to that end”; (3) the means must “not [be] prohibited” 
elsewhere in the Constitution; and (4) the means must be “consist[ent] 
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.” Marshall also emphasized 
that “should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass 
laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the Government, 
it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requir-
ing such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the 
law of the land.”20
In Gibbons v. Ogden (1824),21 Marshall issued the Court’s first major 
opinion addressing the scope of congressional authority to regu-
late “commerce … among the several States.”22 Gibbons upheld the 
 18 Ibid., 413–15.
 19 McCulloch. 17 U.S. (4. Wheat), at 421.
 20 Ibid., 423.
 21 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
 22 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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constitutionality of a federal law granting navigation licences to ships 
engaged in “the coasting trade,” and barred the State of New york from 
granting a monopoly of navigation on the hudson River, the lower part 
of which runs between New Jersey and New york.23
Marshall defined commerce relatively broadly as “intercourse.”24 but 
he also emphasized that the commerce power has significant limits, 
listing “inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every descrip-
tion, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and 
those which respect turnpike roads, ferries,” as part of the great “mass” 
of issues that federal power under the Commerce Clause does not 
cover.25 Unlike modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Marshall’s 
theory of the clause specifically did not include everything that “may 
have a remote and considerable influence on commerce.”26
Although relatively supportive of federal power, the pre–Civil War 
Supreme Court did issue two major opinions constraining it: Marbury 
v. Madison27 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.28 The former is most famous for 
its role in helping to establish the power of judicial review.29 It also rep-
resented an early case where the Court enforced constitutional limits 
on the powers of the federal government. but its actual impact in con-
straining federal power was extremely limited because it invalidated 
only a relatively minor provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Dred Scott was far more consequential. For decades, one of the biggest 
issues in nineteenth-century American politics was whether to permit 
slavery in the nation’s extensive western territories. Under the Con-
stitution, these territories were controlled by the federal government 
until they could be formed into states. In legislating for them, Congress 
was not limited by the enumerated powers constraints that applied 
in established states. Southern supporters of slavery sought to ensure 
that as much territory as possible would be open to slave-owners; most 
 23 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1–2.
 24 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189.
 25 Ibid., 203.
 26 Ibid.
 27 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
 28 60 U.S. (19 how.) 393 (1857).
 29 historical evidence indicates that the idea of judicial review was widely accepted 
in American legal thought and practice well before Marbury. See, e.g., Philip 
hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (Cambridge: harvard University Press, 2008); 
and Scott Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power: The Origins of an Independent Judiciary, 
1606–1787 (New york: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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northerners preferred that slavery be banned in the federal territories. 
both sides knew that a territory where slavery was legal would likely 
become a slave state, while a free territory would probably be a free 
state, thereby affecting the balance of power in Congress.
In two major political bargains – the Missouri Compromise of 1820 
and the Compromise of 1850 – northerners and southerners agreed to 
ban slavery in some western territories, while allowing it in others. In 
Dred Scott, the Supreme Court upended this delicate balancing act by 
ruling that Congress lacked the power to ban slavery in the federal ter-
ritories, thereby invalidating key parts of the two grand bargains; the 
Court also ruled that the Constitution did not permit even those blacks 
who were not slaves to become citizens.30 The 7–2 decision, written by 
pro-slavery Chief Justice Roger b. Taney, was legally dubious and polit-
ically explosive.31
The resulting furore undermined northern moderates who sought to 
compromise with the South, and helped lead to the election of Abra-
ham Lincoln to the presidency in 1860, on a platform that took a hard 
line against the expansion of slavery. That, in turn, precipitated the 
secession of the southern states and the bloody Civil War of 1861–5 that 
ultimately led to the abolition of slavery by the enactment of the Thir-
teenth Amendment in 1865. Other key aspects of Dred Scott, including 
the ban on black citizenship, were overturned by the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, which, among other things, guaran-
teed citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”32
2. The Post–Civil War Period
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court entered a seventy-year period 
during which it enforced significant limits on federal powers and issued 
a number of notable decisions constraining congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause and other parts of the Constitution. In Paul 
 30 For a discussion of Dred Scott and its impact, see Don Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (New york: Oxford University Press, 
1978).
 31 For a good summary of the legal weaknesses in Taney’s opinion, see David Currie, 
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789–1888 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 264–73.
 32 U.S. Const. Amend. XIv, Section 1.
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v. Virginia (1869), the Court ruled that the commerce power did not cover 
regulation of insurance contracts because the latter were not “articles 
in commerce.”33 In United States v. E.C. Knight (1895), the Court invali-
dated the application of federal antitrust laws to a manufacturing firm 
as beyond the commerce power because there is a distinction between 
interstate commerce and manufacturing that takes place within the 
boundaries of a single state.34
The late nineteenth-century Court also limited federal power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gave Congress the 
authority to adopt “appropriate” legislation enforcing that amend-
ment’s various provisions protecting the rights of recently freed slaves 
and others, against state governments. In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,35 
the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which banned racial 
discrimination by private businesses operating places of public accom-
modation; the Court ruled that Congress could not use Section 5 in this 
way, because the amendment prohibits only discrimination by state 
governments, not private entities.
The Court’s most widely reviled decision limiting federal power was 
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), which struck down a law that banned the 
interstate transportation of manufactured goods produced by children 
under the age of sixteen.36 Over time, this ruling came to symbolize the 
supposed excesses of the pre–New Deal Court.37
The Court also issued a controversial decision limiting Congress’s 
power to impose taxes, holding that an income tax qualified as a “direct 
tax” that must be apportioned among the states in proportion to popu-
lation, as required by the Constitution’s Direct Tax Clause.38 This deci-
sion was negated by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 
1913, which gave Congress the power to adopt income taxes without 
apportionment.
 33 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869).
 34 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The distinction between commerce and manufacturing echoed 
Chief Justice Marshall’s distinction between commerce and activities that merely 
“have a remote and considerable influence on commerce.” Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203.
 35 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
 36 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
 37 For a recent discussion and critical evaluation of Hammer’s negative historical 
reputation, see Logan Everett Sawyer, III, “Creating Hammer v. Dagenhart,” William 
and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 21 (2012): 67–122.
 38 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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While the pre–New Deal Court enforced some significant limits on 
the powers of the federal government, it also often upheld federal 
economic regulations against potentially plausible challenges. These 
included laws banning the transportation of lottery tickets across state 
lines,39 federal regulation of railroad rates on lines that do not cross 
state borders,40 the “White Slave Act” forbidding interstate transporta-
tion of women for prostitution or other “immoral” purposes,41 and the 
Pure Food and Drug Act forbidding interstate transportation of “adul-
terated” food.42
In two consolidated 1923 decisions addressing the scope of Con-
gress’s power to spend for the “General Welfare,” the Court made it 
very difficult for states to challenge the constitutionality of conditions 
attached to federal spending grants to state and local governments and 
almost impossible for most individual citizens to do so.43
Even when the pre–New Deal Supreme Court imposed signifi-
cant limits on federal power, it did so supported by a political con-
sensus in favour of constitutional constraints on federal authority. 
The Supreme Court sometimes bucked majority public opinion, 
most notably in Hammer v. Dagenhart. but although nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century public and elite opinion was characterized 
by numerous disputes about the scope of federal authority, there 
was broad agreement that there should be some strong constitu-
tional limits.44 Long-standing regional rivalries between the North 
and the South also helped limit federal power by making it more 
difficult to build a consensus in favour of broad new federal leg-
islation. These ideological and political foundations for limits on 
federal power deteriorated only slowly during the early twentieth 
century.
 39 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
 40 Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
 41 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
 42 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
 43 See Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
 44 For summaries of this broadly held view, see Robert higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: 
Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (New york: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 78–84; and barry Weingast, “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: 
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 1–31.
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3. The New Deal Transformation
Although many on the political left had criticized the Supreme Court’s 
decisions limiting federal power – especially over economic issues – 
for years, these attacks gained added momentum from the Great 
Depression that began in 1929.45 The federal government, led after 1933 
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, began to enact a wide range of 
“New Deal” interventionist policies intended to alleviate the crisis and, 
more generally, regulate the economy in unprecedented ways.46
At first, the Supreme Court resisted many of the new policies. Most 
of the justices on the Court in the mid-1930s had been appointed by 
pre–New Deal presidents, and they supported judicial enforcement of 
limits on federal power. between 1935 and 1937, the Court invalidated 
several major New Deal policies, including the National Recovery Act 
(NRA) of 1933, the centrepiece of Roosevelt’s First New Deal, and argu-
ably the most sweeping regulatory legislation in American history.47 
The NRA established a system of wage and price controls and cartels 
that encompassed nearly the entire non-agricultural economy.48 The 
unanimous decision striking down the law was joined by progressive 
justices such as Louis brandeis and benjamin Cardozo, as well as the 
Court’s conservatives. This line-up indicates both the NRA’s radical 
nature and the extent to which judicial enforcement of limits on federal 
power commanded widespread support among pre–New Deal jurists.
The Court also invalidated other important New Deal laws, such as 
laws restricting agricultural production in order to raise prices,49 regu-
lating wages, prices, and production of coal,50 and constraining the sale 
 45 For discussions of constitutional change during this period, see, e.g., barry 
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 
(New york: Oxford University Press, 1998); and William Leuchtenburg, The Supreme 
Court Reborn (New york: Oxford University Press, 1995).
 46 For a survey of the different New Deal interventions, see higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, 
159–95. Many New Deal policies actually had their origins in the initiatives of the 
previous administration of herbert hoover, who was a convinced interventionist, 
not an advocate of laissez-faire. See Joan hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten 
Progressive (boston: Little brown, 1975).
 47 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
 48 See Michael Weinstein, Recovery and Redistribution under the NIRA (New york: North-
holland, 1981).
 49 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
 50 Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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of oil produced in excess of quotas established by the federal govern-
ment.51 but even during the early New Deal period, the Court did not 
strike down all major new regulatory legislation.52
In 1937, the Court largely stopped resisting the expansion of Con-
gress’s powers. The shift in the Court’s position coincided with Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s effort to “pack” the Court by enacting a law that 
would allow him to add a new justice for every current justice over 
the age of seventy who chose not to resign. Since many of the justices 
who voted to strike down New Deal laws were over age seventy, the 
effect would have been to allow Roosevelt to create a new majority 
more amenable to his preferences. Controversy still rages over whether 
the Court’s change of course was a “switch in time that saved nine” 
motivated by a desire to forestall the court-packing plan, which was 
eventually defeated in Congress.53 Whatever the reason, the majority of 
the Court gradually gave up its resistance to New Deal legislation. In 
United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel (1937)54 and United States v. Darby 
(1941),55 the Court repudiated most of the pre–New Deal restrictions on 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937)56 and Helvering v. Davis,57 the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act, 
which created federal and cooperative intergovernmental programs for 
unemployment insurance, retirement pensions, and welfare for single 
mothers. Davis and the Court’s earlier decision in Butler also endorsed 
the theory that Congress’s power to spend money for the “General Wel-
fare” allows it to spend for nearly any purpose.58
 51 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
 52 For example, in 1935, the Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality of sweeping 
new federal regulations requiring private individuals to turn in all gold coins and gold 
bullion they owned to the government. See United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 
(1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
 53 For recent accounts, see, e.g., burt Solomon, FDR v. the Constitution: The Court-
Packing Fight and the Triumph of Democracy (New york: Walker, 2009); and Jeff Shesol, 
Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. the Supreme Court (New york: Norton, 2010). 
For an influential account suggesting that the Court’s shift was not motivated by 
political considerations, see Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 20–32.
 54 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
 55 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
 56 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
 57 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
 58 Ibid., 640–41; Butler, 297 U.S. at 65. Butler had nonetheless invalidated part of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act on other grounds.
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The Supreme Court’s broadest New Deal–era interpretation of fed-
eral power came in Wickard v. Filburn (1942).59 The Court ruled that 
the Commerce Clause authorized a provision of the 1938 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act that required a wheat farmer to limit his production 
of wheat, even though none of that wheat was ever sold in interstate 
commerce or crossed state lines. This decision went beyond previous 
cases such as Darby, which had all involved regulation of commercial 
employment relationships or the production of goods for sale in the 
market. It suggested that Congress had the power to regulate almost 
any activity that, in the aggregate, has a significant effect on commerce. 
In the modern world, that could mean almost any activity of any kind.
by 1942, all but one of the nine Supreme Court justices had been 
appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even if the swing voter justices 
on the old Court had held firm, they could not have continued to resist 
for long. The president, backed by a Democratic majority in the Senate, 
could eventually get what he wanted by appointing justices willing to 
uphold it. This was a nearly inevitable result of the Democratic Party’s 
long string of electoral victories in the 1930s and early 1940s, which 
allowed it to dominate both Congress and the presidency.
4. The Partial Revival of Judicial Enforcement of Limits on Federal Power
After the New Deal transformation of constitutional law, few structural 
limits on federal power remained. between 1937 and 1995, the Supreme 
Court did not invalidate a single federal law as beyond Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority. The Court issued noteworthy unanimous 
decisions holding that the clause authorized Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which banned racial discrimination in places of public 
accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants.60 One of them justi-
fied the application of the law to a local restaurant that served almost 
exclusively in-state residents.61 The Court concluded that the clause 
authorized congressional regulation of any activity that Congress 
had a “rational basis” for believing might have an effect on interstate 
commerce.62
 59 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
 60 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
 61 McClung, 379 U.S. at 300–4.
 62 Ibid. at 304.
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A 1971 decision reinforced the point by upholding a federal law ban-
ning loan-sharking, even though it applied mostly to small-time local 
loan sharks.63 In dissent, Justice Potter Stewart lamented that “under 
the statute before us, a man can be convicted without any proof of 
interstate movement, of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, 
or of facts showing that his conduct affected interstate commerce.”64 
The Warren Court of the 1960s, led by liberal Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
also took a permissive approach to the scope of Congress’s enforce-
ment powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, largely 
deferring to congressional judgments of what qualified as “appropri-
ate” enforcement legislation.65
In National League of Cities v. Usery (1976),66 the Court offered a 
ray of hope to advocates of judicial limits on federal power when it 
struck down a federal law requiring state governments to comply 
with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act in their dealings with their 
own employees. The Court ruled that, although Congress had broad 
power to regulate private economic activity under the Commerce 
Clause, the Tenth Amendment restricts such regulation when applied 
against state governments. The Amendment states that “powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple”; in the majority’s judgment, this language limited direct federal 
control of “the states as states.”67 National League of Cities contrasts 
with the New Deal Court’s dismissal of the Tenth Amendment as “but 
a truism” that imposes little if any constraint on the scope of Congres-
sional authority.68
National League of Cities was, however, overruled in 1985 in Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.69 The majority came close 
to endorsing the notion that the constitutional division of authority 
between the federal and state governments should be determined 
entirely by the political process, because state governments can 
 63 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
 64 Ibid., 157, (Stewart, J., dissenting).
 65 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
 66 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
 67 Ibid., 837.
 68 Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
 69 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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effectively look after their own interests without assistance from the 
courts.70
by the 1970s, the dominant view among legal elites was that judicial 
review would not and should not significantly constrain the scope of 
federal power. This belief was buttressed both by the idea that broad 
federal power is necessary to deal with the complexity of the mod-
ern economy and by the association between federalism and racism 
that had arisen thanks to southern state governments’ attempts to use 
“states’ rights” to oppose federal intervention against racial discrimina-
tion by state and local governments.
beginning in the early 1990s, however, judicial enforcement of lim-
its on federal power was partially revived under Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, who was appointed to that position by President Ronald 
Reagan in 1986. The Rehnquist revival had several causes. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the resurgent Republican Party claimed that federal power 
had grown too great and advocated allowing the states greater auton-
omy. Reagan and his successor, President George h.W. bush, appointed 
several Supreme Court justices committed to reinvigorating judicial 
enforcement of federalism, including Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin 
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas.
Just as the earlier collapse of judicial review of federalism had its roots 
in the triumph of the New Deal coalition that dominated American pol-
itics for several decades, so the Rehnquist revival would not have been 
possible without the rise of more conservative political forces in the 
1980s.71 In addition, a new generation of conservative and libertarian 
legal scholars began to challenge the previous intellectual consensus 
against judicial review of federalism.72 Finally, as time passed since the 
 70 The idea that federalism issues should be left to the political process enjoyed wide 
support among legal academics during this period. For leading statements of that 
view, see, e.g., Jesse h. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and herbert J. Wechsler, “The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of 
the Federal Government,” Columbia Law Review 54 (1954): 543–64.
 71 For a well-known work defending the theory that judicial review generally follows 
the dictates of dominant political coalitions at the federal level, see Jack M. balkin 
and Sanford Levinson, “Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,” Virginia Law 
Review 87 (2001): 1045–1109.
 72 See Steven Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008).
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Civil Rights revolution of the 1960s, the association of federalism with 
racism diminished in the public mind.
The 1990s revival of judicial review of federalism proceeded along 
several fronts. In United States v. Lopez (1995),73 the Court issued its 
first decision constraining congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause since the 1930s. Five years later, the Court invalidated another 
law as beyond the commerce power in United States v. Morrison.74
In interpreting the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Rehnquist Court was less deferential than its predecessor in the 
1960s. It ruled that Section 5 legislation must be “congruent and pro-
portional” to the unconstitutional state action it seeks to remedy and 
cannot forbid too much state activity that is not unconstitutional in 
and of itself.75 In its 2013 ruling in Shelby County v. Holder,76 the Roberts 
Court similarly limited the scope of Congress’s powers under Section 2 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, which authorizes it to pass “appropriate” 
legislation to implement the amendment’s ban on racial discrimination 
in voting.
In response to massive long-standing discrimination against Afri-
can-American voters in the southern states, Congress had enacted the 
voting Rights Act of 1965, which included a provision requiring many 
state and local government in the South (and a few elsewhere) to 
“pre-clear” any changes to their voting laws with the federal Justice 
Department. While few today doubt that this sweeping measure was 
“appropriate” in 1965, the issue confronting the Court in Shelby County 
was whether the application of pre-clearance to these same jurisdic-
tions was still appropriate after nearly fifty years of extensive political 
change, during which minority participation in elections has greatly 
increased, to the point where it is often no worse in the covered jurisdic-
tions than elsewhere.
because “things have changed [so] dramatically,” a narrow 5–4 
majority ruled that Congress’s 2006 reauthorization of the list of juris-
dictions subject to pre-clearance was unconstitutional because there is 
no longer a close enough fit between the list of covered jurisdictions 
 73 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
 74 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
 75 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Morrison also applied this principle in 
ruling that a provision of the violence against Women Act was not narrowly enough 
targeted against actual state government discrimination against women.
 76 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
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and the prevalence of discrimination against minority voters.77 both 
the justices and outside commentators were sharply divided between 
those (mostly on the right) who believed that the Court’s decision was 
a justifiable response to changing historical circumstances, and those 
(mostly on the left) who argued that it showed insufficient deference to 
Congress and opened the door to future racial discrimination in elec-
tion law.78
The Rehnquist Court also issued a series of decisions ruling that the 
Tenth Amendment bars federal “commandeering” of state officials for 
the purpose of using them to enforce federal law.79 In the 2013 case 
of Windsor v. United States, the Roberts Court built on the Rehnquist 
Court’s emphasis on respect for state prerogatives by striking down 
Section 3 of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal 
marriage benefits to same-sex couples who had entered into marriages 
in states that permit gay marriage under their state law.80 The Court 
invalidated the law in part because it intruded into a field normally left 
to the states.81
Finally, the Court began to enforce more vigorously the theory that 
the Eleventh Amendment, which bars suits against non-consenting 
state governments “by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State,”82 also implicitly forbids the federal govern-
ment from authorizing private lawsuits against states even by their 
own citizens.83
The Rehnquist “federalism revolution” was an important jurispru-
dential development. but its impact on the scope of federal power has so 
far been limited. In the Commerce Clause field, the Court struck down 
only relatively minor laws in Lopez and Morrison: the Gun Free School 
Zones Act barring gun possession near a school zone, and a provision 
of the violence against Women Act giving victims of gender-motivated 
 77 Ibid. at 2625–31.
 78 For the latter view, see ibid. at 2636–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
 79 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); and Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
 80 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
 81 because of its significant implications for individual rights, this case is discussed in 
greater detail in part III of this chapter.
 82 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XI.
 83 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), applying this principle 
to lawsuits in federal courts; and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733 (1999), which 
extended it to bar congressional authorization of lawsuits in state court.
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violence the right to sue their alleged assailants in federal court. both 
were invalidated because they did not regulate any kind of “economic 
activity” and were not an “essential” part of any broader economic 
regulatory scheme.84 This leaves plenty of room for Congress to con-
tinue to regulate economic transactions and even any “non-economic” 
activities that it seeks to control as part of a broader system of economic 
regulation. Moreover, any restrictive impact that Lopez and Morrison 
might have had was seriously undermined by the Court’s next Com-
merce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich (2005).85
The 6–3 majority in Raich ruled that the Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to ban the possession and production of medical marijuana, 
even when the drug in question has never crossed state lines or been 
sold in any market. Unlike the farmer in Wickard, who used his wheat 
to feed his own cows as part of a commercial farming operation,86 
Angel Raich’s marijuana production was not part of any commercial 
enterprise. The Court nonetheless ruled that Congress’s power extends 
to this case because Raich’s actions qualified as “economic activity,” 
which it defined broadly as any activity that involves “the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities,”87 and also because it 
was “rationally” connected to a broader regulatory effort to suppress 
the national market in marijuana. by defining “economic activity” so 
broadly and taking a deferential stance on the issue of whether even 
non-economic activity can be regulated, Raich diminished the likeli-
hood that Lopez and Morrison would lead to significant constraints on 
federal power.88 Importantly, the Raich majority included key conserva-
tive justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia, who had voted to 
limit federal authority in Lopez and Morrison.
Similar, though less severe, constraints limit the impact of the Court’s 
other recent decisions restraining federal power. The commandeering 
cases can be circumvented to a large extent by tying mandates imposed 
on state governments to federal grants as conditions that the recipi-
ents must meet. Conditional grants can also be used to get around the 
 84 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–64; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–14.
 85 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
 86 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
 87 Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–6.
 88 For a more detailed analysis of Raich, see Ilya Somin, “Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism 
as a Casualty of the War on Drugs,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 15 (2006): 
507–50.
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Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. States can be induced to 
consent to allow themselves to be sued as a condition of receiving fed-
eral funds. In addition, the Court has ruled that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar lawsuits authorized by Congress’s enforcement 
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court still some-
times defines broadly.89
Finally, until very recently, the Court made no effort to limit Con-
gress’s powers under the Spending Clause. The 1987 case of South 
Dakota v. Dole reiterated the rule that Congress’s power to spend money 
for the General Welfare encompasses almost any objective the legisla-
ture might choose, and also gives it broad power to make conditional 
grants to state governments.90
It is probably still too early to fully assess the potential effects of NFIB v. 
Sebelius,91 the Court’s blockbuster 2012 ruling on constitutional challenges 
to the Affordable Care Act, President barack Obama’s 2010 health-care 
law.92 In NFIB, twenty-six state governments and various private parties 
challenged the constitutionality of a central provision of the ACA, the man-
date requiring most Americans to purchase government-approved health 
insurance by 2014. The challengers argued that the mandate was different 
from previous federal regulations approved under the Commerce Clause, 
because it did not regulate any pre-existing economic activity, even under 
the broad definition of such endorsed by the Court in Raich. Instead, it 
forced people to buy insurance even if they had been inactive.
A 5–4 majority accepted this argument, concluding, as Chief Justice 
Roberts put it, that Congress does not have the power to “regulate indi-
viduals precisely because they are doing nothing.”93 A majority of the 
Court also ruled that the mandate is not authorized by the Necessary 
 89 See, e.g. Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), 
which upheld the application of the U.S. Family and Medical Leave Act to state 
governments, despite the relative weakness of evidence that the absence of mandated 
family leave in some states was a result of unconstitutional sex discrimination.
 90 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
 91 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
 92 For a variety of perspectives on the health-care decision, see Gillian Metzger, Trevor 
Morrison, and Nathaniel Persily, eds., The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court 
Decision and Its Implications (New york: Oxford University Press, 2013). For my 
own tentative early assessment, see Ilya Somin, “A Taxing, but Potentially hopeful 
Decision,” SCOTUSblog, 28 June 2012, http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-
taxing-but-potentially-hopeful-decision.
 93 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2587 (Roberts, C.J.).
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and Proper Clause, holding that the mandate is not “proper,” even if it 
is necessary.94
however, Roberts broke with the Court’s other four conservatives 
and upheld the mandate on the basis that it could be interpreted as 
a tax authorized by Congress’s power to impose taxes.95 he claimed 
that the mandate might be considered a tax because an individual’s 
failure to purchase insurance (1) triggered a relatively small monetary 
fine collected by the Internal Revenue Service, (2) does not qualify as 
a crime if the fine is paid, and (3) does not require a showing of crimi-
nal intent.96 Thus, he avoided striking down what would have been 
the most important federal law invalidated by the Court as beyond the 
scope of federal power since the 1930s.
The twenty-six state governments challenging the ACA also argued 
that its requirement that states greatly expand the scope of their Med-
icaid programs (i.e., health insurance for the poor), or else lose all of 
their federal Medicaid money, was unconstitutional. Surprisingly, they 
prevailed. Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices voted to partially 
strike down the Medicaid expansion because it was unconstitutionally 
“coercive,” acting as a “gun to the head” of the states, which stood to 
lose federal Medicaid subsidies equal to as much as 10 to 16 per cent 
or more of their total state budgets, unless they accepted the expan-
sion.97 While previous decisions had noted that “coercive” grants were 
unconstitutional, this was the first use of the spending power that the 
Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutional since the 1930s.
Whether NFIB has any major impact on future cases remains to be 
seen. The ruling that the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause do not authorize federal regulation of people who are “doing 
nothing” might limit future federal mandates.98 but such mandates 
 94 Ibid., 2591–3.
 95 Ibid., 2594–2600.
 96 Ibid.
 97 Ibid., 2601–7. The Court did, however, allow the federal government to offer the 
states new subsidies in exchange for expanding Medicaid, even though it eliminated 
the threat to cut the states’ massive pre-existing Medicaid grants. Ibid.
 98 Some contend that this ruling is not part of the Court’s holding, since it was not 
necessary to reach the ultimate result that the mandate is constitutional. In a 
section of his opinion joined by the four liberal justices who also voted to uphold 
the mandate, the Court specifically states that the Commerce Clause ruling is part 
of the holding. Ibid., 2593. Whether future Supreme Court decisions accept this 
characterization of the holding remains to be seen.
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could be structured to fit Roberts’s definition of a tax, though the pen-
alties for violation would have to be limited to monetary fines similar 
to those embedded in the ACA.
The Spending Clause ruling could limit future conditions attached 
to federal grants to state governments. but it is hard to say whether 
any such conditions will be deemed by courts to be so coercive as to 
amount to a “gun to the head.” The ruling has, however, already had an 
important effect on the ACA itself. As of late 2015, twenty-two state 
governments had rejected the Medicaid expansion, including such 
major states as Texas and Florida.99 They would not have been able to 
do so if the Supreme Court had upheld this part of the ACA.
The Supreme Court might also consider additional federalism-based 
challenges to the Affordable Care Act. For example, lawsuits currently in 
the lower courts contend that, if the individual mandate is a tax, as the Court 
concluded in NFIB, then the mandate violates the Constitution’s require-
ment that revenue bills originate in the house of Representatives rather 
than the Senate, where the final version of the ACA was first adopted.100 If 
this argument prevails, it could invalidate major portions of the ACA.
Shelby County v. Holder, discussed above, may also have significant 
real-world effects. The pre-clearance system invalidated by the Court 
had a major effect on politics in the covered states. however, the long-
term effects of the ruling are difficult to predict. Congress remains free 
to design new criteria for selecting jurisdictions for pre-clearance, and 
the voting Rights Act includes other tools for combating racial discrimi-
nation in voting.
It is important to emphasize that most of the recent decisions striking 
down federal laws as beyond the scope of congressional power were 
 99 Nick Madigan, “health Care Expansion Is Rejected in Florida,” New York Times, 5 
June 2015.
 100 See Sissel v. Department of Health and Human Services, 760 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The 
first federal appellate court to have considered this issue ruled in favour of the federal 
government. It is possible to argue that the Origination Clause is not really a limit on 
the scope of federal power, as such, because it merely allocates power between the two 
houses of Congress. however, the purpose of requiring revenue bills to originate in the 
house was probably to make it more difficult for the federal government to raise taxes 
without strong popular support. See James v. Saturno, “The Origination Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement,” Congressional Research Service, 15 
March 2011, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31399.pdf; and J. Michael Medina, “The 
Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey,” Tulsa Law 
Journal 23 (1987): 165–234.
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5–4 rulings pitting the Court’s five conservatives against its four liber-
als.101 Although there are some signs that this may be changing,102 most 
liberal judges and legal scholars continue to oppose anything more 
than minimal judicial enforcement of limits on federal power. As evi-
denced by the Raich case, among others, conservative jurists have not 
been completely consistent in their support of limits on federal power. 
but many of them do favour enforcement of at least some substantial 
constraints. Whether the federalism revival of the last twenty years has 
any long-term staying power is likely to depend on which party makes 
future Supreme Court appointments, and also on whether advocates 
of judicial enforcement of federalism are able to attract more liberal 
support.103 The unexpected recent death of Justice Antonin Scalia – 
a key supporter of most pro-federalism rulings of the last twenty-five 
years – raises questions about the future of the Court’s revival of judicial 
constraints on federal power. 
III. Judicial Enforcement of Limits on State Power
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s equivocal record of enforcing lim-
its on federal power, it has historically enforced a variety of limits on 
state power. Even as judicial enforcement of the former waned after the 
1930s, the exercise of judicial power against state governments greatly 
expanded and shows few signs of abating. The federal courts’ restric-
tions on state laws have been so many and varied that it is impossible to 
give more than a general summary. There has never been a prolonged 
period when the federal courts did not use judicial review to impose 
substantial restrictions on state governments.
1. The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
The period before the Civil War of 1861–5 and the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 is sometimes seen as a time when the 
judiciary did little to constrain the states. During this era, the Court 
 101 NFIB was a rare exception, in that two liberal justices joined the five conservatives 
in striking down part of the law’s expansion of Medicaid.
 102 I discuss some indications that this may be the case in Ilya Somin, “Federalism and 
the Roberts Court,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 46 (2016): 1–22.
 103 For a more detailed assessment of the Supreme Court’s recent federalism 
jurisprudence and prospects for the future, see ibid.
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did not apply the bill of Rights – the individual rights protected by the 
first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution – to state governments.104 
Even after enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court did not 
apply the bill of Rights to the states for many years. Nonetheless, pre–
Civil War federal courts restricted state governments in other ways.
Several important early Supreme Court decisions overturned state 
laws that set aside contractual obligations, as violating the Contract 
Clause of the Constitution, which forbids states from impairing the 
obligation of contracts.105 The nineteenth-century federal courts also 
enforced the “Dormant Commerce Clause” against the states, inter-
preting the Commerce Clause’s grant of power to regulate interstate 
commerce as an implicit prohibition on state legislation that restricted 
interstate trade and commercial enterprise, even in the absence of 
contrary federal legislation.106 Gibbons v. Ogden and McCulloch v. Mary-
land both invalidated state laws interfering with interstate commercial 
enterprises, as well as upholding federal laws.107 The Supreme Court 
also acted to curb some northern states’ efforts to protect free blacks 
and escaped slaves from the onerous federal Fugitive Slave Acts.108
After the Civil War, the Court applied the newly enacted Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which abolished slavery and 
protected a variety of individual rights, against infringement by state 
governments. In the Court’s first major case involving the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873),109 it took a narrow view 
of the amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, which bars states 
from infringing on the “Privileges or Immunities” of American citizens. 
The Court interpreted the clause as primarily a protection for existing 
federal rights, rather than one that protected a variety of economic and 
 104 In 1833, the Court ruled that the bill of Rights applied only against the federal 
government. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
 105 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
 106 For a review of these cases and their impact, see Michael S. Greve, The Upside-Down 
Constitution (Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 2012), chap. 4.
 107 See discussion of these cases in part II.
 108 See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), which ruled that the act 
and the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution negated Pennsylvania’s “personal 
liberty law,” which sought to protect blacks against “self-help” kidnapping by 
slavecatchers. See also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 how.) 506 (1859), which 
overruled Wisconsin’s efforts to free an abolitionist imprisoned for trying to help 
blacks resist the Fugitive Slave Act.
 109 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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personal liberties. This decision largely gutted what many of the amend-
ment’s framers had considered to be its most important provision.110
The late nineteenth-century Court did, however, make some efforts 
to enforce the amendment’s protections against racial discrimination, 
most notably in Strauder v. West Virginia, which struck down a state 
law banning African-Americans from juries.111 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins 
(1886),112 the Court established the important principle that even a law 
that does not discriminate on its face might be struck down if strong 
evidence suggests that it was enacted for the purpose of disadvantag-
ing a racial minority.
These decisions, however, had only a limited impact. As Recon-
struction ended in the late 1870s and early 1880s, and northern whites 
became less interested in protecting the rights of African-Americans 
in the South, the Court’s efforts to enforce those rights waned. In 
1896, the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson,113 a ruling that upheld the 
constitutionality of a state law mandating segregation in railroad cars 
and generally gave states wide latitude to adopt racially discrimi-
natory legislation. Plessy ultimately became one of the most reviled 
decisions in Supreme Court history. It inaugurated an era where the 
courts tolerated extensive racial discrimination against blacks and 
other minorities.
Some scholars argue that, so long as public and elite opinion was 
largely supportive or at least indifferent to such discrimination, the courts 
did little or nothing to protect minorities against it.114 but even during 
the height of Jim Crow segregation, the Supreme Court issued important 
decisions ameliorating the plight of African-Americans – most notably 
 110 On the centrality of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the framers of the 
amendment and its undermining by the Slaughterhouse Cases, see, e.g., Michael 
Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 161–7, 174–7; Randy E. barnett, Restoring 
the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 195–203.
 111 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
 112 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
 113 163 U.S. 537 (1896). On Plessy and its significance, see Charles Lofgren, The Plessy 
Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation (New york: Oxford University Press, 1988).
 114 For the most thorough defence of this position, see Michael Klarman, From Jim 
Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New york: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); see also Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, rev. 
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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the peonage cases,115 which struck down state laws limiting the ability 
of black workers to leave their jobs, and Buchanan v. Warley, a 1917 deci-
sion striking down residential segregation laws.116
Judicial review of state laws in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries is perhaps best known for the “Lochner era” of invalidation of 
state economic regulations, named after Lochner v. New York,117 a 1905 
case striking down a New york law imposing maximum hours for 
bakers under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which forbids states from depriving people of life, liberty, or property 
without “due process of law.” Like Plessy, Lochner has become one of 
the Court’s most denounced rulings, often disparaged as “judicial 
activism” intended to benefit the wealthy at the expense of the poor.118 
Many critics have also attacked what they consider to be Lochner’s oxy-
moronic use of “substantive due process.” by definition, they argue, 
“due process” cannot include any protection for substantive rights.
Revisionist scholars have pointed out that the Lochner-era Supreme 
Court upheld far more state regulatory laws than it struck down –
invalidating only those that seemed clearly driven by interest-group 
lobbying rather than genuine efforts to protect public health or safety. 
Revisionists also contend that judicial review of economic regulations 
had greater basis in precedent and original meaning than conventional 
wisdom suggests.119 Although the extent of its “activism” is sometimes 
exaggerated, the early twentieth-century Court did impose some mean-
ingful constraints on state economic regulation.120
Lochner-era Due Process Clause review of state laws protected what 
we today would call civil liberties, as well as economic freedoms. For 
example, it led the Court to strike down state laws forbidding foreign-
language instruction for students121 and mandating that children attend 
 115 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
 116 245 U.S. 60 (1917). For a detailed discussion of the important real-world effects 
of these cases, see David E. bernstein and Ilya Somin, “Judicial Power and Civil 
Rights Reconsidered,” Yale Law Journal 114 (2004): 593–657.
 117 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
 118 For a modern defence of this conventional wisdom, see Paul Kens, Lochner v. New 
York: Economic Regulation on Trial (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998).
 119 See, e.g., David E. bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011).
 120 For other notable cases striking down economic regulations, see, e.g., Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a minimum wage law for 
women); and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
 121 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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public schools instead of private religious schools.122 “Substantive” due 
process also contributed to the Court’s crucial decision striking down 
residential segregation laws in Buchanan v. Warley.123 Although Buchanan 
did not end residential segregation, it played an important role in ena-
bling African-Americans to move into many areas otherwise barred to 
them.124
2. The Modern “Rights Revolution”
The New Deal transformation of the 1930s that undermined judicial 
review of federalism issues also reversed Lochner and other cases that 
used the Due Process Clause to protect economic liberty against state 
governments.125 by 1955, the Court ruled that “economic” regulations 
could be invalidated only if there was no conceivable “rational basis” 
for them, even one that the state legislature did not consider when it 
adopted the law.126 The New Deal–era Court also undermined previ-
ously strong judicial enforcement of contractual rights under the Con-
tracts Clause, thereby increasing state autonomy.127 As with the decline 
of judicial enforcement of federalism, declining judicial protection of 
economic liberties was caused in large part by changing public and 
elite opinion, and the appointment of new Supreme Court justices in 
line with prevailing sentiment.
but the post–New Deal Court continued and greatly expanded judi-
cial review of state laws infringing a variety of non-economic rights. 
The period since the Second World War witnessed a “rights revolution” 
that led to the growth of judicial enforcement of numerous rights provi-
sions against state governments.128
Perhaps the most important expansion of judicial review dur-
ing this period was the Court’s effort to curb racial discrimination 
by state governments. Brown v. Board of Education (1954),129 which 
 122 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For the connection between Meyer and 
Pierce and Lochner, see bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner, 93–6.
 123 bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner, 78–86.
 124 For a detailed discussion of Buchanan’s effects, see bernstein and Somin, “Judicial 
Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered,” 631–40.
 125 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
 126 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
 127 Home Bldg. & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
 128 See Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
 129 347 U.S. 54 (1954).
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struck down racial segregation in public schools, is probably the 
most iconic decision in Supreme Court history. Although Brown built 
on earlier precedents, including some from before the New Deal, 
it would not have been possible in the absence of outside politi-
cal changes, including liberalization of northern white opinion on 
racial issues, the increasing political power of African- Americans 
in the North, and the slowly rising social and economic status of 
non-whites.130
 Even so, Brown represented a major judicial effort to curb racial 
discrimination by state governments at a time when the president 
and Congress were not yet ready to act on the issue in a signifi-
cant way. Over the next twenty years, the Supreme Court and 
lower courts issued many decisions following up on Brown and 
also striking down other types of state discrimination against racial 
minorities.131
The conventional wisdom holds that these decisions played a key 
role in revolutionizing American race relations and ensuring greater 
equality for racial minorities.132 Revisionist scholars, however, argue 
that they had little effect until Congress and the president began their 
own efforts to enforce black civil rights in the mid-1960s.133 It is true 
that there was little school desegregation in most of the South until 
Congress intervened. but Brown and its progeny played a key role 
in promoting desegregation in other ways, including by raising the 
political and economic costs of maintaining Jim Crow policies for state 
governments.134
The fight against racial discrimination also stimulated efforts by vari-
ous social movements to persuade the judiciary to interpret the Equal 
Protection Clause to constrain discrimination against other groups. 
beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions 
 130 For a review of these points, see Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights.
 131 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (following up on Brown); 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (enforcing 
desegregation orders); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down laws 
banning interracial marriage).
 132 See, e.g., Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and 
Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New york: vintage, 1976).
 133 See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, chaps 2–5.
 134 For a critique of the revisionist literature, see bernstein and Somin, “Judicial Power 
and Civil Rights Reconsidered,” 645–56.
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imposing heightened “intermediate” scrutiny of laws that discriminate 
on the basis of gender.135
Starting in the 1990s, the Court began to limit laws discriminating 
against gays and lesbians.136 In 2013, the Court struck down Section 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a federal law that denied federal 
marriage benefits to people who entered into same-sex marriages in the 
twelve states that permitted them at the time.137 The decision was based 
partly on federalism considerations. because of “DOMA’s unusual 
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state 
definitions of marriage,” Section 3 was subject to a higher level of judi-
cial scrutiny than would otherwise have applied.138 but the Court also 
emphasized that DOMA’s discrimination against same-sex marriage 
was unconstitutional because the law was based on “animus” against 
gays and lesbians and intended to “have the purpose and effect” of sig-
nalling “disapproval” of same-sex couples.139 For this reason, the Court 
concluded that DOMA “violates basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the federal government.”140 Indeed, federalism 
considerations were relevant precisely because Congress’s intrusion 
into an area usually left to the states created a “discrimination of an 
unusual character” that required added judicial scrutiny to determine 
if it was adopted for an illicit purpose.141 
Obviously, the “due process and equal protection principles” appli-
cable to the federal government also apply to the states, as a result of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This suggested that Windsor might even-
tually lead to a Supreme Court decision striking down state laws ban-
ning gay marriage. Over the next two years, numerous state and lower 
 135 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the decision that first adopted that standard; 
and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), a key case restricting single-sex 
education at state universities.
 136 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which struck down a law based on 
“animus” against gays; and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down 
anti-sodomy laws).
 137 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
 138 Ibid. at 2693. For a more detailed discussion of the federalism issues in the Windsor 
case, see Ilya Somin, “The DOMA Decision and Federalism,” volokh Conspiracy, 26 
June 2013, http://volokh.com/2013/06/26/the-doma-decision-and-federalism/.
 139 Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2693.
 140 Ibid.
 141 Ibid.
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federal courts invalidated laws banning same-sex marriage, with only 
one appellate court reaching the opposite result.142
In June 2015, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 in Obergefell v. Snyder that 
state laws banning same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.143 The majority relied on a combination of the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the amendment to reach this decision, 
although its rationale did not clearly endorse any of the specific theo-
ries commonly advanced by advocates of same-sex marriage and relied 
on by lower court decisions that reached the same result as Obergefell.144
As in Windsor, the majority consisted of the four most liberal jus-
tices and Justice Anthony Kennedy, while the four most conservative 
justices dissented. The Court’s ruling is highly controversial. It was 
met with bitter dissents by the four justices in the minority, and angry 
denunciations by social conservatives outside the judiciary. Some who 
supported the decision – myself included – would have preferred that 
the Court rely on a different and clearer rationale for it.145
For present purposes, the key point is that Obergefell represents a 
decision where the Court resolved an important issue in a way that 
 142 See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 459 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 776 F.3d 648 (7th 
Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.Supp. 
2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); Bishop v. United States, 962 F.Supp.2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014); 
Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp.2d 456 (E.D. va. 2014); McGee v. Cole, 2014 WL 321122 
(S.D. W.va. Jan. 29, 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 2014 WL556729 (W.D. Ky. 12 Feb. 2014); 
De Leon v. Perry, 2014 WL 715741 (W.D. Tex. 26 Feb. 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, 2014 WL 
1100794 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho, 13 May 
2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014 WL 2054264 (D. Ore. 19 May 2014); Griego v. Oliver, 316 
P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013). The one major exception was DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
395 (6th Cir. 2014), which was eventually overruled by the Supreme Court.
 143 135 S.Ct. 2071 (2015).
 144 These include claims that these laws fail even minimal “rational basis” review, 
claims that they engage in unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender, the argument that they violate a “fundamental” right 
to marry under the Due Process Clause, and others. For a summary of these 
arguments, see Ilya Somin, “Implications of Alternative Rationales for Striking 
Down Laws banning Same-Sex Marriage,” volokh Conspiracy blog, Washington 
Post, 27 February 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/02/27/implications-of-alternative-rationales-for-striking-
down-laws-banning-same-sex-marriage/.
 145 See Ilya Somin, “A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage – but based on Dubious 
Reasoning,” volokh Conspiracy blog, Washington Post, 26 June 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-great-decision-
on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning/.
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went against the preferences of many state governments. While pub-
lic opinion was rapidly moving in favour of same-sex marriage in the 
years before Obergefell,146 it is likely that some conservative states would 
have continued to ban it for a considerable length of time, if not for the 
Supreme Court’s intervention.
Over the last sixty years, the Supreme Court has gradually adopted 
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates” all or most 
of the U.S. bill of Rights against state governments through the Due 
Process Clause.147 After the Court’s 2010 decision incorporating the 
Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms,”148 only the Third 
Amendment right not to have troops quartered in private homes, the 
Fifth Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury in criminal 
cases, and the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in civil 
cases remain unincorporated.
The cumulative impact of these incorporation decisions has been 
extremely broad, forcing states to adhere to unitary national standards 
in a wide range of areas. The incorporation of the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause has resulted in stringent limits on censorship of 
most types of speech,149 including tight restrictions on state regulation 
of pornography and obscenity.150 Application of the First Amendment’s 
ban on the establishment of religion has led to strict limits on the ability 
of government to endorse religions, require prayer in public schools,151 
and display religious symbols on public property.152 These decisions 
 146 According to surveys conducted by Gallup, public support for same-sex marriage  
rose from 37 per cent in 2005 to a record 60 per cent in May 2015, just before 
Obergefell. Justin McCarthy, “Record-high 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex 
Marriage,” Gallup.com, 19 May 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/183272/
record-high-americans-support-sex-marriage.aspx.
 147 The prevailing legal standard is that these rights will be incorporated if they are 
considered “fundamental” and “deeply rooted in American history and tradition.” 
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). For arguments that incorporation 
is consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (New haven, CT: yale University Press, 1998); 
and Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Bill of Rights (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986).
 148 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010).
 149 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which established the highly restrictive 
modern standard for speech restrictions.
 150 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
 151 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
 152 E.g., Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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remain profoundly controversial, especially in socially conservative 
areas of the country where local public opinion prefers greater inte-
gration of religion into public education and civic life. Since education 
policy in the United States has historically been controlled largely by 
local governments, there is sometimes considerable resentment over 
federal court intervention in this field.
Incorporation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise of Religion 
clause has prevented states from targeting unpopular religious minori-
ties.153 The incorporation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and 
unusual punishment” has resulted in numerous court decisions regu-
lating the treatment of prisoners,154 and several decisions restricting the 
application of the death penalty.155
One of the most extensive effects of incorporation has been in the 
field of criminal procedure, where the incorporation of rights such as 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and to a jury trial,156 the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
including the “exclusionary rule” requiring exclusion of illegally seized 
evidence from trials,157 and the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-
incrimination have led to a profound transformation in state criminal 
procedure, as well as in police and court practices. This is so large a 
topic that covering it would require an article of its own.158 but it is 
worth noting that the famous Miranda warning familiar to television 
and movie audiences around the world is a requirement imposed on 
states by a 1966 Supreme Court decision.159 because of its widespread 
 153 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), an 
important Supreme Court decision protecting practitioners of vodun, popularly 
known as “voodoo” from laws banning their animal sacrifices.
 154 See Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: 
How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons (New york: Oxford University Press, 1998).
 155 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (banning imposition of the death 
penalty for rape); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning the death penalty 
for the mentally ill); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (forbidding imposition of 
the death penalty on minors).
 156 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
 157 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
 158 For a helpful overview, see yale Kamisar, “The Warren Court and Criminal Justice,” 
in The Warren Court: A Retrospective, ed. bernard Schwartz, 116–58 (New york: 
Oxford University Press, 1996). For an interesting evaluation of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this field, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal 
Procedure (New haven, CT: yale University Press, 1997).
 159 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and highly visible effects, this form of judicial intervention against the 
states has probably had a greater impact on popular consciousness than 
almost any other. The trend towards incorporation of these provisions 
was motivated partly by a sense that it was required by the text and his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also partly by a desire to curb 
the abusive treatment of African-American and other minority defend-
ants by state and local authorities, particularly in the South.160
The end of economic “substantive due process” after the demise of 
Lochner emphatically did not put an end to the use of the Due Process 
Clause to protect other, “non-economic” rights. The scope of such judi-
cially enforced rights has expanded over the last fifty years. In addi-
tion to the incorporation of most of the bill of Rights, “substantive due 
process” has also been used to protect a wide range of “unenumerated” 
rights that are not specifically listed in the Constitution.
The most controversial of the new Due Process Clause rights pro-
tected by the Court in this way are those considered to be part of the 
right to “privacy.” The Court first addressed privacy explicitly in a 1965 
decision that struck down the only remaining state law banning pos-
session of contraceptives even by married people.161 From this modest 
beginning, the right to privacy expanded to cover other issues,162 most 
notably in Roe v. Wade (1973),163 the Supreme Court’s controversial deci-
sion establishing a right to abortion. Even forty years later, Roe remains 
a focus of bitter political conflict, especially in conservative states that 
would like to establish significantly tighter restrictions on abortion 
than allowed by the Court’s jurisprudence.
During the 1960s and 1970s, judicial protection of rights against 
state governments was seen as a largely liberal cause. Conservatives 
 160 On this aspect of the incorporation of protections for criminal defendants, see, e.g., 
Lucas Powe Jr, The Warren Court and American Politics (Cambridge, MA: harvard 
University Press, 2000), chaps 15–16; and William Stuntz, The Collapse of the American 
Criminal Justice System (Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 2011), chaps 7–8.
 161 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
 162 For a detailed and generally sympathetic overview of the Court’s decisions in this 
area, see David Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of 
Roe v. Wade (New york: Macmillan, 1998). The Court modified Roe significantly, but 
reaffirmed its central premises in Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). In a very recent decision, the Court took a strong line against state 
regulations that restrict abortion in the name of health and safety regulation. See 
Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt, 2016 WL 3461560 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 27 June 2016).
 163 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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routinely denounced the Court for its “activism.” As the Court’s com-
position became more conservative over the last thirty years, however, 
conservatives and libertarians have sought to use judicial review to 
protect rights they value. The Court’s recent incorporation of the Sec-
ond Amendment right to keep and bear arms is the culmination of a 
long-standing effort by advocates of gun rights.
Conservative opponents of preferences for racial minorities have 
persuaded the Court to rule that its earlier precedents banning racial 
discrimination by state governments also require “strict scrutiny” of 
preferences intended to benefit historically disadvantaged minori-
ties.164 Conservatives and libertarians have also sought – with mixed 
success – to persuade the courts to provide stronger protection for 
property rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which 
requires that private property be “taken” only for a “public use” and 
with “just compensation.”165
Judicial review has also had a substantial effect on state political 
processes. The Court’s 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment as requiring states to have election districts of 
equal population size for their state legislatures, ending the widespread 
practice of giving “extra” representation to rural districts and others.166 
A 1995 decision invalidated state laws limiting the number of terms to 
which members of Congress can be elected.167
 164 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 88 U.S. 469 (1989), the case that first applied 
strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs. The court recently reiterated the view 
that judicial scrutiny of state affirmative action programs must be rigorous and 
non-deferential in Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013), in the process 
modifying an earlier 2003 ruling that had given greater deference to state officials 
seeking to use affirmative action to promote “diversity” in higher education. For 
the earlier decision, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
 165 For an overview, see Ilya Somin, “Taking Property Rights Seriously? The Supreme 
Court and the ‘Poor Relation’ of Constitutional Law,” George Mason Law & 
Economics Research Paper no. 08-53 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1247854. For an analysis of the most famous and controversial 
decision arising from these efforts, see Ilya Somin, The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City 
New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015).
 166 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
 167 US Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Unlike Reynolds, this ruling 
invalidated a state election law because the majority concluded that it violated the 
Constitution’s implicit requirement that states cannot limit the range of people 
eligible to run for federal offices, rather than because it violated individual rights.
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Some of the Court’s decisions enforcing individual constitutional 
rights restrict the federal government as well as states, and a few have 
invalidated significant federal laws.168 but historically the federal courts 
have invalidated many fewer federal laws than state laws. And even 
when they strike down federal laws, the result does not necessarily pro-
mote state autonomy, because the relevant legal norm is still defined 
and enforced by a federal institution.
In sum, the Court has a long history of enforcing a wide range of con-
straints on state governments, a trend that shows little sign of abating. 
The net effect of this tendency is to substantially restrict the power of 
state and local governments. In that sense, it tends to promote political 
centralization at the expense of regional autonomy.
Nonetheless, judicial protection of individual rights against state 
governments does promote decentralization in another important 
sense; it devolves more decision-making power to individual citizens 
and private organizations, which often means an even greater extent 
of decentralization than would regulation by state and local govern-
ments.169 If, for example, federal courts prevent state governments from 
censoring speech, regulating religion, restricting marriage rights, or 
overriding private property rights, power over these aspects of society 
is transferred to a lower, more decentralized level than the state govern-
ment or even a local one. As a result, individual citizens are now more 
free to speak as they wish, use their property as they see fit, or marry 
the partner of their choice.
IV. Why Judicial Review Promotes Unitarism More Than Federalism
Although judicial review has limited both federal and state power at 
different times, it has constrained the states far more. Especially since 
the late 1930s, federal courts have imposed only modest constraints on 
the federal government, even as they enforce far greater restrictions on 
 168 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (ruling that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s restrictions on racial discrimination apply to the federal government); 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010) (striking down a 
significant federal campaign finance law as violating the First Amendment).
 169 On devolution to individual choice as the ultimate form of decentralization, see Ilya 
Somin, “Foot voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom,” in Nomos LV: Federalism 
and Subsidiarity, ed. James Fleming and Jacob S. Levy, 83–122 (New york: New york 
University Press, 2014).
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state government autonomy. Today, the courts enforce an extraordinar-
ily wide range of rights against state governments, most of them tend-
ing to force the states to adhere to relatively uniform, federally imposed 
standards.
This pattern is not accidental. Judicial action against federal laws is 
hampered by several structural constraints. Most importantly, federal 
judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, 
limiting the extent to which there is likely to be a Supreme Court major-
ity that diverges greatly from the preferences of the federal govern-
ment’s political branches. When the Court substantially deviates from 
the latter’s views, it is often brought into line by new judicial appoint-
ments. historically, presidents have usually sought to appoint judges 
supportive of their party’s agenda, which often coincides with that of 
majority public opinion.
Even when justices wish to restrict federal power, they are careful not 
to offend majority public opinion and the national political branches 
too much, because they depend on the latter to enforce their decisions. 
Congress also has the power to limit the courts’ appellate jurisdiction, 
increase (but not decrease) judicial pay, and create new judicial posi-
tions to be filled by appointees potentially more amenable to the wishes 
of the dominant political coalition in the federal government.
Flouting national public opinion can create a damaging political back-
lash that leads to the Court’s defeat.170 In the most dramatic such case, 
the Court’s efforts to protect slavery in Dred Scott backfired so com-
pletely that it helped bring on the early abolition of the institution Chief 
Justice Taney hoped to defend. While both state and federal officials usu-
ally comply with judicial rulings, and the institution of judicial review 
enjoys broad public support,171 the justices know that both compliance 
and support could erode if they make too many unpopular decisions.
 170 For the argument that the courts have been increasingly attentive to majority 
opinion over time, see barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion 
Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (New 
york: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009).
 171 The Supreme Court typically enjoys much higher public approval ratings than the 
other branches of government. Even when public approval of the Court was unusually 
low in early 2013, 52 per cent of Americans still approved of its performance, compared 
to only 31 per cent who disapproved. See Pew Research Foundation, “Supreme Court’s 
Favorable Rating Still at historic Low,” 25 March 2013, http://www.people-press.
org/2013/03/25/supreme-courts-favorable-rating-still-at-historic-low/. Since 1985, 
the Court’s approval rating has usually ranged from 60 to 75 per cent. Ibid.
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In some federal systems, efforts to limit federal power are buttressed 
by the reality that subnational governments are bulwarks for national 
ethnic minorities that are majorities within a particular region.172 In the 
United States, however, the most important national minorities are also 
minorities within the states. As a result, minority groups usually do 
not view state governments as their protectors, and – at least for a long 
time – American federalism was tainted by its association with racial 
discrimination against African-Americans.173
Even state governments often have an interest in promoting expanded 
federal power, because they want more federal subsidies and often also 
support federal laws that limit economic competition between state 
governments.174 NFIB v. Sebelius was thus an unusual case because 
twenty-eight state governments had filed lawsuits against a major new 
federal program.175
Courts face much weaker constraints when they strike down state 
legislation, especially state laws that are disapproved of by national 
political majorities. In such situations, dissenting states can do little to 
retaliate against the judges. The federal government and sympathetic 
state governments elsewhere in the country may even support such 
judicial intervention.
This is not to suggest that the courts can never impose significant 
limits on federal power. The Supreme Court often enforced such lim-
its during the country’s first 150 years. Also, judicial enforcement of 
limits on federal power has experienced a modest revival over the last 
twenty-five years. In both instances, however, judicial intervention was 
effective in part because external political forces backed it.
The fact that federal judges serve until they die, resign, or (in rare 
cases) are impeached and removed from office also creates opportu-
nities for the judiciary to check the other branches of government. In 
 172 See works cited in note 4.
 173 This may be changing in recent years, as minority groups have gained greater power 
in state and local governments and in some cases have achieved greater influence 
over them than over the federal government. For an argument along these lines, see 
heather K. Gerken, “A New Progressive Federalism,” Democracy 24 (Spring 2012), 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/.
 174 John McGinnis and Ilya Somin, “Federalism v. States’ Rights: The Case for Judicial 
Review in a Federal System,” Northwestern University Law Review 99 (2004): 89–130.
 175 In addition to the twenty-six states involved in the case that reached the Supreme 
Court, two other states, virginia and Oklahoma, filed separate lawsuits challenging 
the law.
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some cases, the incumbent justices were appointed by previous presi-
dents whose ideological orientation may be very different from that of 
their newer colleagues. Democrats Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s and 
barack Obama since 2009 both had to cope with ideologically inimi-
cal justices appointed by their predecessors. Republican presidents 
sometimes face similar problems, as did Richard Nixon, for example. 
Judicial autonomy is also reinforced by widespread political ignorance, 
which ensures that most voters are often unaware of all but the most 
controversial Supreme Court decisions.176 This sometimes enables the 
courts to strike down even relatively popular laws without suffering a 
major political backlash.
V. Conclusion
Overall, American judicial review has done far more to promote cen-
tralization than to limit the power of the federal government. This pat-
tern is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. however, the extent 
to which the courts are willing and able to limit federal power has var-
ied widely over the course of American history.
Currently, there is sharp conflict between those who want much 
more aggressive judicial enforcement of limits on federal power and 
those who believe that this type of judicial review should be cut back 
or even abolished. The deep disagreement over NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) 
and Shelby County v. Holder (2013) reflects this division. It is not clear 
which side will ultimately prevail. Perhaps neither will for a long time 
to come.
In recent decades, the debate over federalism and judicial review has 
become connected to debates over interpretive methodology. Many 
conservative jurists, such as the late Justice Antonin Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas, argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in accord-
ance with its original meaning, which they argue justifies stronger judi-
cial enforcement of limits on federal power.177 Liberals such as Justice 
Stephen breyer tend to support “living Constitution” theories of inter-
pretation that justify reinterpreting the text in light of contemporary 
 176 See Ilya Somin, “Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New 
Perspective on the ‘Central Obsession’ of Constitutional Theory,” Iowa Law Review 
90 (2004): 1287–371.
 177 See, e.g., Thomas’s concurring opinions in Lopez and Morrison and the joint 
dissenting opinion authored by four conservative justices in NFIB v. Sebelius.
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needs, which they contend require broad federal power.178 The overlap 
between conflicts over federalism and debates over interpretive meth-
odology makes consensus in this field even more difficult to achieve.179
Some conservatives still criticize the federal courts for what they 
regard as excessive limits on state-government powers in the name of 
enforcing individual rights. At the same time, many liberals and liber-
tarians argue that the courts should enforce a broader menu of indi-
vidual rights against the states. While federal judicial enforcement of 
individual rights against state governments is often associated with 
political liberals, in recent decades conservatives also have advocated 
increased judicial intervention to protect some rights, particularly prop-
erty rights and the rights of gun owners. It seems unlikely that we will 
see a major rollback of the use of judicial review to protect individual 
rights against state governments. but it is difficult to say how many 
additional constraints courts will impose on the states in the future.
In contrast to widespread criticism of the federal courts’ role in interpret-
ing the Constitution, there have been few serious recent efforts to restruc-
ture the federal system by constitutional amendment. Some scholars have 
argued for significantly restructuring the Constitution in various ways.180 
but such ideas have gained little political traction. In 1995, Congress came 
close to passing an amendment requiring the federal government to bal-
ance its budget. but it is doubtful that it would have been ratified by the 
necessary three-quarters of the states, even if it had passed Congress. vari-
ous other federalism-related amendment proposals have had even less 
success. The extraordinary difficulty of amending the Constitution has 
probably reduced the attractiveness of this strategy for change.
The federal courts play a complex dual role in the federal system, pro-
tecting the states in some ways while restricting their power in others. 
Federal judges are always likely to impose substantial constraints on 
state governments, especially when their policies diverge greatly from 
the views of national political majorities. In the right circumstances, how-
ever, the courts can also impose meaningful restraints on Washington.
 178 See Stephen breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (New 
york: Knopf, 2005); Stephen breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 
(New york: vintage, 2011), chap. 10.
 179 Recently, some liberal constitutional law scholars have embraced originalism and 
argued that it justifies an expansive interpretation of federal power. See, e.g., Jack 
balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 2011).
 180 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).
15  Comparative Observations and 
Conclusions
nicholas aroney and john kincaid
In one of several essays published in the New York Journal in 1787 and 
1788, Anti-Federalist1 author “brutus”2 predicted that the Supreme 
Court of the United States would “lean strongly in favour of the general 
government.” he emphasized two reasons. First, the provisions of the 
U.S. Constitution are expressed in “general and indefinite terms” that 
invite a nationalist interpretation. Second, members of the Court would 
be motivated to “extend their power and increase their rights” both 
directly by expanding their own jurisdiction and indirectly by allowing 
the general government to enlarge its authority.3 In response, Alexander 
hamilton famously proclaimed that the judiciary “will always be the 
least dangerous” branch of the federal government.4
Later, brutus expressed concern that the Court, as an “independent 
authority,” would be “exalted above all other power in the govern-
ment.”5 Extremely sceptical about the neutral role of this high court in 
the world’s first modern federation, he observed, “had the construc-
tion of the constitution been left with the legislature, they would have 
 1 Anti-Federalists opposed the proposed U.S. Constitution in 1787–8. The name 
“Anti-Federalist” was a term of opprobrium fastened on them by supporters of the 
proposed constitution who seized the rhetorical high ground by calling themselves 
“Federalists.”
 2 brutus was probably Robert yates, a New york judge, delegate to the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention, and friend of New york’s Anti-Federalist governor, George Clinton.
 3 brutus XI (31 January 1788) in herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 2:420–1.
 4 Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press,  
1961), 522.
 5 brutus Xv (20 March 1788), in The Complete Anti-Federalist, 437.
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explained it at their peril; if they exceed their powers, or sought to find, 
in the spirit of the constitution, more than was expressed in the letter, 
the people from whom they derived their power could remove them, 
and do themselves right.” but when the ultimate power is “lodged in 
the hands of men independent of the people … no way is left to control 
them but with a high hand and an outstretched arm.”6
Was brutus prophetic? Do high courts in federal countries generally 
interpret their constitutions so as to “extend the powers of the general 
government”? Are they federalists or unitarists? The evidence pre-
sented in this volume is mixed, though leaning in brutus’s direction.
I. General Findings
1. Centralizing and Decentralizing Trends
In some countries, the federation courts have contributed to a gradual 
centralization of power. Ilya Somin concludes in this volume, for exam-
ple, that while the U.S. Supreme Court has promoted both centralization 
and state autonomy at different times, on balance it has strengthened 
the power of the federal government, including the power of the fed-
eral courts, at the expense of the states’ powers – a pattern unlikely to 
change in the foreseeable future. Nicholas Aroney likewise argues that, 
despite occasional variations, a centralizing pattern has been evident 
in Australia for almost a century. These findings confirm Daniel J. Elazar’s 
observation that the U.S. Supreme Court and the Australian high Court 
stand out as centralizers among the courts of federal countries.7
Some other federal countries suggest a similar story, especially where 
the constitution, although federal in form, is relatively centralist in 
substance. Rotimi Suberu concludes in this volume that the Nigerian 
Supreme Court, while playing a role in moderating Nigeria’s “overly 
centralized federal system” and helping to arbitrate conflicts, has had 
only limited impact on the federal system, which remains “constitu-
tionally skewed, politically corrupt, ethnically contentious, and, there-
fore, chronically fragile.” Rodrigues, Lorencini, and Zimmermann note, 
“brazilian federalism has always been highly centralized,” and “the 
 6 Ibid., 442.
 7 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 
214–26. See also John Kincaid, “From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509 (1990): 139–52.
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contemporary judiciary has largely maintained this centralization.”8 
Although Canada is usually seen as having been transformed from a 
centralized federal system into a much more decentralized one,9 Eugénie 
brouillet points to recent shifts towards more unitarist jurisprudence by 
Canada’s Supreme Court.10 Elisenda Casanas Adam describes Spain’s 
Constitutional Court as having been, until recently, “fairly balanced” 
between expansive interpretations of the central state’s competences, 
and rulings defending powers of the autonomous communities. More 
lately, the Court has become a “polarizing centralist.”
Whether centralization is a general or necessary tendency may cer-
tainly be questioned, however, if the conclusions of the other contrib-
utors to this volume are taken into account. Arthur benz depicts the 
German Constitutional Court’s “balanced” approach as a clear excep-
tion to any general inclination of federal courts to foster centralization. 
A similar role of securing an “equilibrium” between the orders of gov-
ernment and protecting constituent-government powers is ascribed to 
belgium’s Supreme Court by Patrick Peeters and Jens Mosselmans. José 
Caballero Juárez concludes that Mexico’s Supreme Court has played a 
varied role, on one hand interpreting the Constitution in ways that pro-
vide state and local authorities with new opportunities to exercise their 
powers, while, on the other hand, standing at the apex of an integrated 
judicial system that prevents state courts from establishing themselves 
as sources of legal norms having authority within their states.
Complex pictures are presented for other countries. Nico Steytler 
points out that while South Africa’s constitutional court has tended to 
support the constitutional rights of local government, it has not given 
full effect to the corresponding rights of provincial governments under 
the national Constitution, resulting in “hourglass” federalism in which 
the provinces are squeezed by both a dominant national government 
 8 See, similarly, Jacob Dolinger and Luís Roberto barroso, “Federalism and Legal 
Unification in brazil,” in Federalism and Legal Unification: A Comparative Empirical 
Investigation of Twenty Systems, ed. Daniel halberstam and Mathias Reimann, 153–67 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).
 9 See Alan Cairns, “The Judicial Committee and Its Critics,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 4 (1971): 301–45; Peter W. hogg, “Is the Supreme Court of Canada 
biased in Constitutional Cases?,” Canadian Bar Review 57 (1979): 721–39; Katherine E. 
Swinton, “Federalism under Fire: The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada,” Law 
and Contemporary Problems 55 (1992): 121–45.
 10 See also Emmanuelle Richez, “Losing Relevance: Quebec and the Constitutional 
Politics of Language,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 52, no. 1 (2014): 191–233.
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“above” and powerful local and metropolitan governments “below.” 
Manish Tewari and Rekha Saxena note that while India’s Supreme 
Court was apparently unitarist for much of its history, the Court has 
shown signs of a somewhat more federalist orientation since the early 
1990s, albeit against the weight of a Constitution that is mostly centralist 
in design and purpose.
India and South Africa also highlight a relatively new development 
in which local governments have been constitutionally recognized as 
the third order of government, as is true in brazil, Mexico, and Nige-
ria.11 Some other constitutions, such as those of Germany, Spain, and 
Switzerland, contain provisions guaranteeing local self-government. 
Aside from the “hourglass” outcome in South Africa, the constitutional 
recognition of local government has not yet had significant impacts on 
the federalist or unitarist leanings of high courts.
Andreas Lienhard and his colleagues recognize that Switzerland is a 
distinct case, especially because the federal Supreme Court does not exer-
cise judicial review over federal legislation. Nonetheless, they point to 
its tendency to avoid finding cantonal legislation unconstitutional wher-
ever possible. The general effect of the Court’s judgments has been to 
strike a “balance” between centralization and decentralization. Another 
exceptional case is Ethiopia, where, according to Gedion hessebon and 
Abduletif Idris, there is very little federalism-related case law, principally 
because the Constitution prevents the courts from playing such a role. 
They conclude that neither the federal nor the state judiciaries have had 
any significant role in shaping the development of the federal system 
because the house of Federation is charged with deciding constitutional 
disputes between the central government and the states.
Although the variations noted above inhibit easy generalization, the 
predominant leaning of nine of the eleven high courts that exercise judi-
cial review over federation law has been unitarist. Five of these courts – 
Australia, brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and the United States – have a marked 
unitarist orientation. Mixed cases are Canada, where the court was gen-
erally province-friendly but recently took a more centralist tack; India, 
where the court long had a centralist orientation but issued more decen-
tralist rulings after 1989; South Africa, where the constitutional court has 
been centralist with respect to the provinces but somewhat decentralist 
with respect to local governments; and Spain, where the court has often 
 11 Nico Steytler, ed., Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
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balanced the powers of the centre and the autonomous communities 
but issued a notably centralist ruling in 2010 on Catalonia’s statute of 
autonomy. The basque Country, moreover, boycotted the court for many 
years. The only high courts described as being consistently balanced 
between unitarism and federalism are those of belgium and Germany. 
Strikingly, no contributor to this volume describes his or her federation’s 
high court as leaning regularly in a federalist direction or as favouring 
decentralization, although belgium’s court is a candidate for this cat-
egory. On balance, brutus was perhaps more prescient than hamilton 
about the long-term impacts of high courts on federal systems.
To the extent that any of these courts are politically independent, 
they have some choice as to whether to lean in a federalist or unitarist 
direction, but such choices are constrained by often powerful constitu-
tional, institutional, and political forces that impel them to list in one 
or another direction. Independent courts are not insulated from politi-
cal processes, and they are obliged to interpret a constitution that is 
more or less federalist in substance. Similarly, these same forces play an 
important role in whether a federation’s high court performs a major, 
minor, or no role in shaping a federal system’s arrangements.
2. Importance of Internal and External Vantage Points
These findings might seem to be at odds with the decentralization indi-
ces presented in table 3 in the Introduction. Despite the centralist orien-
tations of the high courts of brazil, Canada, and the United States, these 
federations are among the top thirteen most decentralized countries 
globally, according to the World bank’s indices. The high courts of Aus-
tralia and the United States have long been seen by many observers as 
being among the most centralizing of federal high courts, but Australia 
is the fifty-fifth most decentralized country, while the United States is 
the ninth most decentralized. Furthermore, no European country has 
apparently become more centralized since 1980; devolution has been 
more common.12 Indeed, about 95 per cent of democracies worldwide 
now have some type of elected subnational government.13
 12 Gary Marks and Liesbet hooghe, “Contrasting visions of Multi-level Governance,” 
in Multi-level Governance, ed. Ian bache and Matthew Flinders, 15–30 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004).
 13 World bank, World Development Report 1999/2000 (New york: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 107.
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There is, we believe, no contradiction. The decentralization indices, 
while rough, provide a useful two-dimensional benchmark for under-
standing the impacts of the courts examined in this volume, namely, 
(1) centralization or decentralization trends relative to each federation’s 
past, and (2) centralization and decentralization trends relative to other 
countries. For example, while the U.S. federal government is vastly 
more powerful relative to the states than it was in the past, in part 
because the U.S. Supreme Court has been significantly centralist since 
1937, this centralization has occurred in a system that was substantially 
non-centralized at its founding, and it remains, relative to most coun-
tries, comparatively non-centralized today. The enumeration of lim-
ited powers in the federal Constitution, the Anti-Federalist tradition of 
opposition to centralization, and the dualistic character of U.S. federal-
ism with non-delegated powers reserved to the states or the people, 
as well as other factors, allow the states to continue being significant 
polities. Compared to other countries, moreover, they are huge polities. 
The GDP of the United States is of course comparatively gargantuan, 
but just as remarkable is the fact that, in 2014, the GDP of California 
equalled that of brazil; Texas equalled Canada; New york, Spain; Ohio, 
Nigeria; Maryland, South Africa; and Pennsylvania, Switzerland.14 The 
U.S. states, while individually small compared to the United States, do 
not suffer from puny governance capacities.
The centralizing leanings of recent Canadian Supreme Court rulings 
likewise occur within a system that was and remains comparatively 
non-centralized in practice. What is surprising about the World bank 
indices is that many observers have long regarded Canada as more 
decentralized than the United States.15 Likewise, the World bank’s 
index ranks brazil as more decentralized than thought by most scholars, 
while Australia’s fifty-fifth-place ranking more closely matches scholars’ 
qualitative rankings.
Devolution trends evident in Europe since 1980 help to explain the 
findings that all three European constitutional courts examined in this 
 14 Steven Perlberg, “This brilliant Map Renames Each US State with a Country 
Generating the Same GDP,” business Insider, 12 February 2014, http://www.
businessinsider.com/countries-vs-us-states-gdp-map-2014-2.
 15 E.g., Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed. (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 177; and Thomas O. hueglin and Alan 
Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2015), 22 and 110.
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volume – belgium, Germany, and Spain – have been comparatively bal-
anced between unitarism and federalism, although recently the belgian 
court has moved in a more decentralist direction while the Spanish 
court has put some brakes on devolution.
how one assesses the federalist or unitarist impacts of a federation’s 
high court depends partly, therefore, on where one stands. Inside a 
federation, the high court can appear to have had substantial unita-
rist impacts; from a comparative perspective, the high court’s unitarist 
impacts can appear less substantial.
3. Relevance of Exceptional Cases Having No Judicial Umpire
It is also important to consider the significance of two federations that 
have no high court authorized to invalidate federation laws. These 
federations, Switzerland and Ethiopia, challenge notions of judicial 
supremacy and offer important lessons. First, a federation can endure 
and function democratically without such a court. Whether this requires 
special circumstances is uncertain. Swiss federalism in its various incar-
nations is more than seven hundred years old. The customary and 
traditional modes of mutual accommodation built up over centuries 
likely obviated the need to institute a U.S.-style supreme court in 1848. 
The United States had no such history in the 1780s, nor did any other 
federation examined in this book. The litmus test of this proposition 
is whether Ethiopia can endure as a federation and become demo-
cratic without a high court empowered to engage in constitutional 
review, challenge a monopolistic party system, and ensure more rights 
 protections.
Second, these cases partly reflect the kind of view held by American 
Anti-Federalists like brutus, namely, that a federation’s high court is 
inevitably a creature of the federation government. It is not a true third 
party neutrally umpiring disputes between the federation and its con-
stituent polities. The Swiss, therefore, leave this power in the hands of 
the sovereign people construed as both a single national people and as 
multiple peoples. A constitutional amendment requires a double major-
ity of the people of the country and of the peoples of a majority of the 
cantons. Whether this approach requires special circumstances also is 
uncertain. Switzerland is a small country with a population equal to 
that of New york City. Ethiopia’s house of Federation is a variation on 
the Anti-Federalist view because it consists of representatives chosen 
through the constituent state councils, and each nation, nationality, and 
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people is guaranteed at least one representative, with another repre-
sentative provided for each additional one million population of each 
nation and nationality. The paucity of cases in Ethiopia prohibits any 
firm conclusion, but given the dominance of a single party coalition 
nationwide, one suspects that the house of Federation is a creature of 
the party controlling the federation government. by contrast, belgium’s 
constitutional court may be the only example in this volume of a court 
being almost a creature of the constituent polities.
Third, the Ethiopian and Swiss exceptions acknowledge that inter-
preting a constitution and umpiring relations between a federation 
government and its constituent polities are ultimately political acts that 
significantly affect the balance of power and, thereby, the well-being 
of different citizens and communities. Establishment of an independ-
ent constitutional or supreme court creates an appearance of legalistic 
non- political decision-making, the symbolism of which may be impor-
tant for the life of a federation, but it does not alter the fact that such 
a court is a political actor and, moreover, an actor usually independent 
of the people and their elected representatives. This undemocratic and 
counter- majoritarian character of high courts sometimes elicits attacks on 
the legitimacy of their exercise of judicial review.16 Some critics suggest 
that the political process, not the courts, should determine the balance 
of power between the federation and its constituent polities.17 Although 
these debates are not the focus of this volume, the analyses of judicial 
behaviour undertaken in this the book are very relevant to such questions.
4. Relevance of the Constituent Power
A fundamental question faced by courts in federal countries concerns 
the conception of the political community underlying the federal polity. 
Is it conceived ultimately in singular unitary terms or plural federal 
terms? This question can be interrogated from social, political, and 
legal perspectives.
 16 E.g., Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,” Yale Law 
Journal 115, no. 6 (April 2006): 1346–1406; and Alexander M. bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch, 2nd ed. (New haven, CT: yale University Press, 1986).
 17 E.g., Jesse h. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional 
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), but see Nicholas Aroney, “Reasonable Disagreement, Democracy and the Judicial 
Safeguards of Federalism,” University of Queensland Law Journal 27, no. 1 (2008): 137–43.
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Most federal constitutions refer to the constitutive authority by which 
the federation was legally constituted. Some, for example, appeal to 
“the people”; others appeal to “the states”; and yet others to some com-
bination of “the people” and “the states.” Many textual features and 
structural relationships established by federal constitutions are shaped 
by conceptions of the constitutive authority (le pouvoir constituant) upon 
which they are based, and much judicial reasoning and interpretation 
of such constitutions proceeds, explicitly or implicitly, on a certain view 
of the location and nature of that constitutive authority. The conception 
of constitutive authority presupposed by a court may or may not be 
altogether consistent with what the constitution declares that author-
ity to be, but either way, the underlying conception influences the way 
in which the court interprets the constitution. As such, ideas about the 
underlying constitutive demos or demoi can be a focus point for both 
the social and political context in which the federation operates and the 
constitutional rules and principles applied by the courts.
Determining whether a federal constitution’s foundations are federal-
ist or unitarist in this sense is important but complex. Not only are there 
no ideal types, but the relevant data and ways of analysing the question 
are diverse. Many federal constitutions expressly attribute originating or 
ultimate sovereignty to the “people,” the “nation” or the “state” in the 
singular (e.g., belgium, brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, and Spain); some, 
however, attribute it to a plurality of “peoples,” “nations,” and “states” 
(e.g., Ethiopia); others use more ambiguous formulas, such as where the 
singular “people” is used together with a reference to a plurality of con-
stituent polities (e.g., Australia, Germany, Switzerland, and the United 
States). These statements as to originating or ultimate sovereignty may 
or may not be entirely consistent with a federation’s actual historical ori-
gin. Despite the reference to “the people” in Australia, Germany, and 
the United States, for example, all three constitutions were ratified or 
approved by all of the constituent polities as expressed by their respec-
tive parliaments, special conventions, or popular referendums.
In such federations, the underlying juridical question concerns 
the location or identity of the “constituent power.” how-
ever, identifying this power, because it has to do with what hans 
Kelsen called the Grundnorm18 or what h.L.A. hart called the “rule of 
 18 hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: harvard University 
Press, 1949).
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recognition,”19 is a matter not only of law but also of normative presup-
positions and political effectiveness (Kelsen) or social fact (hart). The 
location and nature of this constituent power can therefore be assessed 
both before and after the federation has come into being. Thus, it can be 
asked: (1) what was the effective legal-political authority by which the 
content of the federal constitution was then determined, and (2) to what 
legal-political authority is its validity now ascribed? Judicial assump-
tions about these matters can shape courts’ approaches to their inter-
pretation of the constitution.
This is especially so when courts face novel questions about the scope 
of federal and state power where the text is silent or ambiguous. The 
Canadian Patriation Reference is an example. The Supreme Court was 
asked whether a Canadian request for british legislation to amend the 
Constitution could be made unilaterally by the federal Parliament or 
whether a “sufficient” degree of agreement from the provinces would 
also be necessary.20 While a majority of the Court held that as a mat-
ter of law the federation could request an act of patriation without ref-
erence to the provinces,21 a differently composed majority held that a 
constitutional convention22 constrained the federation from doing so 
without a sufficiently representative (but not necessarily unanimous) 
degree of provincial consent.23 because the texts of the relevant consti-
tutional instruments do not address this question explicitly, the Court 
reasoned on the basis of a particular theory of the fundamental grounds 
and nature of Canada’s federation.24
Another example is U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, which asked 
whether the people of Arkansas could amend their state constitu-
tion to impose term limits on their representatives in the federal 
 19 h.L.A. hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
chap. 5.
 20 Patriation Reference [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
 21 Ibid., 762–809 (Laskin, C.J., Dickson, beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, and 
Lamer JJ.). This involved a rejection of the “confederal” arguments accepted by the 
minority: ibid., 809–48 (Martland and Ritchie JJ.).
 22 According to Peter W. hogg, conventions “are rules of the constitution that are not 
enforced by the law courts,” but they “regulate the working of the constitution” and 
“prescribe the way in which legal powers shall be exercised.” Constitutional Law of 
Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997), 19. 
 23 Ibid., 874–910 (Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, beetz, Chouinard, and Lamer JJ.).
 24 Similar reasoning occurred in the Quebec Veto Reference [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793; and the 
Quebec Secession Reference [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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Congress.25 The Constitution does not provide explicit guidance on the 
question, so the Supreme Court sought to resolve it by asking whether 
members of Congress are to be conceived as representatives of their 
respective states or of the people of the United States as a whole, and 
whether the Constitution itself derives from the people of the states or 
the people of the nation. Four members of the Court maintained that 
the “ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority” is “the consent 
of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferen-
tiated people of the Nation as a whole” and that it remains within the 
reserved powers of the states to impose term limits on their representa-
tives in the federal Congress.26 however, a majority of the Court consid-
ered that the qualifications laid down in the Constitution are “fixed and 
unalterable,” and that the Constitution gives effect to the principle that 
“sovereignty is vested in the people” and that this confers on the people 
“the right to choose freely their representatives” in the Congress.27 The 
states do retain a significant array of powers under the Constitution, but 
the power to add qualifications is not part of those powers and, even 
if they were, the Constitution removed such powers from the states.28 
According to the majority, this is because the states are not a collection 
of “independent nations bound together only by treaties”; rather, the 
Constitution created a national government that owes its allegiance 
to the people of the nation as a whole.29 As Justice Anthony Kennedy 
put it, “The whole people of the United States asserted their political 
identity and unity of purpose when they created the federal system.”30 
The fact that the Supreme Court split 5–4 in favour of a national-
ist interpretation that struck down congressional term-limits laws in 
twenty-three states shows that this question of the ultimate grounds of 
the Constitution remains alive in the United States.
The jurisprudence of Australia’s high Court offers a third example. 
In its early decisions, it proceeded on the view that the Constitution 
embodied a compact between independent states, interpreting federal 
 25 Cynthia L. Cates, “Splitting the Atom of Sovereignty: Term Limits, Inc.’s Conflicting 
views of Popular Autonomy in a Federal Republic,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
26, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 127–40.
 26 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846–50 (1995).
 27 Ibid., 514 U.S. 779, 791, 794–5 (1995), relying on Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 
(1969).
 28 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801–2, 806 (1995).
 29 Ibid., 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995).
 30 Ibid., 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
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power narrowly and constructing a strong doctrine of intergovernmen-
tal immunities on that basis. however, since its landmark decision in 
1920 in the Engineers Case,31 premised on a view of the Constitution 
as an act of the british Parliament that gave effect to the will of the 
Australian people, it has interpreted federal power very widely and 
limited the intergovernmental immunity doctrine to preserving state 
government “autonomy.”
Even though the latter two cases reflect the way in which the Ameri-
can and Australian courts have, often by close majorities, tended 
towards centralizing interpretations of their respective constitutions, 
these shifts are relative to the constitutive foundations of each sys-
tem. In the aftermath of the Civil War, for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court described the U.S. Constitution as establishing “an indestruct-
ible Union, composed of indestructible States.”32 Not only is the union 
indissoluble, but the states are permanent, constituent members of the 
federation. While much the same could be said of Australia’s states, 
this is not the case in India, where the federal authorities can overrule 
the distribution of powers by a two-thirds resolution of the Council of 
States,33 require state governments to implement federal laws and poli-
cies,34 intervene in the affairs of the states in cases of “emergency,”35 and 
make alterations to the territories of the states and create new states by 
amalgamating or dividing the territories of existing states.36 As India’s 
Supreme Court has observed, “There is no warrant for the assumption 
that the Provinces were sovereign, autonomous units which had parted 
with such power as they considered reasonable or proper for enabling 
the Central Government to function for the common good. The legal 
theory on which the Constitution was based was the withdrawal or 
resumption of all the powers of sovereignty into the people of this 
country and the distribution of these powers … between the Union and 
 31 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd, (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129.
 32 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869).
 33 Indian Constitution, Art. 149; see also Art. 150.
 34 Indian Constitution, Arts. 256, 257.
 35 Indian Constitution, Pt. XvIII.
 36 Indian Constitution, Arts. 3, 4. An amendment to the Constitution in 1955 stipulated 
that such proposals must first be recommended by the president and be referred to 
the legislature of any affected state for the expression of its views, but the power to 
make the change remains vested in the Union Parliament acting by simple majority. 
The States Reorganisation Act 1956, enacted in this way, implemented a far-reaching 
reorganization of the states along linguistic lines.
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the States.”37 The Constituent Assembly that established the Constitu-
tion, purporting to act in the name of the people of India as a whole, 
deliberately constructed a constitution that could be either “unitary” or 
“federal,” as “time and circumstances” required.38
South Africa and Spain are similar to India in this respect. In South 
Africa’s Education Policy Case, for example, the Constitutional Court held 
that the merely derivative status of the provinces means that there can be 
no room in South Africa for a version of the “anti-commandeering” doc-
trine developed in the United States whereby the federal Congress cannot 
require state officials to enact or administer federal law.39 Likewise, in its 
decision on the revised statute of autonomy enacted by Catalonia in 2006, 
Spain’s Constitutional Court deliberately read down those aspects of the 
autonomy statute that appeared to assert a kind of constitutive power 
in the Catalan people, reasoning that sovereignty is vested in the entire 
Spanish people and that the statute of autonomy is strictly subordinate to 
the Constitution as authoritatively interpreted by the central court.40
Each of these cases underscores the importance of attending to (the 
often contested) conceptions of the basic constitutional foundations of 
each country’s federal system. While the jurisprudence of each country 
develops dynamically in response to changes in that country’s social and 
political conditions, conceptions of the federation as being founded on an 
agreement among “sovereign” states or on the consent of the people of 
the “nation” as a whole play an important role in shaping the court’s juris-
prudence. Conceptions of the nature of the political community underly-
ing the federal polity are important in shaping the orientation of the court 
in a relatively federalist or unitarist direction. These conceptions, in turn, 
are influenced by an array of factors identified in the Introduction to this 
volume, and discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter.
II. Possible Explanatory Factors
Ambiguities in constitutional provisions on federalism create oppor-
tunities for courts to intervene and expand their power and to forge 
 37 West Bengal v. India, AIR 1963 SC 1241; 1964 SCR (1) 371, 396.
 38 India, Constituent Assembly Debates (New Delhi, 1951), (13 December 1946; 22 January 
1947), “Objectives Resolutions 1 and 4,” (4 November 1948), “Motion re. Draft 
Constitution.”
 39 See In re: The National Educational Policy Bill, No. 83 of 1995, 1996 (4) bCLR 518 (CC); 
New York v. United States, 505 US 144 (1992).
 40 Constitutional Court Decision 247/2007.
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 jurisprudential approaches to federalism that reflect the court’s concep-
tions of the federation’s foundations, structure, and raison d’être. The 
variety of approaches to federalism displayed by federal high courts is 
cause for much reflection. As Cheryl Saunders argues, federalism is rou-
tinely defined as involving a constitutional distribution of powers; yet, 
in some federations, there has been an inexorable expansion of central 
power to the point that the courts are close to abandoning the task of 
enforcing the distribution of powers.41 however, as noted above, in a few 
countries, the courts appear to have adopted a more balanced approach.
What accounts for this variation? There are a number of possible 
explanations, some interrelated. One general explanation is that a federal 
system, like any system of government, evolves in response to influential 
social and political pressures. It may be that the tendency to centraliza-
tion or non-centralization is determined primarily by the federation’s 
underlying socio-political reality. On this account, a decisive question is 
whether the federation is territorially homogeneous or heterogeneous in 
its ethno-linguistic and religious make-up.42 Alternative explanations are 
more institutional. here, relevant questions concern the way in which 
the constitution distributes and allocates responsibilities, the structural 
relationships between the federation and the constituent polities, and 
the assumptions, methods, and values embedded in the judicial process 
itself.43 Other explanations lie in the organization and operation of politi-
cal parties, which substantially determine the extent of government cen-
tralization or non-centralization in a federation,44 and the influence of 
history on the founding and operation of a federal system.
 41 Cheryl Saunders, “Can Federalism have Jurisprudential Weight?,” in The Federal 
Idea: Essays in Honour of Ronald L. Watts, ed. Thomas J. Courchene, John R. Allan, 
Christian Leuprecht, and Nadia verrelli (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2011), 111.
 42 Jan Erk, Explaining Federalism: State, Society and Congruence in Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Germany and Switzerland (London: Routledge, 2010).
 43 See Gerard baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia, 
and Canada (vancouver: UbC Press, 2006).
 44 William h. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (boston: Little, brown, 
1964), 129; Donald v. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-hill 
Ryerson, 1987), 103–4; Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvestova, 
Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions (New york: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), chap. 6; Klaus Detterbeck, Wolfgang Renzsch, 
and John Kincaid, eds., Political Parties and Civil Society in Federal Countries (Don 
Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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The questions we posed to the contributors to this volume were 
intended to elicit information relevant to answering explanatory ques-
tions such as these. In what follows, we offer tentative answers, while 
recognizing the need for more research. The sections below generally 
follow but expand upon the explanatory factors set out in the Introduc-
tion to this volume.
1. Federal and Pre-Federal History
The impacts of history on the formation and operation of federations 
and their courts are evident in the case studies. All of the devolution-
ary federations reflect responses to centralized, authoritarian pasts. bel-
gium’s system reflects, in part, reactions to abuses that occurred under 
long periods of rule by the Dutch, Austrians, and French. The judici-
ary was elevated to a prominent position at independence in 1831. by 
contrast, the framers of Ethiopia’s 1994 Constitution were suspicious of 
the judiciary because judges were seen as sympathizers with the brutal 
Marxist Derg regime of 1974–87. Federal Nigeria reflects, in part, reac-
tions to centralized colonial pasts, while South Africa and Spain repre-
sent reactions to domestic authoritarianism – Francoism in Spain and 
apartheid in South Africa – and brazil and Mexico had prior centralized 
and authoritarian regimes.
Of the federations we have labelled as both devolutionary and inte-
grative, Germany had prior centralized and authoritarian periods, and 
Canada and India had colonial pasts with considerable power centred 
in London. In Canada, moreover, Québécois desires for autonomy and 
even independence need to be understood in the context of Canada’s 
british colonial history and continuing English-speaking majority in 
the country as a whole.
Of the three integrative federations, Australia and the United States 
also had british colonial histories, but the individual colonies enjoyed 
measurable degrees of self-government and semi-independent courts 
that were well-established and largely retained at the time of federation. 
The Swiss, who have no colonial or authoritarian past (except for the 
brief and unpopular helvetic Republic imposed by Napoleon between 
1798 and 1803), forged the most non-centralized federation of all and saw 
no need to vest their federal high court with judicial review authority 
over federal law. It exercises this authority only over cantonal law.
Other historical circumstances also contributed to differential 
responses to centralized, authoritarian pasts. In South Africa, where the 
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ruling African National Congress (ANC) views the polity as a single 
national community, the Constitutional Court has been accorded con-
siderable respect as an independent guardian of human rights, but its 
federalism jurisprudence is less independent of the ANC line. In plural 
Canada and Spain, certain constituent polities exhibit more restrained 
support for the high court, because it can weaken the cultural iden-
tity and self-government of those polities by its rulings on both human 
rights and the balance of power within the federation.
Path dependence produced by history can cast a long arc over high-
court jurisprudence. For example, the constitutional development of the 
United States and the federalism jurisprudence of its Supreme Court 
cannot be properly understood without appreciating their entangle-
ment with the consequences of the country’s 246-year history of black 
slavery. This legacy is reflected in, among other things, the Court’s 
numerous nationalizing rulings based on the Fourteenth Amendment 
(1868) of the U.S. Constitution and its controversial rulings on the fed-
eral voting Rights Act of 1965.45
historical influences are also durable for institutional reasons, includ-
ing the legal system. In common-law federations, history endures 
through the body of precedents that have been built up over time. 
Although courts in civil-law systems do not rely on precedents in the 
same way, the civil law reflects historical influences and is usually slow 
to change. A considerable amount of custom and tradition can be codi-
fied and locked into civil law for generations.
however, courts occasionally make dramatic turnabouts, as in the 
famous “switch in time that saved nine” in the United States in 1937. 
Facing considerable Democratic political pressure from the White 
house and Congress, the Supreme Court reversed course on its com-
merce-clause jurisprudence. Australia’s high Court took a significant 
change in course in its landmark Engineers Case in 1920. Germany’s 
Constitutional Court turned towards more Land-friendly decisions 
during the 1980s. Mexico’s Supreme Court inaugurated a new era of 
constitutional enforcement in the late 1990s. Nigeria’s Supreme Court 
reduced its federalism decision-making after 2007. Spain’s Constitu-
tional Court took a big step away from precedent in its 2010 ruling on 
Catalonia’s statute of autonomy, a ruling that provoked massive public 
 45 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1236 (2013); and Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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protests in Catalonia. Courts, therefore, also overrule themselves. In 
early 2015, Canada’s Supreme Court, responding to its conception of 
changing cultural norms, overturned a 1993 precedent by ruling that 
physician-assisted suicide is a fundamental right.46 This controversial 
decision invalidated a federal law banning such suicide; as a result, it 
let stand a 2014 Quebec law allowing it.
Finally, an important aspect of history we could not adequately 
incorporate in this volume concerns the conquests of indigenous peo-
ples that occurred in Australia and all the western hemisphere federa-
tions. The peoples who survived the conquests were marginalized, and 
credible efforts to redress injustices did not begin until the 1960s. One 
trend has been to facilitate reassertions of territorial self-government 
while also protecting individual rights. The Constitution of brazil pro-
vides for the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples to their 
traditional lands,47 and a decision of 2009 upheld the legality of a fed-
eral demarcation and preservation of indigenous land.48 In Mexico, a 
constitutional amendment of 2001 went farther by recognising the right 
to self-determination of indigenous peoples, to be implemented by 
the states in a manner consistent with “national unity.”49 In the United 
States, the federal executive branch treats tribal governments on a 
government-to-government basis, but the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
befriended tribal sovereignty.50 Canada established the self-governing 
territory of Nunavut in 1999, and its Supreme Court issued a landmark 
ruling expanding First Nations’ land rights in 2014.51 The ruling will 
substantially affect certain powers of both the federal and provincial 
governments. Similarly, Australia’s high Court issued two ground-
breaking rulings expanding Aboriginal land rights,52 but the deci-
sions provoked legislation that restricted the rulings’ reach. Whether 
 46 Carter v. Canada 2015 SCC 5.
 47 Constitution of brazil, Art. 231.
 48 Raposa Serra do Sol, Pet. N. 3.338-RR (D.O.U., 25 September 2009).
 49 Constitution of Mexico, Art. 2.4. See Guillermo de la Peña, “A New Mexican 
Nationalism? Indigenous Rights, Constitutional Reform and the Conflicting 
Meanings of Multiculturalism,” Nations and Nationalism 12, no. 2 (2006): 291–2.
 50 David E. Wilkins and Keith Richotte, “The Rehnquist Court and Indigenous Rights: 
The Expedited Diminution of Native Powers of Governance,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 33, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 83–110.
 51 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia 2014 SCC 44.
 52 Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; and The Wik Peoples v. Queensland 
(1996) 187 C.L.R. 1.
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indigenous governments will become constituent polities within these 
federations or occupy some asymmetric or junior position remains to 
be seen.
In summary, courts operate within the constraints and traditions of 
their federation’s history while also helping to shape that history to the 
extent they make independent rulings of political and socioeconomic 
import. These decisions, in turn, often affect the balance of power 
between the federation and the constituent states. however, as the case 
studies in this volume demonstrate, high courts vary in their willing-
ness or ability to shape history.
2. One People or Many Peoples?
As noted above, the conception of political community underlying a fed-
eral polity serves as a focal point for both the social and political context 
in which the federation operates and the constitutional rules and prin-
ciples that are interpreted and applied by the courts. Whether a federal 
country consists of a single ethno-linguistic or religious community or 
incorporates several such communities, especially territorially located 
communities such as the peoples of the basque Country and Catalonia 
in Spain, can have a long-term association with the evolution of the fed-
eral system towards more or less decentralization. Ethno-linguistic or 
religious communities may advocate for national policies that benefit 
them and preserve their distinctiveness. These communities, especially 
territorially concentrated ones, constitute multiple demoi who may not 
regard themselves as part of one demos. Additional challenges arise 
when some constituent polities representing discrete ethno-linguistic 
or religious groupings have not ratified the federal constitution, such 
as Quebec, which has not ratified the Constitution Act, 1982, and six 
Swiss cantons that never ratified any of Switzerland’s three modern 
federal constitutions. Where, then, lies le pouvoir constituant? If there is 
a single demos, the pressure may be towards formulating uniform poli-
cies across the country, as in Germany, but if there are several demoi, 
political outcomes, especially on issues of salience to particular cultural 
identities, will often be implemented in ways shaped by those identi-
ties, as in belgium, Canada, and Spain.53
 53 Erk, Explaining Federalism, 7–10.
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The latter three countries, although devolutionary or mixed in origin, 
have undergone significant transformation in a federalizing direction 
as a result of both formal changes to their constitutions and judicial 
interpretation. The impact in Canada of the Patriation Reference on the 
formal process by which the Canadian Constitution was patriated has 
been noted. In belgium, a succession of formal changes introduced since 
1970–1 have resulted in the conferral of substantial powers on the com-
munities and regions, and the belgian Constitutional Court has engaged 
in a relatively broad approach to interpreting those powers, taking the 
autonomy of the communities and regions as its starting point. Moreo-
ver, the new Article 35 proposes to reverse the basic logic of the system 
from the devolutionary principle that the federation retains all residual 
powers to the federative principle that the federation will be limited 
to matters expressly assigned to it. In Spain, the historic nations and 
geographic regions have taken advantage of their capacity to initiate 
statutes of autonomy, thus exercising a kind of semi-constitutive power 
in the context of a formerly unitary constitution and devolutionary sys-
tem. The role of Spain’s Constitutional Court is said to have been gener-
ally balanced, although its decisions to limit the scope of the reformed 
statutes of autonomy of valencia and Catalonia have elicited consider-
able criticism and heightened secessionist sentiment in Catalonia.
belgium, Canada, and Spain demonstrate how an originally devo-
lutionary and relatively centralized constitution can, under conditions 
of territorial heterogeneity, be federalized over time, just as Australia 
and the United States illustrate how the reverse can occur under con-
ditions of relative territorial homogeneity. however, this pattern does 
not always obtain. The Constitutional Court of relatively homogeneous 
Germany and the Constitutional Court of heterogeneous belgium are 
both described in this volume as relatively “balanced.” In heterogene-
ous Canada, the Supreme Court has moved from a generally decentral-
ist to a slightly more centralist orientation, while the Supreme Court of 
heterogeneous India has done the reverse. Seeking to hold heterogene-
ous regions together, courts sometimes respond by tightening central 
control and sometimes by strengthening regional autonomy. Indeed, 
the decision may depend on the gravity of the case at hand. As in India, 
it seems, Spain’s Constitutional Court, rightly or wrongly, deemed 
Catalonia’s 2006 statute of autonomy to be the camel’s nose in the tent 
that posed an existential threat to the Spanish state.
Courts in multilingual federations face special interpretative chal-
lenges when their federal constitution is officially rendered in multiple 
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languages, such as English and hindi in India. In Canada, the English 
and French versions of the Constitution Act, 1982 and amendments are 
equally authoritative, although interpretive problems may arise when 
the versions are not clearly harmonious. Usually, when one version is 
clearer on a point than the other, the courts favour the clearer version. 
Courts may also prefer the version that best protects a right, construes it 
more liberally, or best effectuates the purpose of a right. however, some 
contend that proper interpretation requires compatibility between both 
language versions.54 Linguistic diversity within a federation can con-
tribute to deep cleavages that doubly complicate the contested nature 
of constitutional interpretation.
Nonetheless, despite the importance of managing multinational con-
flict in territorially heterogeneous belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, India, 
Nigeria, Spain, and Switzerland, we do not find high courts being major 
direct players in managing such conflict; conflict is managed (or misman-
aged) mainly through political processes. In Ethiopia and Switzerland, 
the courts are sidelined from such management. In the other federa-
tions, high courts help set some of the rules of multinational coexistence 
(e.g., Canada’s secession reference case55) and enforce the constitutional 
choices made by the political process, but high courts are not superior 
participants or even equal co-participants with other political actors in 
such conflict management. Furthermore, the composition of the high 
courts in most heterogeneous federations mirrors to some extent the 
multinational composition of the federation, thereby sensitizing these 
courts to the political interests of the federation’s constituent communi-
ties. Only in Spain has the Constitutional Court arguably aggravated 
multinational conflict since 2010. When high courts do enter the political 
thicket of multicultural conflict management, it is often at the request of 
political forces, as in Canada’s secession case, or the insistence of political 
forces, as in the Spanish Court’s rulings on Catalonia.
3. Constitutional and Institutional Structure
The above considerations do not mean that constitutions are entirely 
malleable in the hands of the courts, but they do mean that underlying 
 54 hugo Cyr and Monica Popescu, “Constitutional Reasoning in the Supreme Court of 
Canada,” draft, 3 August 2014, 20, Social Science Research Network, http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475709.
 55 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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conceptions of the purpose, foundations, and nature of the federation 
can influence the outcome in borderline cases. The texts and structures 
of constitutions are meant to impose constraints on judicial discretion. 
To some extent, they do, although more so in some countries than in 
others.56 Consider the distribution of legislative competences. The alloca-
tion of powers in a federal constitution can be more or less generous to 
the federation or the constituent polities, and the logic and structure of 
the distribution can vary. Areas of competence can be distributed spe-
cifically between the federation and the constituent polities, or specific 
competences can be given to one and the residue assigned to the other. 
Some competences may be exclusive, others concurrent. Sometimes 
framework powers are conferred on the federation, leaving the states to 
enact more detailed and specific laws within the parameters determined 
by federal law. The formal logic of a federal constitution can thus be to 
distribute legislative competences into “coordinate” spheres of law and 
administration, with strict constitutional rules for resolving conflicts and 
inconsistencies between federal law and laws of the constituent polities, 
or it can envisage a more cooperative framework where, for example, 
general laws are enacted by the federal legislature but implemented by 
the executive authorities of the constituent polities. All of these “techni-
cal” differences in constitutional language and logic make a difference, 
not only to the forms of argument that can sensibly be advanced by law-
yers, but also to the interpretations of the constitution that are reasonably 
open to the courts. It is important to identify the “margin of decisional 
freedom” available to the courts in any particular context.57
As noted, an important distinction is between federations estab-
lished through the integration of previously independent political com-
munities and those that emerged through constitutional devolution of 
responsibilities to sub-state political communities (see table 1 in the 
Introduction).58 This is a significant distinction, although its sharpness 
 56 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (New york: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 3–4, chap. 7.
 57 André bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal high Courts: A Political Theory of 
Judicial Review,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 26 (1993): 7.
 58 Carl Joachim Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New york: Praeger, 
1968), 177; Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension 
of Politics (New york: holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 113–15, 120–8; Koen 
Lenaerts, “Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism,” American Journal 
of Comparative Law 38 (1990): 205, 206–7; Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 320–3.
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is not always easy to maintain.59 The clearest cases of integration, such 
as the United States and Switzerland, are, for different reasons, not quite 
pure instances,60 and the clearest cases of devolution, such as Spain and 
belgium, involve the recognition of very old, once independent sub-state 
nations.61 Cases that fall between these two poles, such as Australia and 
Canada, display features of both, the former tending more towards the 
integration end of the spectrum, the latter towards the devolution end. 
but despite the difficulty of finding a pure type, the distinction between 
integration and devolution has explanatory power, at least in relation 
to how the constitutive foundations of a federal system are understood, 
and how this understanding tends to shape the way in which govern-
ment powers are distributed among the orders of government, how the 
federation’s governing institutions are constructed, and the prescribed 
means by which the federal constitution can be amended in the future.62 
An assessment of the role of the courts in each country must consider 
these basic facts about the constitutive origin of the system and the 
terms of the federative settlement expressed in the constitution’s text 
and structure. These features often shape the composition and jurisdic-
tion of the courts themselves, and they constitute the very substance of 
the constitution the courts are called upon to interpret and apply.
The constitutional logic of the distribution of powers is thus related to 
the underlying conception of the federation. Integrative federations pre-
suppose the prior existence of the constituent polities as self- governing 
political communities. Their constitutions, therefore, usually take the 
existence, nature, and scope of the constituent political institutions and 
competences for granted, and provide only for the establishment of the 
governing institutions of the federation, including its legislative com-
petences. Moreover, in strongly integrative systems (e.g., United States, 
 59 See Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 65.
 60 Richard Kay, “The Illegality of the Constitution,” Constitutional Commentary 4 (1987): 
57–80; Jean-François Aubert, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel Suisse (Neuchâtel: Ides et 
Calendes, 1967), 30–2.
 61 Frank Delmartino, hugues Dumont, and Sebastien van Drooghenbroeck, “Kingdom 
of belgium,” and Luis Moreno and César Colino, “Kingdom of Spain,” in Diversity 
and Unity in Federal Countries, ed. Luis Moreno and César Colino, 48–74 and 289–319 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).
 62 John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, eds., Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change 
in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2005); Nicholas Aroney, “Formation, Representation and Amendment in Federal 
Constitutions,” American Journal of Comparative Law 54, no. 1 (2006): 277–336.
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Switzerland, and Australia), the premise is that the powers of the con-
stituent polities were originally plenary or general and were qualified 
or limited under the constitution only in the specific ways agreed upon 
as a condition of federation. In all the integrative federations, residual 
or “reserved” powers lie with the constituent polities. In strongly devo-
lutionary systems that emerged from a unitary state (e.g., belgium and 
Spain), the federative logic usually goes in the opposite direction; the 
competences of the federation are originally general and continuing, 
subject to the grant of specific powers to the constituent polities.63 In 
systems that fall roughly between these two poles, the competences 
are often specifically distributed between both the federation and the 
constituent polities, albeit sometimes supplemented by a “catch-all” 
residuary clause (e.g., Canada and India). In some devolutionary states 
that had at least rudiments of constituent polities before federation 
(e.g., brazil and Ethiopia), the residual power may lie with the constitu-
ent polities.
The critically important question in distribution-of-powers cases con-
cerns the relationship between the scope of federal power and the scope 
of the constituent polities’ power. Even though the presupposition of 
integrative and devolutionary systems is to accord a certain logical pri-
ority to the competences of the original political unit (in devolutionary 
systems) or units (in integrative systems), the specificity of the powers 
conferred on the derivative political unit (in integrative systems) or units 
(in devolutionary systems) can advantage those derivative units. This 
is because the powers can be interpreted in essentially two ways: either 
solely by reference to the positive language in which they are conferred 
(on the derivative unit or units) or by keeping also in mind the pow-
ers that are reserved (to the original unit or units). If these putatively 
“reserved” powers are not spelt out in the constitution, the courts have 
to infer them from the intentions, structures, or purposes of the consti-
tution. but because this can be a controversial judicial method, courts 
often prefer to focus on the words used by the constitution; thus, the 
 63 Devolution within the United Kingdom is a partial exception. There, the distribution 
of powers is exceptionally complex and asymmetrical. however, the whole 
scheme is founded on the assumption of british parliamentary sovereignty. See 
Alan Trench, “The Framework of Devolution: The Formal Structure of Devolved 
Power,” in Devolution and Power in the United Kingdom, ed. Alan Trench (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007), 48.
Comparative Observations and Conclusions 505
specificity of the powers conferred on the derivative unit of govern-
ment garners for them a kind of interpretive priority.
In integrative systems that specify only the federation’s powers, the 
result of this kind of reasoning tends to favour the authority of the 
whole over the parts. This is apparent even in the distribution of com-
petences within the European Union. According to the president of the 
European Court of Justice, Koen Lenaerts, “The residual powers of the 
Member States have no reserved status. The Community may indeed 
exercise its specific, implied or non-specific powers in the fullest way 
possible, without running into any inherent limitation set to these pow-
ers as a result of the sovereignty which the Member States retain as 
subjects of international law. There simply is no nucleus of sovereignty 
that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community.”64 
While the constitutional courts of many of the EU’s member states have 
maintained that the member states retain certain fundamental constitu-
tional prerogatives, it is widely recognized that the European Court of 
Justice almost always upholds EU laws against challenges.65
Much the same outlook has been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in its interpretation of the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
which guarantees that “the powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.” Rather than treating this 
principle as a factor that shapes the interpretation of federal powers, 
it has been termed merely a “truism that all is retained which has not 
been surrendered.”66 Accordingly, the Court has held that the power of 
Congress over interstate commerce, for example, “is complete in itself, 
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations 
other than are prescribed in the Constitution”67 and that it is a power 
that “can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-
exercise of state power.”68 It took some time, as Somin shows, for this 
 64 Lenaerts, “Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism,” 220.
 65 Joseph Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe,” Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 
2403–83. Although see Alan Dashwood, “The Limits of European Community 
Powers,” European Law Review 21 (1996): 113–28; Renaud Dehousse, “Community 
Competences: Are There Limits to Growth?,” in Europe after Maastricht: An Ever 
Closer Union?, ed. Renaud Dehousse, 103–25 (Munich: Law books in Europe, 1994).
 66 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
 67 Ibid., 114, citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), 196.
 68 Ibid.
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principle to work itself out in the United States,69 but it ultimately con-
tributed to the expansive commerce-clause jurisprudence that is now 
U.S. Supreme Court orthodoxy.70 That said, the Court still endorses the 
principle of enumeration and on some (limited) occasions has deployed 
it to impose some restraints on federal power.71 
In Australia, similarly, the constitutional guarantee of the continuing 
existence of state powers and state constitutions72 has been treated as 
irrelevant to determining the scope of federal legislative powers, which 
are interpreted as widely as the language used can sustain, without 
consideration of the powers reserved to the states or with a view to 
maintaining a “federal balance.”73 Perhaps more so in the United States, 
the principle of enumeration has been applied by the high Court to 
strike down federal laws,74 but the general trend has been to read fed-
eral powers as widely as possible. The only substantial limit on federal 
power in these countries concerns cases where federal law is deemed 
to interfere excessively with the functioning of the constituent polities 
themselves, which in Australia means interfering with their capacity to 
function as independent governments,75 and in the United States means 
that congressional legislation cannot “commandeer” the states76 and 
cannot unduly interfere with the “special and specific position” that 
the states occupy in the constitutional system.77
 69 See also John Kincaid, “The Rise of Coercive Federalism in the United States: 
Dynamic Change with Little Formal Reform,” in The Future of Australian Federalism: 
Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Gabrielle Appleby, Nicholas Aroney, 
and Thomas John (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 157.
 70 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
 71 E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000); and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct 2566 (2012).
 72 Australia Constitution, ss. 106 and 107.
 73 E.g., New South Wales v. Commonwealth (2006) 229 C.L.R. 1.
 74 Especially in relation to the “commerce” power, which the high Court has insisted is 
limited to the regulation of interstate trade and commerce: e.g., Airlines of New South 
Wales Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No. 2) (1965) 113 C.L.R. 54.
 75 Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth, (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31; Austin v. Commonwealth, 
(2003) 215 C.L.R. 185.
 76 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997).
 77 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985). See also 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842–4 (1976), which was overruled by 
Garcia.
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It would be tempting to conclude, as Malcolm Feeley and Edward 
Rubin argue, that when the court’s jurisprudence fails to identify a core set 
of issues over which the states retain exclusive and constitutionally guar-
anteed authority, this is evidence that a genuinely federal system does not 
exist anymore.78 however, such a conclusion rests on an unduly stringent 
definition of federalism; it requires a core set of constitutionally reserved 
state competences that can be positively identified prior to the interpretation 
of the powers of the federation – a condition that no integrative federation 
that is silent about the powers reserved to the states can satisfy short of 
judicial construction of a list of reserved powers by implication.79 because 
the competences of the constituent polities are undefined in such systems, 
there is nothing specific in the constitution’s text to help the courts iden-
tify a core set of issues over which the constituent polities retain exclusive 
authority. This contrasts markedly with such devolutionary federal sys-
tems as belgium and Spain and with mixed systems (e.g., Canada and 
India) in which the competences available to the general and regional 
orders of government are both specified in the constitution. In the former, 
there is a clear textual basis for identifying the devolved powers of the 
constituent polities; in the latter, the courts have to determine how the two 
lists of powers are to be understood together.
In Canada, the dual list of competences has made it relatively easier 
for the courts to maintain a kind of balance between the respective pow-
ers of the dominion and the provinces. In the early interpretation of the 
British North America Act, 1867 (UK), the prevailing view of the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council was that the explicit competences 
granted to both orders of government must be taken into consideration 
when interpreting the scope of power granted to either. Adopting the 
nautical image of “watertight compartments,” the Judicial Committee 
embraced a dualistic approach that avoided overlaps of power between 
the exclusive powers granted to the two orders of government.80 In 
recent years, Canada’s Supreme Court has adopted a more dynamic or 
evolutionary (i.e., “living tree”) approach to interpreting the Constitu-
tion81 in which the possibility of concurrent legislative competence is 
 78 Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic 
Compromise (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009), chap. 5.
 79 It also overlooks the many other characteristic elements of these political systems 
that are recognizably federal: see Watts, Comparing Federal Systems.
 80 A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, 354.
 81 The metaphor can be traced to Edward v. A.-G. for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124, 136.
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made possible through, among other things, a “double aspect” doctrine 
that enables both orders of government to legislate in a way that relates 
to the same subject matter.82 Nonetheless, when the interpretative 
approaches of the closely related federations of Canada and Australia 
are compared, it is evident that the Canadian Court’s approach to the 
grant of specific exclusive powers to the provinces results in a relatively 
more balanced approach than occurs in Australia.83
belgium offers another instructive example. Its Constitutional Court 
regards the powers specifically conferred upon the communities and 
regions as having been completely and integrally transferred to them; 
hence, limitations on those powers are interpreted narrowly. As Peeters 
and Mosselmans observe, because the powers granted respectively to 
the federation, the communities, and the regions are exclusive, the Con-
stitutional Court considers it necessary to determine “where the centre 
of gravity lies” in each case and to attribute authority to the appropriate 
order of government. A “double aspect” doctrine, similar to that applied 
in Canada, marks a limited exception to this approach by allowing federal 
and regional legislation to regulate the same subject, provided there is no 
incompatibility between the two laws. however, in relation to the concur-
rent power over taxation, for example, when a tax law is primarily a non-
fiscal policy instrument, the Court asks whether the law infringes on the 
competences of the other authorities in a disproportionate manner. The 
constitutional principle of “federal loyalty” (similar to the German concept 
of Bundestreue, discussed below) has also been interpreted by the belgian 
Constitutional Court as a ground for review of legislation, even though 
the probable intent of the constitutional provision was that it be applied 
politically rather than enforced judicially. In the 2012–14 state reform, the 
Special Majority legislator extended the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction 
in order to confirm this case law of the Court.
Spain’s quasi-federalism also proceeds on the basis of two sets of pow-
ers: competences reserved to the central state and competences that may 
be assumed by the autonomous communities through their statutes of 
autonomy. This constitutional capacity of the autonomous communities 
 82 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, para. 4.
 83 Compare Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 4th ed. (Sydney: 
butterworths, 1997), 28–9; bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical 
Paradigm,” McGill Law Journal 36 (1991): 308–81; Nicholas Aroney, “Reserved 
Matters, Legislative Purpose and the Referendum on Scottish Independence,” Public 
Law (2014): 421–45.
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to exercise the power to define, within limits, their own competences has 
been moderated, however, by the Constitutional Court’s insistence that 
sovereignty remains located in the Spanish people as a whole, and that 
the powers exercised by the autonomous communities are conferred by 
the Constitution rather than deriving independently from the sovereign 
rights of the people of each autonomous community. Consistent with 
this outlook, the Court has tended to interpret the competences of the 
Spanish state expansively, while adopting a more restrictive approach to 
the competences of the autonomous communities, reasoning that their 
“exclusive” powers must not prevent the central state from exercising its 
exclusive powers. Especially in relation to the powers of the central state 
over such matters as economic planning and equality of individual rights, 
Adam points out that while the Court has maintained that room must 
be left for the autonomous communities to exercise powers that affect 
these matters, it has nonetheless formulated numerous exceptions for 
measures that the Spanish state argues are necessary to attain important 
central-state objectives. Similarly, in relation to “framework” laws, while 
the Court has affirmed that it should articulate minimum standards on 
the basis of which the autonomous communities can enact particular leg-
islative policies, the Court has subsequently allowed the central state to 
enact a whole range of secondary laws, administrative acts, and detailed 
regulations in particular fields. This has been “balanced” by decisions 
that have interpreted autonomous-community competences flexibly 
and protected them from efforts by the central state to usurp recognized 
competences of the autonomous communities, but as the Court’s deci-
sion concerning Catalonia’s 2006 statute of autonomy demonstrates, the 
devolutionary nature of Spain’s system provides the Court with a basis 
for reading statutes of autonomy, not as expressions of self-constitutive 
authority but as ordinary organic laws of the Spanish state.
Similar observations can be made about the Indian Supreme Court’s 
approach to the federal distribution of power in that country. When a law 
enacted within a particular legislature’s powers also affects or relates to 
the subject matter of another legislature, the Court examines the substan-
tive character of the impugned law to identify its “pith and substance.”84 
 84 The “pith and substance” doctrine can be traced to decisions of the Privy Council 
interpreting several “federal” arrangements and constitutions within the british 
Empire, including those in Canada and Northern Ireland. See, e.g., Union Colliery Co. 
of British Columbia Ltd v. Bryden [1899] A.C. 580, 587; and Gallagher v. Lynn [1937] A.C. 
863, 869–70.
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Such an approach can be used to support and protect the exclusivity 
of both state and union competences, but given the very large array of 
powers conferred upon the union, it tends to favour the central author-
ity. As one constitutional authority cited by Tewari and Saxena observes, 
“Where the question arises of determining whether a particular subject 
mentioned is in one list or another, the court looks to the substance of 
the matter. Thus, if the substance falls within the Union List, then the 
incidental encroachment by the law on the State List does not make it 
invalid.”85 Nonetheless, the existence of the union, state, and concur-
rent lists of powers obligates the Court to consider whether a union 
law unconstitutionally enters a field of exclusive state power. Tewari 
and Saxena explain that when undertaking this inquiry, the Court seeks 
to give effect to two principles, which are supposed to be construed 
harmoniously, namely, that the national interest must be given pri-
macy, and state legislatures should not be summarily excluded from 
legislating.
Over time, of course, the distribution of powers in a federation may 
be altered by constitutional amendments, giving rise to an interplay 
between those amendments and the high court’s interpretation of the 
distribution of powers. brouillet notes that Canada’s Supreme Court 
has had a substantial impact on federalism because the federal and 
provincial governments have been unable to amend the Constitu-
tion. Somin makes a similar point about the United States because of 
the difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution. benz argues that in 
Germany, constitutional amendments, which are common, enhanced 
federal power until 2006 when constitutional reform reversed the cen-
tralization trend. In turn, he reports that the Constitutional Court has 
become more Land friendly. In belgium, constitutional change has 
given more powers to the regions and communities, and the constitu-
tional court has followed suit. In Mexico, amendments have increased 
federal power and constrained judicial sympathies for decentraliza-
tion. In Switzerland, constitutional change, as well as the introduction 
of uniform codes of civil and criminal procedure in 2011, have had 
centralizing effects, although cantons have been given more avenues 
to participate in federation decision-making. Swiss federalism, argue 
 85 P.M. bakshi, The Constitution of India, 12th ed. (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 
2013), 246–7.
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Lienhard and colleagues, has moved from an emphasis on self-rule to 
an emphasis on shared rule.86
4. Legal Traditions and Culture
The way in which a constitution distributes competences cannot explain 
all the variations in approach displayed by courts in federal coun-
tries. Another significant explanatory factor concerns the courts’ legal 
and institutional context. There are important differences in judicial 
appointment processes and legal procedures, as well as in conceptual 
assumptions and methods of reasoning, that tend to be displayed by 
the constitutional courts of most civil-law federations and the supreme 
courts of many common-law federations. Although there are risks in 
over-estimating differences between the common-law and civil-law tra-
ditions, as well as in failing to recognize important differences among 
specific legal systems within each tradition, certain distinctive features 
of the two traditions appear to be significant for the way in which the 
courts understand and interpret their federal constitution.87
One way to put the distinction is that in civil-law systems, the ten-
dency is to assume that law is essentially statutory, that it consists of 
deliberately enacted legal codes that lay down the structure of the entire 
 86 A further consideration is asymmetric federalism (see Watts, Comparing Federal 
Systems, 125–30). belgium, Canada, India, and Spain are examples of constitutional 
asymmetry, where the constitution itself accords more powers to some constituent 
polities than others. Except for the Spanish Constitutional Court’s 2010 ruling on 
Catalonia’s statute of autonomy, which constrained asymmetry, this matter has not 
been prominent on high court dockets. Political asymmetry refers to differential 
powers of constituent polities that arise from demographic and socio-economic 
factors. All federations display this kind of asymmetry, although the extent of it 
varies. The effect can be considerable, as when the U.S. state of California introduced 
a law requiring all eggs sold in the state to come from chickens kept in coops large 
enough for them to stand up and extend their wings. A challenge to the law, on 
the basis that it violated the federal commerce clause because it imposed costly 
regulations on out-of-state egg producers, failed, but the affected states plan to 
appeal the decision. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 
(1963), in which the court rejected a challenge by Florida farmers to a California law 
that set a standard of ripeness for avocados sold in the state.
 87 See Konrad Zweigert and hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 1:68–70; Mirjan Damaška, “The Common Law/Civil 
Law Divide: Residual Truth of a Misleading Distinction,” Supreme Court Law Review 
(Canada) (2d) 49 (2010): 3–21.
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body of law conceived as a comprehensive, rationally organized sys-
tem of norms. In common-law systems, the tendency is to assume that 
law is essentially decisional, that it consists of a body of judicial deci-
sions made in response to specific cases initiated by parties to particular 
legal disputes. It is true that, notwithstanding these tendencies, judicial 
decisions in civil-law systems play a significant role in determining the 
exact meaning and application of codified law, while statutory law plays 
an increasingly important role in common-law countries. but the under-
lying conceptual orientation exerts a powerful influence. At the risk of 
over-simplification, in the civil-law tradition, law tends to be conceived 
as an entire systematic whole, whereas in the common-law tradition, it 
is generally conceived as a collection of discrete judicial decisions made 
in the particular circumstances of each case. As Daniel halberstam and 
Mathias Reimann have suggested, these kinds of differences seem to be 
associated with the extent to which a legal system is substantively uni-
fied in terms of the content of its applicable rules of law.88
A written constitution has a moderating influence in common-law 
countries, because it transforms a legal system constituted fundamen-
tally by “unwritten” common law into a system based ultimately on 
a written document.89 Nonetheless, the exact relationship between 
the written constitution and the common law remains controversial. 
Some argue that the common law continues to be the fundamental 
context in which the constitution operates;90 others maintain that the 
constitutional law of the country remains ultimately “judge-made.”91 
As Justice Oliver Wendell holmes famously remarked in relation to 
American common law, “The life of the law has not been logic, it has 
been experience.”92 This general outlook is especially influential in 
 88 Daniel halberstam and Mathias Reimann, “Federalism and Legal Unification: 
Comparing Methods, Results, and Explanations across 20 Systems,” in Federalism and 
Legal Unification: A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Twenty Systems, ed. Daniel 
halberstam and Mathias Reimann (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 3, 41–5.
 89 In relation to the United States, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
 90 Owen Dixon, “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation,” 
Australian Law Journal 31 (1957): 240.
 91 David A. Strauss, “Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,” University of 
Chicago Law Review 63 (1996): 877–935. Indeed, it is consistent with such views to 
defend federalism in the language of burkean conservatism: Ernest A. young, “The 
Conservative Case for Federalism,” George Washington Law Review 74 (2006): 874–87.
 92 Oliver Wendell holmes, The Common Law (boston: Little, brown, 1881), 1.
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federal countries like Canada and Australia, which were formed in 
a manner that maintained legal continuity with british law and the 
traditional English conventions of the Westminster version of par-
liamentary responsible government. In Canada and Australia, the 
federation’s body of constitutional law is not contained in a single 
constitutional document but in several constitutional enactments.93 In 
the interstices between these documents, judge-made law and West-
minster conventions sometimes play decisive roles, with very impor-
tant implications for the federal system.94 by contrast, in common-law 
countries that came into being through revolutionary assertions of 
independence, such as the United States and India, it is easier to iden-
tify a discrete “founding moment” for the polity, and the sources of 
fundamental constitutional law are less complex and fragmented. 
Although the United States and India are within the common-law tra-
dition, their constitutional jurisprudence has developed away from 
its original, English moorings more than is evident in Canada and 
Australia.95
Related to these differences in the underlying conception of law 
are important differences in curial procedure in constitutional cases. 
In common-law countries, judicial review is usually exercised by any 
court when litigating parties raise constitutional issues. In civil-law 
countries, normally only constitutional courts exercise judicial review, 
typically either in the form of “abstract” review initiated by political 
actors and government institutions, “concrete” or “incidental” review 
initiated by ordinary judges when constitutional issues arise in particu-
lar cases, or “constitutional complaints” when individual litigants seek 
constitutional relief from the application of a law to their circumstances, 
usually when all other legal remedies have been exhausted, such as the 
 93 In addition to the federal constitutions of each country, these enactments include 
the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK); the Canada Act 1982 (UK); and the Australia Acts 
1986 (UK and Aust.).
 94 E.g., Patriation Reference [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753; United Kingdom, “Report by the 
Joint Committee of the house of Lords and the house of Commons Appointed to 
Consider the Petition of the State of Western Australia” (1934–44).
 95 See, generally, Leslie Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991); Peter C. Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: 
The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); bruce McPherson, The Reception of English 
Law Abroad (brisbane: Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2007).
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recurso de amparo in Spain.96 Thus, although constitutional courts may 
be called upon to exercise judicial review in the context of the specif-
ics of a particular case, they often exercise the power in the abstract 
and upon the initiative of political actors and institutions, such as gov-
ernments, members of the legislature, or representatives of constituent 
polities. In common-law countries, this function is usually undertaken 
in the context of a specific case, initiated by the affected party or parties, 
and exercisable by any court.
The federal jurisprudence of Germany’s Constitutional Court pro-
vides an important illustration of a civil-law approach to constitutional 
adjudication. As Donald Kommers explained, the style and content of 
the Court’s judgments give the impression of a jurisprudence “based 
on reason and logic” rather than “experience,” an approach that reflects 
a conception of law as a “self-contained, rational, deductive system 
of rules and norms” rather than a pragmatic response to context and 
social realities.97 In the Southwest State case, for instance, the Court in 
its first major decision began its substantive reasoning by emphasizing 
the “internal coherence and structural unity” of the basic Law, stating 
that “no single constitutional provision may be taken out of its context 
and interpreted by itself” but must be interpreted “in such a way as 
to render it compatible with the fundamental principles of the Consti-
tution and the intentions of its authors.”98 Emphasizing the “unity of 
the Constitution as a logical-teleological entity,”99 the Court often says 
that it aims to maintain a “practical concordance” of the constitution’s 
 96 See Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutional Courts,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 816. The distinction between abstract and concrete review is not quite 
as clear as this in practice. See David Feldman, “Judicial Review of Legislation” 
(paper presented at the Anglo-Israeli Judicial Workshop, Jerusalem, 2007). A partial 
exception is the availability in Canada of abstract review of legislation through the 
“reference” jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 
S-26 (Can), s. 53. Another is the combination of both decentralized-incidental and 
centralized-abstract review available in brazil: Keith S. Rosenn, “Judicial Review in 
brazil: Developments under the 1988 Constitution,” Southwestern Journal of Law and 
Trade in the Americas 7 (2000): 293.
 97 Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40–1.
 98 Southwest State case, 1 bverfGE 14, 32 (1951), reproduced in Kommers, Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 62–6.
 99 Church Construction Tax case, 19 bverfGE 206, 220 (1965), cited in Donald Kommers, 
“German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon,” Emory Law Journal 40 (1991): 837–51.
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basic principles by which apparently conflicting values are brought 
into “harmony.”100
Numerous textual and structural features of Germany’s basic Law 
encourage this outlook. Thus, while the range of exclusive and concurrent 
powers conferred on the federal legislature is very extensive,101 unlike 
most other federations, the Land governments participate directly in 
the formation of federal policy and legislation through the bundesrat.102 
Germany’s system of “administrative federalism” also requires the coop-
eration of the Länder in the administration of federal legislation.103 The 
capacity of the federation to exercise several of its concurrent legislative 
powers is restricted to circumstances where it is necessary to establish 
“equivalent living conditions” throughout Germany or to maintain “legal 
or economic unity.”104 Moreover, the federation and the Länder are bound 
to a highly integrated financial system that closely regulates their powers 
to impose taxes and apportions tax revenues among them.105 Consistent 
with these features, the Constitutional Court has developed the princi-
ple of “federal comity” or Bundestreue, by which the federation and the 
Länder must exercise their respective powers in a pro-federal manner that 
respects each other’s authority.106 The Court also has applied the principle 
of subsidiarity to control the exercise of federal concurrent powers,107 a 
development that led to a constitutional amendment in 2006 to restrict 
the operation of the principle to only some of the concurrent powers.108
As benz points out, aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence have some-
times favoured “federal unity”109 and at other times “Länder auton-
omy.”110 but when placed in comparative perspective, what is perhaps 
 100 Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 46–7.
 101 basic Law, Arts. 73–4.
 102 Ibid., Arts. 50–1.
 103 Ibid., Arts. 83–5.
 104 Ibid., Art. 72(2), amended in 2006.
 105 Ibid., Arts. 105–8.
 106 Television I case, 12 bverfGE 205 (1961). See also Fabian Wittreck, “Die bundestreue,” 
in Handbuch Föderalismus, ed. Ines härtel (berlin: Springer, 2012), 1:497–525.
 107 Greg Taylor, “Germany: The Subsidiarity Principle,” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 4 (2006): 115–30.
 108 Greg Taylor, “Germany: A Slow Death for Subsidiarity?,” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 7 (2009): 139–54.
 109 E.g., Atomic Weapons Referenda I case, 8 bverfGE 104 (1958).
 110 See the attempt to harmonize these principles in the Southwest State case, 1 bverfGE 
14 (1951).
516 Courts in Federal Countries
most remarkable is the Court’s willingness to narrow its interpretation 
of federal powers on the ground that the scheme of the basic Law is 
to confer only specific and limited powers on the federation with the 
intention that the Länder retain power to legislate in relation to all 
matters not specifically allocated to the federation, even though (and 
possibly because) the number of these “reserved” powers is not com-
paratively large.111 Such an approach to federal and state power is strik-
ingly different from what occurs in the United States and Australia, 
where the courts do not generally reason in terms of competences 
reserved to the states.
Switzerland presents another important illustration. As in Germany, 
Swiss federalism is predicated on a “cooperative” relationship between 
the federation and the cantons,112 including the principle that federal 
law is implemented largely by the cantons.113 The federation is also 
constitutionally required to respect the autonomy of the cantons,114 and 
the constitutional principle of subsidiarity authorizes the federation to 
act only when the cantons or municipalities are unable to do so effec-
tively.115 Moreover, disputes between the federation and the cantons are 
usually resolved by negotiation, and sometimes by a popularly initi-
ated constitutional referendum rather than by judicial action. In this 
context, even though the Tribunal fédéral does not exercise judicial 
review over federal legislation, the court has drawn on the principle of 
cantonal sovereignty to uphold cantonal legislation in the face of alleg-
edly inconsistent federal laws. This has extended to the finding that the 
general reservation of cantonal sovereignty supports the retention of 
very specific powers, even where an amendment to the constitution has 
removed explicit reference to those powers.
Mexico presents another illustration. Its Constitution adopts the 
same pattern of distribution of legislative competences as in the United 
States, Germany, and Australia. The competences of the federal Con-
gress are specified, and those powers not expressly granted to the fed-
eration by the Constitution are deemed to be within the competence of 
the states. however, as José Caballero Juárez points out, since 1995, the 
 111 E.g., Concordat case, 6 bverfGE 309 (1957); Television I case, 12 bverfGE 205 (1961); 
Explosives Control case, 13 bverfGE 367 (1962); Engineers case, 26 bverfGE 246 (1969).
 112 Swiss Constitution, Art. 44.
 113 Ibid., Art. 46.
 114 Ibid., Art. 47.
 115 Ibid., Art. 5a, 43a para. 1.
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Supreme Court, particularly through the controversias constitucionales 
procedure, has used its powers of review to protect the “five orders” 
recognized by the Constitution.116 While Mexico’s federal system has a 
highly centralized background, rooted in its Aztec, colonial, and post-
colonial history,117 the Supreme Court has recognized, as Juárez puts it, 
that when one order of government has the power to regulate a certain 
topic, the limits of such regulation have to be scrutinized in light of the 
power of other government orders also to regulate that topic.
The situation in brazil appears to be very different. As Rodrigues, 
Lorencini, and Zimmermann point out, while the Constitution reserves 
to the states the powers not conferred upon the federation, the powers 
granted to the central government are so vast that the states are left 
with virtually no matters about which they can legislate free from the 
constraints of federal legislation. Consequently, the idea of any legisla-
tive power being reserved to the states is effectively meaningless. While 
many court decisions have struck down state and municipal laws in 
response to conflicts with the federal Constitution or federal law, very 
few decisions have invalidated federal laws on federalism grounds.
Another relevant dimension of domestic legal cultures is the growing 
influence of foreign and international law. This is most evident in the 
federal member-states (as well as Switzerland) of the European Union 
where treaties, community law, and decisions of the European Court 
of Justice have affected the distribution of powers within those federa-
tions. This has been of such major concern that all these countries have 
amended their constitutions or revised laws to allow their constituent 
polities a sizable voice in EU decision-making that affects their powers. 
Consequently, the EU establishes both constraints and opportunities 
for decision-making by the constitutional courts of these federations. 
Foreign-law influences are evident to varying degrees in nearly all the 
high courts examined in this volume, but those influences appear to 
have had little impact on the courts’ federalism jurisprudence. These 
influences have more impacts on other areas of law, such as human 
rights, environmental protection, and economic development. how-
ever, insofar as international law and foreign law emphasize legal 
uniformity in many areas such as rights protection, labour regulation, 
 116 Namely, constitutional, federal, state, federal district, and municipal.
 117 victoria E. Rodríguez, “Recasting Federalism in Mexico,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 28, no. 1 (1998): 235–54.
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and environmental protection, then those influences will push federal 
courts and legislatures in a unitarist direction.
A further factor in a federation’s legal traditions and culture is the 
extent to which federalism is a value. Many observers have argued that 
a federal system requires, among other supports, a federal political cul-
ture to sustain it.118 A notable finding of our comparative analysis is 
that, except for Switzerland, where federalism is an important value, 
federalism is not deemed an especially important or intrinsic value by 
the courts in most of the federations. It may be a given value insofar as 
it is entrenched in each country’s constitution (except South Africa and 
Spain), but federalism is often little more than an instrumental value. 
halberstam observes, “Rarely do courts consciously consider calibrat-
ing the degree of integration in the light of principles of federalism.”119
Germany and India appear to have accepted federalism as a gener-
ally worthwhile value, and to protect that value, each country’s con-
stitution ensures it against majoritarian erosion. The eternity clause in 
Germany’s basic Law120 protects the country’s federal features against 
amendment, and the federal features of India’s Constitution are the 
most difficult to amend. Such amendment requires a majority vote of 
all members of each house of Parliament, a two-thirds majority of all 
members present and voting, and ratification by at least half the states. 
brazil’s Constitution forbids amendments that would abolish or debil-
itate the federal system, but federalism nonetheless competes with a 
unitarist culture, and federalism has never been a prominent theme in 
brazil’s law schools. Ethiopia’s political leaders do not believe a unitary 
system would be viable, but federalism seems to be regarded mainly 
as an expedient strategic balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces. 
Likewise in Canada, Nigeria, and Spain, federalism seems to be seen 
as the best option for holding these heterogeneous countries together. 
Australians see their federalism as desirable, but want to restructure it, 
although there is no agreement on how to do so. While few Americans 
would support a unitary system, most Americans treat federalism as an 
instrumental value and have supported expansions of federal power 
 118 Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 192–7; and Jenna bednar, The Robust Federation: 
Principles of Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 187–8.
 119 Daniel halberstam, “Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, ed. Gregory A. Caldeira, R. Daniel Kelemen, 
and Keith E. Whittington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 157.
 120 Art. 73(3).
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that produce outcomes they like. In Mexico and South Africa, federal-
ism is perhaps little more than a necessary evil. Mexico has had a his-
tory of centralized governance, and some important political groups 
in South Africa want to abolish the provinces. In belgium, despite the 
“federal loyalty” provision contained in its Constitution, it is not clear 
that the two major linguistic groups wish to maintain a long-term fed-
eral marriage. Meanwhile, the Constitution stipulates procedural rules 
intended to protect each group from undesirable autonomy dilutions.
Only some of the courts examined in this volume have a developed 
federalism jurisprudence (i.e., Australia, Canada, Germany, and the 
United States) or appear to be developing one (i.e., belgium and India). 
however, with the partial exception of the German Court’s embrace 
of Bundestreue, no court has formulated a consistent and coherent 
long-term doctrine of federalism or treated federalism as an especially 
important value. The only country where federalism appears to be such 
a value, namely, Switzerland, has no high court authorized to tamper 
with it.
5. Selection of Judges and Institutional Roles of Courts
Another approach to explaining how courts interpret their federal con-
stitution is the institutional position of courts in the federal system and 
the procedures for selecting judges. Most federations not only rely on 
the institution of judicial review to regulate the distribution of author-
ity within the federation, but also confer final authority to do so on a 
court of ultimate constitutional jurisdiction. Although the structure of 
the court may differ as between the broad models of a constitutional 
court established separately from the general system of courts or a 
supreme court that operates at the apex of the court hierarchy,121 the 
capacity of the court to determine constitutional matters is essentially 
very similar. Conferring such power on a single court in a federation 
tends to align the court with the governing institutions of the federa-
tion as a whole, even though a court’s composition, jurisdiction, and 
institutional setting may ameliorate this to some extent. Are such courts 
 121 Mauro Cappelletti and William Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials (Indianapolis: bobbs-Merrill, 1979), 76–83; and Alan R. brewer-Carias, 
Judicial Review in Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
128–31.
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independent arbiters of federal disputes, or are they “device[s] of cen-
tralized policymaking”?122
The way in which constitutional courts and supreme courts are con-
stituted varies considerably. Judges of federation supreme courts are 
typically appointed by the federal government, often with only mini-
mal consultation with leaders of opposition parties or representatives 
of the constituent polities, and they are usually chosen from the ranks 
of lower court judges or very senior legal practitioners. The member-
ship of constitutional courts often consists not only of sitting judges 
and senior practitioners but also law professors and former politicians, 
usually appointed through deliberative parliamentary processes that 
involve significant political negotiation and compromise over candi-
dates and often give the political representatives of the constituent poli-
ties substantial opportunity to influence appointments.
In this respect, the countries examined in this book can be placed 
roughly on a spectrum. At one end is the high Court of Australia – a court 
strongly aligned with the federation as a whole. First, the Court sits atop 
an integrated hierarchy of federal, state, and territory courts over which 
it exercises both general appellate jurisdiction and special constitutional 
jurisdiction. Second, members of the Court are appointed by the federal 
government with only nominal consultation by the federal attorney- 
general with his or her state counterparts. Third, the Court is not espe-
cially representative of the various states; more than three-quarters of all 
its appointees have come from the two largest states and none yet from the 
two smallest ones. These factors combine to suggest an important explana-
tory factor for the high Court’s strongly centralist orientation.123 
A similar explanation of judicial centralism seems possible for India. 
Until recently, members of India’s Supreme Court were appointed by the 
president in consultation with the Supreme Court, but the Court inter-
preted this as requiring the Court itself to concur in the appointment.124 
 122 Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), 55; André bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal high 
Courts: A Political Theory of Judicial Review,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 26 
(1993): 3–29.
 123 James Allan and Nicholas Aroney, “An Uncommon Court: how the high Court of 
Australia has Undermined Australian Federalism,” Sydney Law Review 30 (2008): 
290–1.
 124 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 441; 
AIR 1994 SC 268.
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This stance reflects the exceptionally powerful and unifying role the 
Court has played in India’s legal and political system and the breadth 
of its original, appellate, and advisory jurisdiction across all areas of 
law, including constitutional, statutory, and common law. It remains 
to be seen what difference will be made by the new National Judicial 
Appointments Commission (NJAC), which, pursuant to the 121st Con-
stitutional Amendment Act, 2014, provides binding advice to the presi-
dent on judicial appointments.125 The Supreme Federal Court of brazil is 
likewise oriented to the federation as a whole. Although appointments 
to the Court proposed by the federal president must be ratified by the 
Senate, this usually occurs as a matter of course, and most appointees 
have been drawn from the three most populous and wealthy states.
Judges of the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts are 
appointed by the president subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate.126 
This process has produced different results at various times in Ameri-
can history. Famous among them is the confrontation between the 
Court and President Franklin D. Roosevelt over “New Deal” legislation 
during the 1930s, which was eventually resolved through the threat of 
the president’s “court packing” plan and the fact that the Democratic 
Party’s electoral victories enabled it to dominate both Congress and the 
presidency. Likewise, the partial revival of judicial enforcement of fed-
eral limits on congressional power from the mid-1990s can be traced 
to appointments to the Court made by Republican Presidents Richard 
M. Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George h.W. bush, and George W. bush. In 
the past, non-judges such as former governors, members of Congress, 
a former president, and law professors were appointed to the Court, 
but politicization of the Senate’s confirmation process in recent dec-
ades has led presidents to nominate judges from lower federal courts. 
President barack Obama deviated from this pattern in 2010 when he 
nominated Elena Kagan, who had no prior judicial service, but in 2016, 
he nominated an appeals court judge to replace the late Antonin Scalia. 
 125 The NJAC consists of the chief justice of India, two other senior-most Supreme 
Court judges, the union minister of law, and two “eminent persons” nominated 
by a committee consisting of the prime minister, the chief justice of India, and 
the leader of the opposition or of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha. 
One of the two “eminent persons” is to be nominated from among scheduled 
castes, scheduled tribes, minorities, or women. Its advice, if not vetoed by any 
two of its members, is binding on the president, subject to only one request for 
reconsideration by the commission.
 126 US Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2.
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During vacancies on the high court, appeals court judges desiring ele-
vation to the Supreme Court are more likely to vote in harmony with 
the president’s ideology, vote for the United States as a party, and write 
more dissenting opinions in which they can articulate their views more 
clearly for the president’s advisers.127
Canada presents a complex picture, too. All judicial appointments of 
superior courts, even at the provincial level, are made by the federal gov-
ernment, but the Supreme Court Act requires that three judges of the high 
court be from Quebec.128 The history of Canadian federal jurisprudence 
needs also to be assessed in the light of the important early role of the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council. The movement in Canadian doctrine 
from an emphasis on a dualistic system of exclusive powers under the 
Judicial Committee to a cooperative system of overlapping powers under 
the Supreme Court marks a movement towards centralization, though 
not so far as exists in Australia, India, and the United States.
The appointment of constitutional judges in belgium, Germany, 
Spain, and Switzerland is more federalistic than in the above common-
law federations. Judges of the two senates of Germany’s Constitutional 
Court are elected by a two-thirds majority of the bundestag and the 
bundesrat according to a rule that requires each house to elect half of 
the judges, while the appointment of the Court’s president and the 
vice-president alternates between the two chambers. Appointment to 
belgium’s Constitutional Court is especially adjusted to that country’s 
bipolar federalism. Members of the Court are appointed by the king 
from lists of two candidates submitted alternatively by the Senate and 
the house of Representatives, having first been adopted by a two-thirds 
majority, and subject also to the requirement that the Court be com-
posed of six Dutch-speaking and six French-speaking judges. Spain’s 
Constitutional Court consists of twelve judges appointed by the king 
from four proposed by the Congress, four by the Senate, two by the 
federal government, and two by the General Council of the Judiciary, 
but without explicit regard to linguistic or regional representation. In 
Switzerland, judges of the Tribunal fédéral and other federal courts are 
appointed by the federal parliament, and appointments are made by 
 127 Ryan C. black and Ryan J. Owens, “Courting the President: how Circuit Court 
Judges Alter Their behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court,” American Journal 
of Political Science 60, no. 1 (2016): 30–43.
 128 In addition, there is a convention that three judges will come from Ontario, two 
from the western provinces, and one from the Atlantic provinces.
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consensus in a way that preserves a high level of diversity in language, 
religion, cantonal origin, and party allegiance.
As Arthur benz and César Colino have pointed out, constitutional 
change in a federation is a “multi-dimensional process” that cannot be 
reduced to any one factor.129 It is thus generally not possible to draw 
direct lines between particular judicial decisions and the composition 
of the courts that make the decisions. A wide variety of factors may 
influence judges in one direction or the other.130 but when the over-
all tendencies of the federal jurisprudence of the supreme courts of 
Australia, India, and the United States are compared with those of the 
constitutional courts of belgium, Germany, and Spain, a general pattern 
seems to emerge in which a more federalist mode of judicial appoint-
ment is associated with a more federalist, or at least “balanced,” juris-
prudence, while centralized modes of appointment are associated with 
unitarist tendencies in constitutional interpretation. An exception to 
this generalization is Nigeria. Appointments to the federal courts are 
made by the president on the recommendation of the National Judicial 
Council, subject to confirmation by the Senate, and there is a policy 
of ensuring that judicial appointments broadly reflect the country’s 
diverse federal and geographical identities. In that country’s troubled 
circumstances, however, the Supreme Court has played an ambivalent 
role, at times effectively arbitrating revenue-sharing disputes among 
the federal government and the states, but in the main seeing itself as 
“an interpreter and enforcer of Nigeria’s centrist Constitution.” Mexi-
co’s Supreme Court is appointed by the Senate from three candidates 
nominated by the federal president, but the Court only recently began 
interpreting the Constitution’s federal clauses in a significant way. 
The notion that courts should in some sense be representative of the 
various political and regional identities within the country cuts against 
the account of them as independent of politics and impartial as between 
the interests of the federation and the constituent polities. Furthest along 
the spectrum in this respect are the systems of Switzerland and Ethio-
pia, where deliberate decisions have been taken to reduce or eliminate 
the role of judicial review in federalism disputes and to place greater 
emphasis on “federal-democratic” participation in the political system. 
 129 Arthur benz and César Colino, “Constitutional Change in Federations: A 
Framework for Analysis,” Regional & Federal Studies 21 (2011): 381–406.
 130 halberstam, “Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary.” Several of the 
factors cited by halberstam are, however, neutral in relation to federalism issues.
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The reasons for this, however, differ in the two countries. The Swiss 
have a long-standing tradition of governance by consensus, democrati-
cally expressed through the representative institutions of the federation 
and, ultimately, the popular referendum. In Ethiopia, there is concern 
that the dominance of a particular political party-coalition in all orders 
of government suppresses the political and policy diversity that is the 
hallmark of a genuinely federal polity. South Africa offers another point 
of comparison, because there is an effort to ensure that members of the 
Constitutional Court are “representative” but also to treat litigation as 
a last resort. Thus, members of the Court are appointed by the presi-
dent from lists provided by a Judicial Service Commission composed 
of judges, lawyers, and national and provincial politicians from both 
major parties. however, the Constitution also requires all “spheres of 
government” and “all organs of state within each sphere” to interact in a 
respectful and cooperative manner, avoid legal proceedings, and make 
every effort to settle disputes before commencing such proceedings.
6. Court System and Jurisdiction
When Dicey said that federalism is a system of government in which 
“the ordinary powers of sovereignty are elaborately divided between 
the common or national government and the separate states,”131 it seems 
he primarily had in mind the distribution of legislative power. but this 
idea of a division of sovereignty is not something he carried through 
into the analysis of judicial power within a federation. When he said 
that “the bench of judges is not only the guardian but also at a given 
moment the master of the constitution,”132 he was referring to the final 
authority of the highest court in the country to interpret and apply the 
constitutional distribution of powers. but are the courts of federal coun-
tries to be understood, fundamentally, in the singular or plural? Are 
they integrated into a single hierarchical court system, or are there dual 
(or multiple) systems of court hierarchies, each somewhat independent 
of the other? Most federal countries combine elements of both. There is 
usually a single supreme or constitutional court having final authority 
to determine constitutional cases and disputes among the federation 
 131 Albert venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1915), 139.
 132 Ibid., 170.
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and/or the constituent polities, but the exact jurisdiction of this court 
varies from country to country, and systems of courts in the constituent 
polities and specialized courts often operate in conjunction with it.
The organization of the courts can be more or less federalist in design 
and structure considered across several dimensions. These dimensions 
include institutional features, such as the laws upon which they are 
established and the governments from which they receive funding, and 
jurisdictional features, such as the kinds of matters they are authorized 
to adjudicate and the relationships between courts established through 
various mechanisms of appeal and rules concerning the bindingness 
of their decisions. Thus, courts in federal countries may be established 
by combinations of federal and/or constituent-polity laws, which laws 
may be constitutional or statutory. The federal supreme or constitu-
tional court, as well as other federal courts, is usually established by the 
federal constitution, but many of its institutional features are specified 
by ordinary federal law. Constituent-polity courts may be presupposed 
by the federation and thus established by state law (constitutional and/
or statutory) or be provided for by the federal constitution and regu-
lated by either federal or constituent-polity law. The extent to which 
this is the case often reflects the degree to which the federation is con-
ceived as integrative or devolutionary.
The jurisdiction of federal and constituent-polity courts and the rela-
tions between them are also vitally important. Most federations con-
fer constitutional jurisdiction in federalism-related matters upon the 
federal supreme or constitutional court. Such matters typically include 
the constitutionality, interpretation, and application of the federal con-
stitution and federal laws, the constitutionality of constituent-polity 
laws, and disputes between the federation and a constituent polity or 
polities, or among the constituent polities themselves. Whether courts 
of the constituent polities have jurisdiction in such matters, however, 
varies. Federal countries that have distinct constitutional courts (usu-
ally within the civil-law tradition) ordinarily restrict jurisdiction in con-
stitutional matters to those courts; countries that have a more general 
supreme court (usually common-law countries) affirm the jurisdiction 
of all courts of record, including constituent-polity courts, to deter-
mine any constitutional matters that might emerge in cases that come 
before them. here, however, the jurisdiction of the federal supreme or 
constitutional court to hear appeals or references on points of constitu-
tional law from constituent-polity courts is especially significant, as is the 
extent to which decisions of the federal supreme or constitutional court 
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are authoritative and binding on the courts of the constituent polities. In 
common-law countries, such decisions are strictly binding as a matter 
of precedent (stare decisis); in civil-law countries, the authority of such 
decisions often varies. In some, constituent-polity courts tend to follow 
relevant decisions of superior federal courts lest their judgments be over-
turned on appeal; in others, there has developed a special doctrine that 
establishes the binding authority of constitutional court decisions, such 
as the jurisprudencia in Mexico and the súmulas vinculantes in brazil.
The EU’s judicial system provides an important example and con-
trast.133 The European Court of Justice has limited jurisdiction, which 
is concerned largely with ensuring consistent interpretation and appli-
cation of European community law within the member states and 
includes jurisdiction to determine whether European laws are within 
EU competence. Many such cases brought before the court are com-
menced by way of preliminary ruling on the initiative of the national 
courts of member states, and once the Court of Justice delivers its judg-
ment, the matter returns to the national courts for resolution. Thus, 
enforcement of European community law often depends on the active 
cooperation of the member-state courts, both to refer questions of inter-
pretation and validity to the Court of Justice and to enforce European 
community law in the disputed cases that come before them through 
the remedies available under their respective national systems of law.134 
Even the final authority of the Court of Justice in relation to the inter-
pretation of the EU’s treaties does not stand altogether unchallenged by 
some of the highest constitutional courts of the member states, such as 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which have insisted that 
the law that is implemented in their countries be consistent with their 
national constitutions as interpreted by national courts.135 The EU’s 
judicial system is thus highly dualistic.
 133 Trevor C. hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, 7th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), chaps 2 and 7.
 134 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, and Joseph h.h. Weiler, eds., The 
European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its 
Social Context (Oxford: hart, 1998).
 135 E.g., Maastricht Treaty case (1993), bverfGE 89; and Lisbon Treaty case (2009), 
bverfGE 2 bvE 2/08. See Eric Stein, “Treaty-based Federalism, A.D. 1979: A Gloss 
on Covey T. Oliver at the hague Academy,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
127, no. 4 (April 1979): 897–908; and Trevor C. hartley, “Federalism, Courts and 
Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the European Community,” American 
Journal of Comparative Law 34, no. 2 (April 1986): 229–47.
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There have also been times in American history when the authority 
of the U.S. Supreme Court was challenged by the governing institu-
tions, including courts of the constituent states. While, at least since 
the Civil War (1861–5), the authority and jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to make final determinations in constitutional matters have been 
generally accepted, the judicial system remains highly dualist, espe-
cially when compared to the judicial systems of many other federal 
countries. This is because the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court 
is limited to a specific range of matters, such as the interpretation of 
the Constitution and federal law, while state courts retain control over 
the development of the common law and the interpretation of state 
legislation in each state, including the interpretation of each state con-
stitution. The U.S. Supreme Court did, for a time, contemplate the 
existence of a federal common law that it would apply as necessary in 
cases that came within its jurisdiction, but this idea was abandoned, 
and the Court applies the common law of the particular state applica-
ble to the case before it.136
This is not so in Australia and Canada, largely because their supreme 
courts have general appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from state 
and provincial courts.137 This jurisdiction has supported the develop-
ment in Australia of a “national” common law determined ultimately 
by the highest court of appeal operating within a “nationally inte-
grated” system of courts.138 In Canada, there is likewise a general com-
mon law throughout the country, except that Quebec has retained its 
civil code guaranteed to it through the provinces’ exclusive jurisdiction 
over “property and civil rights.”139 As halberstam and Reimann there-
fore observe, common-law federations tend to confer general appellate 
jurisdiction on a general court of appeal for the entire country, thus 
enabling that court to pronounce authoritatively on the interpretation 
of state statutory law and the common law generally.140
 136 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). For a critique of the complications that have developed since Erie, see Diane 
P. Wood, “back to the basics of Erie,” Lewis & Clark Law Review 18 (2014): 673–95.
 137 Mark Leeming, “Common Law within Three Federations,” Public Law Review 18 
(2007): 186.
 138 Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions for N.S.W. (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51, 114–5 (Mchugh 
J); Lipohar v. The Queen (1999) 200 C.L.R. 485, 505.
 139 Canadian Constitution, s. 92(13).
 140 halberstam and Reimann, “Federalism and Legal Unification,” 12–13.
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One further important exception concerns the place of religious law 
in some common-law federations, such as India, Malaysia, and Nige-
ria. In India, the Supreme Court presides as a general court of appeal 
over a unitary system of courts, thus giving rise to a uniform common 
law across the country developed through the interpretation of a series 
of national statutes that in the second half of the nineteenth century 
codified the common law in a manner considered suitable for Indian 
conditions. however, there also remain distinct bodies of Anglo-hindu 
and Anglo-Islamic religious and family law.141 In Nigeria, as well as 
in Malaysia, there is likewise a unified appellate system for the whole 
country. however, in Nigeria, there are distinct sharia courts estab-
lished by constituent states, and in both Nigeria and Malaysia, there are 
continuing disputes concerning the jurisdictional borders of religious 
and secular law.142
On first analysis, the civil-law federations appear to be significantly 
more unified, because national codes govern much of their private and 
criminal law. however, several of them display a different kind of judi-
cial pluralism traceable to the division of the courts into specialized 
subsystems that deal separately with constitutional, administrative, 
civil, commercial, and criminal matters. This, together with the absence 
of a strict doctrine of precedent, can give rise to greater diversity in law 
and interpretation across the legal system, especially in Germany, for 
example.143
Despite these important differences between the common-law and 
civil-law federations, in all of the federations considered in this book 
except Australia, the existence of a federal constitutional bill of rights 
authoritatively enforced by the highest court has a general unifying 
effect on the entire body of law throughout the country. In some fed-
eral countries such as brazil and the United States, judicial protections 
 141 Jayanth K. Krishman, “India,” in Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social  
and Cultural Encyclopedia, ed. herbert M. Kritzer (Santa barbara, CA: AbC-CLIO, 
2002), 693.
 142 Andrew harding, “Sharia and National Law in Malaysia,” in Sharia Incorporated: 
A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and 
Present, ed. Jan Michiel Otto (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), 491; J. Isawa 
Elaigwu and habu Galadima, “The Shadow of Sharia over Nigerian Federalism,” 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33, no. 3 (2003): 123–44; and M.h.A. bolaji, 
“Shari’ah in Northern Nigeria in the Light of Asymmetrical Federalism,” Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism 40, no. 1 (2010): 114–35.
 143 Compare the chapters on belgium, Germany, Mexico, and Spain in this volume.
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of human rights have especially centralizing effects, because the con-
stituent states are seen as having been historic rights violators.144 The 
constituent polities in some federations also have sets of rights embed-
ded in their constitutions, which are interpreted and enforced by state 
courts. In some countries, such as the United States and Switzerland,145 
this can give rise to greater human rights expectations being imposed 
on state/cantonal legislatures and governments than those that apply 
from the federal constitution. but the rule in all such federations is that 
the rights standards established by the federal constitution can only be 
augmented, not displaced.
In Mexico, the amparos directos procedure has emerged as a means 
by which decisions made by state courts are challenged on constitu-
tional grounds. Federal circuit courts were created in order to reduce 
the mounting backlog of cases before the Supreme Court. Many cases 
were referred to these courts, and cases are now ordinarily heard at 
first instance. There has been, as a result, a corresponding exponen-
tial growth in the number of federal courts, with every Mexican state 
now having a resident federal circuit court. The decisions of the federal 
courts are published, and state courts are bound by them. State courts 
have little incentive to publish their own decisions, and the result, as 
Caballero Juárez points out, is that the state courts “have de facto lost 
their status as high courts in their respective states.”
 144 It might be argued that rights constraints imposed on constituent polities are less 
centralizing than judicial rulings that give more legislative power to the federal 
government, because rights constraints increase the autonomy of individuals and 
civil-society groups that might advocate decentralization. This is questionable, 
however, because autonomous civil-society groups have no inherent motivation to 
increase the power of constituent governments vis-à-vis the federal government; 
they might actually advocate centralization under the theory that is better to be 
governed by one 225-kilogram gorilla than many monkeys. Further, insofar as 
rights constraints are promulgated in the name of federation-wide equality, they 
will likely, as Alexis de Tocqueville argued in the case of the United States, have 
highly centralizing impacts. See Democracy in America, trans. and ed. harvey C. 
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 
640–50.
 145 William J. brennan Jr, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” 
Harvard Law Review 90 (1977): 489–504; John Kincaid, “Federalism and Rights: 
The Case of the United States with Comparative Perspectives,” in Human Rights: 
Current Issues and Controversies, ed. Gordon DiGiacomo, 83–113 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2016).
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7. Political Parties
In 1901, an American journalist, Finley Peter Dunne, wrote through his 
comic character, Mr Dooley, that “th’ Supreme Coort follows th’ elec-
tion returns.”146 The case studies in this volume show that high courts 
are sensitive to their country’s general political trends, including trends 
emphasizing federalism or unitarism. Courts are sensitive also to their 
country’s general political view of federalism. Courts follow these 
trends in part to enhance acceptance of their rulings. Although few 
courts follow political trends slavishly, they do vary in the extent to 
which they are constrained by politics, especially party politics.
Parties first developed in England, but they are intimately linked 
to federalism because they achieved their modern form in the United 
States.147 The modern Democratic Party, organized in 1828, is the world’s 
oldest continuing party. The party system stems partly from the contest 
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution. The party system emerged in the early 1800s in order 
to capture the U.S. presidency (beginning with the 1800 election) by 
generating electoral college votes from the states, organize the election 
system in each state to elect members of the U.S. house of Representa-
tives, control state governments not only for self-government but also 
to make state legislative appointments of U.S. senators (from 1789 to 
1913), and transmit state-based public opinion to federal officials. Until 
the mid-1960s, both parties were confederations of state and local party 
organizations substantially controlled by governors, mayors, and the 
like. As such, they often restrained federal policymaking that infringed 
on state and local powers they deemed important.
In 1960, Morton Grodzins predicted that if the political parties 
became more nationalized and disciplined, the “hallmarks of Ameri-
can decentralization might entirely disappear.”148 he was almost right. 
beginning in the mid-1960s, the parties became significantly more 
nationalized, and members of Congress broke free from their tradi-
tional state and local party moorings, in part because the U.S. Supreme 
 146 Finley P. Dunne, “Mr Dooley Reviews the Supreme Court's Decision,” Sunday Chat, 
9 June 1901, 6.
 147 John h. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011).
 148 Morton Grodzins, “The Federal System,” in Goals for Americans, ed. President’s 
Commission on National Goals (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-hall, 1960), 276.
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Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953–69) issued numerous rul-
ings that overrode state powers and helped dismantle the confederated 
party system.149 The federal system became more nationalized, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court has not significantly interfered with that nationali-
zation, despite the fact that all three chief justices who followed War-
ren were appointed by Republican presidents who vowed to fashion a 
court that would, among other things, revive federalism.
Thus, the Supreme Court helped transform the party system, but its 
entry into the political process upped the ante for the more nationalized 
parties to assert more ideological control over judicial appointments. 
As a result, the court is polarized between conservatives and liber-
als such that virtually every federalism ruling has for several decades 
been a 5–4 decision.150 Until about 2016, the Republican Party was more 
successful because federal court judges have been, on average, more 
conservative than the lawyers who argue before them.151 Ideology is 
important because judicial discretion increases as one ascends the judi-
cial hierarchy such that conservative votes increase from the federal 
district courts to appeals courts and then the Supreme Court.152
Political parties have important impacts on courts, because parties 
control the institutions that select judges, pay their salaries, fund court 
budgets, determine in some countries certain aspects of court organiza-
tion and jurisdiction, bring cases to the courts, generate policies that 
trigger court cases, and enact laws and propose constitutional amend-
ments that alter, augment, or diminish judicial decision-making. Key 
factors in the federations examined in this volume are whether the 
party system features a dominant federation-wide party, as in South 
Africa; multiple parties rooted in culturally or nationally distinct con-
stituent polities, as in belgium and India; two party systems, one in 
 149 E.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1 (1958); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962); and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
 150 The 2016 death of Antonin Scalia will not change this division, because the division 
will remain 5:4 whether a liberal or conservative is appointed to the Court, until 
another justice leaves the Court.
 151 Adam bonica and Maya Sen, “The Politics of Selecting the bench from the bar:  
The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Politicize the Judiciary,” 2014, 
http://j.mp/11g7yJZ.
 152 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Federal 
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Cambridge, MA: harvard 
University Press, 2013).
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constituent polities and one in the federation arena, as in Canada; and 
two or more parties that compete and govern in both the federation and 
constituent-polity arenas, as in the United States.
When there is a dominant federation-wide party, the high court tends 
to exhibit a unitarist orientation, as in South Africa and India (before 
1989). South Africa might seem to be a partial exception, because the 
Constitutional Court has been friendly to local governments, but so is 
the ANC. The ANC opposed a federal system of provinces and then 
constitutionalized local governments as the third order of government 
in order to nurture its grassroots base, deliver services, and promote 
development.153 The Constitutional Court’s support of hourglass fed-
eralism comports with the ANC’s position. In these monopolistic party 
systems, moreover, the high court is less likely to be asked to resolve 
federalism disputes because they are resolved within the party. The 
significance of party organization also is evident in Nigeria for long 
periods of its federal history, where a dominant national party system 
has reinforced centralization within the country. Similarly in Ethiopia, 
intergovernmental disputes are managed within the EPRDF rather 
than in the house of Federation.
Dominant party systems can seriously compromise the independ-
ence of the courts, which may even find themselves under attack by 
partisan political leaders. In 2015, for example, the chief justice of South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court, feeling the stings of attacks by President 
Jacob Zuma and his ANC cohorts, held a press conference flanked by 
twenty-six other senior judges at which he defended the role of courts 
in maintaining the rule of law.154 A year later, the Court ruled that Zuma 
violated the Constitution by refusing to repay the government for pub-
lic money spent on improvements to his home.155
When parties are organized in culturally distinct constituent polities 
and those parties compete in the federation arena, the high court tends 
to be less unitarist, as in belgium. In India, where states are organized 
along linguistic lines, the emergence of multiple state-based parties and 
national governing coalitions in 1989 created a climate more conducive 
 153 Jaap de visser, “Republic of South Africa,” in Local Governments and Metropolitan 
Regions in Federal Systems, ed. Nico Steytler, 268–97 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
 154 “Judges Uncowed,” Economist, 8 August 2015.
 155 Norimitsu Onishi, “Zuma’s Spending on home Is Ruled Unconstitutional,” New 
York Times, 1 April 2016.
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to assertive and federalist Supreme Court rulings. This political climate 
also tends to present the high court with more federalism cases, includ-
ing disputes that cannot be settled among the parties.
When a federation has two party systems, as in Canada and Spain, 
unitarist or federalist orientations hinge on the political philosophy 
of the governing federation party, the extent to which the federation 
parties are themselves centralized, and the ability of constituent-polity 
parties to influence the governing federation parties. Of the major fed-
eration parties in Spain, the Partido Popular, the governing party from 
2011 to 2015, and the new Ciudadanos Party are centralist. The other 
new party, Podemos, opposes Catalan independence but appears to 
support regional autonomy.156 The nationalist parties that are strong in 
some autonomous communities are weaker at the centre. In Canada, 
provincial influences on the federation parties have been sufficient to 
temper unitarist leanings.
When two or more parties compete and govern in both the federa-
tion and constituent-polities, as in Australia, Germany, and the United 
States, unitarist or federalist orientations hinge on the political philos-
ophy of the governing federation party and the extent to which the 
federation parties are themselves centralized. Even if the constituent-
polity branches of the federation party are relatively independent, they 
may be obliged to support, or not openly oppose, centralizing policies 
of their partisans in power in the federal government.
Generally, the high courts in developed federal democracies appear 
to be more independent and less directly controlled by political parties 
than courts in less-developed and less-democratic federations. Experi-
ences in India and Mexico also suggest that transition from a monopo-
listic party system to a multi-party democracy allows more space for a 
federal high court to assert itself.
The judicialization of politics is evident in some of the federations 
examined in this book, especially the more developed federal democra-
cies. Judicialization includes the willingness of courts to enter the polit-
ical thicket and the willingness of parties to recruit the courts as a safety 
valve for conflict. Although federalism appears not to be a prominent 
subject of judicialization, several high courts have issued significant 
 156 In late 2014, a new federation party, Podemos, surged in public opinion polls and 
promised a Third Way, including changing the 1978 constitution to create a federal 
system or give more autonomy to autonomous communities such as Catalonia. 
Podemos also pledged to respect a Catalan independence vote.
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federalism-relevant decisions. Canada’s Supreme Court became the 
first court to authorize a procedure for a federation’s dissolution while, 
at the same time, assuming authority to define the federation’s core 
principles as federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of 
law, and protection of minorities.157 The Court also had a major impact 
on health policy in Canada when it ruled that Quebec’s limits on pri-
vate health-care delivery violated the province’s Charter of human 
Rights and Freedoms.158 In the United States, the Supreme Court’s 1857 
Dred Scott ruling played a significant role in precipitating the Civil 
War,159 and in 2000, the Court vacated a state-law process, thus essen-
tially deciding a presidential election.160 South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court was the first to reject a constitutional text written by a representa-
tive constitution-making body, although in negotiations leading up to 
the final constitution, it had been agreed that the Court could certify 
whether the final constitution adhered to the constitutional principles 
set forth in the interim constitution.161 In the 1993 Maastricht Case, Ger-
many’s Constitutional Court decided the status of the newly unified 
federal republic in the EU.162
In summary, the countries examined in this volume demonstrate the 
importance of party politics for federal high courts and illustrate the 
tensions that can surround courts as they navigate political thickets.163
III. Conclusions
The Swiss and Ethiopian cases demonstrate that a federal system does 
not need a high court exercising constitutional judicial review over 
 157 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
 158 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.
 159 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Robert h. bork headlined his analysis 
of Dred Scott with: “Chief Justice Taney and Dred Scott: The Court Invites a Civil 
War,” in The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New york: Free 
Press, 1990), 28.
 160 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
 161 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1997 (2) SA 
97 (CC); and Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC).
 162 Maastricht Case, bverf GE 89, 155. Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 182–6.
 163 See also Detterbeck, Renzsch, and Kincaid, Political Parties and Civil Society in Federal 
Countries.
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federation law, although the viability and desirability of the Ethiopian 
model and the generalizability of the Swiss model are doubtful. Other-
wise, judicial review appears to have become a permanent feature of 
modern constitutions, federal and non-federal. In federal systems, judi-
cial review has the added tasks of policing the balance of power and 
umpiring disputes between the federation and its constituent polities. 
The high courts examined in this book display remarkable diversity in 
executing these tasks while also manifesting some underlying similari-
ties.
Of course, a viable federation depends on more than judicial review. 
The internal boundaries of federal systems are best regulated by com-
plementary safeguards – structural, political, and popular – in addition 
to judicial.164 Each type of safeguard has strengths and weaknesses. One 
advantage of judicial review, compared to the others, is that it is osten-
sibly impartial and politically disinterested. Judges are usually meant 
to be independent of particular political interests, they are tasked with 
interpreting and applying the written text of the constitution, and they 
are expected to provide reasoned justifications of their decisions.165 
These supposed advantages, however, do not necessarily hold in prac-
tice. Consequently, framers of constitutions need to be aware of the 
multiple factors that shape judicial review.
Careful reflection on the historical circumstances surrounding the 
founding or re-founding of a federal system is important for designing 
a constitution to remedy past injustices or imperfections without being 
so reactive as to neglect transcendent principles and general practices 
of enduring importance. To some extent, constitution-makers can ben-
efit from stepping behind a veil of ignorance166 in order to make choices 
likely to benefit all parties to the federal covenant, especially when cul-
tural and political heterogeneity can lead to mere interest aggregation. 
As such, defining who are the parties to the covenant is important and, 
ideally, needs to be inclusive.
For purposes of judicial review, it is useful to recognize the difficul-
ties in trying to ground a constitution in a singular demos or plural 
 164 Jenna bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), chap. 4. bednar also discusses the more extreme sanctions 
of secession and intergovernmental retaliation (11, 95) and the need for a “federal 
culture” that values federalism itself, 187–8.
 165 See Madison, Federalist 39.
 166 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: harvard University Press, 1999).
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demoi. Is the conception of the constitutive authority homogeneous or 
heterogeneous? A problem, of course, is that there may be disagree-
ment – for example, a majority community advocating a single demos 
against minority communities advocating plural demoi. Fudging this 
issue at the founding, which is sometimes the case, may require the 
federation’s high court to confront the issue in the future and reach 
decisions that might aggravate rather than resolve the issue. And yet 
the issue is usually fudged in the first place because agreement about it 
cannot be reached.
To this end, the manner and extent to which federalism is to be con-
strued as an intrinsic value that prizes, among other things, unity and 
diversity along with self-rule and shared rule might be clarified, if pos-
sible, in constitutional design. An eternity clause partially enshrines 
such a value in the constitution but is not sufficient, because it guar-
antees the structure and sometimes the integrity of the federation’s 
constituent polities but not necessarily the spirit of federalism. The 
concept of Bundestreue might be one indicator for courts of the spirit of 
the federation.167
The case studies in this volume indicate that while the common-law 
and civil-law traditions each pose some specific issues for consideration 
in constitutional design, federations are equally viable under both tra-
ditions. Constitution-making needs to be attentive to the implications 
of the civil law’s emphasis on a written code conceived as a systematic 
whole whereby reason and logic are deemed the basis of jurisprudence, 
and to the common-law’s emphasis on a more diverse collection of dis-
crete judicial decisions whereby experience is an important ground of 
jurisprudence.
The constitutional specification of the distribution of powers also is 
important. A federal constitution may provide guidance by setting out 
separate lists of competences for each order of government. While the 
idea that governments might be restricted to exclusive, watertight com-
partments is unrealistic, two lists of powers provide courts with a spe-
cific constitutional basis for assessing the content of one head of power 
in the light of another, giving rise to a kind of balance in that sense. 
however, many federations, especially integrative ones, presuppose 
the general powers of the constituent polities without particularizing 
 167 See also Michael burgess, In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspectives in Comparative Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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them, and they specify only the federation’s powers. Although intended 
to accord a temporal and logical priority to the constituent polities’ 
powers, such approaches enable courts to interpret federal powers as 
widely as the language used can possibly convey, without regard for 
the powers reserved to the constituent polities. Consequently, one fed-
eral list without a counter list of constituent-polity powers may not be 
in the best interests of the constituent political communities.
At the heart of federalism-related arguments are not only distributive 
questions about which order of government is best placed to achieve a 
certain goal, but also questions about which order is best able to deter-
mine the goals that ought to be secured in the first place.168 Much con-
temporary debate about federalism overlooks this second question, 
presupposing that such judgments should ultimately be made from the 
perspective of the “whole.” Much of the reason for this seems to be 
the tacit assumption that in normative deliberation, an encompassing 
“universal” perspective is always to be preferred to a “parochial” one. 
but to think in that way is to overlook something fundamental about 
the nature of federalism, particularly in its original, integrative sense 
of a consensual coming together of political communities, each assess-
ing the normative benefits of federation independently of the other.169 
The question posed by federalism is not only which polity should have 
responsibility for a particular matter, but which polity should decide 
that question. If federalism is only a “system of government,” we might 
think the answer must be given by the system as a whole. but if feder-
alism is also, more fundamentally, a “federation of polities,” then per-
haps the polities themselves ought to play this role, or at least have a 
say in its determination.
This points to the process of choosing judges for the federation’s 
courts, especially its high court, and the criteria for their selection. The 
cases in this volume suggest that a more federalistic mode of selection 
in which the constituent polities have an influential voice is more likely 
to lead to judicial decision-making that seeks a balance between fed-
eralism and unitarism. Likewise, in heterogeneous federations, a high 
 168 Daniel halberstam, “Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 576, 593–94.
 169 Even devolutionary federations, as has been seen, are prompted by similar claims 
to an independent right to assess such matters on the part of sub-state groups.
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court whose members are at least partially representative of the con-
stituent polities is more likely to seek balance.
Constitution-making also needs to consider the role of political par-
ties in relation to the judiciary and consider the extent to which courts 
can and cannot be shielded from partisan influences. As the cases exam-
ined in this volume suggest, different party systems can have substan-
tial effects on the nature and direction of courts’ jurisprudence.
The structure of the courts requires consideration as well, including 
the existence and authority of courts of the constituent polities. James 
Madison observed that170 if the courts of the constituent polities decide 
their own interpretations of the federal distribution of powers, the fed-
eral constitution will be “different in every state,” a result hardly con-
ducive to sustaining a federation based on the rule of law. however, 
the idea that final authority should therefore be vested in the courts of 
the federation is liable to criticism for the corresponding reason that 
self-interest may incline federal judges to favour federal power. Indeed, 
Madison criticized the U.S. Supreme Court’s tendency under Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall (1801–35) to extend its own jurisdiction and inter-
pret federal legislative powers broadly.171 The remedy for this, Madison 
thought, lay not in denying the final jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
but in underscoring the ways in which it is to be restrained under the 
Constitution. “Trust” would have to be “vested in the Government rep-
resenting the whole and exercised by its tribunals,” he said, but this 
trust must be “controllable by the States who directly or indirectly 
appoint the Trustees.” As the state courts grew in learning, ability, and 
stature, he added, “their decisions at once indicating and influencing 
the sense of their Constituents, and founded on united interpretations 
of constitutional points, could scarcely fail to frustrate an assumption of 
unconstitutional powers by the federal tribunals.”172
In Madison’s view, the jurisdiction, structure, composition, and mode 
of appointment of the courts are vital to the preservation of a balanced 
federal system. As noted above, federal courts composed of judges who 
have strong connections with the constituent polities of their federation 
tend to interpret their constitution in a more federalist manner, while 
 170 James Madison to Spencer Roane (a judge of the virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals), 29 June 1821.
 171 Jack N. Rakove, “Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison,” 
William and Mary Law Review 43 (2002): 1513–47.
 172 Madison to Roane, 29 June 1821.
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more centralist systems of judicial appointment are associated with 
more unitarist interpretations. Furthermore, the authority of courts of 
the constituent polities to develop bodies of jurisprudence indepen-
dently of the federal courts extends the principle of the distribution 
of powers to the courts themselves and to their exercise of jurisdiction 
within the federation.
The life of a federal system depends, of course, on many factors, but 
the design decisions made by constitution-makers with respect to the 
judicial matters examined in this book can have enormous impacts over 
the years on the viability of the federation and its fundamentally fed-
eralist or unitarist orientation. The studies in this volume do not reveal 
one best set of decisions but do shed light on potential federalist or 
unitarist consequences of those decisions. As such, we hope this book 
serves as an invitation to further comparative research that can exam-
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